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How Nations Learn
Praise for the Book
‘The chapters examine how industrial latecomers have crafted strategic and pragmatic
policy frameworks to unleash the universal passion for learning into business organ-
izational practices that drive production capability development and foster innovation
dynamics. The transformational experiences described in the book offer a multitude of
ways in which learning is organized and applied to advance a nation’s productive
structures and build competitive advantage in the global economy.’
Michael H Best, Professor Emeritus, Author of How Growth Really Happens:
The Making of Economic Miracles through Production, Governance
and Skills, Winner of the 2018 Schumpeter Prize
‘The analysis of development and catching-up has finally shifted away from sur-
real problems of ‘optimal’ market-driven allocation of resources, toward the processes of
learning and capability accumulation. This is an important contribution in this perspec-
tive: And yet another nail into the coffin of the “Washington Consensus”.’
Giovanni Dosi, Professor of Economics, Scuola Superiore Sant’
Anna, Pisa, Italy
‘Industrialisation has always been fundamental to sustained economic growth. It
separates the world into high and low-income economies. To create inclusive pros-
perity, we urgently need to understandHowNations Learn. State-supported innovation
is not only cardinal for catch-up, but also to abate climate breakdown (through
crowding in new businesses, nurturing experimentation, and ensuring public benefits).
By studying the economic history of technological advancement in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America, this book makes a powerful case for industrial policy.’
Dr Alice Evans, Lecturer in International Development,
King’s College London
‘How Nations Learn is a book based on big ideas. Why do some nations grow faster than
others? How does the process of economic catch-up work? What does the technological
learning of firms have in common with the policy lessons of governments? How do the
answers to these questions vary across countries and regions of the world? The book
provides answers to these queries from a distinguished interdisciplinary and international
set of scholars, who draw on an impressive reservoir of both contemporary and historical
experiences.HowNations Learn is an essential guide to how to navigate the key dilemmas
of 21st century development, which should be particularly useful to latecomer countries
and those grappling with the pitfalls of uneven development.’
Gary Gereffi, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Global Value
Chains Center at Duke University
‘Arkebe Oqubay and Kenichi Ohno’s important edited book is basically about learning
to “catch up”. It focuses on firm level technology learning and policymakers’ learning,
including learning by doing, emulation and experimentation, involving innovation
and leapfrogging. The volume draws on historical, firm, industry and country experi-
ences to identify factors crucial to successful learning for catching-up, including
latecomer advantages. The chapters suggest that the intensity, pace, “direction” and
context of learning matter, besides stressing the significance of robust industrial
policies and long-term strategic vision.’
Jomo Kwame Sundaram, retired Professor, UN Assistant Secretary General,
2008 Leontief Prize
‘The limited capacity of developing countries to catch up the income level of developed
countries has continued to be a major feature of international development over the
past decades. Professors Oqubay and Ohno have been able to collect a fantastic set of
papers on the crucial question of success and failure in achieving convergence: how
technological learning takes place at the firm, sectorial and national level, allowing
countries to catch up, but also how failure to do so leads to divergence. It considers
both the success stories of Meiji Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and most recently of
China, but also the strong challenges faced in other regions, and notably in Latin
America and Africa. A must read for academic and policymakers alike.’
José Antonio Ocampo, Member of the Board of Banco de la República (Colombia),
Chair of the United Nations Committee for Development Policy, and Professor,
Columbia University
‘While debates on the best strategies for development have been protracted and
contentious, there is widespread agreement on the salience of industrial policy and
technological progress, but a paucity of studies on how this has been accomplished.
The few books published have often been regionally or country based, limited in their
scope of explanation, and analytically narrowed by their fealty to a single theoretical
tradition. In contrast, this timely collection brings new critical insights into the
dynamics of learning with a comparative analysis that is richly diverse in its geographic
and theoretical focus, multidimensional in its level of analysis, and probing in its
evaluation of how countries developed key capacities and transcended exigent histor-
ical barriers. A welcome addition to the literature that is highly recommended.’
Howard Stein, Professor, Departments of Afroamerican and African Studies
and Epidemiology, University of Michigan
‘“Catch-up” economic development requires technological and policy learning. It
increasingly requires unlearning as well. And will and discipline. The editors of How
Nations Learn have assembled a stellar group of contributors to share what they have
learnt about learning, across time periods and continents, spanning technological
learning by companies and policy learning and capability building by states. A most
valuable resource for anyone interested in historical lessons applied sensitively to
contemporary development challenges.’
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Foreword
The process of learning by nations must be situated in historical perspective, for
there is the past in our present, and there is much that we can learn from history.
Until around 1750, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, now described as devel-
oping countries, accounted for three-quarters of world population and more than
two-thirds of world income. Of this, Asia alone accounted for almost three-fifths
of world population and world income, while China and India together accounted
for about one-half of world population and world income. These two Asian giants
also contributed 57 per cent of manufacturing production and an even larger
proportion of manufactured exports in the world. The next two centuries wit-
nessed dramatic changes in the world economy. Between 1820 and 1950, in terms
of Maddison PPP statistics, the share of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in world
income fell from two-thirds to one quarter, while the share of Europe, North
America, and Japan in world income rose from one-third to three-quarters. The
rise of ‘The West’ was concentrated in Western Europe and North America,
followed by Japan later, whereas the decline and fall of ‘The Rest’was concentrated
in Asia, much of it attributable to China and India, although Latin America was
the clear exception.
This evolution of the international economic order led to a profound change in
the balance of economic and political power in the world. It was attributable to
three developments. The first was the Industrial Revolution in Britain in the late
eighteenth century which spread to Western Europe, even if slowly, during the
first half of the nineteenth century. The second was the emergence of a newer,
somewhat different form of colonialism in the early nineteenth century which
culminated in the advent of imperialism that gathered momentum through the
century. The third was the revolution in transport and communication in the mid-
nineteenth century, manifest in the railway, the steamship, and the telegraph,
which dismantled geographical barriers in distance and time. These three devel-
opments, which overlapped and partly coincided in time, transformed the world
economy by creating patterns of specialization in production, associated with a
division of labour through trade and investment, reinforced by the politics of
imperialism.
This led to the ‘Great Divergence’ in per capita incomes. Between 1820 and
1950, as a proportion of GDP per capita in Western Europe and North America,
GDP per capita in Asia dropped from a half to a tenth, in Africa from a third to a
seventh, but much less in Latin America from three-fifths to two-fifths. It was also
associated with the ‘Great Specialization’ in which Western Europe, followed by
the United States and somewhat later Japan, produced manufactured goods, while
Asia, Africa, and Latin America produced primary commodities. Between 1830
and 1913, the share of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in world manufacturing
production, attributable mostly to Asia, in particular China and India, collapsed
from 60 per cent to 7.5 per cent, while the share of Western Europe, North
America, and Japan rose from 40 per cent to 92.5 per cent.¹ It also led to the
demise of traditional industries in Asia, largely in China and India, which reduced
their skill levels and technological capabilities over time. The industrialization of
Western Europe and de-industrialization of Asia during the nineteenth century
were two sides of the same coin.
The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the beginnings of a swing of
the pendulum in the opposite direction, which gathered momentum circa 1990,
with a striking increase in the global economic significance of developing coun-
tries. Between 1990 and 2015, the share of developing countries in world GDP, in
current prices at market exchange rates, has jumped from a sixth to two-fifths, and
in world manufacturing value added from a sixth to almost a half, both entirely at
the expense of industrialized countries.² Thus, it is plausible to suggest that, by
2030, these shares of developing countries in the world economy might return to
their 1820 levels. This process of catch-up so far has been driven by rapid
economic growth, industrialization, and engagement with the world economy.
However, the impressive performance in the aggregate conceals as much as it
reveals. Uneven development has led to unequal outcomes. The catch-up is
characterized by a high degree of concentration in Asia among continents, in
country groups such as BRICS across continents, and in a few Asian countries that
are success stories. The divergence in per capita incomes has stopped. But the
convergence, compared with industrialized countries, is at best modest and
significant in just a few countries. Economic growth has brought about a signifi-
cant reduction in absolute poverty in most parts of the developing world. Yet,
poverty and deprivation persist on a large scale. Inequality within countries has
risen rapidly. And there are emerging divergences between countries. Even so, the
catch-up, albeit uneven and unequal, is real. And this could be a momentous
ongoing shift in world economic history.
In economic history, this idea of countries that are followers catching up with
leaders can be traced back to Veblen in his writing about Germany following in the
footsteps of England.³ For the latter, it was characterized as the ‘penalty of taking
the lead’. This notion was conceptualized further by Alexander Gerschenkron, as
the ‘advantages of relative economic backwardness’, to consider the experience of
¹ The evidence cited in this paragraph and earlier is from Deepak Nayyar, Catch Up: Developing
Countries in the World Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
² Calculated from United Nations, National Accounts Statistics.
³ Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution, Macmillan, London, 1915.
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Russia as a latecomer that was subsequently extended to include France, Italy, and
Austria.⁴The essential hypothesis is as follows. Economic backwardness, relative to
others, creates a tension between the actual stagnation and the potential prosperity.
The gap provides the economic incentive to catch up, while the political process
drives institutional innovation. Wider gaps create stronger incentives to leap
forward. State intervention, then, creates the missing initial conditions for growth,
to compensate for the scarcities of capital, skilled labour, entrepreneurship and
technological capabilities. Greater backwardness needs greater intervention. The
mobilization of savings for investment is critical. In Russia, this was done by the
state, whereas in Germany the same role was performed by the creation of a
banking system that financed industrialization. There are benefits to be derived
by learning from the mistakes of predecessors, so that economic growth for
latecomers is characterized by spurts with periods of high, sometimes exceptional,
growth rates. Obviously, the model has limitations, but its generalizations from
history provide analytical insights into how a mix of ideology and institutions, or
economics and politics, might foster success in countries that are latecomers to
industrialization.
It would seem that learning from history is essential for an understanding of
how nations learn. Theory, history, and experience, together, suggest that the
foundations of success in learning to industrialize lie in a creative interaction
between the state and the market, beyond the predominance of the market model,
adapting to each other as times and circumstances change, to function as mutual
checks and balances.
There are lessons that emerge from the experience of countries that have led the
catch-up process for other latecomers to industrialization and development. First,
there are alternative paths to development, rather than unique solutions, so that
one-size-does-not-fit-all. There are strategic choices to be made between develop-
ment models, each with its mix of the state and the market or openness and
intervention. The emphases, in terms of the relative importance of domestic, as
compared with, external markets, resources, or technologies, also depend on
country-specific conjunctures and circumstances, which are inevitably shaped by
a complex mix of economic, social, and political factors in the national context,
where history matters. Second, development is about creating production capabil-
ities in economies, which need industrial up-gradation and diversification together
with some capacity for innovation, without which industrialization cannot be
sustained. Third, inclusive societies alone can sustain rapid economic growth and
transform it into meaningful development that improves the well-being of their
people. The ongoing catch-up, driven by rapid growth, is necessary though not
⁴ Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1962.
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sufficient for reducing inequality within and between countries. But this catch-up
will not be sustainable unless it reduces economic inequality within countries.⁵
It is individuals, firms, institutions, and governments, people rather than
nations, that learn in the process of development. Even so, the whole can be
greater than the sum total of the parts. Such learning takes place at the micro,
meso, and macro levels. At the micro-level, it is about imparting education, where
school education provides the base and higher education the cutting edge, but
learning outcomes are just as important as spread and access. At the meso-level, it
about nurturing managerial capabilities in individuals and technological capabil-
ities in firms. At the macro-level, it is national production and technological
capabilities, which are the outcome of a complex interaction between incentives,
capabilities, and institutions, in which intervention by governments performs an
essential corrective and strategic role.
It need hardly be stressed that learning from experience is of critical import-
ance. It is about correcting for mistakes. Everybody would agree. But it is just as
important to unlearn from experience. It is about questioning long-held beliefs
and thinking anew. Most have not thought about it. Yet, this distinction is
important to understand the nature of the relationship between ideas and out-
comes, or ideologies and policies, in the wider context of development. Dominant
ideologies are always reluctant to question their belief systems. It means ceding
intellectual or political space. Hence, attempts to unlearn from development,
which require changes in priors or thinking, are few and far between. And it
should come as no surprise that non-dominant doctrines are always more willing
to learn and even unlearn. It means capturing intellectual or political space.⁶ Thus,
a study on how nations learn needs to recognize that unlearning is just as
important as learning.
This is an unusual book on an unexplored domain, in its quest for understand-
ing how nations learn.⁷ It considers conceptual perspectives and empirical evidence
from different countries and different eras, with a focus on the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries. In doing so, it reviews the literature to discuss the
critical issues: learning by countries that are latecomers; development of techno-
logical capabilities; experiences of catch-up at different levels (firms, sectors, or
economies); importance of historical perspectives; policy-learning by governments;
and fostering processes of learning, for firms as well as governments, in countries
that are laggards or caught in the middle-income trap.
⁵ This argument is developed, at some length, elsewhere by the author, ‘Can Catch Up Reduce
Inequality?’ in Peter van Bergeijk and Rolph van der Hoeven (eds), Sustainable Development Goals and
Income Inequality, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2017.
⁶ For a detailed discussion on this theme, see Deepak Nayyar, ‘Learning to Unlearn from Develop-
ment’, Oxford Development Studies, 2008, 36(3): 259–80.
⁷ The literature on this subject is indeed limited. For a perceptive analysis of learning, situated in its
wider context, see Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach
to Growth, Development, and Social Progress, Columbia University Press, New York, 2014.
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The contents of the book are new. And its approach is different. The first part,
which provides broad perspectives on global economic development, the strategic
role of the state, and drivers of technological learning, sets the stage. The second
part, with chapters on Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, China, and Singapore, ana-
lyses the experience of success stories in learning and catch-up, to highlight the
lessons that emerge. The third part, with chapters on Latin America and Vietnam,
analyses the experience of countries in the middle-income trap and a latecomer,
and on Ethiopia, a late latecomer, with case studies at the firm level and industry
level, to derive lessons from outcomes in countries that have not succeeded, or are
in transition, or provide examples of success at a micro level. The concluding
chapter draws together the strands of the arguments developed in different
chapters, to outline an understanding of the notions and processes of learning
discussed in the existing literature, and to examine the implications, in the form of
potential lessons, for countries that are late latecomers to development in the
twenty-first century.
The themes that run through the book are the dynamics of technological
learning at the level of firms and of policy learning at the level of governments.
Industrial policy for the manufacturing sector is seen as the primary driver of
learning, while degrees of freedom in the use of policy space is seen as critical, in
the catch-up process. The essential conclusion to emerge is that there is no simple
formula or magic wand in this learning process, by different actors at different
levels, that countries can import or replicate. Different countries find different
solutions at different times for similar problems. In fact, actual experiences show
that learning has been achieved through a mixture of deliberate imitation, or
adaptation, of foreign technologies or practices and local innovations and prac-
tices, sometimes deliberate and sometimes accidental. Even so, there is much that
countries can learn, as late latecomers, from what went wrong and what turned
out right elsewhere in the past. In this process, it is necessary to contextualize the
learning in time and space rather than simply replicate.
This book provides a sensible blend of simple analytical constructs and down-
to-earth empirical work to coax stylized facts and draw robust conclusions. It
shows that, despite the complexities of such an intangible domain, it is possible to
extract some general principles that enrich our understanding. By doing so, it
injects some new ideas and fresh thinking on the subject. There is much that
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Arkebe Oqubay and Kenichi Ohno
1.1 Background to How Nations Learn
Why do some nations catch up while others lag behind or remain stuck in the
‘middle-income trap’? More importantly, how do nations learn and what are the
key determinants of successful learning and catch-up? How Nations Learn
attempts to provide answers to these questions with contributions from eminent
scholars in the field of technological learning, innovation, industrial policies, and
catch-up. The main focus of the book is on how technological learning and policy
learning occur at the firm and government level respectively. The varied perspec-
tives put forward by a diverse group of authors not only attempt to deepen the
understanding of how learning and catch-up occur, but also aim to stimulate
further discussion and debate around learning. The volume seeks to clarify key
notions and concepts, and to examine empirical evidence of the processes of
learning and catch-up.
The ever-changing global economic, social, and political landscape of the
twenty-first century has made technological learning and catch-up increasingly
complex, particularly for nations that are latecomers to industrialization and
structural transformation. The economic slowdown after the 2008 global financial
crisis, the hyper-globalization of the world economy, the increasing trend towards
protectionism and trade conflict, the accelerated pace of technological advance-
ment and innovation, constrained policy space, and the impact of climate change,
which disproportionately affects emerging and developing economies, have all
resulted in added complexities for countries trying to catch up in the twenty-first
century.¹
How Nations Learn was conceived as a result of two factors: first, an observa-
tion that only a limited number of countries had managed to successfully catch up,
begging the question of why catch-up is a rare phenomenon. Second, while the
¹ See emerging issues of trade, see UNCTAD (2018).
literature on learning has addressed the ‘what’, particularly what firms need to
learn to enhance their technological capabilities, less emphasis is given to ‘how’
technological and policy learning occurs and what influences it from the firm and
national perspective.
Historically, industrial policy was a vehicle for structural transformation, and
a core strategy behind the successful catch-up of countries in East Asia.²
However, some nations such as Malaysia and Thailand have remained stuck
in the ‘middle-income trap’, while many African countries have been left behind
in a ‘low-income trap’. Ensuring successful catch-up is neither automatic nor
inevitable, depending as it does on how nations learn, within the broader thrust
of technological learning and industrial policies.
This book examines how latecomer nations have been able to learn and catch
up, and bring together abstract theories and empirical evidence from country and
sectoral case studies to identify lessons for successful technological and policy
learning in the twenty-first century.
1.2 Aims, Motivation, and Focus
The principal motivation for an edited volume on how nations learn is the need to
revisit ongoing discourse on learning, how learning occurs, and latecomer advan-
tages, and to seek lessons for nations embarking on industrialization in the
twenty-first century. These ‘late latecomers’ to technological learning and struc-
tural transformation are at a very early stage of the catch-up process. In addition,
many nations that started industrialization earlier face challenges and slowdown
on reaching middle-income status. The volume explores past learning and catch-
up experiences by different countries and from different starting positions and
their relevance to late-latecomer countries. Special emphasis is given to the nexus
between learning, in particular technological and policy learning, and the process
of catching up; how the pace and direction of catch-up is influenced and shaped
by learning; and why some countries manage to catch up fast, with relative ease,
while others encounter difficulties. These are all important issues for policymakers
in late-latecomer countries seeking inspiration and specific policy lessons.
Applying the lessons of one set of countries’ development experiences to
policies and strategies in another requires careful analysis and considerable
caution, because every country has its own geographical, political, historical,
demographic, and socio-economic characteristics. Starting economic conditions
and changes in the international economic environment affect the appropriate-
ness of policies at different points in time.
² On centrality of structural transformation and special feature of manufacturing as driver of
growth, see List (1956), Kaldor (1967), and Passineti (1993).
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This is not to deny the usefulness of identifying lessons from successful cases.
History is full of examples of individuals and firms from different nations learning
from each other, either independently or collectively. Often, the problem is not
identifying lessons but ensuring that the circumstances that led to the success are
also considered, including obstacles and failures encountered in the process
(Arrow, 1962). Learning from past experience requires an understanding of the
context (i.e. the history, political economy, economic geography, geopolitical and
global economic developments) in which it occurred. It is important to recognize
the diversity of approaches to learning and catching up, and that there is no ‘best
practice’ that any country can adopt that will guarantee success. The main
challenge is distinguishing how specific policy lessons can generate positive
outcomes in different contexts.
How Nations Learn focuses on both conceptual perspectives and empirical
evidence from different countries and different eras, with particular focus on the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Clearly it is people and firms, rather
than nations, that learn. The objective of the book, however, is to extend the
analysis beyond individuals, firms, and institutions to understand the systemic
aspect of learning—the role of the state as a learner (policy learning) and facili-
tator of learning by the private sector (technology learning), just as a National
Innovation System (NIS) is used as a conceptual framework and systemic
approach to local technological capability building (Fagerberg, Mowery, and
Nelson, 2005).
A useful starting point is to ask why individuals and/or firms in some countries
learn or learn faster and catch up while others do not. Although many firm- and
industry-level studies have deepened our understanding of what firms and indi-
viduals learn, there has been less emphasis on how learning takes place and what
influences learning nationally. The pace and direction of learning is, to a large
extent, determined by policies, incentives, institutions, the role of the state, and the
intensity of policy learning. It is this systemic, national aspect of learning that this
book aspires to understand. From the editors’ perspective, its practical utility lies
in its ability to identify the broader mechanisms and apparatus of learning that
play a key role in facilitating economic or industrial catch-up. Examining a large
number of cases across different sectors, countries, and periods, the reader will
observe that some basic aspects are common to all learning while others are
unique to each society and not internationally transferable.
1.3 Themes and Analytical Perspectives
First, the book reviews the literature on learning, in particular technological
learning and successful catch-up by latecomers through learning from forerunners
(Amsden, 1989, 2001; Gerschenkron, 1962; Hirschman, 1958), learning by doing
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and by experimentation, and emulation to match or excel. A clear understanding
of the factors shaping the intensity, pace, and direction of learning, and the
effects of the changing international context on learning and catch-up in
latecomers is critical. We review evidence from a diverse group of countries,
in particular those from the Far East and South East Asia (Amsden, 1989, 2001;
Chang, 2003; Lin, 2012; Nolan, 2014) that have shown mixed results in learning
and catch-up. As continental European and East Asian economies have shown,
late developers can catch up through learning by doing, pragmatic approach,
imitation and emulation, with active industrial policies and a leading role for the
state (Amsden, 1989, 2001; Amsden and Chu, 2003; Reinert, 2009; Wade, 1990).
There is also a stream of literature that links catch-up and economic develop-
ment with the development of technological capabilities, learning, and innovation
(Abramovitz, 1986; Lall, 1996; Nelson, 1996; Kim and Nelson, 2000). Catch-up
and learning has been influenced by the broader institutions and varieties of
capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Huo, 2016). An economic history of catch-
up in Europe and its periphery can be found in The Spread of Modern Industry to
the Periphery since 1871 (O’Rourke and Williamson, 2017). This study provides
in-depth analyses of the profound divergences characterizing this epoch while
arguing that industrialization anchored in the manufacturing sector has been
pivotal to modern-day economic growth.³
Second, the book reviews learning and catch-up experiences from the perspec-
tive of different levels—firm, industrial/sectoral, and national. Pioneering argu-
ments by Gerschenkron (1962) and Hirschman (1958) on latecomer advantages
and strategies for catch-up emphasized that latecomers can take advantage of their
latecomer status to catch up despite their distance from technological frontiers.
The earliest conceptual contribution on catch-up and late development can be
traced to List (1856), while empirical perspectives have been enriched in recent
years by development economists including Amsden (1989, 2001), Wade (1990),
Chang (2003), and more recently Keun Lee (2013). New perspectives based on
more recent experiences of learning, in particular policy learning by doing, are
provided by Ohno (2013) and Oqubay (2015) among others.
Third, the book emphasizes the importance of historical perspectives in iden-
tifying lessons for late latecomers (Nayyar, 2013; Veblen, 1915). Not all nations
with latecomer advantage have managed to translate technological learning into
catch-up; deciphering the historical experiences will enable late-latecomer nations
to gain a better understanding of the context in which successful learning and
catch-up was achieved.
Fourth, the book enhances understanding of the link between catch-up (defined
as a narrowing of a firm’s or country’s technological and economic gap vis-à-vis a
³ See also Campos and Root(1996), and Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura (1988).
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leading country or firm) and learning efforts, including policy intensity. For late
latecomers, a clear understanding of the pull and push factors in learning and
catch-up, and the role of the state in this process, is critical. Learning also requires
making strategic choices and keeping an eye on the future, going beyond learning
by doing, and in some cases leapfrogging. Experience shows that the nexus
between learning and catch-up is influenced by strategic choices, policy actions,
and the broad economic environment, so the state is a key agent of learning and
catch-up (Mazzucato, 2011, 2018). The roles of the state and of disruptive
technologies in catch-up are exemplified by catch-up trends in South Korea,
Taiwan, the United States, and China. It is in this context that understanding
‘how nations learn’ will be important for late-latecomer countries.
Finally, the analytical focus of the book is on how late-latecomer nations and
those in the middle-income trap can accelerate learning, in particular techno-
logical learning at different levels, to upgrade their productive capacity, improve
the quality of their goods and services, and create a robust and dynamic private
sector. Despite the immense volume of work on policy approaches, there is a
paucity of literature on how learning occurs and the lessons that can be learned
and implemented effectively in diverse contexts. The latest addition by Andersson
and Axelsson (2016), an edited volume containing many insightful contributions,
employs empirical evidence and case studies to show that there is no ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach to catch-up and economic development. We believe there is room
for another edited volume to fill the gap on the ‘how’ aspect of learning and catch-
up. Technological learning (at firm level), industrial policy and policy learning
(at government level), and catch-up are the building blocks of this volume.
1.4 Structure of the Book
Following this introduction are twelve chapters divided into three parts and a
concluding chapter. Part I addresses the broader policy and institutional contexts
in which successful technological learning and catch-up has occurred.
In Chapter 2, Robert Wade focuses on trends in global economic development,
the ideological perspectives that have influenced economic thinking, and their
impact on catch-up over the past seven decades. He highlights that contrary to the
assumption of the ‘old-style’ development economists that starting late has
advantages, only a handful of non-Western emerging and developing countries
have succeeded in catching up with developed economies since the Second World
War. The restrictive institutional structure of the international economic system
and the gravitational forces operating at that level, including the emergence of
global value chains (GVCs) dominated by large corporations, have made it
increasingly difficult for latecomers to escape the periphery and catch up with
developed economies.
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In Chapter 3, Daniel Poon and Richard Kozul-Wright examine the political
economy of technological learning and catch-up in East Asia and the lessons for
other latecomers, in particular the role of the developmental state and its prag-
matic approach to policy formulation and experimentation. Using evidence from
the Chinese experience, Poon and Kozul-Wright illustrate how targeted industrial
policies and controls over the domestic financial system have enabled some East
Asian economies to promote export-oriented production capacity in strategic
sectors and achieve the structural transformation and technological learning
necessary to catch up. They argue that pragmatic experimentalism has been a
common feature in the rapid catch-up growth economies in East Asia generally,
and China in particular.
Chapter 4 by Mariana Mazzucato focuses on mission-oriented innovation, and
the industrial policies and strategic role of the state. Governments are increasingly
seeking economic catch-up that is innovation-led or smart, inclusive, and sus-
tainable in the context of major social and environmental challenges. Tackling
climate change, improving public health and well-being, and adjusting to demo-
graphic changes are expected to be overarching considerations. Mazzucato high-
lights that industrial policies and mission-oriented innovation policy should
respond to these ‘grand challenges’ by identifying concrete issues across the
various sectors encompassing production, distribution, and consumption pat-
terns. This implies not only a rapid rate but also a pattern and direction for
economic catch-up; and innovation requires investments and risk taking by both
private and public actors, increasingly also involving the third sector. Moreover,
the state has a role not only in fixing markets but also in co-creating and shaping
them; ‘mission-oriented policies’ focused on solving societal problems can set
directions while enabling bottom-up experimentation, exploration, and learning;
and missions also require consensus building in civil society. The changes this
requires in mindset, theoretical frameworks, institutional capacities, and policies
are non-trivial, but mission-oriented innovation policy is not a step into the
unknown. This chapter provides substantial theory, evidence, case studies, and
experience accumulated over many decades of successful practice.
Part II reviews the evidence from successful learning and catch-up experiences in
East Asia. In Chapter 5, Kenichi Ohno examines Japan’s rapid technological learn-
ing and catch-up during the Meiji era in the second half of the nineteenth century.
As a latecomer to industrialization, Japan embarked on technological learning by
selectively acquiring frontline technology and know-how from the West and
assimilating them locally through learning by doing, technology licensing, and
joint-venture partnerships with foreign technology suppliers. Ohno underlines
that private-sector dynamism supported by an activist state and a passion to learn
were the main drivers of technological learning and catch-up in the Meiji era.
Chapter 6, by Wan-wen Chu, focuses on Taiwan’s rapid post-war growth,
technological learning, and catch-up, particularly the role of industrial policies
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in facilitating an environment conducive to learning. The chapter maps the
pattern of learning and growth, starting with import substitution in the 1950s,
the transition to export promotion in the 1960s and 1970s, and the entry into the
high-tech sector in the 1980s. The chapter explores Taiwan’s ‘adaptive’ industrial
policies for successful industrial upgrading and catch-up. It also compares the
development paths of Taiwan and South Korea, finding differences in national
and international contexts, targeted sectors, interactions with multinational econ-
omies, and the role of national champions.
In Chapter 7, Keun Lee considers how firms develop the absorptive capacity
required to promote learning and catch-up. Using a data set of more than 3,000
foreign technology acquisition contracts filed by Korean firms between 1970 and
1993, Lee conducts an econometric analysis to establish how firms develop
absorptive capacity and what role foreign technology plays in building it. Absorp-
tive capacity building is a dynamic process that becomes even more effective when
combined with access to foreign knowledge, particularly the tacit knowledge
essential for assimilation of foreign technologies and creation of local techno-
logical capability.⁴
Chapter 8, by Justin Lin and Jun Zhang, focuses on China, a recent catch-up
story, and how the country has been able to broaden the technological com-
plexity of its export sectors and turn its comparative advantage into competitive
advantage through pragmatic and strategic industrial policies that combined
technological learning with policy learning. Lin and Zhang present evidence-
based analysis of China’s dynamic learning and catch-up experience, and iden-
tify the role models that inspired the Chinese leadership to pursue their rapid
catch-up growth agenda. They argue that New Structural Economics—which
emphasizes the importance of dynamic comparative advantage, the structure of
factor endowments, and building on initial conditions—provides a more fitting
explanation for China’s rapid growth and catch-up than mainstream industri-
alization ‘dogma’.
The chapter by George Yeo, Tan Khee Giap, and Tan Kong Yam examines the
learning and catch-up of Singapore since 1965, focusing on the state’s role in
determining the policies, incentives, and key institutions that drove the pace and
direction of technological learning and catch-up. While Singapore is much smaller
than other successful catch-up countries in East Asia, its unique learning and
industrialization experience sheds light on how countries less well endowed with
human and natural resources can promote technological and policy learning that
triggers the process of catch-up. In recounting the Singapore experience, Yeo,
Giap, and Yam also highlight the lessons of past policy failures.⁵
⁴ See also Arrow (1962) and Cohen and Levinthal (1989) on absorptive capacity and learning by
doing.
⁵ See also Oqubay and Lin (forthcoming) on hubs development and industrial upgrading.
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Part III examines the experiences of countries that have remained stuck in the
middle-income trap after initial industrialization efforts, as well as late latecomers
to industrialization that lag well behind in technological learning and catch-up.
The latter includes many less developed economies in Africa and Latin America
that have embarked on industrialization in the twenty-first century in a highly
competitive global economic environment less conducive to policy experimenta-
tion and independence. Using firm- and industry-level evidence, Part III explores
the potential as well as the challenges facing this group of countries in their efforts
to promote technological learning and catch-up.
In Chapter 10, Wilson Peres and Annalisa Primi analyse the industrialization
experiences of Latin American countries, particularly the reasons for their
diverse patterns and degrees of technological learning and catch-up success.
The chapter focuses on eight countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay—and on the policy approaches
and implementation challenges of the last decade. While recognizing the per-
sistent structural weaknesses in these economies, including their poor record of
production and export diversification, the chapter identifies three areas that
offer hope for a positive future outcome: closing the skills gap in the digital
economy; successful penetration of global value chains in highly sophisticated
niche products; and recently introduced successful start-up programmes that
indicate a new dynamism and potential for technological learning and catch-up
in the region.
Chapter 11, by Arkebe Oqubay and Taffere Tesfachew, presents firm-level
evidence of technological learning and catch-up in Africa, a continent that
continues to lag behind in both technological learning and industrialization.⁶
Oqubay and Tesfachew analyse the technological learning of one of the most
successful and dynamic airlines in Africa, Ethiopian Airlines (EAL), and how
it was able to catch up by successfully narrowing the gap between itself and
leading global players in the industry. The chapter reviews EAL’s journey to
building an internationally competitive airline, and explores the challenges and
complexities of learning, and how the airline was able to manage crises by
developing a strong corporate culture and independence. Key to EAL’s successful
learning and catch-up have been its partnership with the leading global player
TWA, limited government interference in its operations and management, and its
strong commitment to an ‘Ethiopianization’ strategy which increased the intensity
of learning.
Chapter 12, by Khuong Vu and Kris Hartley, explores the policies and strategies
promoting technological learning and catch-up in one of the fast-growing
latecomer economies of South East Asia—Vietnam. Khuong and Hartley analyse
⁶ See Cramer, Oqubay, and Sender (forthcoming).
8     
the role of state and industrial policies, from the post-conflict late 1970s reform
years to the creation of macroeconomic conditions and an open economy con-
ducive to technological learning and diversification into manufacturing-based
export-led industrialization in the 1980s and beyond.⁷ The chapter identifies five
key actions necessary to initiate successful and productive learning and catch-up:
making strategic choices; establishing institutional arrangements; building coord-
ination capacity; carrying out development initiatives; and responding to emer-
ging opportunities and challenges. While all these dimensions are important for
learning, Khuong and Hartley argue that making sound strategic choices is
particularly critical for initiating a productive learning process.
Finally, Chapter 13, by Arkebe Oqubay and Taffere Tesfachew, reviews two
cases of successful industry-level learning and catch-up in one of the fastest-
growing African countries—Ethiopia.⁸ The floriculture and cement industries,
representing export-oriented and import-substituting industries respectively,
demonstrate that with strategic industrial policy, supported by an active state
willing to engage in policy learning, including learning from role models and
through policy experimentation, successful technological learning, and catch-up
can be fostered at industry level even in low-income late-latecomer countries. The
chapter also reviews Ethiopia’s recent university reforms, and the strategic and
dynamic learning approach to the development of industrial hubs, which together
have been critical for enhancing the country’s skills base, and developing and
broadening domestic absorptive capacity. Oqubay and Tesfachew show that
successful learning and catch-up by African countries is linked to the intensity,
pace, and direction of learning, and that policy learning by government is essential
if industrial policy is to serve as a vehicle for catch-up.
The final chapter is a contribution to the ongoing debate (and literature) on
learning and catch-up, and the implications for late latecomers, with its focus on
two important areas: (a) our understanding of the notions and processes of
learning and catch-up as discussed in existing literature; and (b) implications
(and potential lessons) for countries still to go through technological learning and
catch-up (i.e. late latecomers).⁹ The discussion focuses on the key dynamics of
technological learning; industrial policy and manufacturing as prime drivers of
learning and catch-up; and finally, catch-up and the scope for policy space in the
twenty-first century.
⁷ See also Thirlwall (2013) on the strategic role of exports.
⁸ See Cheru, Cramer, and Oqubay (2019).
⁹ The concepts and themes of this volume were developed further during an inception workshop
held in Addis Ababa in August 2018 for authors and independent reviewers. The valuable comments
and suggestions received during the workshop helped to tighten the arguments, themes, and analytical
perspectives presented in the book. The editors hope that this book will meet the expectations of our
esteemed readers and that it will help to fill the gap in the literature.
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The old-style development economists—including Gerschenkron, Prebisch, Lewis,
Myrdal, Chenery, Hirschman, Adelman, Seers, and many more—would surely
be disappointed by the record of global economic development in the past half
century, at least when looking at the slowness of catch-up as distinct from the
dramatic falls in global poverty even while population increased at the fastest
rate in human history. Gerschenkron’s ‘late development effect’, or ‘the advan-
tages of backwardness’, seems noticeable more by its absence than its presence,
despite new technology being widely available to people around the world and
despite no shortage of people with entrepreneurial talent.
But perhaps they would not be surprised. At the core of their understanding of
the process of catch-up development were the following propositions:
(1) Development is a disruptive process of non-marginal changes over time,
opposed by many in the society, generating inevitable conflict, and placing
a premium on fragile conflict-resolution institutions—a premium which
calls for not exposing the economy to unmediated international competi-
tive pressures.
(2) The price system in a developing country cannot play the role accorded it in
developed countries as the major allocator of resources, because markets are
too undeveloped and because relying on markets would tend to sustain the
existing production specialization based on static comparative advantage
with decreasing returns to scale—a point which also implies the desirability
of less than full-scale integration into the international economy.
(3) Capital being extremely scarce (or was at the time the pioneers were writing
and for decades after), the state has a large role in husbanding the mobil-
ization and use of scarce capital, on a scale big enough to make centrally
planned, non-marginal changes in the production structure towards
increasing return activities which may well lie beyond the economy’s static
comparative advantage; but it must use mostly decentralized market allo-
cation rather than centrally planned allocation (Reinert, 1994).
(4) The social returns to large, lumpy, and risky investment projects typically
far exceed the private returns to private investors—which again implies a
directive role for the state.
2.2 The Eclipse of Development Economics
and the Rise of Neoliberalism
As we know, these propositions fell radically out of favour in the international
(Western-dominated) development community starting in the 1970s and inten-
sifying in the 1980s and later. This was the time of ascendancy of the development
recipe that came to be known as the Washington Consensus, but which is more
accurately called the Washington–London–Paris–Brussels–Berlin Consensus.
Anyone questioning the universal applicability of the Washington Consensus
was treated as religious sects treat heretics.
Today, many development economists have scarcely heard of Prebisch or
Myrdal, or cumulative causation, or Kaldor’s growth laws, and would agree, if
pressed, that developing countries should mostly follow static comparative advan-
tage and integrate deeply into global production networks with the state providing
only macro stability and general supply-side support, including infrastructure,
incentives for education (public or private), incentives for health care (public or
private), and above all, law and order, protection of private property rights,
including the rights of capital owners to move their capital freely around the
world. They think of development policy as mostly about the supply side, leaving
the demand side to be taken care of by exports—a presumption which conveni-
ently occludes questions about whether income and wealth distribution should be
made more equal.
Why this sharp shrinkage in the legitimate role of the state in the process of
economic development? Perhaps for two linked reasons. First, in the West, led by
the United States, the success of ‘social democratic capitalism’ during the post-war
decades up to the late 1960s squeezed the rate of profit (success in terms of the
ability of the labour movement to translate rising productivity into higher wages
and of the ability of governments to keep recessions short). Business leaders and the
already wealthy began to press for radical reforms intended to restore the rate of
profit and reverse the erosion of their pre-eminence in the social structure, hanker-
ing back to the golden age of oligopolistic capitalism of the early twentieth century.
Fortunately for them a sect of professional economists had long been develop-
ing the paradigm which they proudly called neoliberalism, which aimed to secure
the same kind of social order wanted by business leaders and the wealthy and
banish the Keynesian ‘pro-government-intervention’ ideas prevailing during the
post-war decades (Slobodian, 2018). This sect had the good fortune to include
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the governor of the central bank of Sweden, a passionate opponent of social
democracy. He had the idea of commemorating the 300th anniversary of the
central bank by creating a prize to be called the Nobel Prize in Economics (a name
which both the Nobel Foundation and the Nobel family initially rejected, so that
its official but not used title is The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences
in Memory of Alfred Nobel. The governor knew he could select the awarding
committee members to ensure that the prize went disproportionately to clearly
neoliberal economists in order to show the world that neoliberal economics was
the best, most scientific economics, in contrast to social democratic economics.
The project to remake the world in line with neoliberal principles has been
dramatically successful. A New York Times reporter summarized the prevailing
belief at the World Economic Forum (of business leaders and politicians) meeting
in Davos, Switzerland in 2002:
[A] nation that opens its economy and keeps government’s role to a minimum
invariably experiences more rapid economic growth and rising incomes.
(Uchitelle, 2002)
The prominent Financial Times economics editor Martin Wolf described his
neoliberal vision of the desirable world order as follows:
It cannot make sense to fragment the world economy more than it already is but
rather to make the world economy work as if it were the United States, or at least
the European Union [meaning that governments of nation states should have no
more control over economic transactions across their borders than US states
have across theirs, or at least no more than European Union states have across
theirs] . . . The potential for greater economic integration is barely tapped. We
need more global markets, not fewer. (2004: 4, emphasis added)
In the same spirit, here is Alan Greenspan, former chair of the US Federal Reserve,
shortly before Lehman Bros collapsed in 2008:
[We] are fortunate that, thanks to globalization, policy decisions in the US have
been largely replaced by global market forces. National security aside, it hardly
makes any difference who will be the next president. The world is governed by
market forces. (quoted in Tooze, 2008, emphasis added)
Notice the implied low value attached to national sovereignty and liberal demo-
cratic politics which runs through neoliberal ideology. This goes with passionate
opposition to measures that curb income and wealth concentration at the top,
where the captains of industry live. One of the pioneers of neoliberal economics,
Ludwig von Mises, wrote in 1922: ‘Our whole civilization rests on the fact that
men have always succeeded in beating off the attack of the re-distributors’
(Slobodian, 2018: 277).
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Much later, Robert Lucas (2004), who was awarded the ersatz Nobel Prize, said:
Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and
in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution . . . The
potential for improving the lives of poor people by finding different ways of
distributing current production is nothing compared to the apparently limitless
potential of increasing production.
Inside the World Bank the break with old-style development economics came
with the appointment, by the right-wing Reagan administration, of the former
president and CEO of Bank of America, Ted Clausen, as president in 1981; and the
appointment, by the same government, of Anne Kreuger as chief economist, who
in turn appointed Deepak Lal as her effective number two.
These two believed that the state is essentially predatory, because captured by
coalitions of interest groups to extract rents from the private sector by suitable
regulations, trade and fiscal policies, and, of course, by outright corruption. In this
worldview, the process of economic development requires that the state should be
active in providing the prerequisites of markets (private property rights, especially
the rights of capital owners), but beyond that, should have a closely circumscribed
role in the economy so as to minimize predation and let the private sector learn
what it needs to learn in order to maximize profits for the owners. Kreuger and Lal
set about eliminating economists in their part of the Bank who did not fully sign
on, a process Lal described as ‘cleaning the stables’.¹ Across the Bank, many people
with industry expertise were fired, or else, to stay in Bank employment and retain
US residency and gold-plated pension rights, they rebranded themselves as
experts in environment or primary education or good governance.
Of course, economists on the intellectual frontiers write papers qualifying the
broadly free-market consensus, and enjoy frisking the papers of others. But
beyond the frontiers—among working economists, government officials, business
people—the narrative favouring a global regime of ‘free markets plus international
law to protect the human rights of the owners of capital’ has been dominant over
the past four decades (dominant even after the East Asian/Latin American/
Russian crash of 1997–8 and the North Atlantic crash and ensuing long slump
starting in 2007, both of which you might have thought would prompt a leftward
rethinking of a kind that did occur in the Hard Times after 1929). This narrative
owes its power to the way it legitimizes the interests of Western international
business by dressing them in the values of individualism, liberty, and universalism
at the core of conservative thinking in Western culture, affirming them as values
for all peoples.
Ayn Rand (a Russian who lived her adult life in the United States) was one of
the philosophers of neoliberalism; her writings shaped the thinking of the early
¹ Lal was president of the Mont Pelerin Society in 2008–10.
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neoliberal economists like Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek (co-founders of
the Mont Pelerin Society in 1949, which ever since has functioned as a hub of the
global neoliberal movement). She made explicit the class war subtext of neoliberal
thinking, justifying the dominance of capital and capitalists. In a famous 1961
essay, ‘America’s Persecuted Minority: Big Business’, she wrote:
All the evils, abuses, and iniquities, popularly ascribed to businessmen and to
capitalism, were not caused by an unregulated economy or by a free market, but
by governmental intervention into the economy. (Frank, 2012: 206)
Ludwig von Mises was another who made explicit his championing of the
dominance of capital and capitalists over the rest of the people. He wrote to
congratulate Rand on her novel, Atlas Shrugged:
You have the courage to tell the masses what no politician told them: you are
inferior and all the improvements in your conditions which you simply take for
granted you owe to the efforts of men who are better than you. (Frank, 2012: 147)
However, contrary to popular understanding, neoliberalism has not been a strictly
laissez-faire ideology. It calls for strong state action to protect the rights of the
owners of capital, not only within each nation but between nations—hence it calls
for strong international law to protect the rights of internationally mobile capital.
Leading lights in the movement—including the International Chamber of
Commerce—have co-opted the language of human rights to their cause. They
argue for a normative world order built on national and international institutions
which protect the rights of individuals to trade and move capital wherever they
wish: one rule for all in the world economy. So they have strongly supported
organizations like the GATT and the WTO, or at least, idealized versions of these
international organizations.
This mindset has deeply penetrated the mainstream of the economics profession.
So it is no surprise that when some of these economists noticed—in the 1980s—the
striking success of North-east Asian economies, they came up with explanations
which largely overlooked the role of the state in identifying economic activities
(including sectors) with increasing returns to scale and high potential for future
growth, and giving those activities support not given to others (Wade, 2004).
TheWorld Bank’s book, The East Asian Miracle, published in 1993, is a relatively
sophisticated case in point. It examined the causes of success in eight ‘high-
performing Asian economies’: Japan, the three first-generation newly industrialized
economies of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, and three second-generation
South-east Asian economies of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, plus Hong Kong.
The book argues that in these countries, the state made important contributions
to their fast growth by ensuring the fundamentals: low inflation and competitive
exchange rates; human capital; effective and secure financial systems; low price
distortions; easy access to foreign technology; and low bias against agriculture. In
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other words, the states implemented effective ‘horizontal’ policies, applied across
all sectors. But ‘strategic interventions [policies to promote specific industries or
even specific firms] generally did not work’ (World Bank 1993: 354, emphasis
added; Wade 1996).
The book’s take-away message:
[O]penness to international trade, based on largely neutral incentives, was the critical
factor in East Asia’s rapid growth. (World Bank, 1993: 292, emphasis added)
This argument makes North-east Asia a powerful confirmation of the neoliberal
answer to Adam Smith’s question: how does market capitalism generate human
welfare? The answer is market liberalization—and in a global context, the answer,
as Martin Wolf said, is global integration, or moving towards ‘the world as one
economic country’, having no more restrictions on economic flows or ownership
claims across borders than US states have across theirs. It is an argument not just
for free trade but also for free capital movement and perhaps even free labour
mobility; conversely, it downplays the value of both national sovereignty and
liberal democracy. The people may choose, but capital must decide. In short, the
World Bank concluded that East Asia’s rise was no mystery.
Mainstream economists not only missed the directive role of the state in East
Asia; they also missed the key role of domestic demand—which would have led
them to emphasize the relative equality of domestic income and wealth distribu-
tion and the state’s role in bringing it about. Their blindness is the dark side of a
major reason for the success of the neoclassical paradigm through the twentieth
century. As Aba Lerner (1972) explained, ‘An economic transaction [in this
paradigm] is a solved political problem . . . Economics has gained the title Queen
of the Social Sciences by choosing solved political problems as its domain’
(emphasis added). He meant that the assumption of complete information and
complete contracts embedded in the paradigm, meant that any dispute in a
transaction (e.g. between employer and employee) can be adjudicated and
enforced in courts, rather than by action by the parties themselves. There is no
coercion, no opportunism, no overt power, no problem of income distribution.
Hence the Queen of the Social Sciences can reign alone, ignoring insights from
other disciplines such as political science, international relations, law, philosophy,
sociology, psychology, history, or ecology (Bowles and Carlin, 2017).
2.3 Catch-Up?
I now discuss the ‘big picture’ of economic development performance over the
past seven and more decades. There is important good news on the rise in life
expectancy, fall in child mortality, and fall in frequency of extreme poverty
(Deaton, 2013).
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Here, however, I concentrate on the bad news about catch-up (Nayyar, 2013).
AWorld Bank study (2013) found that of the 101 countries which in 1960 fell within
its ‘middle-income’ range, only thirteen had become ‘high income’ by 2008, almost
half a century later. Of these, four are peripheralWestern Europe (Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, and Greece). Four are miscellaneous (Equatorial Guinea, Israel, Mauritius,
and Puerto Rico). Five are North-east Asia plus one (Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
South Korea, and Singapore). All have small populations, except Japan.
The point can be made even more starkly. How many non-Western countries
have become developed in the past two centuries? If we stretch the categories of
‘countries’, ‘non-Western’, and ‘developed’ (developed to mean, a home-grown
industrialization in capital- and technology-intensive sectors), we reach maybe
seven: in rough chronological order, Japan and Russia in the late nineteenth
century; Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Israel in the second
half of the twentieth century. All but the first two have very small populations.
Of course, mainland China also looks on course to enter this group within a few
decades, bringing what is now the biggest population in the world. In just three
years, 2011–13, China used as much cement as the United States did in the whole
of the twentieth century. China’s Made in China 2025 programme calls for global
leadership, or at least excellence, by 2025, in sectors including artificial intelligence,
5G telecoms, the internet of things, self-driving cars, and battery technology.
But note two qualifications. First, China’s progress up the value-added ladder
has relied heavily on foreign technologies and intellectual property, particularly
American. The Trump government is trying, as of 2018, to wage a trade war on
China with the aim of slowing its ability to compete with US companies in high-
tech sectors. China is particularly vulnerable to cut-offs in US semiconductors,
semiconductor equipment, and aerospace.
Second, China remains a poor country overall. While growing fast, its average
income, around US$17,000 in PPP terms (2017), is still only around 28 per cent of
the United States’, which is about the same as the world average income. It comes
in at 76 in the country rankings, compared to the United States at 11.² (But note
that the margin of error or uncertainty about PPP exchange rate numbers is plus
or minus 25 per cent, according to Angus Deaton and Alan Heston (2010),
implying that China’s per-capita income in international dollars is (2017) some-
where between 21 and 35 per cent of the US per capita income.) If we instead use
lagged market exchange rates, China’s average income is only around 15 per cent
of the United States’. Comparing countries’ incomes at market exchange rates
gives a more accurate indication of one country’s ability to purchase goods and
services in others, and is thus (when combined with total GDP) a better indicator
² These are the World Bank rankings. The CIA puts (2017) China at 83, United States at 13, with
more or less the same average income figures. Wikipedia, ‘List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita’,
accessed 30 September 2018.
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of relative overall power. Militarily, too, China is far behind the United States,
though expanding fast from a low base. The bottom line is that ‘China as emerging
super-power’ is an exaggeration, but it may well join the current set of ‘great
powers’ within the next two decades.
China is one big qualification to the ‘lack of catch-up’ story. Another qualifi-
cation is that the global growth pattern apparently changed in the early 2000s.
Emerging and developing countries (EDEs, to use IMF terminology) began to
grow fast enough to converge upward towards the income levels of advanced
countries. Led by the newly designated BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa), they were heralded as the locomotives of the world economy, the
first time in over two centuries that locations outside Western Europe, North
America, and Japan had led global growth. Buoyed by optimism and neoliberal
conviction, EDEs went all out to integrate further into the world economy, helped
by policies, aid, and urgings from advanced countries.
They liberalized their capital accounts, and facilitated foreign financial organ-
izations’ entry to their domestic market, and residents’ borrowing and investing
abroad. They scrambled to attract into their territories the production of ‘tasks’ or
‘intermediate’ goods and services (as distinct from production of final goods and
services), to fit within the new international division of labour where global value
chains (GVCs) have substantially replaced both arms-length market transactions
and transfers within vertically integrated multinational corporations (MNCs) in
cross-border trade.
EDE states were relaxed about protecting their economies against global boom–
bust cycles—for Western experts declared it the era of the Great Moderation, with
boom–bust cycles a thing of the past. Firms stopped hedging against foreign
exchange risk when they borrowed abroad, and governments stopped making
them do so. Why spend money on hedging when there’s no risk?
Policymakers and policy analysts generally assumed that private governance by
Western big firms in GVCs was substituting for public governance in the host
developing countries. The best role for the state in these conditions was a ‘light-
touch regulatory state’ regulating (but not much restricting) market competition.
The state should regulate but not shape the exogenous forces of globalization and
technology. The developmental state—the type that flourished earlier in capit-
alist East Asia (flourished according to some commentators, though, as noted,
few proper economists)—is obsolete in these highly globalized and financialized
conditions.
Then came the Great Crash of 2007–9 in North Atlantic countries, led by
the United States, followed by the Long Recession. After a lag of several years, EDE
growth converged downwards towards the very low growth rates of advanced
countries.
Recovery from the Great Crash has been unusually slow. In the 100 worst
financial crashes in advanced countries over the past century, it took an average of
seven years to regain pre-crisis average income. This one took nine to ten years on
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average (to 2016–17) and will take considerably longer in some places, like the
southern European Mediterranean (Akyüz, 2017).
By 2017, the United States had resolved the financial crisis but not the economic
crisis, which continues to generate political upheavals (the lack of economic
resolution, including the lack of restraint on surging income and wealth concen-
tration at the top, helped to usher in the governance disaster known as Trump).
The eurozone has not even resolved the financial crisis, let alone the economic
crisis. We see the primitive spectacle of the European Central Bank, the EMU bail-
out fund, and the International Monetary Fund—with cooperation from the Bank
of Greece—lashing out at the Greek elected government that has refused to do all
that it is told. The object is to ensure that:
(a) the interests of creditors (mostly North-western European and American)
are protected at all costs;
(b) neither the Greek nor any other government—especially a Left one—can
expect a debt write-down; and
(c) the wishes of multilateral organizations (reflecting the wishes of the major
governments, like Germany, and their corporate backers) prevail over the
agenda of the weaker semi-sovereign states.
The Crash and Long Recession should have shaken confidence in the long
dominant neoliberal ideas about markets and states, as in the West after the 1929
crash and Great Depression. Instead, rethinking has occurred only at the margins,
and the neoliberal ideal of (a) self-adjusting markets supported by a small,
regulatory state, (b) maximum integration of national economies into the inter-
national economy, and (c) maximum legal protection of the human rights of the
owners of capital, remains ascendant in the West, in the international governance
organizations which advanced countries control (like the OECD, World Bank,
and IMF), and even in much of the economic policy community in many middle-
income countries (Wade, 2017).
I now describe the gravitational forces operating to reproduce the core–
periphery structure of the world economy, or more specifically, to maintain the
‘middle-income trap’ or ‘glass ceiling’. These forces help to sustain the long-term
growth pattern of divergence or very slow convergence of middle-income coun-
tries, Eastern China being the obvious escapee (Fischer, 2015). Space limits mean
that I concentrate not on long-run causes but only on those that have been
particularly important in recent decades.
2.4 Global Value Chains (GVCs) Now Structure
Production and Trade
It is clear that in today’s world economy only a few really large economies have
even the possibility of ‘doing a Japan, Taiwan, or Korea’—building up a phalanx of
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mostly nationally owned modern industries with deep supply chains within the
domestic economy, able to produce whole products or almost whole products
competitively enough to sell in Western markets or as first-tier suppliers to
Western or Japanese MNCs. High entry barriers in the face of existing MNC
dominance, and neoclassically inspired trade and investment rules, make such a
project unviable for most.
The world economy has, since the late 1980s, become dominated by hierarch-
ical GVCs, in which lead firms fragment production of final products into parts
and components, and outsource the various sub-sections or stages to geograph-
ically dispersed producers and sub-producers. Around 80 per cent of global trade
now flows through GVCs led by multinational corporations (UNCTAD, 2013).
From the perspective of neoliberal economics, the rise of GVCs is a blessing
for EDEs, because it permits their producers low-cost entry into international
production and trade, as compared to producing whole products. Millberg and
Winkler remark, critically, ‘the goal of industrial upgrading within GVCs has
become nearly synonymous with economic development itself ’ (2013: 238).
But participation inmanufacturing GVCsmay well provide limited opportunities
to develop production capabilities, because of the forces making for specialization in
repetitive tasks such as assembling components made elsewhere, which prevent
movement into higher value-added segments like design, R&D, and supply-chain
management. Participation also forces subordinate governments to have:
• free or almost free trade;
• secure property rights (including ‘investor-against-state’ laws which enable a
foreign investor to take a host government to an international arbitration
panel if the government introduces measures which may hurt the foreign
investor’s future profits, including actions to protect public health, such as
restrictions on cigarette advertising); and
• tolerance for high concentrations of market power in the hands of lead
companies located elsewhere (Mayer and Philips, 2017).
The key point is that the new phase of globalization characterized by GVCs
(since the late 1980s) tips the balance of power in the world economy firmly in
favour of MNCs, because if one host government does not agree to their condi-
tions, or if labour costs in one country rise too high, the firm can readily shift
production elsewhere. Thomas Palley (2018) describes the economic theory of this
phase of globalization as ‘barge economics’, from the remark by Jack Welch,
former CEO of General Electric, that business would like to put ‘every plant you
own on a barge’, so that it could move its factories from place to place according to
changes in cost conditions. Barge economics is what makes it so difficult for
producers in low-wage countries and their governments to upgrade in GVCs,
because in these circumstances power lies with the business owners—who can
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invite, or not invite, particular subordinate producers to rise in their value chains,
and if the producers press for better conditions, the owners can always ‘float the
barge’ elsewhere.
It is often said, wrongly, that the rise of GVCs has occurred autonomously from
the state, due mainly to technological change cutting the cost of moving infor-
mation and materials. This ignores the active role of Western states in promoting
the rise of GVCs—especially Western states sailing under the neoliberal banner of
self-adjusting markets and requiring host governments’ policy compliance with
this ideology as a condition of access to their high-income markets.
The US government had negotiated some twenty free-trade agreements (FTAs)
by 2015; the EU is part of thirty FTAs; Japan of fourteen (Mayer and Phillips,
2017). But these are not ‘free-trade’ agreements. They contain rules of origin, such
that a high proportion of the value added in products outsourced to lower-cost
countries must come from the lead country—which makes for regional produc-
tion chains. And they often contain tariff escalation clauses, such that if an EDE
starts to produce higher value-added products within a chain, its exports face
higher tariffs in the lead country—which keeps the high value-added activities
in the lead country, protecting the basic core–periphery structure of the world
economy.³
2.5 Rising Dependence on Capital-Goods Imports
and on Highly Monopolized Patentable Knowledge
EDEs depend heavily, almost by definition, on imported capital goods, reflecting
low domestic technological innovation capacity. This dependence has intensified
since the 1980s with the ICT revolution. ICT and other leading technologies of the
current era are more difficult to copy, to reverse engineer, than were the mech-
anical technologies of the post-Second-World-War decades. So the world techno-
logical frontier has moved further out of reach for most developing countries than
it was in earlier decades. This is particularly so because modern capitalism is more
knowledge intensive than earlier, and more of that knowledge is better protected
by patents—especially since 1994 with the formation of the WTO and its Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and many
later so-called free-trade agreements.
Note the paradox (Pagano, 2014). Knowledge is a non-rivalrous good, in the
sense that its use by one user does not reduce its availability to others, unlike a
piece of physical capital. So the marginal cost of using knowledge in a developing
³ Engel and Tagliari (2017) have a chapter in the ‘Global Value Chain Development Report 2017’
which paints a rosy picture of the development pay-offs from integration into GVCs, saying little about
downsides.
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country which is produced elsewhere, should be close to zero—because the
original knowledge is not reduced by its being used again, in contrast to all
material inputs (machinery, labour, etc.) So increased knowledge intensity of
production should boost production around the world, including by small firms.
It should therefore promote catch-up by developing countries, making it easy for
them to combine modern knowledge with low-cost labour and other inputs.
The paradox of modern capitalism is that strong intellectual property rights
(IPR) regimes in developed countries have enabled wholesale privatization of
knowledge and the creation of knowledge monopolies in the hands of big, mostly
Western-based, global firms. Private property in knowledge has global effects,
because it prevents others using that knowledge anywhere in the world where the
property rights can be enforced—even though others using the knowledge do not
curb the knowledge usable by the first user. In contrast, private property in
tangibles—machinery, land—has local effects that do not prevent use by others
elsewhere of a similar machine or similar land. So knowledge monopolies are driving
intense concentration of corporate wealth and power—and holding back global
income catch-up, making the Rise of the Rest an exaggeration (Pagano, 2014).
Indeed, to refer to developed economies as ‘free-market economies’ is even
more misleading today than in the 1960s, when it was already substantially
misleading (as shown by J. K. Galbraith (1967), The New Industrial State).
Developed economies have become, strangely enough, ‘closed-knowledge’ econ-
omies, even though they are highly integrated into global trade, finance, and
investment. Science has also moved from ‘open’ towards ‘closed’—closed behind
patent and copyright protection. Closed-science and closed-knowledge economies
make for a more unequal kind of capitalism very different from the usual
understanding of modern capitalism as ‘free-market capitalism’.
The fundamental change in the character of modern capitalism since the
1990s tends to constrain catch-up by developing countries, not to mention the
prospects for ‘decent work’ in developed countries. The change is captured by
several measures:
(1) Intangible assets now dominate tangible assets in corporate balance sheets.
In 1982, about 62 per cent of the total assets of the S&P 500 firms based in
the United States were tangibles (buildings, machines), leaving intangibles
at 38 per cent (patents, copyright, trademarks). By 1999, intangibles had
jumped to 84 per cent of total assets, leaving tangibles at 16 per cent
(Pagano, 2017).
(2) The distribution of the global total of patents in each of several sectors is very
unequal between countries. Evidence on the distribution of global patents
comes from a study of the between-country distribution of the total patents
in five key growth sectors: electrical engineering, chemistry and pharma-
ceuticals, mechanical engineering, instruments, and process engineering.
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In 1980 the Gini coefficient of distribution between countries of patents in
each of these sectors varied between 0.82 and 0.85. By 2015, the five sectors
all had roughly the same—and much higher—Gini coefficients of just
under 0.95. So companies headquartered in a tiny number of the world’s
180-plus countries hold just about all the patents in these key sectors for
economic development.⁴
(3) Global profits in each of many sectors are highly concentrated in a tiny
number of countries. Global profits are also highly concentrated in a few
countries (Starrs, 2014). Forbes Global 2000, an annual list of the world’s
biggest 2,000 publicly traded companies (by assets, market value, profits,
and sales) gives the share of different countries (the share of companies
headquartered in different countries) in total global profits in each of
twenty-five sectors, such as heavy machinery, electronics, aerospace, bank-
ing, health care equipment and services, and media. In 2013 US companies
had the biggest share of global profits in eighteen sectors, 72 per cent of the
total; and between 2007 and 2013 their profit share increased in ten sectors,
including those classed as the technologically most sophisticated.⁵
(4) China. The only developing country with more than a toehold in the global
distribution of profits is China, which in 2013 ranked in the top five
countries by profit share in twelve of the twenty-five sectors (Starrs,
2014). But other data show how far behind China is. In personal com-
puters, for example, China became the world’s biggest market in 2011,
overtaking the United States. But Chinese companies’ share of profits in
computer hardware and software amounted to only 2 per cent, compared
to the United States’ 72 per cent. In autos, China became the world’s
biggest auto market in 2009; but the profit share of Chinese companies
in the auto, truck, and parts sector was only 5 per cent, while the combined
share of the United States, Japan, and Germany was over 50 per cent.
In electronics, China has been the biggest exporter since 2004, but its profit
share of the exports is 3 per cent, compared to Taiwan’s 25 per cent and the
United States’ 33 per cent. Or take China’s role in innovation, proxied by
triadic patents (registered with the European Patent Office, Japan Patent
Office, and US Patent and Trademark Office). In 2010, US and Japanese
companies held about 60 per cent of the world’s triadic patents; Chinese
companies, 1.8 per cent.
⁴ Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft combined applied for 52,000 patents between
2009 and early 2017. They are diversifying far beyond their original sector. Amazon has applied for a
patent on devices which identify people according to blood flow and heart rate. Apple has applied
for a patent within autonomous vehicle technology, for ‘collision avoidance of arbitrary polygonal
obstacles’ (CBInsights, 2017).
⁵ The knowledge rents earned by the ICT giants are measured and explained in Cooper (2016).
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2.6 Finance is in the Driving Seat of the World Economy
and Exposes EDEs to Volatile Growth
The financial sector has acquired such power in advanced countries that
UNCTAD refers to the current era as ‘finance-driven globalization’ (to which
we might add ‘barge-driven globalization’ and ‘knowledge-monopoly globaliza-
tion’). In most respects the Western financial system is even more powerful than
before 2008. While the big banks are, on average, holding more capital than before
the crisis,⁶ they remain heavily indebted and interconnected, and because of a
wave of mergers during the last crisis the banking industry as a whole is even more
concentrated than before. They—and everyone else—know that in the event of
another 2008-style panic they would probably be bailed out, as before. This
confidence gives them even more power.
Robert Rubin, US Treasury Secretary in the Democrat-led government of Bill
Clinton (and before that, twenty-six years in Goldman Sachs), celebrates this
development. As Treasury Secretary he and his deputy Larry Summers engineered
the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act (1933), which had separated investment
banking and retail banking, and strongly and successfully opposed measures to
regulate the derivatives industry (which became an engine of the 2008 crash).
David Rothkopf, author of Power, Inc. (2012), interviewed Rubin for the book,
well after the crash, and asked whether he thought that having a sector of big
banks ‘too big to fail’ was a problem that should be fixed. Rubin replied:
No, don’t you see? Too big to fail isn’t a problem with the system. It is the system.
You can’t be a competitive financial institution serving global corporations of
scale without having a certain scale yourself. The bigger multinationals get, the
bigger financial institutions will have to get. (quoted in Sharpe, 2012)
In other words, ‘the system’ requires big banks to be propped up regardless of their
performance. As Mike Sharpe says, reviewing Rothkopf ’s book, ‘This is socialism
for the rich, free enterprise for everyone else.’ After Rubin left government service
he worked part time for Citigroup for ten years, and received US$126 million in
remuneration (Wikipedia, 2018).
The dominance of finance causes the management of for-profit companies to
give priority to short-term success targets such as profits, dividends, and share
prices; so it is these indicators—not ones measuring customer experience or even
long-run growth—that weigh heavily in senior executive compensation packages.
⁶ The chair of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from 2006 to 2011, Sheila Blair
(2018), said:
US politicians, with some help from regulators, are trying to weaken these rules [designed to
constrain excessive borrowing by ‘systemic’ financial organizations], setting a dangerous
global precedence. Both Republicans and Democrats supported legislation giving the three
largest US custody banks an average of a 20 per cent reduction to their leverage ratios.
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The effects of financial dominance in service industries are the subject of a 2017
front-page column in The New York Times (International):
Relentless pressure on corporate America is creating an increasingly Dickensian
experience for many consumers as companies focus on maximizing profit.
[According to a veteran public relations executive], ‘There’s always been pressure
from Wall Street. But I’ve been watching this for 30 years, and it’s never been as
intense as it is today.’ Rich bonus packages for top executives are now largely tied
to short-term income targets and fatter profit margins instead of customer
service. (New York Times (International), 2017)
The New York Times titles this column, ‘Discomfort of Air Travel Starts with
Wall Street’. It relates how the prevailing corporate mindset hit a low point
when airline staff violently dragged an unlucky and unwilling passenger—
chosen at random—off an overbooked United Airlines flight in Chicago in
April 2017. But Wall Street loves the result: United Airlines’ stock sold for US
$25 per share in 2012; today it sells for US$80 per share. United’s profit margins
are up from 3.7 per cent to 13.6 per cent over the same period. The average
profit margin for the US airline industry rose from 5.2 per cent to 16.3 per cent
over this period.
International financial markets are organized hierarchically. New York and
London are the top financial centres, and the United States, issuer of the top
currency, enjoys great privilege and power over countries with lower-ranked
currencies (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2018). US monetary conditions and
monetary policy affect monetary conditions around the world, thanks to the US
dollar being the most liquid international store of value and the most widely used
unit of account.
Southern countries, on the other hand, face monetary subordination: they are
unable to borrow internationally in their domestic currency, they are under strong
pressure to maintain completely open capital accounts, and they depend on short-
term portfolio inflows of finance to cover external deficits and a lot of domestic
investment. The low position of their currencies in the international currency
hierarchy means that they must offer higher interest rates or profitable exchange
rate movements in order to attract foreign capital and prevent capital flight.
A rising portion of ‘investment’ tends to be financial investments, crowding out
‘real’ investments to raise production capabilities.
The result: the high interest rates lower domestic capital accumulation and
economic growth; and the volatility of capital flows and exchange rates makes
their economic growth subject to high levels of external vulnerability, which recur-
rently tips into debt crises, further subordinating them in the international ‘real’ and
‘financial’ economy. No surprise if they remain in the ‘middle-income trap’.
To spell out the mechanism in more detail: EDEs’ domestic asset and credit
markets are now heavily populated with foreign investors and financial organizations
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(raising the economy’s external liabilities), thanks to their governments (complying
with Western wishes) putting few regulations and restrictions on:
(a) foreign capital inflows and outflows;
(b) foreign financial establishments in their territory; and
(c) residents’ access to foreign financial markets as borrowers and investors.
Also, their own non-financial corporations have borrowed heavily in inter-
national financial markets, with most repayments in US dollars, further raising the
economy’s external liabilities. The Institute of International Finance calculates
that corporate debt in foreign currencies is now at the highest level ever. Turkey is
especially exposed. Its companies borrowed US dollars to fund factories, shopping
malls, and the Istanbul skyscrapers; and now, as the lira plunges, a growing
number of companies are declaring that they cannot repay their (foreign) loans.
This has the potential to spread far and wide. American investors own nearly
25 per cent of outstanding Turkish bonds and more than half of publicly traded
Turkish stocks (Thomas, 2018).
These trends expose EDEs to boom–bust cycles in the major advanced coun-
tries, the United States above all (Akyüz, 2017)—boom–bust cycles driven by
rising income and wealth concentration at the top in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and several other major advanced countries, and now also China. In the
advanced countries, most of the population has been on stagnant incomes even as
average productivity rises, and the wage share of national income has fallen
dramatically. Most of the gain in income from economic growth accrues to people
at the top, who get much of their income from returns to capital while they sleep.
These economies therefore face a demand gap, a shortfall of demand relative to
supply potential. To boost demand even as income concentration at the top is
high, many governments, notably the Anglo ones, have adopted a debt-led growth
model. They support arrangements which facilitate the ability of people with
modest incomes to borrow in order to spend—and close the demand gap with
borrowed finance. This can generate a credit and asset boom (property, stocks),
which can produce moderate or even fast growth—for a while. But meantime
people’s ability to repay debt out of income (as distinct from the putative value of
their asset, when house prices are rising) tends to fall, the economy becomes more
financially fragile because dependent on continued rises in asset values, and the
fragility can easily tip into financial instability and crisis. The Roman playwright
Plautus captured the point when he had one of his characters declare (around
300 ), ‘I am a rich man—until I have to repay my creditors.’
In the United States this debt-led mechanism produced a series of booms and
busts: savings-and-loan cycle in the 1980s, dot.com cycle in 1990s, sub-prime cycle
in the 2000s, and the ‘quantitative easing’ (QE) cycle since 2008. All but the last
(so far) ended in financial crisis with far-reaching economic and political damage.
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The United States now relies heavily on monetary policy to regulate economic
activity, because fiscal policy is either regressive (tax cuts for the rich) or politically
paralyzed. The US central bank, the Federal Reserve, makes its decisions to serve
the US economy, with little regard for effects on the rest of the world. (In 1971 US
Treasury Secretary John Connelly informed his astonished counterparts at a G-10
meeting in Rome, ‘The dollar is our currency but it’s your problem.’) When US
central bank interest rates are very low, as all through the 2000s to date, finance
and financial establishments tend to head—without restrictions—to EDEs (like
Turkey), where interest rates and other returns are higher: to their markets for
equities, bonds, property, and credit. When US rates go up and/or US growth goes
up, the trend reverses (as in 2017–18). The inflows and outflows can have
destabilizing effects on the exchange rate, investment, productivity growth, and
long-term GDP growth of EDEs.
US monetary policy swings can be expected to be large into the future, with big
spillover effects in the rest of the world, as long as monetary policy continues to be
the United States’ main stabilization tool and the US dollar remains the main
international currency. And as of 2017–18, shadow financial markets in the
United States are frothing, repeating the run-up to the 2007–8 crash as regulators
flout the Dodd–Frank Act (passed after the crash to make a repeat crisis less likely)
and the US Congress has partially repealed the Act.
Note in passing that other large advanced countries, notably Germany and
Austria, have adopted an export-led growth model, which depends on selling into
debt-led countries. The two models are complementary and both are fragile,
which underlines Germany and Austria’s irresponsibility in urging deficit coun-
tries of the European Union, notably Greece, to ‘be like us’ and become net
exporters (Goda and Sanchez, 2017).
To understand better the mechanism producing EDE vulnerability we need to
disaggregate EDEs’ integration into the world financial system by distinguishing
different types of assets (Akyüz, 2017). First, foreign exchange reserves. As they
experienced—or saw others experience—financial crashes, EDEs increased their
foreign exchange reserves many times over, mostly in low-yielding reserve assets
issued by advanced countries, especially the US Treasury. As of 2014, about two-
thirds of total EDE exchange reserves were held either by China or by the fuel
exporters. The other third was mostly borrowed, and matched by an increase in
EDE external liabilities. So their attempt to self-insure gives them a lot less
protection than the exchange reserve figures suggest.
Second, foreign direct investment accounts for a large share of the external
liabilities of EDEs. Contrary to common belief (which says that FDI + GVCs is the
magic formula for EDE economic development), the large stock of FDI in EDEs
substantially raises their vulnerability. A large part of total FDI in EDEs since 2000
is in service sectors, with low exports; and even in manufacturing, the import
content of FDI manufactured exports is high. Typically, the export earnings of
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FDI operations in EDEs do not cover both their imports and their income
transfers (in the form of profits, royalties, licence fees, and interest paid on
loans from the parent company). This means that, typically, FDI makes a negative
contribution to the balance of payments.
At the same time, host governments face more difficulties than before in
putting performance conditions on FDI operations or in other ways extracting
positive spillovers (e.g. technological), because (a) the companies tend to be
footloose (‘barge economics’), (b) they have strong intellectual property protec-
tion, which limits learning by residents, and (c) governments are constrained in
extracting positive spillovers by free trade agreements or bilateral investment
treaties.
Third, bonds. Many EDEs have opened the door wide to foreign buyers of
sovereign bonds issued in local currency. This means the bonds are repaid in
local currency, so foreign buyers take the exchange rate risk, which should
avoid the currency mismatches that triggered many financial crises in Asia and
Latin America in the 1990s and early 2000s. But Yilmaz Akyüz reports that
there is no comprehensive data on non-resident holdings of local currency
bonds—which means that the sovereign debt of many EDEs is probably under-
estimated, more internationalized than reported, and more is held by—fickle,
flighty—private entities than by official bodies (like the World Bank). But note
that China and India wisely continue to restrict non-resident purchase of
domestic bonds.
2.7 Conclusion
Six bottom-line points. First, EDEs as a category have acted in line with consensus
advice in theWestern-dominated international development community to integrate
the national economy to a high degree into the international economy, including in
finance and investment. In thus exposing their growth to shocks in the international
economy, they make it prone to zoom up and down like a rollercoaster.
Stephen Broadberry and John Wallis (2016) argue that the ‘great escape
upwards’ of Western countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—
the emergence of a Western core and non-Western lagging periphery tied to the
core—reflects a long-term pattern of fairly stable and moderate growth in the core
and more volatile growth in the periphery, meaning fairly fast expansion followed
by prolonged shrinkage. They elaborate what they call ‘shrink theory’ as distinct
from ‘growth theory’.
Recent research shows how persistent long-run dollar cycles affect economic
development in EDEs. Dollar appreciation (as during 1981–5, 1995–2002, 2008–9,
and 2012–15, when the data set ends) is associated with (a) fall in commodity prices,
(b) fall in EDEs’ GDP growth, and (c) rise in the number of EDEs experiencing
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external crises (due to large foreign currency debt and sharp exchange rate
depreciations) (Druck et al., 2015; Chow et al., 2015).
The second bottom-line point is that the institutional structure of the inter-
national economy into which EDEs integrate contains a basic impediment to their
development: from the mid-1940s beginning of the Bretton Woods architecture
till today, the mechanism for curbing countries’ external deficits and surpluses
puts all the adjustment pressure on deficit countries to reduce their deficits, and
no symmetrical pressure on surplus countries to reduce their surpluses (think
Germany). Yet developing countries undertaking heavy investment in infrastruc-
ture and production capacity should be able to run sizeable deficits safely, and this
would be more feasible if surplus countries ran smaller surpluses.
Third, the combination of global value chains, knowledge monopoly, and
financialization makes for slow or no long-run convergence upwards of the
majority of EDEs towards the average income and productivity of advanced
countries: in fact, it makes for the continuation of the core–periphery structure
of the world economy, with persisting large gaps in average income and product-
ivity. Again, China is the great exception, thanks partly to it having being a poor
pupil of the Washington Consensus.
Fourth, the core—the West—depends heavily on rental income accruing from
ownership of financial assets, patents, brands, and copyrights on software,
movies and the like. Western, especially American, firms occupy the command-
ing heights of GVCs; and within these commanding heights the top positions
are occupied by a small number of financial firms, which control the ‘real
economy’ firms through shareholdings and debts, and which drive each GVC
towards the goal of shareholder (not stakeholder) value maximization, generat-
ing unpaid-for costs for the living planet and for the insecure workforce in EDEs
(an example is Foxconn) (Vitali and Battiston, 2014). In this structure producers
in low-income countries (such as Bangladesh and Cambodia in Asia) can
certainly get a foothold in entry-level industries like textiles as costs rise in
China; but rising into higher value-added activities, even within textiles, is much
more difficult.
Fifth point: Neoclassical economics is a misleading guide to development
policy. It thinks in terms of curves, not step changes. And it makes no distinction
between activities (or sectors) according to their growth potential––it treats each
unit of GDP as having equal potential for future growth. Yet the governments of
virtually all the successful catch-up countries recognized that they had to nurture
‘superior’ or ‘star’ economic activities by means of trade protection, subsidies, and
regulations, buffering them from—but not insulating them from—competitive
pressures.
Erik Reinert (1994) calls this the ‘List-cum-Smith strategy’ (Friedrich List with
Adam Smith). The British government followed it when it closed down the
prosperous woollen cloth industry in its colony of Ireland starting in 1699, and
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when it closed down the fledgling cotton textile industry in its colony of India
starting in 1814. And it helps to understand why the English economist David
Ricardo, in the early nineteenth century, was happy to provide—and generations
of economists were happy to believe—a theory of comparative advantage which
apparently demonstrated scientifically that England should specialize in textiles
and Portugal should specialize in wine. This at a time when wine making was
technologically stagnant and textiles was a prime site of mechanical and organ-
izational innovation.
Friedrich List summarized the English strategy for economic dominance:
‘The principle, sell manufacturers, buy raw material, was during centuries the
English substitute for an economic theory’ (1844: 12). But as just noted, the English
Ricardo did provide the justifying theory purporting to show that England’s spe-
cialization in textiles and Portugal’s in wine was in their mutual interest, and the
theory has been taught as the bedrock of neoclassical economics ever since.
Finally, for an EDE to escape the periphery and move into the core of the world
economy is in some ways even more difficult now than in the past. The rise of
the North-east Asian economies has shrunk the room to industrialize for late-late
industrializers in Africa or re-industrializers in Latin America. At the same time,
the room for trade management and industrial policy has been shrunk by (a) more
liberal trade rules and (b) deregulated capital markets across borders. Digital
innovation and robotization will accelerate productivity growth, while generating
massive technological unemployment or employment in precarious jobs as dis-
tinct from ‘middle-class’ jobs. And all this in a more carbon-constrained world
facing major disruption in fossil-fuelled capitalism. This puts a premium on
national governments creating effective ‘direction-setting’ agencies, centrally
placed in the state and with top-level political commitment, to navigate through
the complexities.⁷
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3
Learning from East Asia
Catch-up and the Making of China’s
Developmental State
Daniel Poon and Richard Kozul-Wright
3.1 Introduction
As China celebrates its fortieth year since the start of its reform period, a strong
backlash against globalization has gained traction. China, as the pre-eminent
economic success story of the last four decades, is inevitably caught up in this
backlash. Western policymakers, in particular, having held up China as an
example of what happens when policymakers embrace ‘an open liberal economy’
and attract foreign investment (Blair, 2005) now brand it a ‘strategic competitor’
that has abused the rules of that same open liberal economy and distorted global
markets (USTR, 2018).
This is not, however, the first time that a successful late industrializer has gone
from economic paragon to political pariah. After four decades of rapid and
sustained growth from the end of the Second World War, Western attitudes
towards Japan turned from extoling its virtues on the right side of the Cold War
political divide to seeing it as a model of unfair competition exploiting a danger-
ous combination of protectionist practices, underhand state support for its cor-
porations, and financial repression.
Reducing these success stories to a simple binary narrative around state versus
market and open versus closed economies is, however, seriously misleading. This
point was made by Chalmers Johnson (1982) in his seminal book, MITI and the
Japanese Miracle (1982), who emphasized the role of the ‘developmental state’ in
Japan to push policy discussions at the time beyond the black-and-white contrast
between American and Soviet economies. Johnson (1999: 32) would later write
about the ‘enormous ideological resistance in the English-speaking countries’ to
his work, a resistance which, as Cohen and DeLong (2016) have shown, goes
against parts of their own ideological history.
In attempting to understand China’s remarkable development path, this chap-
ter follows Cohen and DeLong in arguing both that ‘getting the political economy
right is and has been of overwhelming importance in producing prosperity’ (23) and
that ‘theAsian developmentmodel is about nothing if not national boundaries’ (18).
From this perspective, we show that it is China’s pragmatic experimentation with
an East Asian-style developmental state configuration that has managed those
boundaries and shaped its interaction with the global economy. This should not
be a great surprise, as it is well known that China’s leaders actively drew lessons
from development experiences in the region (and beyond), particularly from
Japan and the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of Republic of Korea
(ROK), Taiwan, and Singapore (Johnson, 1999; Nolan, 1996).¹
Like East Asian countries that came before it, China’s rise is stirring contro-
versial questions about the roles of comparative advantage, industrial policy,
foreign direct investment, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), technology transfer,
and other trade policy performance requirements in the process of economic
development. Also, and as was the case in the earlier East Asian development
episodes (Amsden, 1994; Wade, 1996), the mix of policy instruments and insti-
tutional mechanisms underpinning its rapid growth have not been widely appre-
ciated and at times have been obscured by the wider international community.
Conversely, it was not uncommon, for example, for Japan’s Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry (MITI) to shroud its strategic activities in secrecy and
to manage information in ways that gave its firms a competitive advantage
(Johnson, 1999: 45). Moreover, it took several decades, and the World Bank’s
misrepresentation of the East Asian ‘miracle’, before Japan felt sufficiently confi-
dent to offer its own account of its economic success.
This chapter assesses China’s developmental state orientation based on a closer
reading of key features as postulated by the authors associated with the term’s
origination. With the international policy community gradually progressing from
the ‘why’ of industrial policy to the ‘how’ of implementing it, the analysis focuses
on forms of what Johnson (1982) regarded as ‘market-conforming methods of
state intervention’, which Wade (2010) later called ‘open economy’ industrial
policy, and Amsden (2001) referred to as ‘reciprocal control mechanism’.²
Section 3.2 sets out the main elements of the developmental state as formulated
by scholars that played important roles in documenting the developmental state in
Japan, ROK, and Taiwan. These elements are used as a rough guide to highlight
institutional experimentation and learning in China’s gradual refinement of the
role of the state in economic management in the industrial and financial sector,
which has combined an export push with targeted policies to promote production
capacity in strategic sectors. The chapter concludes with remarks on the implications
¹ Several studies have explored the extent to which China’s rapid catch-up growth follows the East
Asian developmental state model; using different metrics the studies have presented a varied picture,
often reflecting the time and place of the authors concerned—see Zhang, 2018; Knight, 2014; Boltho
and Weber, 2009; Baek, 2005; Pearson, 2005; Lee et al., 2002; Breslin, 1996.
² Similar to these concepts, Gunnar Myrdal used the term ‘operational controls’. See Kozul-Wright
and Poon (2018).
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of China’s developmental state trajectory and the transferability of policy lessons
from its experience to other developing countries.
3.2 Elements of the East Asian Developmental State
Chalmers Johnson’s account of Japan’s rapid post-war catch-up growth laid the
foundations of the East Asian ‘developmental state’ concept on which later authors
would further build. In adopting this term, Johnson was consciously creating a
taxonomy of ‘how the government intervenes and for what purposes’ (1982: 18).
He classified the Soviet centrally planned economy model as ‘plan-ideological’,
whereas capitalist economies came in two broad forms: ‘plan-rational’, associated
with Japan’s developmental state; and ‘market-rational’, associated with the US
regulatory state.
Plan-ideological economies essentially exhibited a disconnect between the
‘how’ of government intervention and the ‘what’ of achieved outcomes. Policy
instruments of centrally planned economies, such as state ownership of the means
of production, wide-ranging state planning, and strict bureaucratic goal setting,
were treated as not simply tenets of sound economic management but objectives
in their own right; evidence of inefficiency or ineffectiveness that put these tenets
into question was deemed heretical.
In contrast, the distinction between the two capitalist-type economies is related
to different approaches to managing private economic activities and the state’s
priorities in economic policy. A market-rational state relies on regulatory powers
to set the rules of the game of market competition, but generally does not concern
itself with finer-grained details of domestic industry structure or firms. A plan-
rational state, however, actively sets social- and economic-oriented goals, places its
highest priority on ‘development functions’ linked to policies of industrialization,
and focuses on domestic industry structure and firms to enhance the nation’s
international competitiveness. By extension, these different approaches entail
different policy tools: in particular, whereas a market-rational state prefers using
horizontal non-selective policies to achieve efficiency, a plan-rational state prag-
matically leverages the use of both horizontal and selective instruments to priori-
tize degrees of policy effectiveness, over pure efficiency concerns (Haggard, 2018:
20; Johnson, 1982: 18–22; Wade, 2018: 11).³
It is because of these distinctions and the primary focus of a plan-rational state
on progressing through stages of industrialization that the developmental state is
³ Although Johnson argued that a market-rational state usually does not have a formal industrial
policy because this would imply a strategic goal-oriented approach to the economy, he qualified this
statement with ‘or, at any rate, will not recognize it as such’ (1982: 19). In this way, he may have been
hinting at the apparent ‘covert’ use of industrial policy in many developed countries (Block, 2008;
Chang, 2010: 85–6).
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often associated with managing the process of capital accumulation to address
failures in market structure and coordination that can weaken the investment
process (Wade, 1990). In this vein, a key common feature among East Asian
development experiences (including China’s) was relatively high levels of domes-
tic investment rates (Singh, 1996; UNCTAD, 1996), which are, in turn, associated
with the creation and management of economic rents (UNCTAD, 2016) along
with higher rates of learning, technical progress, and structural change (Ocampo,
2005: 16). Similarly, for Amsden (2001: 125), the four main functions performed
by the developmental state are tilted towards issues linked to production capabil-
ities: development banking, local content management, strategic and selective
opening, and national firm formation.
While Johnson knew well that Japan’s developmental state would be hard to
emulate, he recognized that it was not impossible for a different society to configure
its own socio-political arrangements in ways similar to post-war Japan by giving
highest priority to industrialization objectives and incentivizing public–private-
sector cooperation. As such, Johnson distilled four essential elements of the devel-
opmental state to provide an abstract model of Japan’s catch-up growth experience
which other countries could use as a rough guide to inform their own policymaking
and concrete implementation (1982: 314–15).⁴ These four elements are: (i) a small
but high-quality bureaucracy composed of the best managerial talent available in
the system, able to select and support strategic sectors including through supervised
competition; (ii) a political system which allows the bureaucracy sufficient scope to
take initiatives and to operate effectively; (iii) market-conforming mechanisms of
state intervention with discretionary power both to guide private interests and strike
a balance with public interests and able to improve their own effectiveness in these
tasks through learning by doing and repeated interactions (both cooperative and
conflictual) with the private owners of strategic sectors; and (iv) a lead role for a
pilot, or apex, organization—such as Japan’s MITI—endowed with strategic cap-
acity to implement industrial policy, indirect control of government funds, and
‘think-tank’ functions (Johnson, 1982: 315–20).
Over time, these key elements were elaborated and refined by authors also
closely associated with developmental states in the Asia region. In his comparative
analysis involving South Korea, Peter Evans (1995) coined the term ‘embedded
autonomy’ to highlight the nature of the state’s utilitarian need for close working
relationships with private-sector firms, while also maintaining the ability to
discipline these actors in aligning the interests of capital with those of the
state—instead of vice versa.
⁴ Foreshadowing similar reactions to the rise of the NIEs, and more recently China, Johnson (1999:
40) lamented that ‘the “learn-from-Japan” craze then sweeping the United States was dangerously
ahistorical and simple-minded’. At the same time, he also acknowledged that perhaps the single most
important question about Japan’s developmental state was: ‘Is it duplicable? Is there really a Japanese
model? What are the general, culture-free lessons to be learned from the Japanese case?’
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Amsden also emphasized embedded autonomy features in her concept of
‘reciprocal control mechanism’, which involved a set of institutions that impose
discipline on economic behaviour, such that ‘recipients of subsidies were subjected
to monitorable performance standards that were redistributive in nature and
results-oriented’ (2001: 8). Importantly, Amsden believed that fostering industrial
development by using reciprocal control mechanisms in the areas of science,
technology, and innovation constituted the ‘neo-developmental state’ (2000: 6, 13)
under stricter multilateral rules of international trade.
Keeping in mind Johnson’s idea of market-conforming mechanisms of state
intervention (the third element), Wade, Amsden, and others argued that the cases
of Taiwan and ROK were distinguished not by their resort to a wide range of
policy tools of intervention, but by the imposition of performance criteria on
which state support was made conditional. Firms receiving preferential state
policies had to meet performance metrics related to, for example, targets for
exporting, or local content requirements, or advances in domestic production
capacity. On this last metric, conditions were tied to closing the price and quality
gap between imports and domestic substitutes by a certain time period, or to
pushing forward the technological frontiers of domestic production (Amsden,
2001; Wade, 2018).
More specifically, Wade regarded East Asian industrial policy as consisting of
two kinds: ‘pulling the market’ and ‘pushing the market’.⁵ The first kind involved
cases where the government clearly made an investment decision that private
investors would not have otherwise made. The second kind involved cases where
the government supported investment directions made by private firms, but
pushed them to advance the domestic technological frontier in these areas, as
well as other areas where these firms might profitably invest next. These two kinds
of economic interventions, but especially the second kind, are what Wade called
‘open economy’ industrial policy—which strategically blends an export push with
explicit consideration of import substitution activities (Wade, 2010: 155–6;
Amsden, 2004).
Wade illustrates Taiwan’s ‘pushing the market’ institutional mechanism in the
form of a fiscal incentive scheme for which domestic or foreign firms were eligible,
provided that they invested in production capacity that met certain product
specifications. Over time, production capacity was increased by adjusting upwards
the product-specific technical threshold at which firms would be eligible to receive
benefits (Wade, 2010: 156; 2018: 14).⁶
⁵ For conceptual clarity, these terms are re-formulations of Wade’s original concepts of: ‘leading the
market’ and ‘following the market’.
⁶ The formulation and adjustment of technical specifications found in the scheme were facilitated by
selective use of foreign consultants as part of a process of building domestic production capabilities.
Through the provision of US aid, much of the industrial planning and screening in Taiwan in the 1950s
was done by J. G. White Engineering Corp. of New York. In the early 1960s, it was the Stanford
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Over time, as the production capacity of domestic firms improved, the
product-specific technical threshold at which firms were eligible for fiscal incen-
tives would be raised to push firms to upgrade and diversify their production
capacities. The ratcheting-up feature of this incentive mechanism applied to
specific product-level technical standards within and across different industrial
sectors as domestic capabilities progressed from light-industry goods to medium-
and high-technology goods. Also, Taiwanese policymakers resisted appeals to
make the product list of the fiscal incentive scheme broad and unselective and,
over time, the product lists became more precisely defined. As these product lists
were used over the course of decades, they were updated regularly to avoid quickly
becoming out of date (Wade, 2010: 155–6; 1990: 183–4). This bureaucratic capacity
was located in the Industrial Development Bureau within Taiwan’s Ministry of
Economic Affairs, which provided an industrial extension service parallel to the
agricultural extension service, mostly staffed with engineers (Wade, 2018: 15;
Amsden, 2004).
Thus, East Asian developmental states conducted both kinds of ‘pulling the
market’ (from the top down) and ‘pushing the market’ (from the bottom up)
industrial policies, ‘in a way that generates pressure for upgrading and diversifying
national production’ (Wade 2003: 636). Getting at the heart of open-economy
industrial policy practice, domestic firms were granted a range of incentives to
replace imports, but they were not fully insulated: industrial policies provided
domestic producers a limited buffer from international competitive pressure ‘until
such time as the producers succeeded in (almost) matching the price and quality
of competing imports, or failed to do so’ (Wade, 2018: 14).
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 delves into China’s processes of institutional and policy
learning in the transition from a plan-ideological state to a plan-rational devel-
opmental state model, with a focus on industrial and financial sector reforms and,
in particular, the use of ‘open economy’ industrial policies in pushing and pulling
domestic production capacities towards upgrading and diversification.
3.3 China: Transition to Plan-Rational State
China’s experience of navigating the transition from a centrally planned economy
to a market-economy model has been forty years in the making. Previously, the
government’s role in economic planning, coordination, and resource allocation
Research Institute that helped detail next steps in industrialization, while in the 1970s and 1980s, the
government employed the services of Arthur D. Little International Inc. for the same purpose (Wade,
1990: 211). Similarly, in the Republic of Korea, it was noted that, ‘the star of technology transfer to
Korea is the short-term independent consultant. Typically such a figure is Japanese, either retired or
still in the permanent employment of a Japanese enterprise, consulting in Korea on an ad hoc basis’
(Amsden, 1989: 234).
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effectively supplanted market mechanisms, but with the onset of reforms in the
late 1970s, Chinese leaders wanted to improve economic performance and to
replicate the achievements witnessed in the East Asia region.
On the eve of reform in 1978, Chinese leaders did not have a detailed blueprint
that foresaw all the twists and turns of reform for the next four decades. Rather,
policymakers adopted a gradual and strategic approach to economic reform and
integration into the global economy, premised on a pragmatic agenda that sought
practical evidence-based policy lessons for the country’s economic problems. The
idea was not to quickly liberalize the economy, in hopes that market mechanisms
would sprout automatically, but to maintain stability while gradually putting in
place market-supporting institutions that would drive reforms and economic
growth. In doing this, China’s leaders maintained a healthy scepticism of main-
stream economic theory and policy advice emanating from advanced industrialized
nations (El-Erian and Spence, 2008; Perkins, 1988). In particular, China’s gradual
approach has been characterized by a strong emphasis on experimentation with
microeconomic-level measures to adjust institutional arrangements that improve
incentives, which, in turn, eased accumulated distortions and imbalances at the
macroeconomic level (Heilmann, 2008; Hofman, 2018; Lin and Wang, 2008).
This section focuses on China’s industrial-sector reforms, but to fully appreci-
ate the institutional and policy learning processes, it is important to recognize the
origins of Chinese reforms in the agricultural and rural sectors. It is in these areas
that China’s pragmatic experimentation to transition from planned to mixed
economy began and led to its ‘dual-track’ reform approach, through the house-
hold responsibility system (HRS), which jump-started the country’s sustained
economic performance and became a hallmark of its overall reform-policy mind-
set (Lin, 1992). Moreover, as was common to (later) reforms in other sectors,
agricultural reforms were at times fitful and reversed due to government concerns
over loss of control and unanticipated outcomes, but these were expedient detours
rather than a return to pre-reform practices (Sicular, 1988). This approach paid
close attention to political economy dynamics whereby a market track provided
the incentives for economic actors to enhance productivity, but on condition that
they fulfil their obligation to the plan, while the plan track represented implicit
transfers to compensate economic actors who could be worse off from market
liberalization by maintaining existing rents and subsidies under the plan (Gilson
and Milhaupt, 2011; Qian, 2003).
A second stage of reforms from 1985 onwards allowed a greater role for
markets in guiding agricultural production as state plans were phased out. This
stage was marked by progressive market liberalization as procurement pro-
grammes and quotas were replaced by a combination of contract and market
purchases. The supply of other agricultural inputs, such as credit and chemical
fertilizers, also increased substantially during the reform period (Lin, 1992). State
control over procurement and prices of farm inputs were relaxed only gradually
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during the reform era, beginning in the mid-1980s with machinery, pesticides, and
plastic film, and in the early 1990s extended to key inputs such as chemical
fertilizers (Huang et al., 2008).
3.3.1 Industrial and Financial Sector Reforms
Under central planning, SOEs were the main economic agents in the non-
agricultural sectors responsible for the production and distribution of goods: on
the one hand, they exerted little autonomy over key decisions of their operations
as these were determined by government plans; on the other hand, they provided
essential social services (such as housing, health care, education) to employees and
their families. Prices and profits played essentially no role in resource allocation as
competition was circumscribed and most SOEs were allowed monopoly power
over a given local or provincial market. Monopoly prices, in turn, created profits
that were in large part surrendered to the state and accounted for the bulk of
government revenue (Yusuf et al., 2006).
Broad-based success in boosting output and productivity in agriculture pro-
vided momentum to extend reforms to the industrial sector. By the mid-1980s, an
enterprise responsibility system (ERS) was enacted, based on the HRS, to improve
the economic performance of SOEs by formalizing the relationship between SOEs
and the responsible government agency. Like HRS, initial reforms focused on the
incentive structure of firms, followed by reforms to the overall market environ-
ment in which firms operated. ERS required firms to abide by state plans and
output quotas, and in return allowed them greater autonomy over issues such as
production decisions, use of retained earnings (and other sources of financing),
employee compensation and recruitment practices, staffing levels, and purchase of
inputs. Moreover, a dual-track system was established as plan-track products
(using inputs provided at planned prices) were sold at state prices, while
market-track products were sold at market prices (using inputs purchased at
market prices). By the end of 1988, the ERS applied to 93 per cent of SOEs, and,
over time, as the number of industrial goods subject to state-set prices was
reduced, market competition increased incrementally as the two tracks converged
(Rawski, 1994; Song, 2018).
Increased competitive pressures were complemented with measures to relax
industry entry barriers and to foster non-SOE enterprises, particularly in labour-
intensive downstream sectors. These changes resulted in significant shifts in
China’s structure of production in the 1980s and early 1990s, with the previously
dominant role of SOEs reduced by increasing output shares by industrial collect-
ives, particularly township and village enterprises (TVEs), and foreign-funded
firms, primarily investors from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. These trends are
shown in Table 3.1; by the mid-1990s, SOEs were no longer the dominant
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industrial producer, surpassed by collectives whose share then proceeds to decline,
as these are converted into other ownership categories, particularly private and
joint-stock enterprises, whose shares of industrial output rises alongside that of
foreign-invested firms.
Despite much diversity in the ownership and management of TVEs, some
broad generalizations are applicable. Most TVE industrial output is produced by
firms that are controlled by local governments, rather than formal worker
cooperatives. TVEs are perhaps best understood as an institutional adaptation
to China’s transition to markets: by the late 1980s, markets and market prices
existed for nearly all commodities (product markets), but factor markets for land,
labour, and capital would only slowly emerge in the 1990s. Although many would
later be privatized, TVEs were the expedient policy solution that allowed rural
communities to translate control over assets into income streams despite the
absence of asset markets and conventional property rights enforced by a legal
system and at the same time helped boost local fiscal revenues (Gilson and
Milhaupt, 2011: 263–4; Naughton, 1994).
In contrast, the state generally concentrated on sectors that were not deemed
appropriate to other ownership types, such as natural monopolies (capital inten-
sive), pillar industries (capital goods), national defence industries, and other high-
technology areas (Nolan and Wang, 1999: 185). This is consistent with views held
by Chinese policymakers at the time that sectors in the middle-level technological
range should be given stronger state support since these sectors provide inputs
that are used by the export sector, and a sole focus on labour-intensive industry
based on existing comparative advantage could ultimately place a ceiling on
economic development (Baek, 2005: 488–9).
Table 3.1 Gross industrial output by ownership
category, 1995–2011 (percentage of total)
Ownership category 1995 2001 2006 2011
SOEs* 34.0 18.1 9.7 7.9
Collective 36.6 14.6 4.3 2.0
Private 12.7 9.2 21.2 29.9
Joint-stock 3.0 29.6 33.0 33.1
Foreign** 11.7 28.5 31.6 25.9
Other 1.9 0.1 0.2 1.2
Total 99.9 100.1 100 100
Notes: *Defined as wholly owned state enterprises. **Includes
foreign-invested enterprises from Hong Kong, Macau, and
Taiwan.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on China Statistical Yearbook
(various years).
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These initial reform measures increased domestic market competition, but
SOEs’ soft budget weaknesses remained a problem and growing losses by SOEs
in the 1990s motivated deeper reforms. Further ownership diversification was
signalled with Deng Xiaoping’s open show of support in 1992 for the country’s
experiments with special economic zones, known as Deng’s ‘southern tour’. At
that time, the basic legal infrastructure to support private exchange was enacted,
such as corporate, foreign investment, bankruptcy, competition, commercial
banking, central banking, insurance and securities laws (among others). Overall,
Chinese leaders sought to establish the institutional framework for a modern
enterprise system based on Western corporate models adapted to the ‘socialist
market economy’: in most cases, the laws were not designed to support private-
sector activity per se, but aimed to facilitate state-sector reform. The 1993 Com-
pany Law, for instance, provided the framework for SOEs to be re-organized as
corporate entities, which helped to streamline previously ill-defined shareholding
control structures in the state-owned sector (Heilmann, 2018: 94–6; Yusuf et al.,
2006: 72).
Although Table 3.1 clearly shows the reduced role of the state in industrial
output, the process of corporatization in the 1990s sought to further diversify
ownership patterns to enhance enterprise economic performance and oversight,
but retain a significant, albeit adapted, role for the state (Nolan and Wang, 1999:
188–9; Yusuf, 2006: 87–9). This can be observed by examining the composition of
fixed-asset investment by ownership category: as China pursued investment-led
growth that rose from 29.4 per cent of GDP in 1980 to over 40 per cent after the
global financial crisis, the structure of types of enterprises contributing to total
fixed-asset investment has clearly diversified, especially since the mid-2000s. In
contrast to Table 3.1 showing the industrial output share of SOEs declining to less
than 10 per cent, Figure 3.1a presents a different picture: by 2016, the share of
total fixed-asset investment attributed to SOEs was 21.3 per cent, and to private-
sector enterprises was 32.9 per cent. In 2016, the largest share, 44.4 per cent, was
accounted for by a ‘mixed’ ownership category.
The composition of this mixed ownership category is revealed in Figure 3.1b,
with a growing proportion for the ‘joint-stock’ enterprises: by 2016, this type of
enterprise accounted for 81.7 per cent of fixed-asset investment within the ‘mixed’
category of Figure 3.1a, while foreign-invested enterprises (including those from
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) accounted for 9.7 per cent. Many of these joint-
stock firms, it should be noted, include state-holding enterprises (majority state-
owned share) or state-controlled enterprises (state-owned share less than 50 per cent)
(Milhaupt and Zheng, 2016: 4; Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011).
The process of SOE corporatization would become known as ‘grasp the large,
and release the small’, and was adopted as government policy in 1995. By 1997, the
government embarked on a more forceful round of state-sector consolidation and
ownership diversification, while also allowing large numbers of workers to be laid





















































































Total fixed asset investment by ownership category (1980–2016)
Mixed Private (domestic) Collective State-owned






















































































Composition of 'mixed' ownership category of fixed asset investment (1995–2016)
Other HK, Macau, Taiwan (China) Foreign-invested Joint ownership
Joint-stock Joint-stock enterprises Foreign-invested companies
Figure 3.1 Components of China’s fixed-asset investment
Note: The ‘joint-stock’ category includes limited liability companies and shareholding companies.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on China Statistical Yearbook (various years) and UNCTADstat
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off. The idea of privatization was still deemed politically sensitive, but SOE
corporatization took a multitude of forms: mergers, employee and management
buyouts, stock exchange listings, open sales, bankruptcy, leasing, and joint ven-
tures with foreign enterprises. Overall, the goal was to keep the number of
remaining large central SOEs between five hundred and a thousand. These
reforms gained further political impetus with the onset of the Asian financial
crisis of 1997–8, as Chinese leaders sought to address a key vulnerability—since
state banks were the primary source of lending to SOEs, weak SOEs resulted in a
banking sector burdened with non-performing loans (NPLs) (Poon, 2014: 10–12;
Song, 2018: 351–2; Yusuf et al., 2006: 78–81).
SOE corporatization was intertwined with three institutional reform initiatives
that would be the foundations for an emerging regulatory state. First, in the late
1990s, China’s economic bureaucracy was streamlined with many line ministries
downgraded in rank or eliminated, which allowed the space for a growing number
of regulatory commissions to supervise healthy industrial structure at the sectoral
level to be created in the 1990s and early 2000s, such as for financial services
(securities, insurance, and banking) and infrastructure sectors (telecommunica-
tions, aviation, and electric power). Second, as part of bureaucratic restructuring,
incumbent business monopolies were spun off from the ministries that previously
controlled them, creating conditions for ‘limited’market competition—ideally two
or three large SOEs complemented by a handful of smaller upstart local players.
Third, a clearer rationale for the role of the state in the economy and its division of
labour with non-state firms (Naughton, 2010: 444–5; Pearson, 2005: 302–4).
Overall, these reform measures helped remaining large SOEs boost retained
earnings, and by 2003 the government established the State-owned Assets Super-
vision and Administration Commission (SASAC) to own, oversee, and manage
state assets at the central level, which was replicated with SASAC bureaus in local
government. At the beginning, SASAC was responsible for 196 of the largest
SOEs, with the objective of reducing the number to 80–100 by 2010. By the end
of 2013, 113 central SOEs remained under SASAC’s ownership; by 2018, the
number was reduced to ninety-six. Most of these central SOEs are in ‘strategic’
natural monopoly sectors in which SASAC will maintain sole ownership or
absolute control, but also in competitive downstream ‘pillar’ manufacturing and
service sectors in which SASAC will maintain strong control and influence. While
natural monopoly sectors are often considered ‘strategic’ in other countries, the
identification of ‘pillar sectors’ is less common. China’s pillar sectors include:
equipment manufacturing (machinery), automobiles, information technology,
construction, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, and chemicals (Lin and Milhaupt,
2013; Poon, 2014: 10).⁷
⁷ In 2016, SASAC announced the reorganization of SOEs into three functional categories: 1) those
operating in competitive and commercial industries; 2) those involved in national security and in key
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These variations in the diversification of ownership hint at traces of ‘China’s
institutional ecology’ (Milhaupt and Zheng, 2016: 20), or the use of various
‘institutional bridging’ mechanisms through which the state has embedded itself
within the private sector, through ‘the pervasive use of personnel-rotation sys-
tems, linked equity-ownership structures, and strategic forms of cooperation, such
as joint ventures, which serves to unite separate components of the state sector’
(Lin and Milhaupt, 2013: 701–2). In the more recent context, reform of the state
sector continues to carefully proceed along the lines of a ‘mixed ownership’
economy, with the outcome uncertain (Milhaupt and Zheng, 2016; Naughton,
2018). But as some have observed, ‘party documents specify that the market’s
“decisive role” is in resource allocation. In other words, in China the market is a
mechanism for setting prices but not for reassigning control of assets’ (Kroeber,
2016: 6).
With the onset of the reform period, China’s financial system changed from a
mono-banking to a plural-banking system. In 1984, four state-owned specialized
banks were spun off from the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) to better differen-
tiate between commercial and central bank functions. Thus, the ‘big four’ state
banks were created: the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China (BoC), China
Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).
Further reforms in 1994 sought to enhance the independence of the central
bank and to separate commercial lending from policy lending, by creating three
separate policy banks and by converting the state banks to state-owned commer-
cial banks (SOCBs) (UNCTAD, 2016: 26).
In the early 1990s, administrative measures rather than markets still allocated
funds for China’s economic growth via a credit plan, which was abolished in 1998.
SOCBs gained greater autonomy over lending decisions, but PBoC still restricted
the total amount of credit available for SOCBs to lend and indirectly intervened
through ‘window guidance’ to control bank lending. At the same time, the
government gradually established basic financial markets, such as an interbank
bond market, a foreign exchange market, and government and corporate bond
markets. Experiments in stock markets began in the 1980s and led to the creation
of the Shanghai Security Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Security Exchange in
1991 (Okazaki, 2007: 12–13, 19).
Overall, policymakers maintained a cautious orientation to market mechan-
isms and capital markets, while introducing improvements in corporate govern-
ance and risk management (Chen, 1999; Yi, 2014; Zhao, 2017). For example,
because of China’s capital account restrictions, foreign investors only gained
access to China’s capital markets in 2002, through a transitional arrangement
called the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme that included
industries/areas considered the ‘lifeline’ of the economy; and 3) industries that provide public goods.
See SASAC (2016).
50     -
qualification requirements and investment quotas that were only relaxed over
time (SSE, 2015). For the most part, stock markets have been an instrument to
provide SOEs with other capital-raising channels, rather than for fundamental
changes to Western-style corporate governance (Walter and Howie, 2011: 146–7;
Yusuf et al., 2006: 71–2). Growth of bond markets has been relatively slow, but by
the end of 2017, the total value of outstanding issuance was around 63 per cent of
GDP, with state or policy banks accounting for over 80 per cent of total issuance
(Wright and Rosen, 2018: 11–12). Only in July 2017 were foreign investors
allowed to trade in mainland interbank bond markets using Hong Kong accounts
under a streamlined process (International Capital Market Association, 2018).
A similar propensity for institutional learning and experimentation can be dis-
cerned in China’s approach to venture capital markets (Lin, 2015).
The financial system has gradually diversified, but banks still accounted for
81 per cent of all assets held by financial institutions in China at the end of 2017
(Wright and Rosen, 2018: 11). A key turning point occurred in the late 1990s, as
authorities sought to address high levels of accumulated NPLs by injecting capital,
transferring NPLs to asset management companies, selling minority stakes to
foreign strategic investors, and raising new funds through stock market listings
in Hong Kong. By 2003, Central Huijin Investment was formed to recapitalize
financial institutions, and in so doing became a controlling shareholder for state
banks, policy banks, and other financial entities (Central Huijin, 2017). Central
Huijin is considered the financial sector equivalent to SASAC in terms of owner-
ship of state assets. Regulatory and supervisory functions over banking and
financial institutions, however, were placed under the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC), also created in 2003. By 2007, the China Investment Corp.
(CIC) was established with an initial US$200bn to diversify use of foreign
exchange reserves—a third of the amount would be used to purchase Central
Huijin (Wu and Seah, 2008: 47, 52).
Returned to financial health in the late 1990s, plans to place policy banks on a
more commercial footing were ultimately shelved, particularly with the onset of
the 2008 global financial crisis (Kozul-Wright and Poon, 2018: 18). Going for-
ward, indications suggest that China will ‘make full use of the advantages of
development finance’ in supporting the country’s ambitious foreign economic
policy focused on regional infrastructure building known as the ‘Belt and Road’
initiative (PBoC, 2018; UNCTAD, 2018). More recently, further financial sector
opening was announced, such as allowing foreign investors 51 per cent share-
holdings for securities, fund management, futures, and personal insurance
companies—with this foreign equity restriction to be removed in three years
(Zhu, 2018).
For the purposes of this chapter, it is clear that Chinese leaders have made
substantial progress in institutional and policy learning in gradually refining the
role of the state in economic development: from centralized, direct, and blunt
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forms of control and planning, to relatively decentralized, indirect and more
nimble forms of ‘guidance planning’ (Heilmann, 2018: 137, 151–2). In this
transition from plan-ideological to plan-rational state, policymakers have main-
tained control through adjustments in ‘incentive alignment’ that enabled China’s
pragmatic institutional policy experiments—this has drawn surprising parallels
with the corporate venture capital model in which venture capitalists invest in
start-ups to experiment and learn outside established corporate norms and organ-
izational boundaries (Gilson and Milhaupt, 2011: 270).
To further make the case for China’s developmental state orientation,
Section 3.3.2 briefly examines features of its inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) regime and the ‘Made in China 2025’ plan, which appear to actively use
‘open-economy’ industrial policy tools to push for upgrading and diversification.
3.3.2 Open-economy Industrial Policy Features
China’s strong export push and ability to attract FDI inflows since the early 1990s
has been subject to much policy analysis and debate in terms of the developmental
impact of joining global value chains. Thus, while China’s export orientation is
widely known, its efforts to simultaneously and selectively conduct import sub-
stitution activities has received little attention. These latter aspects have been
an important part of China’s overall development strategy and can be found in
its so-called Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (guidance cata-
logues), which provides for different treatment of FDI inflows in different sectors
in terms of incentives, market access, and ownership restrictions. Long recognized
as a key instrument in China’s industrial policy toolbox (Poon, 2014: 24; USTR,
2018), most existing studies examine the guidance catalogues from a narrow
commercial, legal, or national security perspective, rather than for the purposes
of understanding China’s processes of institutional learning related to catch-up
economic development.
First introduced in 1995, the FDI catalogues were issued amidst rising FDI inflows
and have been revised seven times: in 1997, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2017.
The guidance catalogues are unlike most other policy documents insofar as they
consist only of line after line of production learning objectives of varying technical
specificity. Each ‘line item’ is organized by classification (encouraged, restricted,
prohibited) and by industry (agriculture, manufacturing, services) sub-sector. Put
simply, encouraged sub-sectors are eligible for policy incentives, whereas restricted
or prohibited sub-sectors are deemed too sensitive and are generally closed to FDI
inflows. Activities not found among line items under the three classifications are
considered ‘permitted’ (neither provided incentives nor protected).
Table 3.2 highlights two features of the guidance catalogues: line items that
contain foreign equity ownership ceilings (Table 3.2A), and line items that contain
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Table 3.2 FDI guidance catalogue: ownership and production capacity features
A. Line items with foreign equity restrictions by classification (1995–2017)
Classification FDI guidance catalogues
1995 1997 2002 2004 2007 2011 2015 2017
Encouraged with foreign equity ceilings 20 20 41 42 61 50 21 0
Restricted 111 111 74 77 86 79 38 35
Prohibited 28 28 32 33 39 38 36 28
Total 159 159 147 152 186 167 95 63
B. Electronics: Integrated circuits
Line item FDI guidance catalogues
1995 1997 2002 2004 2007 2011 2015 2017
Design and large-scale manufacture of integrated circuits with line width of: (microns) <0.35 <0.35 <0.35 <0.35 <0.18 <0.18 <0.028 <0.028
Catalogue classification Encouraged
Equity restrictions None
C. General machinery: Truck cranes
Line item FDI guidance catalogues
1995 1997 2002 2004 2007 2007 2011 2011 2015 2017
Manufacture of truck cranes with lifting capacity of (tons): <50 <50 <50 <50 <300 >300 <400 >400 >400 >400
Catalogue classification Restricted Encouraged Restricted Encouraged
Equity restrictions No FDI allowed Joint venture None
D. Special-purpose machinery: bulldozers
Line item FDI guidance catalogues
1995 1997 2002 2004 2007 2007 2011 2011 2015 2017
Manufacture of bulldozers, horsepower <320 <320 <320 <320 <320 >520 (+design) <320 >520 (+design) >520 (+design) >520 (+design)
Catalogue classification Restricted Encouraged Restricted Encouraged
Equity restrictions No FDI allowed Joint venture None
Source: Poon (2019).
production capacity features (Table 3.2B, 3.2C, 3.2D). In terms of the former,
line items classified as restricted and prohibited are considered as implying
foreign equity ceilings (if not explicitly outlined), but line items classified as
encouraged can also have foreign equity ceilings explicitly included. As seen in
Table 3.2A, adding these together provides a sense of total foreign equity
ceilings in each version of the guidance catalogues over the years: the number
rises to a peak of 186 in 2007, before declining rapidly to sixty-three in 2017,
with the number of encouraged line items with foreign equity ceilings dropping
to zero. Although these ceilings remain for line items in restricted and prohib-
ited sectors, it was over twenty years before ceilings in encouraged line items
were completely dropped.
Tables 3.2B, 3.2C, and 3.2D provide a sense of individual encouraged line items
that also contain production capacity specifications. These tables are a compil-
ation of a single line item from an individual industrial sub-sector across each
version of the guidance catalogues, along with associated classification and explicit
ownership limits. This aspect of the guidance catalogues draws a close comparison
with Taiwan’s use of fiscal incentive schemes to promote diversification and
upgrading of production capacities over time by raising the product-specific
technical threshold at which foreign-invested firms would be eligible to receive
policy incentives.
The most straightforward cases are line items that involve sophisticated tech-
nologies in pillar sectors where Chinese production capacities have been limited,
or in ‘strategic’ sectors with high levels of state ownership. Table 3.2B shows the
rising product-specific technical thresholds for foreign investment in the design
and large-scale manufacture of integrated circuits (ICs). The line item is only
‘encouraged’ throughout all the guidance catalogues with the technical threshold
increasing in capability in 2007, when production of ICs with line width of ‘less
than 0.35 microns’, was raised to IC production with line width of ‘less than
0.18 microns’ (and raised again in the 2015 guidance catalogue). Due to limited
indigenous Chinese production capacities, there were no foreign ownership equity
ceilings included with this line item.
More complex examples of individual line items can be found in pillar indus-
tries where there is already significant existing domestic production capacity.
Tables 3.2C and 3.2D compile the respective line items related to the manufacture
of track cranes with specified lifting capacity (in tons), and to the manufacture of
bulldozers with specified earth-moving capacity (in horsepower). As seen in
Table 3.2C, from the 1995 to the 2004 guidance catalogue, the manufacture of
truck cranes of ‘less than 50 tons’ is under the restricted classification. In the 2007
guidance catalogue, the technical threshold is raised to ‘greater than 300 tons’ for
this line item under the encouraged classification, while investment in truck
cranes with lifting capacity of ‘less than 300 tons’ is restricted. By 2011, this
arrangement is maintained but the technical threshold is increased to greater/less
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than 400 tons. The 2015 and 2017 catalogues maintain the same technical
threshold for this line item under the ‘encouraged’ classification, while that
previously under the ‘restricted’ classification is removed. In terms of foreign
equity ceilings, no FDI is permitted for this line item in the 1995 and 1997
guidance catalogues, which is changed to a joint-venture requirement in the
2002, 2004, 2007, and 2011 versions. The 2015 and 2017 guidance catalogues
include no ownership restriction for this line item.
In December 2016, the State Council, NDRC, and MOFCOM amended the
2015 guidance catalogue and further reduced the ninety-five line items with
foreign equity ceilings. Moreover, all remaining foreign equity ceilings will be
converted into an FDI ‘negative list’ (MOFCOM, 2016). The adoption of the
negative list format was formalized in the 2017 FDI guidance catalogue, which
removed foreign equity ceilings from all line items under the ‘encouraged’ classi-
fication, and further reduced line items under the ‘restricted’ and ‘prohibited’
classifications to sixty-three.
Although the use of the guidance catalogues as an FDI ‘positive list’ industrial
policy instrument seems to have ended, China’s practice of open-economy indus-
trial policy can still be seen in guidance planning practices more closely linked to
innovation (Cheung et al., 2016; Ray et al., 2016), notably the ‘Made in China 2025’
(MC2025) economic upgrading plan issued by the State Council in May 2015.
MC2025 reaffirms the importance of the manufacturing sector to China’s
national security and power, but recognizes that by global standards, China’s
manufacturing industry is large but not strong, and remains weak in areas such
as innovative capabilities, resource utilization rates, industry structure, informa-
tization, quality, and brands. MC2025 is primarily focused on achieving techno-
logical breakthroughs in ten key sectors in advanced manufacturing, including:
next generation information and communication technologies; high-end numer-
ically controlled machine tools and robotics; space and aviation equipment;
advanced rail transportation equipment; new energy vehicles, parts, and compo-
nents (Poon, 2018: 113–14).
Despite international controversy surrounding explicit import substitution tar-
gets found in MC2025 for (domestic and global) market share in the ten key areas
(Kozul-Wright and Poon, 2017), further details in MC2025 accompanying docu-
ments or sector-specific implementation plans suggest production capacity thresh-
olds found in the foreign investment guidance catalogues are also present in more
comprehensive MC2025 key technology and sector road maps, the first version
published in 2015, followed by a second version in 2017 (NMSAC, 2015; 2017).⁸
⁸ Work on the 2015 road map began in April of that year, lasted five months, and included six drafts.
The government assembled over forty-eight academicians and more than four hundred experts and
senior managers drawn from enterprises, universities, research institutes, professional and industry
associations, and relevant government departments (NMSAC, 2015).
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A specific sectoral example of the relatively detailed ‘open economy’ industrial
policy aspects embedded in the CM2025 plan is the road map for hydrogen fuel
cell vehicles (one of the three kinds of ‘new energy vehicles’), which outlines
development objectives for this sector for the period 2020–30. These objectives
include technical capacity and cost targets for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (passen-
ger car, commercial vehicle); key common technologies (hydrogen storage, con-
trol technology, critical materials, and fuel cell stacks) and critical components;
and hydrogen fuel infrastructure (refuelling stations, hydrogen delivery and
supply technologies). Targets are also established for fuel cell system production
capacity, and fuel cell vehicle deployment. Separate detailed roadmaps for
2015–30 are further provided in areas such as: vehicle hydrogen fuel cell stacks
and key components, and passenger car and commercial vehicle fuel cell system
(engine) technologies (SAEC, 2017).
Another less noticed aspect of MC2025 is its financial support policies. In order to
reduce the cost of capital for manufacturing firms, the plan seeks to expand financing
channels, while outlining specific roles for national development banks: the Export-
Import Bank of China will further boost its support for manufacturing firms
investing abroad, and the CDB will be encouraged to increase loans as a way to
‘guide’ other financial institutions to provide innovative products and services for
eligible manufacturing firms, including investments from venture capital and private
equity funds. This approach suggests that China seeks to achieve MC2025 upgrading
and reform objectives by creating a set of purpose-built investment vehicles—
so-called government (or industry) guidance funds (GGFs)—that are responsible
for allocating public funds (Kozul-Wright and Poon, 2017; Lin, 2015; Naughton,
2018: 385–6). Some consider this more market-based investment approach ‘a bold
experiment designed to improve the likelihood of success’ (Thomas, 2015).
In 2015, there were a total of 780 GGFs with capital of RMB2,183.4bn
(US$352.2bn). City-level GGFs were the most numerous, followed by provincial
level, district level, and national level. In terms of fund scale, provincial-level GGFs
led theway, followed by those at the city level, national level, and district level (Poon,
2018). Exemplifying the GGF approach, China’s state-backed Tsinghua Unigroup
recently secured RMB150bn in new financing to support upgrading of the country’s
semiconductor industry. Of that financing, RMB100bn came from CDB and
RMB50bn came from the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund
(NICIIF), a national-level GGF created in 2014 with an initial fund of US$19.5bn
(Kozul-Wright and Poon, 2017). By 2017, the distribution of NICIIF investment
along the integrated circuit production chain was: manufacturing 65 per cent,
design 17 per cent, packaging and testing 10 per cent, and equipment material
8 per cent (Wang, 2017: 9). Importantly, the apparent ‘guidance’ function of China’s
development finance appears to be similar to the ‘signalling effect’ used by devel-
opment banks in East Asian countries to mobilize resources from a wider range of
public- and private-sector financial institutions (Stiglitz and Uy, 1996: 265–6).
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3.4 Conclusion
No country has made the arduous journey from widespread rural poverty to
post-industrial prosperity without employing targeted and selective government
policies to shift the production structure towards activities and sectors with higher
productivity, better-paid jobs, and frontier technologies. Further, while govern-
ment capacities to design and implement these policies reflect specific historical
legacies, and are subject to political, informational, and technical constraints, these
are not fixed; they emerge through acquisition and learning strategies of varying
duration and degrees of contestation. China is no different, though that journey has,
to date, proceeded at a spectacular pace and has been distinct in having to design
and implement such policies as it was shedding the legacy of central planning.
An emphasis on flexibility and experimentation, in the institutions and by the
practitioners of policymaking, appears to be crucial in forging a successful path,
reflecting the realities of operating in an uncertain world where knowledge of the
best ways to promote economic growth and development is limited, and there are
diverse forms of success, contingent on national political and social cultures, on
historically determined path dependencies, and on the behaviour of ruling elites.
Experimentation, together with rules and conventions to ensure that failed
experiments are dropped rather than retained, is of particular importance for
increasing the probability of success.
The chapter has suggested that ‘pragmatic experimentalism’ has been a guiding
approach in China’s success story. In this context, policy goals are rarely of the
either/or type—growth or price stability, open or closed economy, state or private
ownership, or totally fixed or flexible exchange rates—but of various shades in
between. Rather, learning to mix objectives and instruments has been a key to that
success. An important point is that the capacities required to underpin a devel-
opmental state can be created; they do not emerge effortlessly out of existing or
traditional organizations.
There is no single model applicable to all contexts; different institutional forms
will suit particular local histories and politics. However, in the case of China, it was
able to draw on successful neighbouring experiences with a developmental state
and adapt those experiences to its specific challenges. Undoubtedly, its size has
influenced that adaptation process and unlike earlier East Asian cases, China has
had to devise its industrial strategy under the more stringent rules governing
international trade and investment in the WTO era. At the same time, China’s
own success impacts on those rules and alters the environment facing a new
generation of late-industrializing economies—particularly as China expands its
outward economic engagement. Yet, generalized lessons from China’s catch-up
growth can provide valuable insights into the processes of industrialization and
structural transformation, just as the previous cohort of East Asian countries were
often held up as reference models of successful heterodox economic policymaking.
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Catch-up and Mission-oriented Innovation
Mariana Mazzucato
4.1 Introduction
Innovation has not only a rate but also a direction: the twenty-first century is
becoming increasingly defined by the need to respond to major social, environ-
mental, and economic challenges.¹ Sometimes referred to as ‘grand challenges’,
these include environmental threats like climate change, demographic, health and
wellbeing concerns, as well as the difficulties of generating sustainable and inclu-
sive growth. These problems are ‘wicked’ in the sense that they are complex,
systemic, interconnected, and urgent, requiring insights from many perspectives.
Poverty cannot be solved without attention to the interconnections between
nutrition, health, infrastructure, and education, as well as redistributive tax policy.
Grand challenge thinking is being applied both in developed and developing
countries, with some of the most interesting experiments around sustainability
being driven by the needs of emerging economies.
Turning these challenges into concrete problems that drive innovation across
multiple sectors and actors, there is much to learn from ‘mission-oriented’ policies
that in the past have been aimed at achieving specific objectives, whether landing a
man on the moon, or battling climate change (Ergas, 1987; Mazzucato, 2014,
2017). Such policies require different actors (both public and private) and differ-
ent sectors to innovate (going to the moon required innovation in aeronautics,
robotics, textiles, and nutrition). At the same time, to be successful, they must
enable bottom-up experimentation and learning so that the innovation process
itself is nurtured through dynamic feedback loops and serendipity (Rodrik, 2004).
Examples of such direction-setting policies abound, including different tech-
nology policy initiatives in the United States (Mowery et al., 2010), France (Foray
et al., 2009), the United Kingdom (Mowery et al., 2010), and Germany (Cantner
and Pyka, 2001). Mission-oriented policies are not just about throwing funds at
problems but doing so in specific ways. It is for this reason that it is useful to study
how specific mission-oriented agencies and organizations have worked, whether
¹ This chapter is a revised version of Mazzucato (2018), ‘Mission-Oriented Policies: Challenges and
Opportunities’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 27(5) (Special Issue: Mission-Oriented Innovation
Policy and Dynamic Capabilities in the Public Sector).
in military R&D programmes, or in areas like health (Sampat, 2012), agriculture
(Wright, 2012), or energy (Anadon, 2012). In these examples, the relevant organ-
izations made choices on what to fund, going against the more classic position that
the point of policymaking is simply to level the playing field. Indeed, these
agencies, and the wider programmes around them, tilted the playing field through
missions aimed at a public objective, with other policies needing to be introduced
to make it more profitable to move in that direction (e.g. the US land grant system,
or tax reliefs for green investments) (Mazzucato and Perez, 2015).
In this chapter I focus on the broader lessons from mission-oriented pro-
grammes for innovation policy—and indeed policies aimed at investment-led
growth. While much has been written about case studies on missions (Mowery
et al., 2010), this has not resulted in an alternative policymaking toolkit.
Missions—at the least—require those tools to be just as much about market
co-creating and market shaping, as they are about market fixing (Mazzucato,
2016; Nelson, 2011).
The chapter first reviews the characteristics of mission-oriented programmes
before looking at key features of those programmes that can provide lessons.
A discussion follows on how to choose and implement mission-oriented policies,
with an example, and the final section concludes.
4.2 From Technological Feats to Wicked Problems
Mission-oriented policies can be defined as systemic public policies that draw on
frontier knowledge to attain specific goals, or ‘big science deployed to meet big
problems’ (Ergas, 1987). While the archetypical historical mission is NASA
putting a man on the moon, contemporary missions aim to address broader
challenges that require long-term commitment to the development of challenges
that are as much social as technological (Foray et al., 2012). The active role being
taken by governments and transnational organizations to develop strategies for a
greener economy can be seen through a mission-oriented lens—as can those being
developed to create greater wellbeing for an ageing population, and better jobs for
modern youth (European Commission, 2011). In fact, these challenges—which
can be environmental, demographic, economic, or social—have entered innov-
ation policy agendas as key justifications for action, providing strategic direction
for funding policies and innovation efforts.
However, societal missions are much more complex because they are less
clearly defined and indeed must be co-defined by many stakeholders (how to
frame the challenge around inequality is more difficult than those around the
space race) (Foray et al., 2012). One could add that these challenges also require
big regulatory and behavioural changes at the societal/national systems level.
Nelson’s work The Moon and the Ghetto (2011) asked the demanding question
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of why innovation has resulted in such difficult feats as landing a man on the
moon, and yet continues to be so terribly disorganized and technologically
unsavvy in dealing with the more earthly problems of poverty, illiteracy, and the
emergence of ghettos and slums. He argued that while politics was partly the
culprit, the real problem was that a purely scientific and technological solution
could not solve such problems. Even at the disciplinary level there is a greater need
to combine understandings of sociology, politics, economics, and technology to
solve these problems, as well as to make the conscious decision to point innov-
ation towards them. This is exactly what a well-designed mission can achieve.
The so-called Maastricht Memorandum provides a detailed analysis of the
differences between old and new mission-oriented projects (Table 4.1).
Although the memorandum specifically focuses on mission-oriented pro-
grammes that tackle environmental challenges, its analysis applies to other con-
temporary challenges (water and food supply, energy efficiency and security,
disease, demographic change, etc.). This is because these challenges all present
similar characteristics, particularly that new technological solutions to address
them will require long-term commitment from both public and private agents,
and increasingly those in the non-profit sector. They will in most cases also
require changes in regulation and tax policies. And the diffusion of solutions to
Table 4.1 Characteristics of old and new mission-oriented projects
Old: Defence, nuclear, and aerospace New: Environmental technologies and
societal challenges
Diffusion of the results outside the core of
participants is of minor importance or
actively discouraged
Diffusion of the results is a central goal and
is actively encouraged
The mission is defined in terms of the
number of technical achievements, with
little regard to their economic feasibility
The mission is defined in terms of
economically feasible technical solutions to
particular societal problems
The goals and the direction of technological
development are defined in advance by a
small group of experts
The direction of technical change is
influenced by a wide range of actors
including government, private firms, and
consumer groups
Centralized control within a government
administration
Decentralized control with a large number
of agents involved
Participation is limited to a small group of
firms due to the emphasis on a small
number of radical technologies
Emphasis on the development of both
radical and incremental innovations in
order to permit a large number of firms to
participate
Self-contained projects with little need for
complementary policies and scant attention
paid to coherence
Complementary policies vital for success
and close attention paid to coherence with
other goals
Source: Modified version of Table 5 in Soete and Arundel (1993: 51).
-  -  65
a broad base of users requires as much attention to demand-side policies as to
supply-side ones.
The six characteristics of contemporary missions identified in Table 4.1—
diffusion of technologies, economic feasibility, shared sense of direction, decen-
tralized control by public agencies, development of both radical and incremental
innovations, and enabling complementary policies—are of pragmatic importance
for the promotion and implementation of mission-oriented policies.
A mission-oriented approach highlights the need to make a precise diagnosis of
the technological, sectoral, or national innovation system that an innovation
policy wishes to transform. The alignment of different types of capabilities is
key for the success of any mission-oriented policy. These can be described as
follows (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016a):
• Missions should be well defined. More granular definition of the technological
challenge facilitates the establishment of intermediate goals and deliverables,
and processes of monitoring and accountability. When governance is too
broad, it can become faulty, and there is a risk of being captured by vested
interests.
• A mission does not comprise a single R&D or innovation project, but a
portfolio of such projects. Because R&D and innovation is highly uncertain,
some projects will fail and others will succeed. All concerned should be able
to accept failures and to use them as learning experiences. Furthermore,
stakeholders should not be punished because of failures derived from good-
faith efforts.
• Missions should result in investment across different sectors and involve
different types of actors. In order to have highest impact, missions should
embrace actors across an entire economy, not just in one sector and not just
in the private or public realm.
• Missions require joined-up policymaking, whereby the priorities are trans-
lated into concrete policy instruments and actions to be carried out by all
levels of the public institutions involved. While these missions should
involve a range of public institutions, it is crucial that there is a strategic
division of labour amongst them, with well-defined responsibilities for
coordination and monitoring.
These considerations point to the need to adopt a pragmatic approach to
defining missions. Chosen missions should be feasible, draw on existing public
and private resources, be amenable to existing policy instruments, and command
broad and continuous political support. Missions should create a long-term public
agenda for innovation policies, address a societal demand or need, and draw on
the high potential of the country’s science and technology system to develop
innovations.
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4.3 Key Lessons from Mission-Oriented Policies
Mission-oriented policies can transform the policymaker’s tool kit. The next
section reviews ways in which mission thinking requires an alternative lens for
policymaking.
4.3.1 From Picking Winners to Picking the Willing
Missions are about setting concrete directions, which of course must be picked,
that is, chosen strategically. The choice is not whether or not to pick but how:
picking directions is not the same thing as ‘picking winners’ in the sense of picking
individual firms or sectors. It is about deciding that a transformation must occur
in society—and making it happen. The direction will require different missions,
which provide a focusing device for the different actors and sectors to collaborate
in order to concretely achieve it. Thus missions require picking the willing: those
organizations across the economy (in different sectors, including both the public
and private spheres) that are willing to engage with a societally relevant mission.
Missions are a new way to frame ‘vertical policies’. Industrial and innovation
policies require both horizontal and vertical policies working together systemic-
ally. Traditionally, industrial strategy has often focused on (vertical) sectoral
interventions. Until the end of the 1970s this consisted of various measures
ranging from indicative planning to outright nationalization of entire industries
(e.g. steel, coal, shipbuilding, aerospace).
Although certain sectors might be more suited to sector-specific strategies,
there are good reasons for avoiding a sectoral approach—particularly when
private lobbying interests may prevail in negotiating specific provisions with the
government (Buchanan, 2003), negatively influencing the industrial strategy with
indirect measures (e.g. tax credits) that potentially waste public funds and create
little if no additionality in terms of new investment. The patent box tax policies
being adopted in many countries are an example of these misconceived policies
since there is no reason to lower tax on monopoly profits and it has been shown to
have little effect on additional research investment (Griffith et al., 2010).
A mission-oriented approach uses specific challenges to stimulate innovation
across sectors. Through well-defined missions—focused on solving important
societal challenges related to climate change and environmental quality, demo-
graphic changes, health and wellbeing, mobility issues, etc.—governments have
the opportunity to determine the direction of growth by making strategic invest-
ments throughout the innovation chain and creating the potential for greater
spillovers across multiple sectors, including low-tech sectors (Foray et al., 2012).
Germany’s Energiewende is an interesting case of the use of an integrated
strategy that addresses several sectors and technologies in the economy and
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enables bottom-up learning processes. With its missions to fight climate change,
phase out nuclear power, improve energy security by substituting imported fossil
fuels with renewable sources, and increase energy efficiency, Energiewende is
providing a direction to technical change and growth across different sectors
through targeted transformations in production, distribution, and consumption.
This has allowed even a traditional sector like steel to use the ‘green’ direction to
renew itself. While the steel industry in many countries remains relatively low tech
and subsidized, it was the Energiewende policy that placed pressure on steel to lower
its material content. It did so through the use of a ‘reuse, recycle, and repurpose’
strategy (BMUB, 2016). In this sense, mission-oriented policies should be focused
on ways to provide sectors with transformation policies—fewer subsidies and more
focused policies that reward investment and innovation that meet a need.
4.3.2 From Fixing Markets to Actively Co-shaping
Missions do not fix existing markets but create new markets. Indeed, this trans-
formation ambition can be seen in the explicit remit of mission-oriented organ-
izations. Examples below from three classic mission-oriented agencies exemplify
the point: the organizations are not about fixing existing markets but creating new
landscapes:
• NASA: to ‘[d]rive advances in science, technology, aeronautics, and space
exploration to enhance knowledge, education, innovation, economic vitality,
and stewardship of Earth’ (NASA 2014 Strategic Plan).
• DARPA: ‘Creating breakthrough technologies for national security is the
mission of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’.
• National Institute of Health (NIH): to ‘seek fundamental knowledge about
the nature and behaviour of living systems and the application of that
knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability.’
By breaking new ground, and bringing together different players, they are better
able to attract top talent as it is an ‘honour’ and interesting to work for them. By
actively creating new areas of growth they are also potentially able to ‘crowd in’
business investment by increasing business expectations about where future
growth opportunities might lie (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015).
This proactive approach, whereby the state leads and business follows, is
different from the traditional approach where the state is at best a fixer of markets.
The market-fixing approach has its roots in neoclassical economic theory, which
asserts that competitive markets will bring about optimal outcomes if left to
their own devices. This theory justifies government ‘intervention’ in the economy
only if there are explicit market failures, which might arise from the presence
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of positive externalities (e.g. public goods like basic research, which require
public-sector spending on science), negative externalities (e.g. pollution, which
requires public-sector taxation), and incomplete information (where the public
sector may provide incubators or loan guarantees).² On top of this, the literature
on systems of innovation has also highlighted the presence of system failures—
for example the lack of linkages between science and industry—requiring the
creation of new institutions enabling those linkages (Lundvall, 1992).
And yet missions exemplify a more proactive approach to policy than fixing
suggests. It has required public organizations to be responsible for actively shaping
and creating markets and systems, not just fixing them; and for creating wealth,
not just redistributing it.
In a market failure framework, ex ante analysis aims to estimate benefits and
costs (including those associated with government failures), while ex post analysis
seeks to verify whether the estimates were correct and the market failure success-
fully addressed. In contrast, a mission-oriented framework, which actively
co-creates new markets, requires continuous and dynamic monitoring and evalu-
ation throughout the innovation policy process. The notion of public value
becomes a more useful term than a public good since missions may be trans-
formative across the entire value chain and not be limited to narrow areas where
positive and negative externalities exist.
4.3.3 From Fearing Failure to Welcoming Experimentation
Systemic mission-oriented policies must be based on a sound and clear diagnosis
and prognosis (foresight). This requires not only the identification of missing
links, failures, and bottlenecks—the weaknesses or challenges of a national system
of innovation—but also recognition of the system’s strengths. Foresight is neces-
sary in order to scrutinize future opportunities and identify how strengths may be
used to overcome weaknesses. This diagnosis should be used to devise concrete
strategies, novel institutions, and new linkages in the innovation system (Mazzucato,
2016a).
In its most general form, the mission-oriented framework differentiates
between public policies that target the development of specific technologies in
line with state-defined goals (‘missions’) and those that aim at the institutional
development of a system of innovation (Ergas, 1987). The state must therefore be
able to learn from past experiences in mission-oriented innovation policy.
² Reviews of the impact of positive externalities and incomplete information on innovation finan-
cing are provided in Hall (2002), Hall and Lerner (2010), and more recent evidence is reviewed in Kerr
and Nanda (2015). The role for government in the face of negative externalities (climate change) is laid
out in Jaffe et al. (2005).
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Systems and eco-systems of innovation (sectoral, regional, and national)
require the presence of dynamic links between the different actors and institutions
(firms, financial institutions, research/education, public-sector funds, intermedi-
ary institutions) as well as horizontal links within organizations and institutions
(Freeman, 1995). What should also be emphasized, and has not been thus far in
the literature on innovation systems, is the nature of the actual actors and
institutions required for innovation-led growth (Mazzucato, 2016a).
In order to stimulate the innovation process by shaping and creating technolo-
gies, sectors, and markets, missions require dynamic relationships to be developed
which create trust between actors. It is essential in this process for lead public
organizations to galvanize the interests of relevant actors and organize themselves
so that they have the ‘intelligence’ to think big and formulate bold policies that
create a sense of ownership amongst diverse public, private, and academic stake-
holders. It is also crucial to be able to implement the policies by coordinating the
efforts of this network of stakeholders through the state’s convening power,
brokering of trust relationships, and use of targeted policy instruments.
Because innovation is extremely uncertain, the ability to experiment and
explore is key for a successful entrepreneurial state (Hirschman, 1967; Rodrik,
2004, Mazzucato, 2013). Therefore, a crucial element in organizing the state for its
entrepreneurial role is absorptive capacity or institutional learning (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990; Johnson, 1992). Government agencies learn in a process of
investment, discovery, and experimentation that is part of mission-oriented
initiatives. This requires ‘dynamic capabilities’ in the public sector.
Other authors have referred to processes of experimentation and learning
process as ‘smart specialisation’ (Foray et al., 2009).³ However, smart specializa-
tion is most commonly used in connection with a market failure framework,
meaning that it is seen as a discovery process for the identification of bottlenecks,
failures, and missing links (that is, market failures or market gaps). Smart spe-
cialization would be more usefully employed in connection with a systemic
perspective on innovation policies.
Key to mission-oriented innovation is the exploration of the characteristics of
innovation agencies that must be in place so that they can welcome uncertainty
and build explorative capacity. Breznitz and Ornston (2013) focus on the role of
peripheral agencies, arguing that when they become too central and well funded
they lose their flexibility and ability to think outside the box. While flexibility is
undoubtedly important, it is also true that some of the most important innovation
agencies in Europe and the United States were not so peripheral, as can be seen
from DARPA’s continued success in recent years. What seems to be more
important for these organizations is a degree of political independence. Indeed,
Italy’s public holding company IRI (the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale
³ See also also Foray (2018).
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established in 1933) had its most successful phase before the 1970s when it was
public. The key lesson is that it is not about public or private, but what kind of
public and what kind of private.
4.3.4 From a Focus on Quantity of Finance
to a Focus on the Quality
If we focus on the market-making role, rather than the market-fixing one of
missions, it also becomes clearer why they have required public investments by
mission-oriented institutions along the entire innovation chain, not just basic
upstream research. Institutions like the National Science Foundation (NSF) have
been critical to basic research, institutions like DARPA and Advanced Research
Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) to translational research, and institutions like
the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) to long-term finance for companies.
Block has called this distributed network of different state actors the ‘developmental
network state’ (Block and Keller, 2011). Better understanding of the distribution of
public agencies, their positioning across the innovation chain, and the balance
between directive and bottom-up interactions is a key area for future study.
From 1936 to 2016, cumulative R&D expenditure by NIH amounted to more
than US$900 billion (in 2015 dollars), and since 2004 has exceeded US$30 billion
per year. Perhaps unsurprisingly, research shows that around 75 per cent of the
most innovative drugs on the market today (the so-called ‘new molecular’ entities
with priority rating) owe much of their funding to the NIH (Angell, 2005).
Moreover, NIH’s share in total US federal outlay on R&D has increased year on
year over the past fifty years. This suggests that the surge in absolute NIH-related
R&D expenditure cannot simply be conceived as resulting from a generalized and
proportional increase in total R&D expenditure by the government during down-
turns, or as simply levelling the playing field. Instead, it appears a deliberate and
targeted choice on where to direct public R&D funding.
Due to the short-term nature of private finance, the role of public institutions is
often to provide longer lead times and the willingness to engage with high
uncertainty. While in some countries this has occurred through public agencies,
such as DARPA and NIH mentioned above, in others, patient finance has been
provided through other institutions including publicly owned development banks,
otherwise known as state investment banks. State investment banks (SIBs) have
their historical roots in the monetary agreements of Bretton Woods and the
reconstruction plans for Europe following the Second World War. The idea was
to create an institution that promoted financial stability through a permanent flow
of finance to fund the reconstruction plan and unleash agricultural production
potential, thus preventing the deleterious effects that speculative private finance
could have on post-war economic recovery (World Bank, 2015).
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While the traditional functions of SIBs were in infrastructure investment and
counter-cyclical lending during recession when private banks restrained credit
(a classic Keynesian role), they have, over time, become more active as key players
in the innovation system. They have provided the patient capital for innovative
firms, and also focused on modern societal challenges with technological ‘mis-
sions’. For example, SIBs have notably filled the vacuum left behind by private
commercial banks since the financial crisis, more than trebling their investments
in clean energy projects between 2007 and 2012 (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016b;
Fried et al., 2012). A report by Bloomberg New Energy Finance finds that in 2013
SIBs were the largest funders of the deployment and diffusion phase of renewable
energy (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017), outpacing investment from the private
sector (Louw, 2012). Examples of ‘mission-oriented’ investments include: the
European Investment Bank’s €14.7 billion commitment to sustainable city pro-
jects in Europe (Griffith-Jones and Tyson, 2012), the efforts of KfW to support
Germany’s Energiewende policies through the greening and modernization of
German industries and infrastructures, China Development Bank’s investments
in renewable energies, and the technology fund put in place by BNDES (2012) to
channel resources toward selected technologies in Brazil (FUNTEC).
4.3.5 Engagement
Understanding how the definition of missions can be opened up to a wider group
of stakeholders, including movements in civil society (as discussed by Leadbeater,
2018), is a key area of interest. Indeed, it was to a large extent the green movement
in Germany (including but not restricted to the Green Party) that led to a slow
cumulative interest in society about tackling green missions, which was subse-
quently represented in the Energiewende agenda.
Understanding more democratic processes through which missions are defined
and targeted is tied to rethinking the notion of public value. Indeed, part of
building a market-shaping and -creating framework that can guide mission-
oriented thinking beyond the market failure framework involves rethinking public
value beyond the notion of the ‘public good’. Too often the public good concept
has been used to limit and constrain the activities of public actors, creating a static
distinction between activities for business and those for policy. This means that
ambitious policies—daring to reimagine the market rather than just fixing the
public good problem—have then been accused of ‘crowding out’ private activity,
whether the accused are innovation agencies, public banks, or the BBC (Mazzucato
and O’Donovan, 2016).
But similarly, achieving public value cannot be the work only of the public
sector; hence opening up this process to include a wider set of stakeholders—
involved in the definition of missions as well as the serendipitous process of
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how to achieve them—will be an exciting new area of analysis linked to twenty-
first-century innovation policy targeting grand challenges.
4.3.6 From De-risking to Sharing Both Risks and Rewards
Missions require a vision about the direction in which to drive an economy,
focusing investment in particular areas, not just creating the horizontal (frame-
work) conditions for change. Even if this is not about ‘picking winners’ in the
classical sense, but more about ‘picking the willing’ (those organizations across
the economy interested and willing to help achieve a mission), crucial choices
must be made on which organizations to support, the fruits of which will create
some winners, but also many losers. For example, as part of Obama’s drive to
create green growth, the US Department of Energy provided guaranteed loans
to two green-tech companies: Solyndra (US$500 million) and Tesla Motors
(US$465 million). While the latter is often glorified as a success story, the former
failed miserably and became the latest example in the media of a government
being inefficient and unable to pick winners (Wood, 2012). However, any venture
capitalist will admit that for every winning investment (such as Tesla) there are
many losses (such as Solyndra).
And these types of investments are often those that private venture capitalists
are not willing to make due to their exit-driven model that seeks short-term
returns (usually three-to-five-year cycles). In many sectors, venture capitalists
have entered only after decades of public investment (e.g. NIH in biotech, or the
role of SBIR in other areas, as discussed in Block and Keller, 2011). And some have
argued that it is precisely this short-termism that has caused problems in sectors
like biotechnology (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011; Pisano, 2006).
But there is another side to the story. If public funds do act as public forms of
venture capital (VC), then there is reason to argue that the rewards should be
proportional to the risks actually taken. In making their downstream investments,
therefore, governments can learn from portfolio strategies of venture capitalists,
structuring investments across a risk space so that lower-risk investments can help
to cover the higher-risk ones. In other words, if the public sector is expected to
compensate for the lack of private VC money going to early-stage innovation, it
should at least be able to benefit from the wins, as private VC does. Otherwise, the
funding for such investments cannot be secured. It may be desirable to allow the
state to reap some of the rewards from its investments for a number of other
reasons (Mazzucato and Wray, 2015). Matching this type of spending with the
corresponding return would provide a measure of efficiency, holding policy-
makers accountable; government net spending has limits dictated by the real
resource capacity of the economy; and voters will be more willing to accept the
(inevitable) failures if they see that these are compensated by important successes.
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As discussed in Mazzucato (2013) and Laplane and Mazzucato (2018), the
public sector can use a number of return-generating mechanisms for its invest-
ments, including retaining equity or royalties, retaining a golden share of the IPR,
using income-contingent loans, or capping the prices (which the taxpayer pays) of
those products that emanate, as drugs do, from public funds (Mazzucato, 2013).
4.3.7 In Sum, a New Approach to Policymaking
The principles above can be summarized in four big questions, encapsulated by
the provocative acronym R-O-A-R. Policy must ROAR in order to lead with an
ambitious challenge, nurturing organizational capabilities, new forms of assess-
ment, and a better sharing of rewards so that innovation-driven growth can also
result in inclusive growth (Mazzucato, 2016a):
• Routes and directions: how to use policy to actively set a direction of change;
how to foster more dynamic (bottom-up) debates about possible directions
to ensure enduring democratic legitimacy; and how to choose and define
particular missions concretely, but with sufficient breadth to motivate action
across different sectors and actors in an economy.
• Organizations: how to build decentralized networks of explorative public
organizations that can learn by doing and welcome trial and error, with the
confidence and capability to lead and form dynamic partnerships with
private and third-sector partners; how to manage and evaluate progress,
learning, and adaptation; and how to use a portfolio approach to balance
inevitable failure with success.
• Assessment: how to evaluate the dynamic impact of public-sector market-
creating investments, going beyond the static ideas embodied in cost/benefit
analysis and ideas of ‘crowding in’ and ‘crowding out’, based on a richer
conception of public value creation; how to develop new indicators and
assessment tools to aid decision-making.
• Risks and rewards: how to structure new types of deals between public and
private sectors so that rewards are shared as much as risks taken.
These questions provide a starting point for the new categories of thought that
are needed, with many more questions following in relation to application in
particular contexts.
4.4 Choosing and Implementing Mission-Oriented Policies
Missions should be broad enough to engage the public and attract cross-sectoral
investment; and remain focused enough to involve industry and achievemeasurable
74  
success. By setting the direction for a solution, missions do not specify how to
achieve success. Rather, they stimulate the development of a range of different
solutions to achieve the objective. As such, a mission can make a significant and
concrete contribution to meeting a sustainable development goal (SDG) or societal
challenge.
For example, SDG 14, ‘Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas andmarine
resources for sustainable development’, could be broken down into various mis-
sions, for example ‘a plastic-free ocean’ (European Commission, 2018). This could
stimulate research and innovation in ways of clearing plastic waste from oceans, or
reducing use of plastics, innovation in new materials, research on health impacts of
micro-plastics, and behavioural research and innovation to improve recycling or
drive public engagement in cleaning up beaches. Each of these areas can be broken
down into particular ‘projects’. Missions must be chosen. Yet their success will
depend on the bottom-up processes that nurture innovation while ‘getting there’.
A culture of experimentation and risk-taking is a crucial element in the philosophy
of missions. There must be incentives to ‘think outside the box’ to come up with
new solutions to address the mission objective. This requires a portfolio approach,
based on different solutions, and a broad range of different interactions. The
objective should be addressed by multiple actors, stimulating cross-disciplinary
























Figure 4.1 From challenges to missions
Source: Based on Mazzucato (2018)
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formal sciences, social sciences, and humanities; collaborations across different
industries; and new forms of partnership between the public sector, the private
sector, and civil society organizations. Innovation itself is often characterized by
feedback effects, trial and error, and serendipity (the search for one thing leads to
the discovery of another)—picking missions that have different possibilities for
solutions will enhance the innovation dynamic itself.
How should missions be picked? The following five criteria build on the issues
raised above and are clearly set out in the European Commission report onmissions
that will be framing the new (FP) Horizon programme (Mazzucato, 2018):
(1) Bold, inspirational with wide societal relevance
Missions should engage the public. They should make clear that through
ambitious, bold action at the European level, solutions will be developed that
will have an impact on people’s daily lives. To do this, missions must outline
exciting opportunities for bold innovation—while being connected to debates in
society about what the key challenges are, like sustainability, inequality, health,
climate change, and increasing the quality of the welfare state.
(2) A clear direction: targeted, measureable, and time-bound
Missions need to be very clearly framed. While enabling long-term investments,
they need a specific target that can either be formulated in binary ways (as clearly as
whether man has reached the moon and returned back safely) or quantified (as
clearly as whether a certain percentage reduction in carbon emissions against a
baseline has been reached across manufacturing). In addition, they will need a clear
time frame within which actions should take place. This needs to be long enough to
allow the process to grow, for actors to build relationships and interact, while at the
same time being time-limited. Without specific targets and timing, it will not be
possible to determine success (or failure), or measure progress towards success.
(3) Ambitious but realistic research and innovation actions
Mission objectives should be set in an ambitious manner (taking risks), centred
on research and innovation activities across the entire innovation chain, including
the feedback effects between basic and applied research. Ambitious objectives will
ensure that researchers and innovators are challenged to deliver what would
otherwise not be attempted (‘additionality’ in research). Yet, the objective should
be framed to be on the one hand high risk but also realistically feasible, at least in
theory, within the given time period. Setting the technical objectives unrealistically
high will result in a lack of buy-in, while setting the objective too low will not
incentivize extra efforts—or provide inspiration.
(4) Cross-disciplinary, cross-sectoral, and cross-actor innovation
Missions should be framed in such a way as to spark activity across, and among,
multiple scientific disciplines (including social sciences and humanities), across
different industrial sectors (e.g. transport, nutrition, health, services), and different
types of actors (public, private, third sector, civil society organizations). Missions
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need to be chosen to address clear challenges that stimulate the private sector to
invest where it would not have otherwise invested (‘additionality’ in business).
With a problem-focused and not a sectoral lens, problems related to sustainability,
for example, will not just involve renewable energy, but could also involve
transport, strategic design, and new digital solutions, amongst others. Similarly,
problems related to health will involve innovation not only in pharmaceuticals but
also in such areas as nutrition, artificial intelligence, mobility, and new forms of
digitally enhanced public service provision.
Missions connect all relevant actors through new forms of partnership for
co-design and co-creation by focusing on targets that require multiple sectors
and actors to solve. Thus, mission-oriented innovation has the possibility of
leading to system-wide transformation.
(5) Multiple, bottom-up solutions
Missions should not be achievable by a single development path, or by a single
technology. They must be open to being addressed by different types of solutions.
A mission-based approach is clear on the expected outcome. However, the
trajectory to reach the outcome must be based on a bottom-up approach of
multiple solutions—some of which will fail or have to be adjusted along the way.
4.5 Conclusion: A Practical Approach to Implementing
Mission-Oriented Innovation Policies
The chapter opened with the observation that governments are increasingly
seeking economic growth that is smart (innovation-led), inclusive, and sustain-
able. We need to see this in the context of grand social challenges such as tackling
climate change, improving public health and wellbeing, and adjusting to demo-
graphic changes.
Missions cannot happen without new toolkits. We have discussed the need for
policy itself to be seen as market making and shaping rather than just fixing, and
the need for particular tools including the use of patient finance, and the ability of
state actors to experiment, explore, and build capacities for learning.
It is clear that such capacity will be required at different levels. These include:
• Scientific-technological capacity: an appropriate scientific and technological
knowledge base in the education and research subsystem;
• Demand capacity: latent or effective (public or private) market demand, in
terms of both purchasing power and need;
• Productive capacity: an appropriate business base (e.g. existing firms or
entrepreneurs willing to take risks to establish an innovative firm) in the
production and innovation subsystem;
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• State capacity: appropriate knowledge inside the public organizations
formulating and executing policies about the problem and solution being
targeted and/or knowledge about who-knows-what-and-how;
• Policy capacity: appropriate supply-side and demand-side policy instruments
(strategically deployed), supported by complementary policies;
• Foresight capacity: a fine-tuned diagnosis of the problem and solution,
including an analysis of the current situation and future prospects for
targeted technologies and sectors, formulated in terms of a well-defined
mission and vision.
Successful mission-oriented policy experiments require all six factors in place.
They require a more dynamic framing of key questions: less about picking or not
picking, and more about the institutional and organizational capacity of forming
broadly defined directions, through strategic deliberation. Less about static cost–
benefit metrics which so often result in accusations of ‘crowding out’ and more
about dynamic assessment criteria that can nurture and evaluate market-shaping
processes and capture the spillovers that are created across sectors.
Mission-oriented innovation policy has a major part to play in delivering
better-quality growth while addressing grand challenges, but the changes in
mindset, theoretical frameworks, institutional capacities, and policies required
are by no means trivial.
Mission-oriented innovation policy is far from being a step into the unknown.
As set out in this chapter, substantial theory, evidence, case studies, and experi-
ence have been accumulated over many decades of successful practice. It is also
important to understand the challenges associated with gathering the necessary
political commitment and public legitimacy behind such ambitious policies.
To reap the substantial benefits from this approach, what is needed is to
abandon the ideology that often informs, and misinforms, the role that the state
can play in the economy. Public, private, and third-sector actors can work
together in new ways to co-create and shape the markets of the future. We can
learn from practical policy experiences to foster a more coherent and cohesive
framework across sectors, institutions, and nations. Only in this way can
investment-led growth not only help address the growth problem but help solve
the wicked twenty-first-century challenges ahead.
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Progressive Learning of Western Technology
Kenichi Ohno
5.1 Introduction
Learning for catch-up by any nation and in any age exhibits globally common
features as well as locally unique characteristics. Japan’s encounter with the
powerful West in the nineteenth century and its subsequent rise as the first
non-Western industrialized society is already a thing of the distant past, but the
combination of universality and uniqueness was clearly visible there. Meiji Japan’s
development was not a story from a different planet. Despite the fact that its
industrialization took place in very different internal and external contexts from
those facing today’s latecomers, certain basics which are still relevant today were
fulfilled as preconditions for successful catch-up. With a proper distinction
between what was time invariant and what was specific to this particular case,
and with appropriate selectivity and modification, developing countries in the
twenty-first century can still gain valuable insights fromMeiji Japan’s experiences.
No developmental model should be copied directly and without adjustments by
any other country, whether it is Japan in the nineteenth century, Korea in the late
twentieth century, or Ethiopia at present. In this sense, the lessons of Meiji Japan
carry fundamentally the same value and quality as other model nations.
Catch-up always takes place in an international context where a nation is
confronted with diverse stimuli and formidable pressure from without. Certain
foreign things and systems must be adopted as concrete benchmarks for climbing
up the ladder. Broad and pragmatic learning that covers technology, institution
building, and policy formulation is required at all levels in the private and public
sectors. Moreover, to be successful, catch-up must go beyond just government
propaganda to become a national passion embraced by all firms and citizens and
driven by a mixture of pride and humiliation. All these features were present in
Meiji Japan’s industrialization.
Certain key elements must be present for catch-up regardless of country or age.
These constants include competent industrial human resource, competitive
domestic enterprises, industrial infrastructure, proper business institutions, and
constructive engagement between the state and the private sector. The Meiji
government created or strengthened all of these elements. But how these were
implemented was quite unique to Meiji Japan. The two prominent features are
discussed below. Additionally, the government endeavoured to establish a modern
and friendly business environment and macroeconomic stability as a background
for industrial catch-up in the context of the late nineteenth century—not perfectly
but with a fair amount of success.¹
However, external circumstances surrounding Meiji Japan were very different
from those of today. This was the age of imperialism and colonialism. Japan’s
global integration was forced by the show of American military power, not by the
friendly counsel of a well-meaning international organization. There were no
donor countries to help latecomers with knowledge acquisition or infrastructure
building. All costs for foreign advisers and turnkey projects were borne on the
Japanese side which led to a desire for ‘import-substituting’ engineers and tech-
nicians as quickly as possible. Under Western pressure, free trade was imposed
with tariff rates set to a uniform 5 per cent. Thus, there was little scope for infant
industry protection until 1911 when tariff rights were regained. FDI and external
borrowing were available, but Japan resisted both for fear of foreign dominance
(except for borrowing for war purposes). Investment funds had to be generated
domestically. Meanwhile, reverse engineering and copy production were fre-
quently practised until 1900 when the commercial law was revised to protect
Western intellectual property rights. Meiji industrialization had to proceed with
more self-reliance and greater caution against foreigners’ hostile intentions than is
the case today.
Another unique feature of Meiji Japan was the high absorptive capability of
Japanese people, enterprises, and government which facilitated rapid technology
transfer and internalization with proper local adjustments. Technology learning
progressed from simple to complex, and from foreigner dependent to Japanese
owned. A large part of this chapter is devoted to describing how this was done in
concrete projects, business decisions, and policy measures. Possible reasons for
Japan’s high absorptive capacity are explored from a historical perspective. Within
fifty years of forced opening, Japan, formerly a backward agro-society, emerged as
one of the most advanced economies of the world by the early twentieth century.
This internal capacity of Meiji Japan was truly remarkable, and offers a compelling
reason for not copying its policies to another developing country, apart from the
obvious differences in age and international conditions.
¹ Business climate and the macroeconomy of Meiji Japan are beyond the purview of this study.
Suffice it to say that the Meiji government rapidly introduced a large number of Western systems
including the metric standard, banking, business education, commercial law, joint-stock companies,
and the stock exchange. Inflation surged in early Meiji, and it took many years for the government
to settle on the type of monetary system most suitable for Japan. The Bank of Japan was created as
a sole central bank in 1882 and the silver standard was replaced by the international gold standard
in 1897.
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5.2 Rapid Industrialization and Westernization
From the early seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan
was ruled by the samurai (warrior) government of the Tokugawa family which
governed from Edo (present-day Tokyo). Japan then was an internationally
isolated feudal society² with its production mainly based on peasant agriculture.
As the nineteenth century dawned, Western powers began to approach Japan for
diplomacy and trade but the samurai government refused to deal with them.
Then, in 1853, an American military fleet (the Black Ships) commanded by
Commodore Matthew C. Perry entered the Bay of Edo to demand the opening
of Japanese ports with a display of cannon fire. The following year, Japan was
obliged to sign treaties of ‘amity’ with five Western powers which permitted port
calls by foreign ships. Four years later, in 1858, Japan was forced to conclude
‘unequal’ commercial treaties with the West under which it lost the right to set
its own tariff rates or charge foreigners with criminal offences. Through this
humiliating experience, Japan found itself a backward nation which was no
match for Western economic or military might. A decade of political struggle
and military conflicts ensued, which toppled the samurai government and
established a new one that considered rapid Westernization and industrializa-
tion as paramount national goals. The new Japan was officially ruled by Emperor
Meiji but actually was run by former young samurais who ended the Tokugawa
rule by military means.
Meiji Japan (1868–1912) set itself the targets of political modernization, indus-
trialization, military build-up, and correcting the unequal commercial treaties. All
of these were eventually attained. In less than half a century after the forced
opening of ports, it succeeded in vigorously importing Western systems and
technology, transforming itself into a ‘modern’ state boasting a Western-style
constitution, parliament, laws, courts, cabinet, ministries, military, police, and
local governments (Banno and Ohno, 2010, 2013). In the economic arena, an
industrial revolution in light manufacturing was achieved in the 1890s (Minami,
1986; Hara, 1999). By the early twentieth century, Japan had overtaken the United
Kingdom as the world’s top exporter of cotton textile products. In the military
sphere, Japan defeated the Qing Dynasty of China (1894–5) and the Romanov
Dynasty of Russia (1904–5), and secured control over Korea and a small part of
North-eastern China. As Japan’s political, economic, and military standing rose,
Europe and America agreed to revise the unequal commercial treaties in steps
with the complete restoration of tariff and court rights achieved in 1911. After the
² There is a debate regarding whether the Edo society should be classified as feudal. Here, we define
feudalism simply as a leader–follower relationship based on provision of land to govern. The Tokugawa
shogun, wielding unrivalled power, freely allocated and reallocated land to govern to regional samurai
lords (daimyo) and in turn required absolute loyalty and obedience from them.
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First World War (1914–18), Japan was invited to major international conferences
as one of the Big Five along with the United Kingdom, the United States, France,
and Italy.
Meiji Japan’s emergence from an agro-based backward latecomer to one of the
most advanced nations in the world was accompanied by a fast and broad
absorption of Western technology and its local adjustments, and high-quality
human capital which made this possible.
More specifically, as domestic capability steadily rose, one prominent aspect of
Meiji Japan’s technology absorption was progression from easy to complex in
both content and method of technology learning (Uchida, 1990). This situation
will be amply and concretely demonstrated in the rest of this chapter. Another
essential feature was a happy blend of strong private dynamism and (mostly)
appropriate industrial policy. This was true not only in the late nineteenth
century, but also in the post-Second-World-War period when Japan recorded
another rapid growth, this time based on heavy industries and high technology
(Ohno, 2018). In both periods, private dynamism was the main engine of growth
while policy played an important supporting role. Another unique factor was the
long co-existence of traditional and modern industries and their parallel devel-
opment and interaction (Nakamura, 1997; Odaka, 2000). Old industries from the
Edo period were not wiped out by the intrusion of superior Western technology.
This was possible partly because Japan and the West belonged to entirely different
cultural spheres with dissimilar food, clothing, and housing, and also because
Japanese traditional industries selectively adopted new technology to improve and
scale up production.
5.3 Historical Background
The natural question is: where did Japan’s private dynamism and relatively wise
government come from? For this, a historical perspective is crucial. The answer
must be found in the periods leading up to the Meiji period, not just in what the
Meiji government did in terms of technology transfer or engineer training.
Before delving into concrete ways of technology learning, this section reviews
the preconditions for the Japanese industrial revolution which had been pre-
pared before Meiji. It also explains why today’s developing countries are advised
not to directly copy the policy menu of Meiji Japan, not only because external
conditions have changed greatly since the late nineteenth century but also
because many of the latecomers today lack the internal preparation for technology
learning which Meiji Japan had.
Umesao (2003) advances a hypothesis that Japan’s unique geographical pos-
ition generated social dynamism throughout its recorded history of almost two
millennia. According to him, Japan—just like Britain—is physically separated
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from the Eurasian Continent by a narrow strait. This allowed it to import the
culture and systems of high civilization with relative ease while avoiding or
minimizing military invasion from outside. Enjoying external stimuli under
efficient defence, society could evolve continuously without being destroyed or
severely damaged by foreign invaders. The Japanese state, which first emerged in
the fourth century , evolved sequentially from strong central power to decen-
tralization, feudalism, the rise of local economic activities, and finally capitalism,
unlike societies on the Eurasian Continent which were prone to attacks and even
annihilation by violent nomadic peoples every few centuries. Umesao believes that
Japan’s unique geography and the resulting cumulative history prepared condi-
tions for strong economic growth, and that its industrialization proceeded in
parallel with that of the West rather than by just copying others.³
Shiba, in historical essays published over 1986–96, points to Japan’s status as an
island nation as the major factor shaping the Japanese people, making them
curious and eager to accept foreign ideas and objects but only after adjusting
them to Japanese tastes and mindset. The other key shaping force identified by
Shiba is the samurai spirit whose highest value is honour, not personal gain or
family prosperity. Japanese people want to live and die honourably, avoiding
shame.
Maegawa (1998) observes that, in general, an encounter with the powerful West
often weakens or even destroys an indigenous society but it may also lead to its
activation and dynamism. In the world system, the centre (large nations and
international organizations) imposes its rules on the peripheries (latecomers),
forcing them to adopt the norms created by the strong. The peripheries look
helpless and passive in the face of external pressure. However, Maegawa argues
that a latecomer is not really weak if it controls the type, terms, and speed of the
importation of foreign things, using them to stimulate the existing society for new
growth. Even as foreign elements are added, the basic structure of the indigenous
society can and should remain intact. A nation that does this is said to manage
global integration adroitly. Meiji Japan is regarded as a prime example of this feat,
which Maegawa calls translative adaptation.
What is the mechanism by which long and evolutionary history forges a nation
capable of absorbing foreign elements effectively without losing national identity?
Umesao is reticent on this question, and we can list only some hints (Ohno, 2018).
Frequent mergers of domestic and foreign elements make the society unafraid of
and resilient to external shocks, and at the same time flexible enough to change. It
will also learn appropriate methods and procedures for mixing two cultures.
³ Umesao’s hypothesis was first presented in a Japanese article published in 1957. He terms it an
‘ecological view’ but, as explained here, it is more concerned with Japan’s particular geography which
permitted an uninterrupted social evolution. The view that Japan’s long history, especially the existence
of feudalism prior to Meiji, prepared conditions for industrialization is echoed by two oriental scholars
of Western origin, Karl Wittfogel (1957) and Edwin Reischauer (1978).
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Moreover, the mindsets of both the ruler and the ruled are inculcated by the
institutional memory of the long past to admire behaviours that preserve the
nation against short-term crises. Heroic deeds are told and re-told through books,
poems, songs, and theatrical arts in which the hero laments the cruel fate but selects
the action that best serves the nation and its future generations. Japanese people
adore Yoshitsune, a young and splendid samurai leader in the twelfth century who
won dazzling victories but was cornered by his jealous brother to his tragic death,
as a model samurai who performed duties without clinging to self-interest. There
are many other heroes and heroines remembered by all generations. Spiritual
values such as hard work, honesty, perseverance, high aspiration, sacrifice, and
long-term vision are esteemed. Japanese national leaders, government officials, and
business people are naturally affected by this socio-cultural tradition.
When feudal Japan was confronted by Western powers in the middle of the
nineteenth century, this historically generated national mindset was fully at work.
In politics, the previously uncontested authority of the Tokugawa family began
to crumble after the unequal commercial treaties were signed with the West
without the emperor’s approval, and domestic opponents of the treaties were
brutally suppressed through execution and imprisonment. From around 1860,
the legitimacy of the Tokugawa government was openly challenged, leading to
several years of intensive debates and fights over new political leadership and the
wisdom of foreign trade. Even in this fierce competition, opposing camps often
cooperated over a common goal of avoiding colonization by modifying strategies
and re-forming partnerships rather than clinging to their original positions with
an unwavering determination for mutual annihilation (Banno and Ohno, 2010;
Ohno, 2013). The transition from feudal Edo to modern Meiji was achieved with
surprisingly low casualties of about ten thousand warriors and soldiers. In contrast,
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars resulted in five million deaths,
and post-Second-World-War conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Nigeria, Cambodia,
Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Sudan each claimed over one million lives. One
Meiji journalist wrote: ‘Although both [Japan and France] go from one extreme
to the other, our people do so within certain bounds while the French do so
outside these bounds’ (Tokutomi, 1889).
Moderation in political and military showdown had several causes. Fights over
political leadership and international trade were restrained by the rise of National
Study (kokugaku) which strengthened Japanese national identity,⁴ nationalism
against foreign colonizers, the emerging rich and intellectual classes who preferred
moderation to extremism, and popular discontent with the outdated policies and
⁴ Historically, Japanese academic research had long been dominated by imported ideas of Buddhism
and Chinese philosophy. In the Edo period, however, respect for and study of Japan’s ancient beliefs
and literature emerged with Keichu, Kamono Mabuchi, Motoori Norinaga, and Hirata Atsutane as
leading scholars. When the US Black Ships arrived in 1853, kokugaku quickly turned from academic
research to the political ideology ‘respect Emperor and repel foreigners’ (sonno joi).
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governance of the Tokugawa rule. These in turn were the results of the peaceful
and steady development of Edo society which nurtured the sense of national
oneness for common goals. For these reasons, nineteenth-century Japan could
maintain a subtle balance between fierce political competition (dynamism) and
ultimate national unity (stability) in the midst of a severe external crisis.
In the socio-economic arena, Edo Japan spawned many important develop-
ments which facilitated technology learning and industrialization in the subse-
quent Meiji period. First, smallholder family agriculture grew in both cultivated
area and land productivity. There were active public and private projects for
opening new fields and water management, and new farming methods, tools,
and organic fertilizers (dried fish) were introduced to boost quality and yields.
Second, nationally integrated markets and transport systems for rice (tax base) as
well as various cash crops and manufactured products developed. It can be safely
said, as price data show, that Edo Japan’s domestic market was highly integrated.
Third, commerce, finance, and a wealthy merchant class emerged with Osaka as a
national economic centre. Fourth, a large number of pre-modern manufactured
goods such as sake, kimonos, ceramics, cutlery, processed food, and natural dye
were produced in virtually every han through private effort and public support.
Fifth, some regional lords even succeeded in systematically promoting agriculture
and manufacturing in their domains and increased tax revenue, even though the
central Tokugawa government was largely uninterested in and incapable of such
promotion (Ohno, 2018).
On top of all this, education became a national fad from top samurai to
commoners. For adults, official and private courses were offered in ancient
Chinese literature and philosophy as well as, in later years, Western languages,
medicine, and navigation. For children aged roughly seven to thirteen, around
twenty thousand unregulated for-profit private primary schools (terakoya)
emerged all over Japan where self-appointed teachers taught reading, writing,
and arithmetic (abacus) with flexible and individualized curriculums.
Thus, when Japan was prised open for diplomacy and trade in the 1850s by the
American Black Ships, its people and institutions were ready to absorb and
internalize new technologies and systems presented by the West. It can be said
that Japan’s re-encounter with the advanced West occurred just at the right time,
when Japanese society had evolved sufficiently and was willing to take up the new
challenge of transformative growth. The old policies and systems imposed by the
Edo government had become constraints on new growth.
5.4 Early Attempts at Technology Learning
In 1854, the Edo government made its first conscious effort to import pragmatic
foreign technology by installing Western-style armaments for coastal defence.
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Some hans also tried to replicate foreign technology by building furnaces to smelt
metals for casting cannons. Scholars of Dutch studies and traditional craftsmen
built such furnaces relying solely on descriptions in imported Dutch books, which
however were already outdated by the time they were translated.⁵Haphazard copy
production of steel and arms generally failed. Some hans also test produced
Western-style ships and steam engines from Dutch texts, but the technology
gap between their results and actual foreign ships visiting Japan was so great
that this effort had to be abandoned. Realizing the limitations of learning tech-
nology only from books, the central government and some hans reverted to
directly importing ships and firearms manufactured in the West after Japan
opened up for international trade in 1859.
The results were not so disappointing in cases where technology was transmit-
ted in the presence of foreign instructors. The construction in 1854 of a Western-
style wooden ship at Heda port in the Izu Peninsula, where Japanese carpenters
worked under Russian naval officers and shipwrights to build a new vessel for
Russians to return home, can be regarded as the first successful attempt at on-site
technology transfer. The Japanese carpenters absorbed the technology so well that
they later became skilled workers in Japanese naval arsenals and private shipyards.
Another notable case was the Nagasaki Naval Training Centre. Established in
1855, it trained the crew of Japan’s first Western-style battleship, the Kanko Maru,
which was a gift from the Dutch government. This training project was a joint
undertaking of the Dutch navy and the Edo government with daily management
entrusted to the former. Five Dutch naval officers trained 167 samurais who had
been competitively selected from all over Japan. Courses focused on standard
naval training such as navigation, artillery, and the care and maintenance of steam
engines. The Japanese crew also received on-the-job training with navigation
exercises to Kagoshima. Between 1860 and 1870, the Edo government and a
number of han governments imported a total of 166 ships from the West. It was
the graduates of the Nagasaki Naval Training Centre and two similar centres
subsequently set up in Edo and Hyogo who operated them. The importation of
different types of ships enabled the Japanese to compare and enrich their know-
ledge of warships, engines, and artillery. Similarly, the army of the Edo govern-
ment acquired skills both through the artillery it imported and the foreign military
advisers who trained students.
The Edo government also built the Nagasaki Steel Mill and Shipyard in 1857
and the Yokosuka Steel Mill in 1866 as ancillary facilities for the Nagasaki Naval
Training Centre. These facilities, which later becameMitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard
⁵ During the Edo period, the Netherlands was the only Western nation permitted to trade with
Japan under the strict control of the central government and only at Nagasaki. The only other country
that was granted trading rights with Japan was China. For this reason, Western technology entered
Japan through Dutch books and products.
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and Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, replicated Western mechanized factory production
and transferred technology to the Japanese under the supervision of foreign
engineers and technicians. Kagoshima Spinning Mill, established in 1867 by
Satsuma Han, adopted a similar approach. These early factories became a model
for the Meiji government’s programme which hired foreign advisers for construc-
tion and to guide factory operation.
5.5 Foreign Experts and Turnkey Projects
In the early years of Meiji, the new government hired from 300 to 600 foreign
advisers in any year on a project contract basis, at considerable fiscal cost, to
establish Western-style state-owned enterprises in railways, telegraphy, and silk
reeling (Umetani, 1968). Some foreign advisers received salaries higher than
that of the Japanese prime minister. Each project recruited a team of foreigners,
usually of the same nationality, with various functions, who imported virtually all
the materials required to create an exact replica of a foreign model (Kasuya, 2000).
These were turnkey projects with a foreign director supervising his fellow coun-
trymen and Japanese workers, with the Japanese side taking over operation and
maintenance after project completion.⁶ Yokosuka Shipyard, Tokyo-Yokohama
Railway, Imperial Mint, and Ikuno Silver Mine were examples of such projects.
Foreign advisers were also hired individually to fill specific technological needs at
government bureaus and agencies as well as industrial, mining, and agricultural
projects run by the Home Office and the Hokkaido Settlement Agency. Such
individual employment required greater ownership and involvement on the
Japanese side than projects entirely entrusted to foreign teams.
These turnkey projects hired Japanese workers only for unskilled or auxiliary
tasks. The Imperial Mint was directed by William Thomas Kinder who was
dispatched, along with other experts, by the British Oriental Bank to create and
manage the mint under a Japanese government contract. Its annual reports were
published in Kinder’s name. The official report of the Ministry of Industry’s
Telegraphic Service, however, was submitted in the name of the Japanese
second-in-command. The Japanese edition of the report claimed that Japanese
and foreigners shared duties equally but the English edition stated that the
Japanese worked under the supervision of foreigners. The latter was probably
⁶ Technology transfer at state-run enterprises under turnkey projects proceeded on a trial-and-error
basis rather than as a well-planned process. Masahide Yoshida, a former samurai serving the Edo
government, recounted that he had been recruited as one of the first Japanese staff of the Telegraphic
Bureau in 1869 simply because he was studying English in Yokohama. On the third day he was asked to
send and receive telegrams, of which he had no previous knowledge. He somehow learned the skill but
eventually chose to become an interpreter for the foreign adviser laying telegraphic cables between
Tokyo and Nagasaki (Uchida, 1990).
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closer to the truth, while the former version was designed to please senior ministry
officials.
The primary aim of establishing a mint, telegraphic service, railways, and
shipyards was to rapidly introduce modern industrial infrastructure comparable
toWestern models. Given the speed at which theMeiji government wished to build
them, it is not surprising that these enterprises were run by a large number of
foreigners who managed them in the same way as establishments at home. These
early projects did not always consciously aim at transferring technology to Japan.
Western countries also considered it highly desirable for Japan to build infra-
structure to Western standards. For foreign diplomats, merchants, and shipping
companies, Nagasaki and Yokosuka Steel Mills were indispensable for the repair
of their ships. Nagasaki Kosuga Dock and Takashima Coal Mine were additionally
created to repair foreign ships and replenish fuel (charcoal) under the manage-
ment of British merchant Thomas B. Glover. A request for the construction of
lighthouses and the telegraph service was made by British Consul General Harry
Smith Parkes to the Meiji government. By 1874, British engineer R. H. Branton
was commissioned, who assembled an eighty-eight-man strong team of British,
Chinese, and Filipino workers that included builders, lighthouse keepers, and boat
crews. Branton undertook construction and maintenance with all costs borne by
the Meiji government. These lighthouses ensured safe passage for foreign and
Japanese ships alike.
In the area of telegraphy, the Edo government signed an agreement with the
French government to build a telegraph service in 1866. However, this decision
was overturned by the Meiji government which chose, through the mediation of
the British Consul General, a domestic service provider. The Danish-owned Okita
Telegraph Company was awarded a contract for sole agency. By 1866, two
international telegraph lines had been laid from Europe to the Far East via Russia
and via the Indian Ocean, with Japanese telegraphic cables connecting them at the
end and extending them to Nagasaki and Yokohama, the two port cities with large
foreign settlements. This enabled foreign diplomats and merchants in Japan to
have easy contact with home.
Japanese government orders for machinery, equipment, and materials brought
handsome profits to foreign merchants, who also mediated technology transfer.
Jardine Matheson & Co. and the Oriental Bank competed over an order to build
and equip the Imperial Mint. When the latter won the contract, it not only
imported second-hand equipment from the Hong Kong Mint and sold gold and
silver for minting but also provided Japan with management expertise by hiring a
British team headed by Kinder. For any such project, foreign merchants would act
as middlemen for the import of management and technology by mobilizing
engineers and technicians from the home country.
International migration of Western engineers was also behind the prevalence of
turnkey projects abroad. As much British industrial infrastructure had been
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completed by the 1850s, the pace of building railways, ports, and other facilities
slowed down, producing a surplus of civil engineers in Britain. Needing work,
many chose to migrate to the Continent, then to British colonies and foreign lands
such as Canada, India, Australia, South Africa, and South America. Machinery
and equipment makers also turned to overseas markets. For British railway
contractors, it was customary for a supervisor who received an overseas order to
secure all equipment and materials needed, such as train track and locomotives, at
home, hire subcontractors and a team of skilled workers, then travel with them to
his destination. In 1857, a team of 160 Britons travelled to Argentina to build a
railway. A similar team came to Japan thirteen years later to lay the first railway
between Shimbashi and Yokohama.
As noted above, technology transfer was not the main purpose of turnkey
projects, but the method did provide a good training ground for Japanese workers.
It fostered new machine operators, steam engine drivers, steelworkers, and elec-
tricians. They often migrated from state-owned enterprises to the private sector or
set up their own factories, spreading Western technology that they had acquired
and contributing to the creation of Japanese enterprises with modern manage-
ment knowledge from the 1880s onwards.
As the absorption of Western technology and management progressed, turnkey
projects conducted by large foreign teams came to an end in the relatively early
years of Meiji. From around 1875, state-owned enterprises stopped hiring such
teams and, by 1880, foreign engineers had disappeared from all but a few
workplaces. Factories and facilities that had been created under management
contracts were now run by Japanese. This shift resulted partly from the strong
desire of the Meiji government to ‘import substitute’ engineers so it no longer had
to foot the expensive bill. But more important was the speed with which Japanese
workers absorbed new practical skills. Japanese enterprises did not need continued
foreign help to operate modern and complex equipment which the country had
only seen a decade or so before. There were already competent Japanese managers
and engineers who could easily replace foreigners.
5.6 Engineering Education
After the departure of the foreign advisers, Japanese engineers assumed the role of
internalizing and diffusing Western technologies in Japan. They understood the
core Western technology and could put this knowledge to practical use. They
collected the latest technical information from abroad and instructed appropriate
models to purchasing missions to be dispatched to European and American
manufacturers. After a factory was built, they supervised its operation. This
smooth transfer of Western technology owed much to the fact that Meiji Japan
trained a large number of Japanese engineers to an exceptionally high standard in
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a short period, a feat that few latecomer countries have been able to emulate. Apart
from the turnkey projects mentioned above, industrial training was realized by
sending students abroad as well as by establishing domestic institutions for
technical education and training.
Early engineers studied Western technology before a formal university and
technical education system was established. They can be divided into three types.
First, there were Dutch studies scholars from the late Edo period who relied on
imported technical books and journals. They worked for Western-style establish-
ments owned by the Edo government or various hans, and later served as
engineers for the Meiji government. Oshima Takato, who built the first blast
furnace in Japan, Takeda Ayasaburo, who built the star-shaped fort in Hakodate,
and Utsunomiya Saburo, who became Japan’s first cement manufacturer, were
among them.
Second, there were graduates from technical schools managed and taught by
foreigners. They included the Nagasaki Naval Training Centre (1855), the Yokosuka
Shipyard School (1870), the Telegraphic Service Technical Training College
(1871), the Imperial Naval Academy’s Institute for Maritime Studies (1873), and
the Railway Engineering Training Centre (1877). These institutions taught in a
foreign language—usually English and sometimes German—and transmitted
the knowledge necessary to perform assigned functions so workers could run
the business after foreign management left. The graduates later worked as
foremen or junior technicians in the Japanese army, telegraphic service, rail-
ways, and shipbuilding. For instance, in 1878–80 graduates from the Railway
Engineering Training Centre supervised and successfully completed the con-
struction of a railway from Kyoto and Otsu which included tunnelling through
Osaka Mountain.
The third group of early Meiji engineers were those who were sent abroad to
study by the government. The Ministry of Education and the military selected the
best graduates from educational or training institutions for continued study
abroad. They proved to be extremely good and hardworking students despite
the meagre stipends provided by the government. Returning to Japan, they
worked as senior technical experts for government ministries or for the private
sector. The very first overseas students were seven men sent to the Netherlands by
the Edo government to learn military navigation in 1862. The navy later sent
many trainees abroad from the Yokosuka Shipyard School and the Naval Acad-
emy to learn shipbuilding and arms manufacture. There were also some who
chose foreign education at their own expense, and even others who went abroad
without official permission.
By the end of the 1880s, as far as the records show, the government had
dispatched around eighty students abroad to be trained as engineers. Of these,
twenty-one studied shipbuilding, seventeen mechanical engineering, thirteen civil
engineering, ten mining and metallurgy, six arms manufacture, and four studied
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chemistry. By destination, twenty-eight were sent to the United Kingdom, twenty
to the United States, fourteen to France, nine to Germany, and eight to the
Netherlands (excluding unknowns, Uchida, 1990). They not only took formal
courses at universities but also went to renowned technical schools, received
on-the-job training at factories, or had private lessons to broaden their knowledge.
Not many Western universities at that time offered practical technical educa-
tion or acknowledged its value. In the United Kingdom, only universities in
Scotland and London had mechanical and civil engineering chairs prior to the
1840s. It was customary for a British engineer to be trained on site, first working as
an apprentice and then as an assistant. Many of the British engineers who
migrated abroad had been trained in this way. In France, there were some notable
technical institutions such as École Polytechnique, École d’Application, and École
Centrale. In Germany, each state boasted a number of technical and vocational
schools, including the mining school of Freiberg established in 1765. In the United
States, there were few technical education institutions until the first half of the
nineteenth century. Boston Tech, which later became Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, was founded in the 1860s, and at around the same time Columbia
University and Cornell University first offered civil, mechanical, mining, and
materials engineering courses. However, these technical institutions and courses
were still considered to rank below universities until the end of the nineteenth
century. It can be said that the first wave of Japanese overseas students were sent to
the right institutions for absorbing practical technical knowledge, and received
first-class training on a par with European and American engineers. It is no
surprise that they could easily replace foreigners on their return to Japan.
Meiji Japan accepted engineering, along with medicine and law, as one of the
new subjects to be studied vigorously. Unlike Western Europe, it did not look
down on engineering as an inferior subject of lower academic quality. The early
establishment of faculties of engineering at Japanese universities contributed
greatly to the country’s technological advance. Meiji Japan selectively imported
the latest and best of the engineering education which the West had created
through a century of trial and error, and combined them for the best practical—
not academic—results. This was initiated with the founding of the Institute of
Technology (Kobu Daigakko) in 1871, and courses in applied science and civil and
mechanical engineering at the University of Science.
The Institute of Technology was established by the Ministry of Industry to train
a cadre of engineers for its mining, railways, telegraphy, and construction bureaus.⁷
As the ministry did not possess the required technical expertise, it hired Henry
⁷ In 1871, Kogaku Ryo (School of Engineering) was created within the Ministry of Industry and
upgraded to a university in 1873. The university was renamed Kobu Daigakko in 1877. It was merged
with the University of Science to become the Faculty of Engineering of the Tokyo Imperial University
under the Ministry of Education in 1886.
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Dyer, a British engineer, to run the Institute under a management contract. As
rector of the Institute, Dyer was in the fortunate position to be able to design a
programme which he considered ideal by integrating theory and practice, a feature
that British engineering education lacked. The six-year programme of the Institute
included basic training in English and mathematics in the first two years, special-
ized classroom instruction in the next two years, and internship at various bureaus
of the Ministry of Industry under the supervision of foreign engineers in the final
two years. On graduating, young engineers were expected to assume positions
within the Ministry of Industry. At the University of Science, a smaller number of
graduates found employment at the Home Ministry, the Imperial Mint, and other
establishments. Three other imperial universities founded in the Meiji period—
Kyoto, Tohoku, and Kyushu—were equipped with a faculty of engineering from
the outset.
These faculties of engineering were not research oriented but dedicated solely
to transmitting Western engineering knowledge to Japanese soil. Textbooks were
all foreign, and many of the lectures and examinations were conducted in English
or German. The journals published by the Societies of Industrial, Mechanical,
and Electrical Engineering devoted many pages to overseas mission reports and
excerpts from foreign journals.
Establishment of schools to supply mid-level industrial instructors and factory
supervisors was proposed by Gottfried Wagener, a hired German engineer, and
Tejima Seiichi, a Ministry of Education official. Tokyo Shokko Gakko (Tokyo
Craftsmen School, later renamed Tokyo Kogyo Gakko or Tokyo Industrial
School) was the first to be established in 1881. It selected students aged 16 to 17
through exams and school records. Courses were first offered in mechanical
engineering and chemical engineering with other subjects added later. In early
years, special courses were also taught on how Western technologies should be
adapted to upgrade indigenous Japanese industries such as textiles, ceramics, and
brewing. Unlike the Institute of Technology, all the instructors were Japanese
except Wagener who taught ceramics and glass making. The school initially faced
administrative and financial problems but these were overcome around 1890 as
Tejima took over the top management role. In 1897, under the Technical Schools
Act, it was formally recognized as an industrial high school. Tokyo Kogyo Gakko
became Japan’s leading institute for producing industrial instructors, factory
managers, engineers, and entrepreneurs. When its campus in central Tokyo
was destroyed by the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923, the school relocated to
O-okayama where the Tokyo Institute of Technology is today.
Apart from the Tokyo campus, publicly run industrial schools were created in
Osaka (1901), Kyoto (1902), Nagoya (1905), Kumamoto (1906), Sendai (1906),
Yonezawa (1910), and Akita (mining course only, 1910), making a total of eight
schools by the end of Meiji. Subsequently, twenty-three more industrial schools
were opened by the 1940s. After the Second World War, most of them were
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converted to faculties of engineering of national universities, and many privately
run industrial schools were also established. Education offered at industrial
schools was more limited in scope than that offered at the faculties of engineering
at universities, but student quality was high. They attracted good students who
could not afford to attend a university. While university graduates normally
assumed official or academic positions, industrial school graduates went to fac-
tories and became core engineers.
Table 5.1 shows the number of Japanese engineers by type of education from
1880 to 1920. In early Meiji, the number of recognized engineers was fewer than a
hundred which caused a severe shortage of experts who could understand and adopt
Western technologies. Subsequently, university-educated engineers and industrial
school graduates grew greatly in number. By the turn of the century, engineers
employed in the private sector outnumbered those in government offices.
The sectoral distribution of engineers tells us about the leading industries of
Meiji. At the end of the Meiji period in 1911, among all engineers employed in the
private sector 513 (18.0 per cent) were in the mining sector, 300 (10.6 per cent)
were in textiles, 250 (8.8 per cent) were in shipbuilding, 231 (8.1 per cent) were in
power and gas, 186 were in commerce (6.5 per cent), 149 (5.2 per cent) each were
in railways and food processing, 106 (3.7 per cent) were in general machinery, and
104 (3.7 per cent) were in electrical machinery,
It is noteworthy that the commercial sector also employed engineers. During
Meiji, sogo shosha, or general trading houses such as Mitsui, Okura, and Takada
played a crucial role in transferring technology to Japanese corporate customers.
They made foreign trips, established overseas branches, collected technical infor-
mation from academic journals, helped their customers to choose appropriate
technologies and foreign manufacturers, and assisted in ordering, transporting,
Table 5.1 Number of Japanese engineers by type of education




Early Meiji-era engineers 61 72 – – –
University graduates 25 183 474 1,075 1,795
Industrial school graduates – 45 263 1,160 1,999
Subtotal: 86 300 737 2,235 3,794
Private organizations Early Meiji-era engineers – 17 54 34 –
University graduates – 131 385 846 3,230
Industrial school graduates – 34 389 1,963 7,138
Subtotal: – 182 828 2,843 10,368
Total Early Meiji-era engineers 61 89 54 34 –
University graduates 25 314 859 1,921 5,025
Industrial school graduates – 79 652 3,123 9,137
Grand total: 86 482 1,565 5,078 14,162
Source: Uchida (1990), p. 281.
      99
installing, and operating the equipment. They also mediated technical cooperation
agreements between Japanese and foreign firms, as explained in Section 5.7. To
perform these roles, general trading houses needed many industrial engineers.
5.7 Machinery Import and Foreign Partnership
In middle to late Meiji, Japan began to expedite technology transfer by learning
from imported machinery as well as through technical cooperation agreements.
With a growing number of Japanese engineers, it became possible for enterprises
owned and operated solely by Japanese to absorb sharply targeted foreign tech-
nologies. Some specific examples are given below.
To set up a national telephone network, engineers at the Ministry of Commu-
nications, including Oi Saitaro, a graduate of the Institute of Technology, collected
publicly available technical information, visited the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Germany to compare their telephone systems, negotiated with foreign
telephone equipment makers, and selected the kind of system suitable for Japan.
Advanced equipment had to be imported, but Japanese engineers and workers laid
the lines and managed operations without any foreign assistance. By comparison
with the introduction of telegraph services through a turnkey contract in early
Meiji, its capacity as a receiver of foreign technology had improved remarkably.
In the navy, early Meiji-era engineers trained in Britain and France, as well as
shipbuilding and armaments engineers graduating from naval technical schools,
were similarly instrumental. Throughout the Meiji period, the principal battle-
ships were imported mostly from the United Kingdom, with Japanese naval
shipbuilding and armaments engineers travelling to Britain as observers while
state-of-the-art battleships were built and readied for delivery. This provided them
with ample opportunity to learn about ship design and construction from the
British navy and shipyards. Their knowledge proved invaluable to the domestic
production of arms and support vessels by Japanese naval arsenals. Over time,
Japan acquired capacity to build even principal ships. Private shipyards such as
Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, Osaka Steel Works, and Ishikawajima also gradually
improved their ability to construct steel-hulled ships by importing machinery
and equipment. These enterprises relied on imported steel materials and compo-
nents that could not be produced domestically. Sometimes they also procured
designs from Britain (Arisawa et al., 1994).
In the textile industry, the government imported ten sets of cotton spinning
machinery, each equipped with 2,000 spindles, from the United Kingdom. After
installing and test running the equipment at state-owned mills in Aichi, the
government sold these concerns off to the private sector as ten separate cotton
mills. Engineers and technicians from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce
assisted with commercialization of these factories. Graduates of the Institute of
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Technology, employed as master engineers, built and managed Owaribo and
Miebo, two dominant mills of that early period. In the next phase, the large-
scale private cotton mills of Osaka, Amagasaki, and Kanebo were built. For this,
university-educated engineers designed factory plans, and travelled to the United
Kingdom to purchase machinery and acquire the practical skills and technology
needed (Hanai, 2000).
As these examples illustrate, technology transfer from middle Meiji onwards
occurred mainly through the import of machinery and acquisition of know-how
that accompanied such machinery. As Table 5.2 shows, machinery imports rose
significantly throughout the Meiji period. It should also be noted that foreign
machinery entered Japan at the uniform low tariff of 5 per cent imposed by the
‘unequal’ commercial treaties until Japan regained tariff rights in 1911.
Alongside machinery imports, domestic production of machinery had also
emerged. Not surprisingly, Japanese machinery in the Meiji period was inferior
in quality to Western. Moreover, in design, nearly all machines manufactured in
Japan were copies of imports. In this way Japanese producers acquired technology
arduously, gradually, and through trial and error, leading in some cases to
commercially viable domestic production.
Table 5.2 Machinery imports in the Meiji period (in 1,000 yen)




11.8 19.3 35.8 43.1 65.1 113.5 78.0
Railway
carriages
– 29.0 355.8 518.5 1,045.6 1,771.7 2,336.0
Locomotives – 72.2 408.2 1,505.4 1,963.5 1,705.8 1,156.8
Steamships 81.9 718.5 841.7 4,744.5 3,562.2 4,692.1 2,215.6




– – – – 102.5 262.2 873.9
Dynamos and
electric motors
– – – – 322.6 1,546.0 2,275.4
Machine tools – 3.0 4.5 106.1 649.1 2,404.2 2,687.9
Spinning
machines
– 71.9 784.5 3,012.1 1,330.3 1,840.8 3,608.0
Looms – 25.6 99.0 206.1 199.8 391.5 1,060.8
Total 1219.2 12,066.4 5,755.0 16,427.7 19,145.1 30,354.8 37,381.6
Note: Import of steam engines for 1883–7 does not include the value for 1883.
Source: Nihon Boeki Seiran (Japanese Statistics of International Trade), Toyo Keizai Shimposha (1935).
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The early days of electrical equipment production provide examples. Tokyo
Light Company, a distributor of imported electrical machinery, tried to encourage
domestic production of dynamos and light bulbs which it was procuring.
The company’s Senju Power Plant test purchased dynamos from Ishikawajima
Shipyard that were designed and copy produced from a catalogue under the
supervision of a certain professor, but the heat they generated distorted their
shape. Similarly, Miyoshi Electric Machine, a pioneer firm in electrical machinery,
supplied dynamos to Kobe Light Company and tram motors to the municipality
of Kyoto. In both instances the products were returned as defective. Through such
failures, Japanese industries learned that they could not rely on amateur copy
production and that Western technology had to be absorbed more systematically
with repeated trial production until it was successfully internalized.
From the 1900s, technical cooperation agreements offered a new way of trans-
ferring relatively new technology from large foreign firms of various nationalities.
In some cases, such as Japan Steel Works, Nippon Electric Company (NEC), Tokyo
Electric, and Shibaura Engineering Works, these contracts included establishment
of joint-stock companies between Japanese owners and the foreign firm.
Let us look at the case of steam turbine technology. This was a new technology
invented in 1884 by Charles Parsons in the United Kingdom. Within a decade, the
technology spread to ship engines and thermal power plants throughout the West.
Meanwhile, Japanese navy yards and private shipyards were producing their own
reciprocating steam engines and boilers. In 1905 the Japanese navy learned that
the British navy planned to adopt steam turbines in their principal ships for
increased speed. This news prompted the Japanese navy to import Curtis turbines
from the United States and install them on the Ibuki and the Aki, battleships that
were under construction at the time. The navy also acquired the patent for turbine
technology from Curtis and encouraged Mitsubishi Shipyard to acquire the
Japanese patent for Parson’s turbines. Thereafter, Mitsubishi and the Japanese
navy began their own turbine production for future ships while continuing to
import turbines for ships under construction. This was a complex way of tech-
nology transfer combining learning from imported products, the rights to patent
execution, and copy production.
Steelmaking was an area in which the Ministry of Industry had difficulties
transferring technology during the 1870s and 1880s. State-owned steel works at
the (later privatized) Kamaishi Iron Mines did produce pig iron and steel with the
assistance of hired foreign engineers, but the quality was not up to expected
standards. By that time, the United States and Germany had improved technology
greatly with open-hearth furnaces and basic oxygen furnaces which permitted the
construction of large integrated mills combining iron making, steelmaking, and
rolling processes. A strongly worded petition from the Japanese military urged
the government to import a complete set of integrated steel mills. In 1901, the
state-owned Yawata Ironworks, with technology from the German company
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Gutehoffnungshütte, was constructed. This was a turnkey contract consisting of
commercially confidential mill design, imported machinery and equipment, and
provision of German engineers and technicians. However, unlike turnkey pro-
jects in the early Meiji period, the metallurgy engineers were Japanese. Moreover,
the Japanese side chose the factory site and the type of technology to be adopted,
and made the decision to procure raw materials from China. When initial oper-
ations using the German technology failed, it was Japanese engineers who adjusted
the technology to local conditions and enabled the mill to operate successfully
(Suzuki, 2000).
The creation in 1907 of Japan Steel Works, a joint-stock company owned by
Mitsui and two British companies, Armstrong and Vickers, also originated from a
request by the Japanese military for domestic production of armour plating and
large-calibre guns for its lead ships. In this case, equipment and know-how were
entirely British, but the Japanese engineers and skilled workers, who came mostly
from naval munitions factories, quickly learned and assimilated the technology
transferred.
In electrical machinery, the following three historical circumstances led to the
establishment of joint ventures with American firms. On the Japanese side, the
revision of commercial treaties with the West around 1900, based on the principle
of equal treatment of domestic and foreign nationals, permitted foreign direct
investment in Japan for the first time. Furthermore, as the modified Japanese law
guaranteed the patent rights of foreigners, Japanese manufacturers were no longer
allowed to copy produce the latest imported goods for free. On the American side,
leading electrical equipment manufacturers had adopted a strategy of manufac-
turing new products at overseas subsidiaries.
In 1896, the Japanese government decided to adopt the American Telephone &
Telegraph (AT&T) system under its First National Plan to Expand Telephony. As
the government intended domestic production of telephone equipment, Western
Electric, which was the manufacturing arm of AT&T, first tried to form a joint
venture in Japan by acquiring the stock of Oki Electric Industry. However,
negotiations with Oki failed, prompting Western Electric to establish Nippon
Electric Company (NEC) in 1899, holding 54 per cent of the shares. NEC was
the first subsidiary of a foreign firm in Japan. Western Electric and NEC were
bound by a technical cooperation agreement that gave NEC the right of sole
agency in Japan and a monopoly on future patent re-execution rights. Western
Electric offered technical guidance to NEC, for which the latter paid roughly
2 per cent of its sales revenue. NEC initially distributed imported telephones,
then built a manufacturing plant with design and equipment imported from
Western Electric, and produced telephones by using materials and processes
satisfying international standards under the supervision of an American foreman.
All internal documents were written in English. Thus, the products and produc-
tion methods of NEC were identical to those in the United States.
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In 1905, General Electric (GE), another American giant, concluded a technical
cooperation agreement with Tokyo Electric which was similar to the one between
Western Electric and NEC, with GE acquiring 51 per cent of Tokyo Electric’s
shares. The latter had evolved from Hakunetsusha, a light-bulb manufacturer
established in 1890. As the company had been unable to establish a viable
production technology or compete with imported light bulbs from Germany, it
sought management assistance from GE, a world leader in the industry. GE’s
policy of allowing its subsidiaries to produce light bulbs under their own patents
was another reason why Tokyo Electric selected GE as a business partner. Equip-
ment and materials were imported from GE, and American engineers came to
Japan to teach manufacturing methods. Tokyo Electric’s engineers were well
trained and able to quickly master any frontline technology developed by GE.
Unlike NEC which was newly founded, Tokyo Electric was an existing company
acquired by GE as an overseas factory. But the technology transfer method was
quite similar in both cases.
Business collaboration between GE and Shibaura Engineering Works in 1907
was different from the above two cases, however: it was partial and more incre-
mental. GE acquired only 24 per cent of Shibaura’s shares while the remainder was
held by Mitsui. Technical assistance was provided through patent licensing
agreements, supplemented by sharing of R&D results, exchange of engineers,
and access to the blueprints for production equipment. In return, Shibaura paid
royalties amounting to 1 per cent of sales revenue. Mitsui opted for this technical
cooperation to catch up with rapid technological advances abroad under the
constraint of the Universal Patent Convention that now protected the patents of
foreign manufacturers in Japan. Through this collaboration, Shibaura was able to
design heavy electrical equipment by executing its rights on the GE patent and
obtain new technical information through the exchange of engineers. But this did
not give Shibaura a great technology leap, unlike the cases of NEC and Tokyo
Electric. GE’s technology was added to Shibaura’s existing technology without
fundamentally changing the character of the latter. Large dynamos continued to
be imported from GE which competed with Shibaura products. This was a case of
a patent licensing agreement supplemented by a purchase contract for machinery
and know-how.
These cases provide examples of how the latest Western technology was
introduced to Japan in the late Meiji period. Whether technical cooperation
agreements entailed an acquisition of dominant shares by foreigners depended
largely on the corporate strategy on the foreign side. Some transfers of technology
were selective and partial while others were guided by foreigners in every respect.
The latter may look like a repetition of the wholesale purchase of Western
technology practised in early Meiji, but there were important differences. First,
by the end of Meiji, Japan was importing frontline technologies which were
simultaneously being developed and adopted in the West rather than buying
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common and mature technologies as in the early Meiji period. Second, the
existence of competent domestic engineers and technicians allowed Japan to
take a significant lead in selecting, adjusting, and internalizing imported tech-
nologies instead of remaining a passive student.
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6
Catch-up and Learning in Taiwan
The Role of Industrial Policy
Wan-wen Chu
6.1 Introduction
Taiwan’s post-war economic performance has been extraordinary. Its real PPP per
capita income was only US$916 in 1950,¹ less than one-tenth that of the United
States. By 2008, Taiwan’s real per capita income had increased 22.8-fold, and by
2017 it had reached 84 per cent of the United States’ and was ranked nineteenth in
the world in terms of PPP per capita GDP.²
When the Japanese colonialists withdrew from Taiwan following their
country’s defeat in 1945, Taiwan was still a typical colonial economy, mainly
exporting sugar and rice to the protected Japanese market. Industrialization
under colonialism was limited; it supported Japanese military activities, and
the plants were mostly owned and managed by the Japanese.³ At the end of
1949, the Nationalist regime in mainland China was defeated by the Com-
munists and had to retreat to Taiwan. Fortunately, Taiwan was able to embark on
a path of sustained industrialization, rapidly reducing its reliance on primary
exports. The share of rice and sugar in Taiwan’s exports declined from 74 per cent
in 1952, to 47 per cent in 1960, and a mere 3.2 per cent in 1970,⁴ indicating the fruits
of industrialization in the first twenty post-war years.
Taiwan managed to sustain the rapid pace of development throughout the
post-war decades, and has grown from a low-income to a high-income economy.
Its GDP and per capita GNP grew at an average annual rate of 9.2 and 6.3 per cent
respectively in the first thirty post-war years, 1951–80, and 5.7 and 4.9 per cent
from 1981 to 2016 (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). It faced various challenges along the
way, but facilitated by suitable and adaptive industrial policies, it managed to
adapt to the new environment and transform itself at every turn. For example, its
¹ This is from Maddison (2010). The unit was 1990s International Geary-Khamis dollars.
² According to the IMF World Economic Outlook (July 2018), Taiwan’s PPP per-capita GDP was
US$50,293, about 84 per cent of the United States’ (US$59,501), in 2017. http://www.imf.org/external/
datamapper/PPPPC@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD.
³ For discussion of the Japanese colonial period, see Ho (1978) and Cumings (1984).
⁴ See Chu (2017: 68).
high-tech industry has become the major manufacturer of ICT (information and
communications technology) products in the world in the last two decades.⁵
This chapter will examine how and why Taiwan developed its economy suc-
cessfully in the post-war era. It will first discuss conditions at the beginning of the
Table 6.1 Major economic indicators (I), 1951–2016









1951–60 8.1 3.6 4.5 14.1 11.9 22.1 9.8
1961–70 9.7 3.1 6.8 15.4 16.5 26 3.4
1971–80 9.8 2 7.7 13.9 13.8 29.5 11.1
1981–90 7.6 1.4 6.4 7.9 6.2 10 3.1
1991–2000 6.3 0.9 5.1 8.2 5.1 10 2.6
2001–16 3.3 0.4 3.1 0.8 3.7 4.7 1.0
1951–2016 7 1.7 5.4 9.1 9.1 15.9 4.6
Note: *Figures were deflated by indexes with 2011 as the base. ** Figures before 1969 were deflated by
indexes with 1986 as the base; those afterwards were by indexes with 2011 as the base. *** Figures for
1995 and before exclude quarrying.
Sources: 1. DGBAS, http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1; http://61.60.106.109/task/sdb; http://
www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=9522&ctNode=2857; 2. CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, various
years. 3. DGBAS, http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=9522&ctNode=2857.














GDP by Industry (%)
Agriculture Industry Service
1952 213 11.3 8 –71 32.2 19.7 48.1
1960 164 16.6 11.5 –133 28.5 26.9 44.6
1965 229 17 19.4 –106 23.6 30.2 46.2
1970 393 21.7 30.4 –43 15.5 36.8 47.7
1975 978 31.3 39.9 –643 12.7 39.9 47.4
1980 2385 30.7 52.6 78 7.7 45.7 46.6
1985 3290 19.5 52.5 10,678 5.7 44.6 49.7
1990 8124 23.1 44.5 12,639 4 38.9 57
1995 12,918 25.7 46.3 9330 3.3 33.1 63.5
2000 14,704 24.4 52.2 11,218 2 30.5 67.5
2005 16,051 21.9 61 15,817 1.7 31.3 67.1
2010 18,503 20.7 71.5 23,364 1.6 31.1 67.2
2016 22,540 20.9 62.8 49,753 1.8 35.1 63.1
Sources: 1. DGBAS, http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1; http://61.60.106.109/task/sdb; http://
www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=9522&ctNode=2857. 2. CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, vari-
ous years.
⁵ See Amsden and Chu (2003).
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post-war era, and then review the various stages of development in chronological
order, from import-substitution industrialization in the 1950s, through export
promotion and upgrading in the 1960s and 1970s, to entry into the high-tech
sector from the 1980s, and to liberalization and globalization subsequently.
6.2 Factors Favourable to Development
The Nationalist government that took over Taiwan in 1945 after fifty years of
colonial rule encountered difficulties because state and society did not understand
each other. Though Taiwan’s economy had been badly affected by the war,
however, there were some factors that were favourable to economic development
in the early post-war period.⁶ The Japanese colonialists had built modern infra-
structure and laid the foundations for subsequent modernization. US military and
economic aid provided crucial political support and much needed resources to
stabilize the economy and the regime. But it was up to the Nationalist government
to build up the infrastructure to make post-war growth possible. This confirms the
structuralist theory of development which argues that it is necessary for the state
to play an active role to substitute for the deficient market mechanism in a
latecomer country.
Stabilizing the economy made implementing industrial policy feasible after
1949. In the post-war years on the mainland, the Nationalist government had
mishandled the economy, causing hyperinflation, which contributed greatly to its
defeat. The political leaders learned the hard way that it was crucial to maintain
macroeconomic stability. A key factor in Taiwan’s early success in promoting
industrialization were the many highly motivated officials with experience in
economic planning on the mainland who built up the bureaucratic organization
required for effective industrial policy. The government appointed the National
Resource Commission (NRC) to help restore major industrial production (espe-
cially Taiwan Sugar and Taiwan Power).⁷ A new set of institutions and policies to
promote industrialization effectively emerged.
Moreover, Taiwan was fortunate in having the scope to practise industrial
policy during the early post-war period. Japan’s economic forces, with their
superior productivity, had to leave Taiwan after the defeat of 1945. However,
US political and military aid stemming from Cold War considerations enabled the
Nationalists to intervene in the economy to promote development. Associated US
economic aid provided crucial foreign exchange to support the currency, reduce
the fiscal deficit, and stabilize prices and the economy. The aid agency also
⁶ This section draws much from Chu (2017).
⁷ Facing the imminent threat of Japanese military invasion, the Nationalist government set up the
National Resource Commission in 1935 to build up military supply and related industrial production.
NRC was responsible for basic wartime industrial production, and continued to train relevant person-
nel in preparation for post-war industrial recovery and construction. See Chu (2017: 172–98).
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coordinated with the local economic bureaucracy so that the right to allocate US
aid became an industrial policy tool. Nevertheless, US aid played a positive role in
Taiwan’s development only because the local government used it in the right way.
Where this was not the case, as often occurred elsewhere in the developing world,
US aid did not necessarily produce favourable results.
What was the private business sector like at that time? During the colonial
period, exporting sugar and rice to the Japanese market had brought steady
growth to the local economy, but colonial policy had limited industrialization to
a Japanese enclave. Some local businessmen accumulated wealth by participating
in trade. After the war, from 1945 to 1949, small plants emerged producing light
industrial consumer goods. After 1949, land reforms implemented by the govern-
ment discouraged the elite from living on agricultural rent. Locals who had been
discouraged from engaging in modern industries during the colonial era found the
new investment environment enticing, and their behaviour was strongly influ-
enced by industrial policy. Sensing the government’s resolve to promote industri-
alization, the private sector responded by learning about and investing in modern
industrial production.
6.3 Economic Recovery and Import Substitution in the 1950s
Taiwan’s post-war industrialization was undoubtedly very much a state-led
development, with the Nationalist government having almost all the essential
policy tools at its disposal and using them to promote economic development
resolutely.⁸
Nevertheless, they faced formidable odds of political uncertainty, large-scale
immigration from the mainland, persistent fiscal and balance of payment deficits,
and chronic shortages of foreign exchange and material resources.⁹
The government needed large amounts of material resources to restore eco-
nomic stability, relying first on gold reserves and then on US aid to shore up the
currency. From 1950 to 1965, economic aid amounted to about US$1.5 billion,
which was almost equal to the total balance of payment deficit.¹⁰
In a series of land reforms, the Nationalists implemented the ‘Land to the Tiller’
programme in 1953. The compensation given to landlords partly consisted of
shares in the four industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs). To ensure the lasting
success of the land reform, the government paid careful attention to the agriculture
sector, assuring farmers an adequate supply of necessary inputs for production. In
⁸ For discussions of major policies, see Amsden (1979), Ho (1978), Wade (1990), Gold (1981), and
Chu (2017).
⁹ This section draws on Chu (2017: 198–220).
¹⁰ Chao (1985: 8).
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addition, the newly emerged industrial sector provided opportunities for the elite
who had to leave the rural sector. The rise in agricultural productivity and output
helped to secure an ample food supply for the enlarged population and to keep
industrial wage levels low. It also contributed to an improvement in income
distribution.
Moreover, to successfully industrialize, the government needed to extract
surplus from a very productive agricultural sector. The fact that the agricultural
sector had made significant gains in productivity, and the land reform had
redistributed income in the tenants’ favour, made the sector better able to bear
the heavy fiscal burden. The former tenants’ newly acquired land could be turned
into capitalized assets in the modernization process. In a way, the success of the
land reform started a virtuous cycle.
In addition to its pursuit of economic recovery, in the 1950s the government
promoted import-substitution industrialization due to severe foreign exchange
constraints. During 1951–3, it kick-started the main target industry, cotton
textiles, by bearing most of the risks and responsibilities itself. A few other
industries, including utilities, fertilizer, and some consumer essentials, were also
targeted and enjoyed prioritized allocation of resources.
Instead of expanding the SOE sectors, the Nationalists promoted private
enterprise. Though most of the non-agricultural US aid went to support the
large SOEs, especially utilities and transportation, a significant part of it was
used to promote new manufacturing industries, mostly in the private sector.
Here the government acted as entrepreneur, drafting the investment plans from
scratch and handling them all the way up to handover to the would-be private
industrialists. The share of private enterprise s in manufacturing output, therefore,
increased from 41 per cent in 1952 to 70 per cent in 1966.¹¹
Despite retreating to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek intended eventually to ‘recover’
the mainland. Paradoxically this provided the strong political will necessary to
support post-war developmental projects. The economic bureaucracy enjoyed
great autonomy in promoting industrialization under authoritarian rule, and the
pathway to industrialization has continued to the present day. Section 6.4 will
discuss subsequent changes in policy.
6.4 Policy Reform and the Start of Export-Led Growth in 1958
The scale of the domestic market was obviously too small to realize economies of
scale in industry and to sustain growth. For example, the cotton textile industry
reached self-sufficiency within just two years and began to accumulate excess
capacity. However, the foreign exchange regime was designed to facilitate import
¹¹ CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, various years.
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substitution, and had overvalued exchange rates and a complicated set of multiple
exchange rates. To help lessen the foreign exchange constraint and encourage
firms to export,¹² the government had to design schemes, such as ‘getting the
prices wrong’.¹³
With hindsight, the switch to an export-promotion policy regime seemed a
logical next step for a government eager to find ways to sustain growth and push
industrialization. However, due to fear of unforeseen risk and resistance from
vested interests, the Foreign Exchange Reform was implemented in 1958 only
after a prolonged round of heated debate among the economic bureaucrats and
the ruling elite. In a two-stage process the multiple exchange rates were converted
to a unitary rate, the currency was devalued significantly, and various export
promotion programmes were adopted.
Furthermore, to promote overall economic development, the government
enacted the 19-Point Programme for Economic and Financial Reform and the
important Statute for Encouraging Investment in 1960. The latter remained in
effect till 1990 when it was replaced by the Statute for Promoting Industrial
Upgrading. It put in place the framework to reduce investment barriers and to
provide tax breaks for investors. The policy regime switch was not as drastic as it
seemed, however, because the extent of trade liberalization was rather limited, and
the domestic market remained to a great extent protected. Nonetheless, exports
began to grow very rapidly, led by the textile industry: Taiwan’s cotton textile
products began to be subject to import restraints in the US market as early as 1962.
This occurred long before apparel exports began to take off in the late 1960s,
showing the beneficial effects of import substitution.¹⁴
6.5 Industrial Upgrading
The policy switch did not imply, however, that the government would cease to
promote industrialization. As light industry was beginning to grow in the 1950s a
secondary import-substitution programme was introduced to set up the upstream
production to supply inputs to the exporting downstream industries, though with
time limits, and price and quality conditions.¹⁵ A man-made fibre manufacturing
plant was established with government help in the mid-1950s. The automobile
industry made a start in 1956. Plans for the steel and petrochemical industries also
¹² This section draws on Lin (1973: Chs 4 to 6) and Chu (2017: 273–300).
¹³ Amsden (1989) coined the phrase ‘getting the prices wrong’ in her seminal work on South Korea’s
post-war economic development. The term means that the latecomer state has to provide subsidies to
the disadvantaged latecomer firms so as to alter the prevailing market prices to induce the latecomer
firms to embark on the learning process.
¹⁴ Chu (2008).
¹⁵ Chu (2001). This is similar to the Korean case as described in Amsden (1989).
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began to be discussed in the 1950s. Due to difficulties in obtaining technology and
capital, the first naphtha cracking plant did not begin operation until 1968, and
the first integrated steel mill began construction only in the early 1970s. Both were
undertaken by SOEs, socializing investment risks deemed unsupportable by the
private sector at the time. All these were part of the plan to promote industrial
deepening.
In the 1970s, the level of US support, which had been crucial for the survival of
the Nationalist government on Taiwan, began to lessen. US–PRC relations started
to thaw, though diplomatic relations were not established until January 1979. This
created a legitimacy crisis for the Nationalist regime, while around the same time
the first oil crisis of 1973 brought an economic crisis. In response, between 1974
and 1979 the government introduced the ‘Ten Construction Projects’: six major
infrastructure projects, one nuclear power plant, and three industrial projects—
the integrated steel mill, and expansion of petrochemical plants and shipyards.
These helped to stimulate the economy in the short term, and to build up
infrastructure and sustain and deepen industrialization in the long term.
6.6 Entry into High Tech
Once plans for heavy industry were in place in the early 1970s, the government
began to plan for the next growth industry: electronics. Adopting a different policy
approach this time, the government set up the National Science Council and
public research laboratories such as the Industrial Technology Research Institute
(ITRI). The first integrated circuit (IC) project was started in 1976. Subsequent
spin-offs from ITRI, principally the United Microelectronics Corporation in 1980
and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company in 1987, now comprise the
majority of Taiwan’s IC industry.
This policy environment also supported local production of key information
technology (IT) components, and with successful industrial upgrading, Taiwan has
in recent years become one of the world’s largest producers of IT products,
semiconductors, liquid-crystal-display units, and man-made fibres. In 2016
Taiwan’s ICT products continued to occupy a substantial share of the world market
in, for example, notebook computers (83 per cent), motherboards (84 per cent),
tablets (38 per cent), servers (36 per cent)¹⁶, IC foundry (71 per cent) and IC design
(19 per cent).¹⁷ Taiwan’s industrial prowess is largely unseen, however, because its
leading firms are mostly subcontractors for firms in advanced countries.
Amsden and Chu (2003) have studied how Taiwan upgraded and entered the
high-tech sector. The strategy of Taiwanese firms has been to play second mover
¹⁶ Market Intelligence and Consulting Institute (MIC), 2017, Information Industry Yearbook 2017, p. 12.
¹⁷ ITRI, 2017, Semiconductor Industry Yearbook 2017, 2–14.
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or act as subcontractor. Lacking frontier technology, firms enter when the product
becomes mature, and earn profits based on efficient and low-cost manufacturing
and timely delivery. They have to absorb the technology and expand production
quickly. These firms mostly relied on locally trained engineers, as well as some
returnees from abroad. While support of the education system, accumulated
manufacturing experience, and local production networks provided the necessary
conditions for the emergence of these firms, it was also the government’s indus-
trial policy that helped to set up the right environment and the crucial institutions,
and assisted the advancement of the industry along the way. As a result, the main
players in Taiwan’s IT industry are large nationally owned firms, not foreign
capital. Domestically, the share of the IT and electronics sector in total manufac-
turing value added rose from around 18 per cent in 1990 to 54 per cent in 2017
(Table 6.3).¹⁸Meanwhile, an increasing proportion of offshore production shifted
to China, reaching 92 per cent in 2016.¹⁹ This gave Taiwanese firms access to an
abundant supply of cheap and efficient labour, allowing them to greatly expand
their scale of operations. Despite this trend, total employment in the electronics
sector has not declined over the last two decades.
Most of the successful second movers in Taiwan have not pursued R&D-
intensive and own-brand strategies to catch up. Second movers expand through
accumulated organizational capabilities based on subcontracting manufacturing,
which implies path dependence.²⁰ Thus, the strategy of choice for most has been
upgrading subcontracting, cross-industry subcontracting, and then own-brand
manufacturing, in that order. Industrial policy has been a crucial structural factor
affecting a firm’s strategic choices. South Korea has produced successful global
brands, supported by the state’s national champion policy and long-term com-
mitment to the chaebŏl, the Korean conglomerates. China has also adopted a
highly ambitious national champion strategy. The fact that the government in
Taiwan has never adopted a national champion strategy helps to partly explain the
evolutionary path of Taiwan’s second movers, and attests to the importance of
industrial policy.
6.7 Liberalization and Globalization
With the exception of the high-tech industry, overall industrial policy until 1986
was export promotion, accompanied by secondary import substitution and pro-
tection of the domestic market. Most of the banks were publicly owned. The
government had successfully maintained macroeconomic stability by keeping the
budget mostly in balance and the inflation rate low. Foreign exchange was under
¹⁸ MOEA (2017). ¹⁹ MIC (2017: 13). ²⁰ Chu (2009).
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Table 6.3 Distribution of manufacturing value added, 1971–2017 (in per cent)






12.8 11.9 7.9 8.4 6.8 7.1 4.2 5.3 –5.8 –1.8
Textile, apparel, and leather 23.2 23.9 18.7 17.5 12.6 6 2.1 1.8 –17.2 –4.2
Wood and furniture 4.3 2.9 2.7 4.3 2.6 1 0.3 0.3 –3.3 –0.7
Paper and printing 3.3 2.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 2.2 1.6 1.5 –1.1 –0.7
Chemicals and products 8.8 9.2 8.9 8.8 9.4 12.8 12.7 9.2 4.1 3.6
Petroleum refining 5.4 4.9 8 5.3 4.8 2.3 2.3 4.4 –3.1 2.1
Rubber and plastics 9.4 8.7 8.4 9.8 9.4 4.6 2.6 2.6 –4.8 –2
Non-metallic minerals 4 3.7 4.3 4 3.8 2.8 1.7 1.2 –1.2 –1.6
Basic metal 6.2 5.3 5.2 6.7 7.6 13.6 10.2 4.8 7.4 –8.8
Metal products 1.1 1.1 5.7 5.2 5.5 8.2 4.4 4.1 7.1 –4.1
Machinery 4.2 3.1 4 3.7 4.8 5.8 5 4.4 1.6 –1.4
Electrical and electronics
machinery
11.9 16.8 13.3 13.8 18.6 26.9 48.2 54.2 15 27.3
Transport equipment 4.3 4.7 6.6 5.8 7.1 4.7 3.6 4.1 0.4 –0.6
Miscellaneous 1.2 1.2 3 3.1 3.5 2.1 1.4 2.2 0.9 0.0
Sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: MOEA, Yearbook of Industrial Production Statistics by Taiwan Area, ROC, various years.
control, the exchange rate remained stable and undervalued, and the domestic
market was protected.
However, a great and unavoidable transformation of the Taiwanese economy
began in 1986. Though the government tried to guide the process, its hands were
forced, and instead of adopting forward-looking policies, it simply made necessary
adjustments.
Trade surplus and exchange reserves began to accumulate rapidly from 1980.
The protection of the domestic market left increasingly wealthy domestic con-
sumers ever more unsatisfied. The sustained trade imbalance between the United
States and East Asia eventually led in 1985 to the signing of the Plaza Accord,
which forced the New Taiwan Dollar to appreciate from 1986. Its value had risen
40 per cent against the US dollar by 1989. Under US pressure, the government
relaxed foreign exchange controls and began to reduce tariff rates, remove non-
tariff trade barriers, and phase out the tariff rebate programme. Substantial asset
bubbles began to appear in the local stock and housing markets. Wages began to
rise significantly, and industry’s share in GDP started to decline (see Table 6.2).
Meanwhile, the government also began to liberalize the internal economic
environment. With the lifting of martial law in mid-1987 by President Chiang
Ching-Kuo,²¹ the government began to open up (to both foreign and local firms)
domestic markets in some of which the number of operating licences had previ-
ously been limited and more or less frozen since the early post-war period. The
most important of these newly liberalized markets were modern services, such as
banking, telecommunications, transportation, and mass retailing. Significantly, at
the same time, the government began to improve the cross-Strait relationship by
allowing citizens to visit relatives on the Mainland for the first time since 1949.
Privatization of state-owned enterprises began two years later. Thus, democra-
tization, liberalization, and globalization went hand in hand within a short period
of time. It should be stressed that this was a process of managed liberalization,
even though the extent of its success is debatable.
In hindsight, the government probably should have implemented these reforms
earlier in a more forward-looking way. The change from a developmental state
model, in which growth was given priority, to one in which political, social, and
economic goals had to be renegotiated and realigned, proved difficult.
The pace of globalization has been swift in Taiwan since the late 1980s. The
flow of inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased sig-
nificantly. Inward FDI now mostly flows into the modern service sectors, as entry
restrictions continue to lessen. By the time Taiwan entered the WTO in 2002,
the domestic market had already become quite open. Outward FDI mostly took
place from the late 1980s onward, beginning with the move of labour-intensive
²¹ He was the son of Chiang Kai-shek, the Generalissimo who had led the Nationalists from 1920s
until his death in 1975.
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production, first to the ASEAN countries and later to China. In the last few years,
high-tech industry has also begun to move mass production lines to China, with
firms under intense pressure to upgrade their operations again. Taiwan’s outward
FDI has become increasingly concentrated on China. The situation in the export
trade is similar.²²
In sum, though Taiwan’s economy has become increasingly globalized, its
external relations have been dominated by the cross-Strait relationship.
6.8 Recent Slowdown and Prospects
Taiwan’s economy has performed relatively well since embarking on its trans-
formation in the late 1980s. Industry has continued to grow, and unemployment
has remained at a moderate level. Although labour-intensive production has
moved offshore, electronics has become Taiwan’s pillar industry, continuing to
upgrade and expand, and maintaining its global competitiveness. Integration with
the Chinese economy has provided growth momentum and has helped the second
movers expand in scale.
As Taiwan’s economy approaches maturity, however, economic growth has
been slowing down in the last two decades. At the height of post-war growth, in
the 1960s and 1970s, overall annual growth averaged nearly 10 per cent, but from
2001 to 2016 growth averaged only 3.3 per cent, and investment growth has fallen
to 0.8 per cent this century (see Table 6.1).
There remain serious challenges. Overall growth is overly reliant on the old
export-promotion regime. There are several probable reasons for the recent lack of
investment growth: the flow across the Strait remains one way; the growth of
domestic consumption lags behind overall growth; and the dominant industry,
electronics, has encountered greater competitive pressures. Although economic inte-
gration with China continues to grow, political debate persists in hindering rational
policy planning. At the same time, globalization has brought an unprecedented
increase in the degree of economic inequality. The new rules of political competition
have not been conducive to addressing these challenges.
These conflicts remain unresolved, and society is yet to face up to the crucial
question of how to fit China into Taiwan’s economic future. Only if future
political developments promote more productive dialogue within Taiwan and
across the Strait will Taiwan be able to formulate a new economic vision for its
future development.
²² CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2017, 226–7. In 2016, the share of exports heading to Hong
Kong and China amounted to 40.1 per cent of Taiwan’s total exports, while that to the United States
was 12 per cent.
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6.9 Industrial Development Trends
Taiwan still relies very much on its industrial sector to maintain growth and
global competitiveness. Industrial production has been the driving force from
the beginning of the post-war period. The share of agricultural production in
GDP decreased from 38 per cent in 1953 to below 10 per cent after 1978, while
manufacturing’s share increased from 12.9 per cent in 1952 to 29 per cent in
1970, reached a peak at 39.4 per cent in 1986, and had fallen to 30 per cent by
2016. The share of services remained stable, around 48 per cent, in the first
thirty post-war years, and then steadily rose to 63 per cent by 2016 (Table 6.2).
The shifting pattern of GDP composition among the primary, secondary, and
tertiary sectors in Taiwan closely resembles that of more advanced countries,
of course, indicating the steady advance of Taiwan’s economy. The changes in
employment composition are similar to those of GDP. The total number of
employees in the manufacturing sector has remained around 2.4 million
during the last two decades. Several industry trends are observable in Taiwan.
Its exports mainly consisted of labour-intensive products in the earlier post-
war period and technology- and capital-intensive products in the later period.
Taiwan’s exports came mainly from small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in
the earlier period and from large-scale firms in the later period. During both
periods, subcontracting has been the dominant business model. At present, the
leading industrial enterprises in Taiwan are high-tech subcontractors and
medium-tech upstream input producers. Very few large-scale firms have
their own brands, and Taiwan’s few global brands are mostly owned by non-
major firms.²³
Part of the reason why Taiwan has been able to maintain healthy growth over
the last sixty years is that its industry has been very adaptive, with new growth
industries emerging as its comparative advantage has shifted. In the early post-war
period, the leading sector was the textile and apparel industry. At its peak in the
early 1970s, it contributed over 23 per cent of manufacturing value added. Since
then its share has continued to decline, reaching a mere 1.8 per cent in 2017.
The changes in each sector’s share in total manufacturing value added during
1971–2000 and 2001–17 are shown in Table 6.3. In the former period, the declines
in textiles and plastics were offset by increases in chemicals, basic metals, and
electronics. The more traditional industries gradually moved their operations
overseas. In the latter period, however, almost all sectors except electronics experi-
enced decreases in their shares of total manufacturing value added. The share of
the electronics sector rose steeply from 26.9 per cent in 2000 to 54.2 per cent in 2017,
and the share of the top three industries now accounts for 68.7 per cent.
²³ Chu (2009).
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6.10 The Role of Small Firms in Taiwan’s Development
It is often argued that small firms played a key role in Taiwan’s development,
unlike the case of Korea. For example, Feenstra and Hamilton (2006) believe
Taiwan’s post-war development was a case of bottom-up industrialization. They
argue that after the war, SOEs took over Japanese firms and remained dominant
till the early 1970s. Only then did Taiwan’s economy set off on a trajectory of
genuine development. The dynamic export sector, dominated by small firms,
created demand for intermediate goods, and that allowed large firms to grow
and transform themselves. Thus, they argue, it was small firms that began to lead
the entire economy starting from the late 1960s.
Chu (2017), however, finds an alternative explanation. After the war, the SOEs
which took over Japanese firms did not expand much beyond their domain.
Private enterprises, fostered by the government’s industrial policy, took advantage
of the Japanese departure and immediately began to grow rapidly. SOE share in
industrial production began to decline in the early 1950s, falling below 50 per cent
in 1958, when the government changed its policy from import substitution to
export promotion. It also began to push import substitution of upstream input
production right at the beginning of the export promotion stage. Entrepreneurial
small firms, eager to engage in exports, were helped by changes in industrial policy
that made exports profitable, granted subsidized export loans, and promoted
import substitution of intermediate inputs. In short, Taiwan’s trajectory of genu-
ine development started early, from the 1950s, and was not characterized by
sudden emergence as postulated in Feenstra and Hamilton (2006). Moreover,
the government played a key role in changing the environment and leading
development.
Amsden and Chu (2003) present a pointed and well-documented case, disput-
ing Feenstra and Hamilton’s (2006: 210) argument that ‘the small firm tail of
Taiwan’s economic organization wags the entire economy’. Amsden and Chu
(2003: 67–76) find that it was large firms that played the leading role in recent
industrial upgrading. They show that although small firms in Taiwan increased
their share of employment both in total manufacturing and in the electronics
sector from 1986 to 1996, their share of value added remained at a much
lower level. In the important electronics industry, the disparity between employ-
ment and value added was even greater. The relative efficiency (valued added
per worker) of large firms in this industry increased during this period, while that
of small firms declined, reflecting their deficiency in skills and investment.
Amsden and Chu (2003) show that although the numerous small firms consti-
tuted a dense production network in most of Taiwan’s industries, they provided
mainly passive low-tech components to the leading firms at arm’s length. Leading
firms, however, cooperated with ITRI to transfer key technology from foreign
suppliers.
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Chu’s (2015) updated data on value added and efficiency by firm size of
Taiwan’s manufacturing and electronics industry shows that the small firms’
share of value added dropped to only 9 per cent in 2011 in the electronics industry,
while their relative efficiency has been declining since 2001.
In her first study of Taiwan’s machine tool industry, Amsden (1977) found that
small firms in a latecomer country, unlike advanced countries, tend to lack skills,
investment, and frontier technology. Hence they cannot be the agent of industrial
upgrading.
6.11 Comparison with South Korea
The overall development pattern in the post-war period has been extremely
similar in Taiwan and South Korea. However, there has been a distinct difference
in policy on big business and national champions.²⁴ In Taiwan, establishing
national champions has never been a priority. The Nationalist government has
prioritized stability over growth, and shied away from pursuing a high-risk
national champion strategy. Through its control over the banks, the state has
kept the debt–equity ratio relatively low throughout the half century of post-war
growth. Lacking firm long-term commitment from the state, most of Taiwan’s
leading firms found the branding strategy too risky to pursue. The state’s pursuit
of industrial deepening from the 1970s was comparable to Korea’s Heavy and
Chemical Industrialization Plan, but Taiwan’s private firms were unwilling to
undertake the projects.²⁵ It was therefore state-owned enterprises rather than
chaebŏl that undertook industrial deepening. Institutional arrangements in Taiwan
differ from those of SouthKorea, because of their different strategies for big business
and national champions.
There are two possible reasons for the Nationalist government’s pursuit of this
strategy. The Nationalists’ top priority was economic stability, probably because
they believed that the failure of their economic policies, which caused hyperinfla-
tion and widespread discontent, contributed greatly to their defeat by the Chinese
Communists in 1949. It may also have to do with their particular kind of
nationalist vision. In the early post-war period, they still believed they could
realize their grand plan to modernize China after retaking the mainland, and
thus planned Taiwan to be a model province. In this context a risky national
champion strategy might jeopardize its economic stability.
²⁴ Cheng (1990).
²⁵ In these projects, the state solicited but failed to obtain participation from private firms. Thus, for
example, China Steel, an SOE, undertook the integrated steel project, while semi-public firms, United
Microelectronics and TSMC, were set up with mainly state funds to undertake the electronics projects.
See Chu (2001).
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In South Korea, when the Park regime began to promote economic
development in the 1960s, it clearly designated chaebŏl as the agents of industri-
alization and used various policy tools to help them. It was understood between
the state and chaebŏl that Japan was the model to be emulated and chaebŏl should
strive to be national champions with prominent positions in the global market.
This type of policy regime, especially long-term subsidized loans to the chaebŏl,
helped to finance fast chaebŏl growth and industrial deepening, but also led to an
extremely high debt–equity ratio that came to characterize all large Korean firms
before the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Though some chaebŏl, such as Samsung and
LG, finally managed to become global brand-name companies, this high-risk
national development strategy undoubtedly brought high volatility to the firms,
the industries, and the overall economy. Of the top thirty chaebŏl before 1997, half
have either gone bankrupt or have undergone reorganization.²⁶
The state’s policy on big business has significant implications for the scope
remaining for small firms. Unlike the Korean government, the Nationalists did
not privatize the large Japanese firms but kept them as SOEs. They also ensured a
favourable policy environment for small firms by facilitating export production,
granting subsidized export loans, and so on. By indirect facilitation, restraining
the SOEs and not promoting big business, therefore, the Nationalist government
allowed some room for small firms to grow.
6.12 Policy Lessons
At each stage of Taiwan’s post-war development the government sought to
improve the policy environment for all sectors, but with limited resources it
was only able to actively promote certain targeted industries, such as textiles,
chemicals, and electronics. These industries played the role of growth engine,
pulling related sectors to grow together. The pattern of industrial development
in advanced countries has been used as a road map. In addition, products
ranked by import value can indicate potential targets for import substitution
at various stages of development. Fortunately, some of the choices, though not
all, have borne fruit.
Moreover, industrial policy had to adapt to the changing environment. Diff-
erent policy measures were required to promote different target industries.
For example, SOEs were tasked with setting up the first petrochemical and
integrated steel plants. However, the government changed tactics when promoting
²⁶ For discussion of industrialization in the earlier period, see Amsden (1989). Woo (1991) discusses
the importance of the state’s financial leverage in the Korean model. For more recent upheaval, see Shin
and Chang (2003).
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electronics. It set up public research labs, such as ITRI, to assist with the
introduction and development of technology. It established science parks to
promote industrial clusters. It helped to set up a venture capital industry to
promote IC-related industries in the 1980s. It also made ITRI spin-offs semi-
private firms, not SOEs, so that they would have more autonomy in management.
Throughout Taiwan’s industrialization, economic officials sought to maintain
economic stability and remove obstacles to industrial investment. When growth
began to slow under the import-substitution regime, the policy was switched to
promotion of exports and upstream inputs. The foreign exchange system was
reformed into a single exchange rate regime. Time limits and performance
requirements are considered the key difference between the protection regimes
in East Asia and Latin America, and relevant legislation continued to be revised
to improve the investment environment. Various agencies were set up to help
enterprises raise productivity.
In the early period, economic development also brought about some benefi-
cial social results, which in turn were helpful to subsequent development. Land
reform contributed to social and income equality. Labour-intensive export
production provided ample jobs for young people leaving the agricultural sector.
Industrial districts were quite widely dispersed until recently when the electron-
ics boom concentrated new jobs in the north of the island. Implementation of
industrial policy relied partly on SOEs, leaving room for SMEs, unlike the case
in South Korea.
Education policy emphasized mass education in the early period, vocational
education in the later period, and higher education only recently. In the earlier
period, education policy served economic development well by supplying a large
number of good-quality unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and an ample supply
of competent engineers. The higher education system has been greatly expanded
since the 1990s. Education reform and further liberalization plans have been the
subjects of heated debate in recent years.
Heath policy focused on public health in the early period, emphasizing control
of the spread of communicable diseases and implementation of a birth control
programme. The health programme has expanded alongside economic progress
through the years. A universal health care plan came into effect in 1998, and
remains the major social welfare programme in Taiwan today.
In recent years, however, democratization, liberalization, and globalization
have posed challenges to Taiwan’s original development model, in which growth
was given priority. Industry faces increasing global competitive pressure to con-
tinue to upgrade. Political, social, and economic goals have to be renegotiated and
realigned in the new environment. It remains to be seen how successfully Taiwan
will transform itself in the future. As always, economic policies will have to adapt
to the changing environment.
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7
The Origin of Absorptive Capacity
in Korea
How Korean Industry Learnt
Keun Lee
7.1 Introduction
The concept of absorptive capacity (AC) was introduced and defined in an
influential article by Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) as the ability of a firm to
identify, value, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment. AC is
also recognized as an important binding constraint in the development of late-
comer economies. Borensztein, Gregorio, and Lee (1998) perform a country panel
regression and find that foreign direct investment will produce a growth effect
only if a country has a certain level of AC. Fagerberg (1988), and Fagerberg and
Verspagen (2002), similarly argue that AC is proxied by the total research and
development (R&D) of a country as a fraction of its gross domestic product (GDP).
Hammerschmidt (2009) and Griffith et al. (2003) consider AC as a function of total
R&D efforts at firm or sector levels.¹
Although several empirical studies emphasize the importance of absorptive
capacity by considering in-house R&D or human capital as proxy (Keller, 1996;
Mowery and Oxley, 1995), a recent finding indicates that AC cannot be appro-
priately proxied by R&D or staff quality alone (Flatten et al., 2011; Lane et al.,
2006). Moreover, the earlier studies fail to discover the origin of AC aside from
formal R&D or education. This recognition introduces two important questions:
What is the origin of AC? How can we tell whether this capacity is established in
a firm? These questions are particularly relevant in the context of latecomer
countries in which firms are usually uncertain about conducting their own R&D
and continue to rely on imported technology by specializing in assembly-type
production. Scholars studying Korea as an example of a successful latecomer
economy have emphasized the importance of AC in enabling Korean firms to
¹ This chapter is a non-technical re-writing of the author’s previously published article, Chung and
Lee (2015), ‘How Absorptive Capacity is Formed in a Latecomer Economy: Different Roles of Foreign
Patent and Know-how Licensing in Korea’, World Development 66: 678–94.
learn and assimilate external knowledge (Evenson and Westphal, 1995; Keller,
1996; Pack, 1992).
The two-step approach of Zahra and George (2002) to AC helps address our
questions by differentiating ‘potential’ from ‘realized’ AC: the former involves the
acquisition and assimilation of externally generated knowledge, whereas the latter
guarantees the successful application of such knowledge for transformation and
exploitation. Chung and Lee (2015) used a similar two-step quantitative analysis
to answer the two questions. The first step investigates factors encouraging a
latecomer firm to conduct its own in-house R&D. The second step determines
whether or not such firms establish AC in house by investigating the factors
driving them to generate their own innovation outcomes.
This two-step approach is similar to that of Kim (1998), who observes that
AC requires learning capability and problem-solving skills; the former is the
capacity to assimilate knowledge (for imitation), the latter the capacity to create
new knowledge (for innovation). However, these definitions of AC may overlap
with the general definition of technological capabilities: the knowledge, skills,
and even experience required to acquire, assimilate, use, adapt, change, and
create technologies or, in short, to generate and manage technical change (Bell
and Pavitt, 1993; Dosi, 1988). While the AC of a firm can be regarded as part of
its technological capability, the key difference lies in its origins or sources
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Given that AC includes the ability of firms to
exploit knowledge from the environment, one means of confirming whether or
not a firm has AC is to check whether it generates any outcomes, such as patents,
from its exploitation activities.
Several studies have observed that access to external knowledge is especially
important in the technological development and AC of latecomer firms (Bell and
Pavitt, 1993; Kim, 1997; Laursen and Meliciani, 2002; Lee, 1996; Park and Lee,
2006). Using data from Japanese firms, Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) examine the
effect of foreign technology acquisition (formal licensing) on the commencement
of own R&D and the generation of own patent applications. In Korea, Lee (1996)
conducted cross-section analysis of the effect of technology import as represented
by the level of ‘technological cooperation with developed countries’, which is a
broad concept.
Our study is distinctive in terms of its emphasis on the role of know-how
acquisition, which involves technical services and training together with relevant
documents on basic operational skills and elementary process technology. Many
foreign technology licensing contracts in Korea, especially during the early
days, involve know-how (a form of tacit knowledge), which is different from
the licensing of patent rights (a form of codified or explicit knowledge) to
advanced technologies. Furthermore, we perform a dynamic analysis of the
effects of foreign technology acquisition over time, as we have a unique data set
of 3,141 foreign technology acquisition contracts filed between 1970 and 1993,
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classified into three categories: know-how-only, know-how-and-patent-rights, and
patent-rights-only acquisitions.
This chapter contributes several new findings. First, we find that it is know-how
licensing, rather than patent licensing, that encourages firms to start in-house
R&D. Second, we find that both in-house R&D and know-how licensing, rather
than patent licensing, help these firms to file their patents successfully for the first
time, which we take as evidence of consolidation of AC. Our findings verify those
of Lane et al. (2006) that the building of AC involves a learning process that
cannot be confined to R&D. This notion is consistent with those of other quali-
tative studies that find that leading firms in Korea generally begin learning
operational skills and elementary process technologies before starting their own
relevant capital investment (Enos and Park, 1988; Kim, 1997) and that since the
mid-1980s these companies have learnt, assimilated, and adopted foreign tech-
nologies before starting their in-house R&D.
The chapter proceeds as follows. We first discuss the institutional context of
foreign technology acquisition in Korea, before explaining the three types of foreign
technology acquisition and relating them to the specific empirical hypotheses
that are to be tested. We then provide a summary explanation of the data and
discussion of the regressions results of Chung and Lee (2015) before offering
conclusions in the final section.
7.2 Foreign Technology Acquisition Trends in Korea
Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) introduce AC as an important concept in
management studies as well as a by-product of the R&D efforts of a firm.
However, given that AC is derived from other sources as well as formal R&D,
the requirements for conducting in-house R&D and generating innovative out-
comes (patent applications) must be thoroughly investigated. This question is
particularly relevant for latecomer countries where building independent capacity
and relinquishing dependence on foreign technology pose a great challenge to
firms. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) as well as Kim (1998) identify two important
elements of AC: prior knowledge base and intensity of effort. The former consists
of knowledge available within the organization, so access of latecomer firms to a
foreign knowledge base is critical. Therefore, this study attempts to determine
the origin of AC in a latecomer economy based on its acquisition of foreign
technologies.
As a latecomer economy, Korea has successfully transformed itself from a
technology-importing to a technology-generating country. Korean firms only
began to conduct in-house R&D in the mid-1980s after undergoing a period of
learning, assimilating, and adapting foreign technologies (OECD, 1996; Lee, 2013).
Figure 7.1 shows that the number of foreign technologies acquired by Korean firms
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increased from as early as the late 1960s, followed by an increasing trend towards
private R&D two decades later. In other words, a significant increase in foreign
technology inflow preceded local R&D efforts and innovation outcomes in Korea.
Many researchers assert that access to external knowledge is especially important in
the development of latecomer firms (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Kim, 1997; Laursen and
Meliciani, 2002; Lee, 1996; Park and Lee, 2006).
Leading firms in Korea generally acquired various forms of know-how, such as
operational skills and elementary process technology, before starting their own
capital investment (Enos and Park, 1988; Kim, 1997, 1998). These firms built their
basic technology proficiency during building and testing of their production
facilities, enabling Korean engineers to assume responsibility for daily operations
as soon as possible.
In 1960, the government addressed two objectives relating to foreign technol-
ogy acquisition with the Foreign Exchange Control Act. The first was to ensure
that foreign exchange, which became scarce after the Korean War, would only be
used for critical technologies. Second, the government wanted to use acquired
technology as a stepping stone on which Korean firms could build their own
technological capabilities (Korea Development Bank, 1991). The scarcity of for-
eign exchange during the 1960s compelled Korean firms to seek government
approval prior to signing a contract with a foreign counterpart if they wanted to
receive technical assistance for a year or longer and if they paid their counterparts
in foreign currencies. All applications were scrutinized by the Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry (Korea Development Bank, 1991).
Korean industries attempted to build production and export capabilities in
labour-intensive or light industries, such as textiles, wigs, rubber footwear, and
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Figure 7.1 Foreign technology acquisition and R&D trends in Korea
Sources: Korea Industrial Technology Association, 1995; National Science and Technology
Information Service (http://sts.ntis.go.kr), Tables 1A and 1B
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realized that these industries had low profit margins and insufficient cash
inflow to produce the necessary foreign debt services. Therefore, both the
government and the private sector wanted to integrate backwards into inter-
mediate goods. If intermediate goods could be secured within the country, the
need for foreign exchange should decrease in the long run. Under the Economic
Development Plan, a series of legislation was enacted to promote the general
machinery, electronics, oil refinery and petrochemicals, transport equipment,
steel, and shipbuilding industries (Byun and Park, 1989). The approval proced-
ure for the acquisition of foreign technologies in these target sectors was also
simplified.
By the late 1970s, many of the initial entrants into the ‘heavy’ industries were
acquiring both physical capital and relevant technology from foreign sources.
Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman (1985: 190–1) reported that more than a quarter
of gross domestic investment in Korea from 1977 to 1979 was spent on foreign
capital goods. In 1978, an automatic approval system for the acquisition of foreign
technology was introduced in general and electric machinery, shipbuilding, chem-
icals, textiles, and finance under the following conditions: (1) the duration of the
contract must be three years or shorter; (2) the down payment must be US$30,000
or less; (3) the running royalty rate must be 3 per cent or lower; and (4) the fixed
fee must be US$100,000 or less. From 1979 onwards, most sectors, except weap-
ons, explosives, and nuclear power, were granted automatic approval for their
projects subject to satisfying the conditions.
The deregulation process continued in the 1980s and the 1990s until the filing
requirement was eventually abolished in 1994. The approval process was simpli-
fied to a filing-and-confirmation process from 1984. From 1988, foreign exchange
banks were assigned to handle foreign technology acquisition applications under
certain scales (Korea Development Bank, 1991; Korea Industrial Technology
Association, 1995: 6).
The Korea Industrial Technology Association, a semi-government agency,
published a data book, KOITA (1995), covering foreign acquisition in the period
1970–93. The value of this unique data set lies in the fact that all contracts
are reported and classified into three categories: know-how-only acquisition,
know-how-and-patent-rights acquisition, and patent-rights-only acquisition. Know-
how-only acquisition typically consists of technical services and training that are
bundled with relevant documents. Know-how-and-patent-rights transfer consists
of technical services, training, and documentation protected by the patent system.
Patent-rights only consists of patent-right licensing.² From this database, we have
extracted 3,813 contracts filed by listed firms. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 and Figure 7.2 show
several examples of the data.
² We follow Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) in using the term, ‘foreign technology acquisition’.
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Table 7.1 Three types of technology acquisition, 1970–93



























1970 35 29 26 3 0 17 16 2 0 1.7
1971 36 13 10 3 0 10 8 3 0 1.3
1972 43 19 12 6 1 18 12 6 1 1.1
1973 126 15 12 3 0 13 10 3 0 1.2
1974 217 25 20 5 0 21 16 5 0 1.2
1975 292 39 16 18 5 28 14 16 5 1.4
1976 313 47 26 20 1 30 18 16 1 1.6
1977 316 37 25 12 0 23 15 11 0 1.6
1978 314 96 45 48 3 49 23 32 3 2
1979 303 94 44 48 2 62 37 31 2 1.5
1980 300 93 43 42 8 60 32 30 3 1.6
1981 295 96 49 36 11 70 40 32 6 1.4
1982 315 156 67 76 13 84 41 32 7 1.9
1983 344 151 79 66 6 96 62 48 4 1.6
1984 423 186 102 78 6 105 71 46 4 1.8
1985 537 196 83 98 15 105 61 50 7 1.9
1986 578 220 100 109 11 119 67 55 10 1.8
1987 605 260 132 113 13 116 85 63 10 2.2
1988 605 334 165 142 27 143 101 60 14 2.3
1989 613 356 175 164 15 131 87 77 9 2.7
1990 639 409 209 181 19 134 85 72 7 3.1
1991 644 297 153 119 23 118 78 78 10 2.5
1992 675 275 135 114 26 109 74 60 11 2.5
1993 671 370 178 163 26 113 81 55 10 3.3
Note: These figures include acquisitions made by non-financial listed firms in the sample between 1973 and 1993. The firms that are scheduled for IPO within the next three
years are included in the sample because of the availability of data. Patent-rights know-how is equivalent to the term ‘know-how-and-patents licensing’ used in the main text.
Source: Tabulated using data from Korea Industrial Technology Association (1995); originally from Chung and Lee (2015).
Table 7.2 Number of technology acquisition contracts concluded by listed firms























22 83 349 869 1,323 15.7 17.9 29.9 42.6 34.7
Chemicals 35 85 275 356 751 25 18.4 23.5 17.4 19.7
Transport equipment 17 57 111 192 377 12.1 12.3 9.5 9.4 9.9
General machinery 28 39 86 149 302 20 8.4 7.4 7.3 7.9
Other 38 199 348 475 1,060 27.1 43 29.8 23.3 27.8
Total 140 463 1,169 2,041 3,813 100 100 100 100 100
Know-how-only 96 232 563 1,015 1,906 68.6 50.1 48.2 49.7 50
Know-how-and-
patent-rights
38 206 540 883 1,667 27.1 44.5 46.2 43.3 43.7
Patent-rights-only 6 25 64 136 231 4.3 5.4 5.5 6.7 6.1
Total 140 463 1,167 2,034 3,804 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Korea Industrial Technology Association (1995), National Science and Technology Information Service (http://sts.ntis.go.kr), and Korea Intellectual Property
Rights Information Office (http://www.kipris.or.kr/); originally from Chung and Lee (2015).
The first finding from these data is that contracts for know-how licensing
dominated in the early years, whereas contracts that involve patents followed
later. Table 7.1 shows that less than ten firms acquired patent-rights-only con-
tracts before the late 1970s, whereas forty-five and forty-eight firms secured know-
how-only and know-how-and-patent-rights contracts, respectively, in 1978. The
shares of know-how-only, know-how-and-patent-rights, and patent-only con-
tracts during the period 1970–5 were 69 per cent, 27 per cent, and 4 per cent,
respectively. However, these shares amounted to 50 per cent, 45 per cent, and
5 per cent between 1976 and 1981, reflecting the subsequent increase in know-
how-and-patent-rights licensing. This pattern may imply that those firms that
successfully assimilated basic operation skills and elementary process technology
through know-how acquisition advanced to the acquisition of technologies that
involve patent rights at later stages. These contracts include not only printed
information and blueprints, but also technical services and training information.
Expatriate engineers usually come to Korea to ensure that the initial operation of
new facilities goes according to plan. Selected Korean engineers are sometimes
sent abroad for training, which emphasizes the importance of human capital
investment in building AC,³ as demonstrated by leading firms in Korea, such as




























































Figure 7.2 Trends in the three forms of foreign technology acquisition
Source: Korea Industrial Technology Association, 1995; National Science and Technology
Information Service (http://sts.ntis.go.kr); Tables 1A and 1B
³ Such investment can be represented by diverse factors, such as the number of engineers and
technicians who are hired by the firm and their years of schooling, attendance in capacity-building
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Various types of training, particularly overseas and on-site training, were
arranged or provided by the firms’ foreign suppliers of facilities and equipment.
For instance, after Hyundai entered into an agreement with Ford to assemble
compact cars on a semi-knocked-down basis, Ford transferred ‘packaged’ tech-
nologies to Hyundai with an accompanying set of explicit knowledge, such as
blueprints, technical specifications, and production manuals. Ford also provided
tacit knowledge to Hyundai, sending ten Ford engineers to Hyundai and training
Hyundai engineers at Ford sites in procurement planning, procurement coordin-
ation, production engineering, process engineering, production management,
welding, painting, after-service, and marketing (Kim, 1998). In the case of
POSCO, the company sent thirty-nine engineers to Japan in1968–9 and 1,861
staff members abroad from 1968 to 1983 during the construction of its first mill
(Song, 2002: 128).⁴
The second finding from these data (see especially Table 7.2) indicates that the
acquisition of foreign technologies is dominated by four capital-intensive
sectors—electrical and electronic equipment, chemicals, transport equipment,
and general machinery—rather than by labour-intensive sectors. These findings
reflect the industrial policy of the Korean government and the effort of firms to
enter these sectors from the early 1970s. The contracts in these four industries
comprised more than 70 per cent of the total contracts filed in the sampling period
and throughout each sub-period in Table 7.2.⁵ This finding indicates that the
state’s control over foreign technology acquisition was critical for structural
transformation of Korean industries from labour intensive to capital intensive,
which has ultimately helped them achieve industrial upgrading. The pillar com-
panies of Korea, such as Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Motors, and POSCO,
were all established around 1970.
The entry of Korean firms into these industries typically involved the manu-
facture of products that were new to Korea yet common in the developed world.
According to a survey by the Korea Development Bank (1991) on foreign tech-
nology acquisition in the 1980s, 55 per cent of such acquisitions by Korean firms
related to mature technologies in developed countries, whereas 70 per cent related
to the expansion of product mix. Given that Korean firms found the knowledge
embedded in manufacturing facilities insufficient for their operations, they sought
programmes, vocational schools, and training in production facilities of the know-how provider.
However, we do not have data for all of these factors.
⁴ These foreign-trained engineers played very substantial roles in the early days of POSCO as their
share in the workforce in charge of facility operation and maintenance reached as high as 62 per cent
and 24 per cent, respectively (Song 2002: 128).
⁵ However, this case was not evident during the period from 1976 to 1981, when the heavy
investment in social overhead capital increased the demand for technology in cement and utility
firms, such as electricity.
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additional services and training (or know-how-and-patent licensing) from firms
in developed countries at an appropriate price.
From the suppliers’ point of view, concealing mature technologies was pointless
because providing know-how was a way of exporting large manufacturing facil-
ities. The Japanese government’s decision to move away from ‘pollution-prone’,
‘natural-resource-consuming’ heavy and chemical industries in 1971 provided a
favourable environment for Korean firms (Enos and Park, 1988). Selling unneces-
sary technologies proved profitable for Japan (Enos and Park, 1988: 34), consistent
with the ‘flying geese’ pattern of economic growth in East Asia, where Japanese
companies serve as leaders to their follower firms from Korea or Taiwan by
transferring their technologies or relocating their factories abroad (Akamatsu,
1962; Kojima, 1973). In this regard, as noted by several scholars including Kiyota
and Okazaki (2005), Korean industries followed a similar path to those of Japan,
with foreign technology acquisition in the form of licensing rather than FDI
nurturing their domestic absorptive capacity and improving their performance
(Lee and Kim, 2010).
Table 7.1 also shows that the number of foreign technology acquisitions in the
form of patent-right licensing increased during the later period, exceeding fifteen
cases a year after the late 1980s. According to the Korea Development Bank
(1991), technologies that were bundled with patent rights were more expensive
or had a higher value than those that were only bundled with know-how. This
arrangement suggests that Korean firms may have demanded something more
than the mere operation of manufacturing facilities after stabilizing their daily
production. Patented technologies may have been adopted as a means of com-
pleting the assimilation and improvement processes that are initiated by invest-
ment and know-how acquisition.
7.3 Building Absorptive Capacity through Assimilation
of Foreign Technology
Foreign technology acquisition is an interaction rather than an event. Silverberg
(1991) and Cimoli and Dosi (1995) emphasize that the imitation and diffusion of
technology are part of the innovation process that essentially results in creativity.
Process implies a certain passage of time. Even successful firms require sufficient
time to accumulate experience and to move ‘from imitation to innovation’ (Kim,
1997). In line with Von Hippel (1994) and in contrast to other studies that focused
on technology spillover from imported capital goods, the current chapter focuses
on the contribution of know-how-only contracts concluded along with capital
investment contracts in the Korean context. Imported capital goods have been
considered among the most important forms of technology transfer in Korea (Lee
and Kim, 2010; OECD, 1996). However, these goods become ineffective without
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the transfer of technology, and especially of tacit knowledge, through
know-how-only contracts. Thanks to frequent on-site training by foreign expatri-
ate engineers, Korean engineers quickly learnt to manage their daily operations
efficiently. If the knowledge were deemed insufficient, the turnkey contractor and/
or other sources, including R&D specialty companies or equipment providers,
were contacted for additional information. Enos and Park (1988) argue that even
in the most successful cases, such as POSCO and Hanyang Chemicals, time and
effort were necessary for Korean firms to become able to use foreign technologies
effectively.
Sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2, and 7.3.3 differentiate and discuss the three types of
foreign technology acquisitions in Korea to formulate specific hypotheses. The
three types of technology transfer are know-how only, know-how and patent
rights, and patent rights only.
7.3.1 Know-how Only
Some examples of know-how only included lubricant, cigarette filter, and epoxy
resin paint manufacturing, the know-how for TV, radio, lift, and escalator
assembly, and the know-how for piston ring, railway brake, boiler, and pump
production (Korea Industrial Technology Association, 1995). Know-how only
sometimes provided critical knowledge, such as operating skills for naphtha
cracking centres, high- and low-density polyethylene and vinyl chloride mono-
mer (VCM) production facilities, and diesel engine facilities. The most valuable
and fundamental technologies were generally bundled together with large-scale
turnkey projects.
The acquired know-how was transferred by foreign expatriates to Korean
engineers on a person-to-person basis. Such transfer usually occurred during
the years when the transferee firm was just beginning to adopt a production
process without the capability to decipher the tacit contents that underlie docu-
mented sources. The primary purpose of foreign technology acquisition during
this stage was to generate efficient and effective investment and to achieve the
desired operating ratio as soon as possible. Although know-how or tacit know-
ledge often constitutes the core competitive advantage of leading firms worldwide
(Cohen et al., 2000), the non-patented know-how that is transferred from a
leading firm to an unrelated party in a latecomer country generally includes
basic operational skills and elementary process technologies that are already
mature and widely known in the industrialized world. This is confirmed by
the Korea Development Bank survey (1991). Hoekman (2005) suggests that
leading firms transferred elementary process technology to Korean firms in
their early years of development because such technology was considered ‘off
the shelf ’, common, and of low value from the perspective of industrialized
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countries. Korean firms often acquired know-how only as part of large-scale
turnkey investment projects. Leading foreign firms found that agreeing to
deliver such turnkey projects at a reasonable price was more profitable than
turning them down. For instance, even if Gulf Oil refuses to transfer some of its
technology to a Korean company such as Hanyang Chemicals, a rival company,
such as Dow Chemicals, may agree to the transfer, leaving Gulf Oil with no
reason to turn down a turnkey project with Korean firms and to keep a well-
known or mature knowledge to itself. Only the price and the conditions of the
transfer matter in this situation (Enos and Park, 1988: 62).
7.3.2 Know-how and Patent Rights
Some examples of know-how-and-patent-rights transfer include the licensing of
acrylic fibre, TPA (raw material for polyester), cassette player, printed circuit
board, excavator, crane, and automobile clutch production (Korea Industrial
Technology Association, 1995). Approximately 44 per cent of all foreign technol-
ogy acquisition contracts of listed Korean firms comprised know-how-and-
patent-rights contracts. The ratio of know-how-and-patent-rights contracts to
foreign technology contracts significantly increased in the mid-1970s when the
basic manufacturing operation of early-mover firms into ‘target’ industries, such
as electrical and electronic equipment, chemicals, iron and steel, and transporta-
tion equipment, began to stabilize.
Know-how-and-patent-rights transfer represents a stage in foreign technology
acquisition in which Korean firms continued to rely on external sources of tacit
knowledge for upgrading their production processes, and yet had accumulated a
certain amount of shop-floor experience in the operation of newly imported
foreign production facilities. As latecomers, Korean firms were under constant
pressure to attain a minimal level of productivity in order to survive in the
international market. Economies of scale and scope were the two main sources
of productivity improvement for Korean firms in the 1970 and 1980s (Amsden,
2001: 197). Economy of scale was critical in the productivity of target industries,
such as iron and steel, petrochemicals, general machinery, electrical equipment,
and transportation equipment. Economy of scope was sought as a means of
generating profits without hitting the technological ceiling (Amsden, 2001: 197).
Korean firms thus tried to invest more in the manufacture of existing products or
in the creation of novel product lines. However, they soon realized that tacit
knowledge about a product or process that was required by these facilities was no
longer regarded as mature or widely known even in advanced economies, and that
the owners of the technology tended to be less willing to transfer the knowledge.
They therefore moved on to acquire patented foreign technology involving both
patent and know-how licensing.
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7.3.3 Patent Rights Only
Some examples of patent-rights-only transfer include the patent-rights-only
licensing for polycarbonate (a highly sophisticated engineering plastic resin),
automobile cooling systems, colour TV, personal computers, and PC graphics
software production (Korea Industrial Technology Association, 1995). As shown
in Table 7.2, only 6 per cent of foreign technology acquisitions comprise patent-
rights-only contracts whereby a latecomer firm is provided with the legal right to
use a certain technology, based on patent documents.
However, patent documents often do not contain sufficient information for the
manufacture of a new product or the design of a new process. Therefore, patent-
rights-only acquisitions imply that the transferee is already equipped with a
certain level of R&D capability and does not require expatriate engineers to
provide a detailed account of the production process. The latecomer possesses
all or almost all the necessary knowledge for adopting a new production process.
The R&D capability may entail formal activities that are performed in well-
established institutes as well as tacit knowledge accumulated from continuous
improvement of imported production processes.
In our cases, most patent-rights-only contracts were concluded by firms in the
electrical or electronic equipment sectors. This situation can be interpreted in two
ways. First, these sectors produce a large number of patentable products. How-
ever, as latecomers, Korean electrical or electronic equipment firms were not the
first to file the relevant patents and licences to produce such products. Second,
these firms had been highly successful in approaching the technological frontier.
Although not the first to develop the relevant technology, Korean firms had the
capacity to develop and use such technology without requiring tacit knowledge
from other parties.
To summarize, there was a sequence for foreign technology acquisition in
Korea. Korean firms began with simple, mature technologies before moving to
complex, advanced ones. Most firms, especially in the 1960s and the 1970s,
preferred to acquire know-how that could help them construct and operate
unfamiliar manufacturing facilities. A typical know-how bundle comprised
printed technological contents as well as related on-site training and services
provided by expatriate engineers. Korean engineers were sometimes sent to the
know-how transferor firm to learn about the implementation process. Korean
firms found manuals and blueprints insufficient for learning because of their lack
of background knowledge. An expert therefore had to visit these firms to teach the
employees how to operate the new technology. Technologies that were inclusive of
patent rights emerged after Koreans improved their capacity to decipher the
codified content of patents. Firms more capable of deciphering the information
reduced their reliance on expatriate engineers over the years. The achievements of
these firms grew as they gained more operational experience.
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Enos and Park (1988) point out that employees of POSCO and Hanyang
Chemicals learnt the tacit contents of process-related technology at an increas-
ingly fast pace as the acquisitions were repeated. The number of mature, and
patented, technologies decreases, and increases, respectively, as these companies
acquire more foreign technologies. The experience of Korean engineers in man-
aging production facilities helped them learn about foreign technologies at a faster
rate. Formal R&D activities usually began after firms had accumulated a certain
amount of experience assimilating foreign technology and conducting several
know-how-only acquisitions.
In-house R&D became more important than foreign technology acquisition
as the technological capabilities of Korean firms progressed because (1) foreign
firms became increasingly reluctant to provide core technology to their potential
competitors in Korea, (2) labour cost-based competitiveness gradually disap-
peared, and (3) government support for private R&D increased (OECD, 1996:
91–2). Private R&D activities have achieved nationwide significance since the
late 1980s. However, there was significant variation across firms in importance
of in-house R&D.
Table 7.3 shows the dates and sequence of the three forms of foreign
technology acquisition, in-house R&D, and own-patent applications of the
leading firms in Korea. Hyundai Motors contracted know-how licensing in
1968, a year after its establishment, followed by know-how-and-patents and
patent-only licensing in 1977 and 1986, respectively. The company reported its
first R&D expenditure in its 1975 financial statement (seven years after its first
know-how licensing and eleven years before its first patent-only licensing),
and filed its first patent application in 1983. Although this sequence seems
typical of most companies listed in Table 7.3 and in the entire sample, different
sequences and intervals between events are observable in several firms. For
instance, several firms waited more than five or ten years after their initial
acquisition of foreign technology before starting their R&D, whereas others
started their R&D in the same year as the acquisition. We find that 385 of the
764 firms in our sample (50.4 per cent) have contracted foreign technology,
233 of which 233 (60.5 per cent) have acquired know-how only as their first
type of technology.
Table 7.4 shows the mean and median number of years that the sample firms
spend between technology acquisition, R&D, and innovations. A one-year median
interval (with a mean of 0.62 years) was observed between the know-how-only
acquisitions and in-house R&D of these firms, which might be shorter than
expected. A zero-year median interval (with a mean of minus 0.25 years) was
observed between the know-how-and-patent acquisitions and in-house R&D of
these firms. Table 7.4 also shows a negative median (–3.0) or mean interval (–3.6)
between patent-only acquisitions and R&D, which indicates that firms usually
conducted in-house R&D before contracting for patent-only licensing.
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1st R&D 1st patent
application
Samsung Electronics 1969 Electric and electronics 1969 1975 1972 1976 1978
LG Electronics 1959 Electric and electronics 1966 1967 1975 1976 1976
Daewoo Electronics 1971 Electric and electronics 1968 1982 1975 1975 1982
Hynix Semiconductor 1949 Electric and electronics 1983 1983 1986 1983 1985
Hyundai Motors 1967 Transport equipment 1968 1977 1986 1975 1983
Kia Motors 1944 Transport equipment 1966 1967 N/A 1975 1979
LG Semiconductor 1989 Electric and electronics 1983 1980 1992 1989 1985
Samsung SDI 1969 Electric and electronics 1985 1978 1983 1974 1976
POSCO 1968 Iron and steel 1970 1971 N/A 1983 1977
Samsung Electro-Mechanics 1973 Electric and electronics 1982 1983 N/A 1975 1982
Kolon 1957 Chemical 1972 1980 1983 1980 1976
LG Chemicals 1947 Chemical 1970 1971 1979 1975 1970
Source: Chung and Lee (2015).
As regards generating innovations, a three-year median (or a mean of 2.8 years)
was observed between the in-house R&D and first-time patent applications of
these firms. A four-year median interval (with a mean of 3.6 years) was observed
between the know-how-only acquisitions and the patent applications of these
firms. A three-year median (or a mean of 3.1 years) was observed between the
know-how-and-patent acquisitions and the generation of innovative outcomes.
A –3-year median (or mean of –1.2 years) was observed between the patent-only
acquisitions and own-patent applications of these firms, indicating that many
firms generated their own patents several years before contracting for patent
licensing.
Two inferences can be obtained from these data. First, in-house R&D activities
began a relatively short time (or one year) after the initial foreign technology
acquisitions of a firm, depending on the type of acquisition. Conducting in-house
R&D does not necessarily mean that a firm has AC, but rather denotes that it
is beginning to build such capacity. Second, firms took an average of three to
four years to generate patent applications after starting their R&D or acquiring
Table 7.4 From the acquisition of foreign technologies to the application of patents
and in-house R&D: interval in years between events, pair-wise and by sequence of the
events Years of interval between events by pair-wise and sequence of the events
Number of years between the events Mean Median Min Max Number
of firms
From know-how licensing to R&D 0.62 1 –16 16 296
From know-how-and-patent-rights
licensing to R&D
–0.25 0 –14 17 240
From patents-only licensing to R&D –3.6 –3 –17 16 39
From R&D to own patent applications 2.8 3 –20 18 245
From know-how to own patents 3.6 4 –19 22 146
From know-how-and-patents licensing
to own patents
3.1 3 –14 19 122
From patents-only licensing to own
patents
–1.2 –3 –9 13 15
Share 1% Share 2%
Total sample firms 764 100.00
Number of firms with ever-acquired
foreign technologies
385 50.40 100.00
Number of firms that started with
know-how-only
233 60.50
Number of firms that started with
know-how-and-patents
135 35.10
Notes: The mean value of 0.62 in the first row, ‘From know-how licensing to R&D’, indicates that the
firms have taken an average of 0.62 years to move to in-house R&D after contracting for know-how
transfer abroad.
Source: Chung and Lee (2015); the original authors’ calculations.
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know-how-based technologies. Therefore, the ability of a firm to generate its own
patents may serve as the final proof of their AC or may signify the end of their
AC-building process.
These inferences form a two-stage hypothesis about the origin of AC: that the
possession of AC can be verified by the capacities of a firm to conduct R&D and to
generate patents.
Our first hypothesis states that the acquisition of the three forms of foreign
technology motivates them to start in-house R&D. We test this hypothesis by
estimating a probit model with conducting R&D (or not) as the dependent
variable. In other words, we define the first step of AC as the capacity of a firm
to conduct in-house R&D. We hypothesize that those firms that have acquired
foreign technology through licensing can promote their AC and subsequently
conduct in-house R&D. We suspect the existence of several differences among
the three forms of acquisition, specifically between those acquisitions that involve
know-how-only and patent-only licensing, because patent licensing and in-house
R&D may substitute each other; firms with licensing for foreign patents may
be discouraged from conducting their own R&D to develop such technologies.
Numerous firms have also conducted R&D before contracting for patent licensing.
As shown in Table 7.4, patent licensing usually follows in-house R&D with a
three-year median interval.
Our second hypothesis seeks to determine whether these firms can achieve
innovations that can be measured based on their patent applications. We use
patent applications as evidence of the successful consolidation—or second step—
of AC. Econometrically, we hypothesize that in-house R&D activities are pri-
marily responsible for the capacity of firms to generate patent applications. We
likewise examine the direct links between the three forms of acquisition and the
generation of patents. We hypothesize that although a positive link exists
between the acquisition of know-how or know-how and patents, and patent
generation, patent-only licensing will not lead firms to generate their own
patents. This hypothesis is consistent with the results in Table 7.4, which show
that although firms have taken three to four years to apply for a patent after
contracting for know-how-only or know-how-and-patent licensing, they had
been applying for their own patents three years before contracting for patent-
only licensing. This test is conducted using a probit model with patent applica-
tions as a dummy variable.
The suitability of patent applications as evidence of a firm’s innovation
may be questioned. Patents tend to reflect and express non-tacit yet codified
knowledge. However, as verified by Jung and Lee (2010), tacit knowledge-
oriented sectors and firms likewise generate patents, although not as many
per unit of R&D expenditure as in explicit knowledge-oriented sectors. There-
fore, we apply a probit estimation method with a dummy variable that takes
the value of one for any positive number of patent applications rather than
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applying regular regressions with the number of patents as the dependent
variable. We likewise apply additional regressions with productivity improve-
ment as the dependent variable to determine whether innovation increases
productivity.
7.4 Data and Econometric Analysis in Chung and Lee (2015)
7.4.1 Data and their Sources
Chung and Lee (2015) combined three distinctive sets of data to examine the
relationship between foreign technology acquisition and the performance of listed
companies. These were: (1) foreign technology acquisition data from 1970 to 1993
collected by Korea Industrial Technology Association and recorded in KOITA
(1995); (2) typical financial statement data from 1973 to 1996 compiled by Korea
Information Service (KIS), Korea Stock Exchange, or Korea Listed Companies’
Association; and (3) patent application data from 1973 to 1996 provided by Korea
Intellectual Property Rights Information System (KIPRIS).
KOITA presents a summary of all foreign technology acquisition contracts
filed before 1994, when the compulsory filing requirements were abolished. This
data set is complete in the sense that all firms were required to report the
conclusion of foreign technology acquisition contracts in which foreign currency
payments were made. Over half of the data set comprises know-how-only
contracts, in which tacit knowledge is the technology of interest. Know-how
acquisitions relating to the construction of POSCO steel mills, petrochemical
complexes, and Hyundai gasoline engine facilities are all documented in the
KOITA data set. This data set tends to represent larger companies that preferred
to purchase foreign technology at arm’s length to enhance their knowledge-based
assets. These companies dominate technological advancements in Korea (Amsden,
2001; Kim, 1997).
7.4.2 Estimation Method and the Main Results
The analysis used a probit model with random effects and followed specifications
similar to those of Bernard and Jensen (1999) as well as Kiyota and Okazaki
(2005) to examine the effects of foreign technology acquisition on the formation
of innovation and AC. The aim is to determine the factors that cause firms to
conduct in-house R&D. Conducting R&D is captured by a binary variable that
takes the value of one if a firm conducts in-house R&D activities. The key
independent variable, or the key variable of interest, is the variable that represents
several forms of technology acquisition (licensing), as well as the in-house R&D
dummy in the case of patent application equations. Technology acquisitions are
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entered as dummies that correspond to know-how only, know-how and patent
rights, and patent rights only, respectively. We also experiment with several
dummy variables by combining two forms of acquisition.
Other control variables include the following. The first is the value of fixed
assets to represent firm size because the asset values, rather than sales or number
of employees, may better represent the propensity of a firm towards capital
investment. Capital investments often play an important role in the absorption
and assimilation of foreign technology. We also control for firm age, which
denotes the number of years that have elapsed since the establishment of a firm.
This variable influences innovative outcome and productivity (Huergo and
Jaumandreu, 2004a, 2004b). Capital–labour ratio indicates not only the level of
past investments, but also the type of technology that is employed by a firm before
its acquisition of foreign technology (Arrow et al., 1961). Industry dummies are
given based on the KSIC two-digit code.
First, the regression results in Chung and Lee (2015) support the hypothesis
that tacit knowledge (licensing involving know-how), rather than explicit know-
ledge (patent-only licensing), matters both in the initial formation of AC or
‘potential’ AC of Zahra and George (2002), and in the final consolidation of AC
or ‘realized’ AC. Second, the results demonstrate the limited effect of patent-only
licensing, which merely reinforces existing AC by contributing to subsequent or
follow-up innovations. Although Lee (1996) reports that technological cooper-
ation with advanced countries tends to have a non-complementary relationship
with in-house R&D, the current study identifies the cooperation method (patent-
only licensing) where the relationship is observed. And third, the study finds that
know-how licensing has an inducing rather than a substituting effect on both
in-house R&D and innovation generation.
Taking these regression results together allows us to determine how firms from
developing countries achieve technological progress, particularly AC. Foreign
firms from advanced countries play a fundamental role in the provision of
know-how and patents. As hypothesized before, latecomer firms tend to acquire
foreign know-how as well as packaged technologies during the early stages of
importing foreign production facilities and equipment. These activities mark the
first stage of AC building. These firms then go on to conduct in-house R&D
activities to assimilate foreign technologies. Later on, latecomer firms begin to
generate their own innovations based on the assimilated foreign technologies,
although these may initially appear ‘imitative’. Therefore, despite eventually
reducing their dependence on foreign knowledge, latecomer firms rely on differ-
ent sources of external and internal knowledge throughout the process. Externally,
these sources change from know-how or imported capital goods to patents,
whereas internally, they change from on-site training and education to own
accumulated knowledge as the firms begin to accumulate ‘prior knowledge’.
This phase marks the end of the AC-building process.
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7.5 Concluding Remarks
The existing literature tends to use in-house R&D as a proxy for AC and fails to
reveal the origins of R&D ability. We define AC as the ability of a firm to conduct
in-house R&D and to generate innovation outcomes, and then try to explain how
it was formed in Korea. We have used unique data from Korea to distinguish three
forms of foreign technology acquisition: know-how-only licensing; know-how-
and-patent licensing; and patent-only licensing. These data show that the majority
of Korean firms began with know-how-only licensing before using patents.
An econometric analysis in Chung and Lee (2015) shows that know-how
licensing associated with imported capital led Korean firms to build AC and
then to start in-house R&D, whereas patent-only licensing was not significantly
related to being able to conduct R&D. Therefore, a substitution effect may be
observed between the introduction of foreign patents and the initiation of own
R&D activities at the early stages of development. A similar econometric exercise
for the second step shows that conducting in-house R&D leads firms to generate
innovations, in terms of either patent applications or increased productivity,
during the later stages of their development. Moreover, know-how licensing
experience tends to be significantly related to firms’ first-time patent applications,
whereas patent-only licensing helps stimulate the subsequent generation of
patents. This study also finds that firms generally spend at least three to four
years building their AC, from the first year of know-how licensing to the first year
of patent applications.
Chung and Lee’s study (2015) was the first to verify the dynamic link between
the learning of tacit knowledge and the formation of AC, as well as the first to
measure the actual length of time firms taking to build this capacity. This finding
verifies the two-step-based differentiation of ‘potential’ and ‘realized’ AC that is
proposed by Zahra and George (2002), as well as the decomposition of AC into
learning capacity and problem-solving capacity by Kim (1998). In contrast to Lee
(1996), our view is that the substituting or inducing effect of foreign technology
acquisition on indigenous R&D depends on the specific licensing method.
Patent-only licensing exhibits a substituting relationship, whereas know-how
licensing tends to produce an inducing effect on in-house R&D. Moreover, a
learning process that involves foreign technology, especially tacit knowledge in
the form of know-how, occurs before firms can conduct in-house R&D and
innovation. However, this specific learning process may not be the only way to
build AC, given the importance of worker education, on-the-job training, and
overseas training.
Lee (2013), arguing that it may be difficult to derive generalizable lessons from
the state-versus-market view of Korean economic development, proposed instead
a ‘capability-based’ view and elaborated various modes of capability building that
may be useful in other latecomer countries. Chung and Lee’s (2015) econometric
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study provides a microeconomic foundation for a macro-level view of economic
development from which several generalizable implications may be derived.
First, the building of AC is a dynamic process that may become more effective
when combined with access to foreign knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge
(know-how). This suggests that know-how transfer should be an essential element
in technology licensing contracts for a latecomer firm. Moreover, the potential
substituting effect of foreign patent licensing may interfere with formation of in-
house AC, especially if it is not linked to the start of in-house R&D activities or
contracting for know-how transfer.
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Learning to Catch up in a Globalized World
Justin Yifu Lin and Jun Zhang
8.1 Introduction
Despite a recent slowdown, over the past forty years the Chinese economy has
maintained an average annual growth rate of 9.5 per cent. No country or region
has ever sustained such a long period of growth at such a high rate. Its per capita
GDP increased from US$156 in 1978 to about US$8,640 in 2017. China has a
population of nearly 1.4 billion, suggesting that in 2017 its total GDP stood at
US$12 trillion, second only to that of the United States, and China’s share of the
world economy has increased from 1.8 per cent in 1978 to around 15 per cent in
2017. Over the same period China’s foreign trade has maintained an average
annual growth rate of 14.5 per cent in dollar terms. Again, no country has ever
been able to move so successfully and so quickly from a closed economy to an
open economy. In 2010, China’s exports overtook those of Germany and it
became the world’s largest exporter. More than 95 per cent of its exports were
manufactured products, making China a new manufacturing powerhouse after
the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and Germany, which had succes-
sively claimed the title since the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century.
More importantly, the technological complexity of China’s manufactured exports
has also increased steadily, narrowing the gap with developed economies dramat-
ically. As a global manufacturing workshop, China has continued to move up the
global value chain. With an increased proportion of value added to its manufac-
tured exports, and its rapid technological progress, China is now transforming
from a technology imitator to an innovator.
Thanks to rapid economic development, China’s urbanization ratio has also
been rising at a remarkable pace—from 17.9 per cent in 1978 to 58.5 per cent in
2017, equivalent to 1 percentage point every year. This means more than 10 million
new urban residents every year. Through its rapid economic growth, China is also
contributing greatly to the world’s poverty alleviation efforts. During the same
period, more than 700 million people have been lifted over the international
poverty line of US$1.25 a day, contributing to more than 70 per cent of the
poverty reduction across the world.
These accomplishments are little short of miraculous. From the 1950s to
the 1980s, China implemented a planned economy and adopted an import-
substitution strategy, prioritizing heavy industries. It gave up its potential
latecomer advantages and sought to catch up with developed economies through
self-reliant industrialization. Nearly thirty years after the founding of the PRC,
however, China was still a large poor country. In 1978, China’s per capita income
did not even reach one-third that of sub-Saharan African countries, 82 per cent of
its people lived in rural areas, and almost 84 per cent lived below the international
poverty line.
Prior to 1978, constant political movements almost crashed China’s economy.
At the National Planning Conference in December 1977, vice premier of the State
Council Li Xiannian stated that the loss of national income caused by the decade-
long Cultural Revolution was about 500 billion yuan, which is equivalent to
80 per cent of the total value of capital construction investment in the thirty
years since the founding of the PRC, and exceeds the total value of fixed assets in
China during the same period.¹
While China’s economic success is widely attributed to its economic reform
and opening-up policy, it might be better perceived as a learning process. As a
latecomer, China has grasped the opportunities to learn both technology and
institutions from early developers and has made full use of its advantages. China is
without doubt the most successful learner of the past forty years.
In this chapter, we will look at how China kicked off its learning journey forty
years ago and why historically it stands out in the process of catch-up. We start
with Deng Xiaoping and his vision of a development paradigm shift taking the
form of quasi-natural experimentation; special economic zones were created in
the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, and a pilot project began for
processing low-end exports with incoming capital from Hong Kong and Macau.
We then look at the development of the Yangtze River Delta, which accelerated
China’s integration with the global economy and led to the establishment of joint
ventures between foreign and Chinese firms and wholly foreign-owned enter-
prises. Rapid accumulation of human capital and export processing in the Pearl
River Delta benefited this region in the early years of reform and opening up, and
the development of the Pudong New Area of Shanghai in 1990 was followed by a
series of market-oriented reform policies and a package of FDI-friendly policies
which brought China’s manufacturing sector into global production chains.
China has successfully pushed the process of industrializing its agrarian econ-
omy through technology learning and a comparative advantage-based catching-
up approach. At the end of this chapter, following the New Structural Economics
conceptual framework developed by Justin Lin, we hope to explain why China has
¹ From Sina Blog, 11 December 2013: http//: blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_64892f210101m0v7.html.
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become a successful learner over the past forty years and what lessons it can offer
for late latecomers.
8.2 Kicking off the Change
8.2.1 A Starting Point
1976 was a bad year in China with the deaths of Chairman Mao Zedong and
Premier Zhou Enlai, and a devastating earthquake which claimed many lives. The
year 1978, however, turned out to be rather unusual. At the age of 74, Deng
Xiaoping had just returned to his leadership position after being purged three
times due to political movements. Although not holding the highest position,
thanks to his seniority and influence, Deng was recognized as the de facto leader of
the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the state.
Before 1978, China had shut itself off from the rest of the world for more than
twenty years. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping encouraged the country’s leaders to make
study trips abroad, and with thirteen leaders believed to have made twenty trips to
foreign countries both in Europe and Asia, 1978 was later named ‘the year of
foreign travel’. Deng himself made visits to Japan and Singapore in 1978 and was
impressed by their technology advancement and high standard of living. In Japan,
he and his wife took a ride on the Japanese Shinkansen high-speed train and
visited Panasonic. He became deeply concerned about China’s backwardness and
technology distance from Japan. He also showed great interest in how Singapore
was utilizing foreign capital to develop its export manufacturing capability.²
In April 1978, China’s National Planning Commission and Ministry of Foreign
Trade also sent a delegation to Hong Kong and Macau. After returning to Beijing,
the delegation submitted a report to the State Council entitled ‘Report on the
Economy and Trade of Hong Kong and Macau’. The report recommended that
two small towns, Baoan County (the predecessor of Shenzhen), bordering Hong
Kong, and Zhuhai County, bordering Macau, be designated export-processing
bases in order to strengthen economic and trade ties between the mainland and
Hong Kong and Macau. Setting up export-processing zones in Zhuhai and Baoan
would exploit the comparative advantages of Guangdong in cheaper land and low-
cost labour force, combining with those of Hong Kong and Macao in provision of
capital and technology.
² In a speech in October 1979, Deng Xiaoping said:
I got some knowledge about how Singapore put foreign capital to use. When foreign
investors set up factories in Singapore, Singapore can get multiple benefits: First, the state
can get revenue from the 35 per cent of corporate tax; second, labourers can get income;
third, it can boost the service industry, which can generate additional income . . . I think
studying the economic issues should focus on how to make full use of foreign capital. If we
don’t use it, it would be a shame.
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Vice premier of the State Council Gu Mu also paid a month-long visit to
Europe with his team in May 1978, reporting to senior Party leaders on his return.
In West Germany, the automation, modernization, and high efficiency greatly
impressed the members of the delegation. They learnt that an open-pit coal mine
with an annual output of fifty million tons of lignite in West Germany used only
2,000 workers, while in China to produce the same output needed 160,000
workers—eighty times more. In Bern, Switzerland, they were also shocked by a
hydroelectric power station with only twelve employees managing an installed
capacity of 25,000kW. They knew that in China, a 26,000kW hydropower station
employed about three hundred people, implying labour productivity more than
twenty times lower.
Again, reported Gu and his team, France’s Marseilles-based Solmer Steel had
only 7,000 workers to produce an annual output of 3.5 million tons of steel, while
China’s Wuhan Iron and Steel (WISCO) employed 67,000 workers to produce an
output of 2.3 million tons. At Charles de Gaulle airport, a plane would take off or
land every minute, making sixty flights an hour, while at Beijing Capital Inter-
national Airport in 1978, there were two flights per hour, and Beijing still found
the workload overwhelming.
In September 1978, Deng Xiaoping visited North Korea, where at a meeting
with his friend Kim Il Sung, he stated: ‘Our starting point for modernization is to
make use of internationally advanced technology.’³
The famous Third Plenary Session of the 11th Chinese Communist Party
(CPC) Central Committee was held in Beijing from 18–22 December 1978,
preceded by more than twenty meetings at which senior Party leaders had
discussed the reports from officials who had made visits abroad. Deng Xiaoping
persuaded leaders and Party members to abandon damaging utopianism and
dogmatism, and to adopt a pragmatic approach to economic development. The
Third Plenary Session decided to end Mao’s Cultural Revolution with its frequent
and radical political movements and to turn the Party’s focus to economic
development and opening up.
8.2.2 Initial Experimentation
On 5 March 1979, the State Council approved a proposal from provincial leaders
in Guangdong Province to locate export-processing and assembly zones in Baoan
and Zhuhai, and agreed to let them absorb capital from Chinese in Hong Kong
and Macau to set up joint ventures.
³ See Liu Jintian’s (1996) article in Literature of the Chinese Communists.
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Coincidentally, the Hong Kong-based China Merchants Group also proposed
to set up an industrial zone in the small peninsula of Shekou. The century-old
China Merchants Group was founded in 1872 by Li Hongzhang, the Military
Minister of the Qing Dynasty. On 6 January 1979, the proposal to set up Shekou
Industrial Zone was submitted to the State Council for approval, and a 2.14 km²
industrial zone was finally approved by the State Council with special policies
including preferential tax and customs policies. On 20 July 1979, Shekou Indus-
trial Zone broke ground and became China’s first export-processing zone in
Guangdong Province.
Inspired by the Asian Tigers’ use of foreign capital and technology to accelerate
their economic development, Guangdong Province asked the central government
for a delegation of authority so that they could take the first pioneering steps in
technology transfer. Guangdong asked for Shantou to be included in the pilot
export-processing plan in addition to Shekou Industrial Zone, as the Chaoshan
area enjoyed geographical proximity to Hong Kong and was home to numerous
overseas Chinese. The province sought authority to implement policies in accord-
ance with international best practice to better attract direct investment from
overseas Chinese, Hong Kong, and Macau compatriots, and foreign companies.
Guangdong planned to experiment with export processing first in Shantou,
Baoan, and Zhuhai, which are adjacent to Hong Kong and Macau, to use overseas
capital, introduce advanced technology and equipment, engage in compensation
trade, processing and assembly, and cooperative running of businesses in China.
Fujian Province, which is close to Taiwan, also proposed the establishment of
an export-processing zone in the city of Xiamen. It hoped to take advantage of
being the hometown of many Chinese living overseas to absorb their remittances,
and aggressively develop export processing.
Recognizing the importance of experimentation to their massive economic
reform agenda, the Chinese government decided on 15 July 1979 to let both
Guangdong and Fujian provinces move ahead of others to set up export-
processing zones in four cities, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen, granting
them the title of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and a certain degree of auton-
omy, and delegating powers to their city governments to attract overseas direct
investment and generate exports. Deng Xiaoping recommended that top priority
in the trial be given to Shenzhen special economic zone.⁴
In terms of size, these four cities were really nothing compared to the whole of
China. Shenzhen SEZ, with a total area of 327.5 km², was the largest. The total
area of Zhuhai SEZ, Shantou SEZ, and Xiamen SEZ was 6.81, 1.6 and 2.5 km²
⁴ In February 1979, the State Council officially issued Document No. 38, which explicitly stated that
an export base and a new type of border city would be established in Baoan. In order to highlight the
importance of Baoan, in March 1979, the CPC Central Committee and the Guangdong Provincial
Committee decided to upgrade Baoan County into Shenzhen City, which was later further upgraded to
the status of a city directly under the province.
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respectively. The total area of the four SEZs initially approved was 338.41 km².
Later, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen SEZs all expanded. By the end of 1990, the
total area of the four SEZs had expanded to 632.1 km².
Though all the SEZs were geographically small, the experiment turned out to be
extremely valuable for the transformation of the Chinese economy in the early
1980s. The principal purpose of setting up SEZs was to learn from early comers
through the use of foreign investment, technology, and management know-how.
As drivers of the development paradigm shift, the SEZs were pioneering movers
ahead of the rest of China in integrating with the world economy, strategically
triggering the learning process and calibrating the institutional distortions of the
Chinese economic system. In fact, given the huge distortions and constraints
existing in China’s economic institutions, it would have been unrealistic in the
late 1970s and early 1980s for China to fully open up and integrate all at once into
the global economy. Guangdong and Fujian provinces were not the growth poles
of China under the planned economy, and therefore the economic cost of policy
change was much lower and it was much easier to manage. This is why China did
not at that time establish SEZs in big cities with relatively better conditions, such
as Shanghai and Tianjin, whose manufacturing production was extremely import-
ant to the economy in the 1980s.⁵
8.2.3 Starting Export Processing in Shenzhen
Construction of Shenzhen SEZ started in the second half of 1980. In order to
ease the financial constraints at the beginning of the development, Shenzhen
decided to set aside legal rules prohibiting transfer of land to foreign investors
and collected land use fees to increase its revenue. Shenzhen was the first city
to attempt to legalize the practice of land use for a fee. In 1982, Shenzhen
published the Interim Provisions on Land Management in Shenzhen SEZ, and
took the lead in reforming the land allocation system. Under the Provisions, the
industrial land was allowed to be leased out to investors for a maximum of
thirty years, commercial land for twenty years, and commercial residential land
for fifty years. Land used for education, science and technology, and health-care
purposes could be leased for a maximum tenure of fifty years.⁶ In the second
half of 1987, the Shenzhen SEZ leased the rights to use three pieces of land to
overseas investors gained land premium of more than RMB 20 million yuan.⁷
⁵ James Kung (1985) was the first to raise this question in this paper.
⁶ Studies on China’s Special Economic Zones (1984), co-authored by the Economics Research
Institute of the College of Economics of Jinan University and the Shenzhen Association for Science
and Technology, provides a detailed introduction.
⁷ This data comes from an article written by Chen Shanzhe (2004) in the 21st Century Business
Herald.
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Based on the experience of land use for money, the Shenzhen SEZ Land
Management Regulations were officially implemented on 3 January 1988. The
Regulations clearly stipulate the separation of land-use rights from land owner-
ship. The government owns the land by law, but the land-use rights can be
transferred by the local government, and re-transferred to others. They can also
be mortgaged and leased. In April of the same year, the transfer of land-use rights
was written into the constitution, which was tantamount to acknowledging the
legitimacy of Shenzhen’s land system reform. After Deng Xiaoping’s famous
South Tour speech in 1992, the land lease system was allowed for and widely
adopted outside the SEZs, paving the way for the easing of fiscal constraints facing
local governments in their public capital formation costs.
Shenzhen was also granted a certain amount of fiscal autonomy and a number
of other special policy concessions by central government and Guangdong prov-
ince. It was allowed to formulate its own package of preferential policies to
support infrastructure finance, marketization, direct investment, and technology
transfer. This policy package provided guidelines for changes to the employment
and wage determination system and to policy restrictions on foreign exchange
and the opening of foreign banks. It was also allowed to break away from the
province’s planned economic and administrative management systems, to
encourage liberalization of factor markets for labour, land, and capital.
The new system of labour recruitment and contracts in Shenzhen was first
introduced experimentally around 1980 in JVs in Shekou. In 1982, based on the
lessons learnt, Shenzhen began to use labour contracts as the main form of
employment, including for top management, in all firms in the SEZ. The lifetime
employment system which used to be prevalent in state-owned enterprises was
finally abolished in Shenzhen. Employment contracts were generally only for two
years. The employment reform obviously sparked economic change and led to
improved human resources for management, laying the foundations for the
establishment of a professional management market and the subsequent transi-
tion to the establishment of corporate governance. Shenzhen adopted a dual-track
approach to avoid excessive social costs caused by the shift of employment system.
Shenzhen also took the lead in establishing a labour insurance fund in collabor-
ation with Chinese insurance companies. This fund, paid into by employer and
employees on a monthly basis, paid pensions and benefits to workers who were
dismissed.
Having made institutional changes with minimal disruption, Shenzhen was
‘ready for take-off ’ as recipient of direct investment from overseas, including
Hong Kong and Macau, and as the export-processing hotspot. A total of 522
investment projects were approved by 1983, with US$2.91 billion of investment,
and US$ 399 million paid in. The average annual paid-in FDI was nearly US$100
million. In 1985 alone, the FDI contracts amounted to over US$1 billion,
and more than five hundred foreign-invested enterprises (including those invested
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by capital from Hong Kong and Macau) were approved. Figure 8.1 shows the
cumulative total of FDI contracts arriving in Shenzhen. Since the 1990s, as China’s
commitment to opening up deepened and wholesale structural reform to a market
economy accelerated, Shenzhen and other SEZs have become even more signifi-
cant as FDI destinations.
In the first few years, processing and assembly (P&A) of garments, metal and
plastic products for export, with materials supplied from Hong Kong, was devel-
oped in Shenzhen. At the time Hong Kong was experiencing severe inflation, with
skyrocketing real wages and land prices, greatly increasing production costs for
Hong Kong’s manufacturing industry and enabling relocation of P&A from Hong
Kong to Shenzhen. Table 8.1 gives the detailed composition of exports from
Shenzhen between 1987 and 1996. It shows that the P&A with materials supplied
or imported was the major export-processing form. Export processing remained a
major contributor to Chinese manufactured exports from SEZs in the 1990s.
Interestingly and surprisingly, in the early 1980s, thanks to the rise of Shenzhen,
the province of Guangdong only accounted for about half of China’s total export
processing.
Granting tariff exemptions on imported intermediate products and compo-
nents is of course a common approach adopted by most latecomers to promote
exports through learning. In East Asian newly industrializing economies (NIEs),
the most popular form of export processing is processing with imported materials
(PIM) by local producers. In China, however, largely due to lack of technical
equipment and insufficient human capital, export processing in Shenzhen and











































Accumulated amount (10,000 US$)
Figure 8.1 Cumulative total of FDI contracts, Shenzhen SEZ
Source: Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook, various years
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by P&A, in which even the equipment was provided by foreign investors, and local
producers only earned a modest processing fee (Lardy, 1994; Sung, 2001).
Since the 1990s, with Shanghai’s Pudong New Area at the head of a new wave of
pilots for opening up and reform, China’s most advanced and integrated area, the
Yangtze River Delta, has had high exposure to foreign direct investment, becoming
another destination for continued investment from East Asian economies such as
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and developed countries in Europe and
America. This new round of rapid FDI inflow together with the continuing shift of
technology toChina, has allowed the country toquicklymove to integrationwith global
production chains and attain the status of a global manufacturing centre. P&A was
gradually replaced byPIM, althoughprocessing exports still accounted for about half of
China’s manufactured exports. For example, the proportion of PIM in China’s exports
in 1992 rose to 28.6 per cent, 10.6 percentage points higher than P&A (Sung, 2007).
Today, Shenzhen, together with its neighborhoods of Dongguan, Foshan, and
Zhongshan in Guangdong Province, has become the most innovative and
dynamic hub of hard technology on the Chinese mainland, boasting a large cluster
of famous global brands such as Huawei, Tencent, BYD, Dajiang, etc. Shenzhen
has also been listed as one of China’s first-tier metropolises.
Table 8.1 Shenzhen’s exports, 1987–96, (in US$ 10,000)
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Total 203,520 332,167 433,845 505,152 559,565
1. General trade 68,898 117,416 137,394 139,613 113,790
2. PIM n.a. 91,847 156,525 222,488 291,094
3. Barter trade n.a. 76 112 137 66
4. Compensation trade 947 901 788 597 218
5. P&A 78,803 116,483 136,153 140,085 152,954
6. Outward processing n.a. 361 370 2,228 1,437
7. Other exports n.a. 5,056 2,511 4 6
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total 628,362 648,271 888,175 894,089 910,352
General trade 141,932 116,648 235,170 185,756 122,589
2. PIM 333,948 398,497 519,561 583,177 645,535
3. Barter trade 25 917 1375 24 169
4. Compensation trade 88 555 2 346 713
5. P&A 151,661 131,205 130,992 109,239 94,462
6. Outward processing 703 382 169 96 169
7. Other exports 5 67 906 15,451 46,715
Notes: 1. Since 1993, barter trade has replaced the previous small-scale cross-border trade.
2. The data in 1987 were incomplete, and n.a. means not applicable.
Source: The Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook.
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8.3 Accelerated Integration with the World Through FDI
8.3.1 Opening Shanghai
It was not until ten years after the establishment of the Shenzhen SEZ that the
development of Pudong New Area and the full-fledged opening up of Shanghai
was put on the agenda. These developments can be regarded as the output from
the learning by early-mover SEZs.
Targeting FDI and export-led growth, Pudong New Area formulated a series of
policies, including reduced or zero income tax for JVs, sole proprietorships, and
cooperative enterprises, abolition of import tariffs on essential machinery and
equipment, vehicles, intermediate goods, and building materials. To encourage
foreign investors to invest in energy and transport projects such as airports, ports,
railways, roads, and power stations, income tax was set at zero for five years after
the first profitable year, and was halved for the next five years. Foreign investors
were also allowed to set up foreign banks in Shanghai (including in Pudong New
Area). Initially, only finance companies were allowed to enter, but later on, to
meet Pudong’s development needs, several foreign banks were allowed to set up
branches in Shanghai. At the same time, a bonded area was established in Pudong
New Area, allowing foreign trade institutions to engage in entrepot trade, and to
serve as agents for foreign-invested enterprises importing raw materials and spare
parts for production and exporting finished products. A land leasehold policy
was implemented in the bonded area and land-use rights extended from fifty to
seventy years, so that foreign-funded companies were allowed to bid for plots of
land in this area for development.
In order to better promote the land lease pilot scheme, Shanghai took the lead
in setting up a Land Resources Management Bureau and a Land Lease Office.
These agencies organized land census, survey, confirmation, registration, and
distribution of land certificates in urban and rural areas, and established relatively
complete land archives and a standardized land management system, laying the
foundations for the land lease pilot programme and widespread implementation
of land-use reform in Shanghai.
Around the same time, in August 1986, Shanghai dispatched a delegation to
Hong Kong to learn about land lease practice and the real estate market in Hong
Kong. The delegation also sought advice from Hong Kong on how to attract
foreign businesses to rent land in Shanghai. Later on, Shanghai invited Leung
Chun-ying (who became chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region from 2012 to 2017) and six other Hong Kong professionals to serve as
consultants for the land lease programme in Shanghai.⁸
⁸ Jun Zhang (2018) reviews this history in the forthcoming revised edition of The Reform Not in the
Public Eye.
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Shanghai’s land lease pilot scheme followed international practice as far as
possible and focused on land transfer to foreign investors, with international
bidding rules and the land premium paid in foreign exchange. On 8 August
1988, Shanghai Hongqiao Economic and Technological Development Zone
successfully transferred land-use rights to a foreign investor for fifty years at a
bid price of US$28.05 million. Soon after, under the land lease pilot scheme,
another piece of land in Hongqiao, the first industrial land, was transferred.
Shanghai also developed China’s first local regulation to allow the transfer of
land-use rights of state-owned land. On 12 April 1988, the first session of China’s
Seventh National People’s Congress amended the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China (Amendment). The stipulation ‘the land use rights may be
transferred in accordance with the provisions of the law’ was added to the
original Article 10, paragraph 4 (‘Any organization or individual may not
seize, trade, or otherwise illegally transfer land’). Since then, ‘land lease’ has
gradually become an important source of finance for local governments, speed-
ing up the process of urban planning, renovating infrastructure, and boosting
the urban real estate market.
Largely thanks to the spillover and diffusion effect of opening the Pudong New
Area of Shanghai, the pace of industrial transformation and integration into
global production chains has accelerated in the Yangtze River Delta region
(including Jiangsu province and Zhejiang province). Inspired by Shanghai’s
opening up and preferential policies, the provincial governments of Jiangsu and
Zhejiang learned to catch up and implemented their own strategy for attracting
foreign investment. A telling example is that in 1993, the Singaporean prime
minister Lee Kuan Yew finally decided to build an industrial park in Suzhou,
Jiangsu province. Of all the reasons that Suzhou was eventually selected by
Singapore, the most important was the potential spillover effect from the future
development of Pudong New Area and Shanghai, to which Suzhou is very close.
Other cities on the shortlist were Qingdao and Yantai, both coastal cities in
Shandong province, where the infrastructure was even better than Suzhou. How-
ever, Lee Kuan Yew considered Suzhou the best choice because of Shanghai’s plan
to build Pudong International Airport, its fully open stance to foreign investment,
and the planned Shanghai–Nanjing (capital city of Jiangsu province) expressway
(which opened to traffic in 1996, creating even closer economic ties between
Suzhou and Shanghai). In fact, thanks to the Shanghai spillover effect and the
manufacturing capacity developed in the 1970s through close connection with
Shanghai, the southern part of Jiangsu quickly became a principal destination for
FDI. Nearly four hundred Fortune Global 500 companies have settled in Jiangsu
Province, including companies from the United States, Europe, Japan, Taiwan,
and South Korea. Kunshan County under the jurisdiction of Suzhou and the
Singapore Industrial Park in Suzhou also host a cluster of famous consumer
electronics producers from Taiwan and Korea.
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Similarly, Zhejiang province benefited from Shanghai, accelerating integration
into global production chains, with Jiaxing, Hangzhou, and Ningbo becoming
favoured destinations for FDI and multinationals because of their proximity to
Shanghai. Zhejiang has also become the birthplace of leading Chinese internet
companies such as Alibaba and NetEase.
8.3.2 FDI Inflow and Export Growth after the 1990s
Figure 8.2 shows FDI inflow to China between 1984 and 2017. In the initial SEZ
development phase in Guangdong and Fujian, FDI was relatively small. With the
opening of Shanghai and the Yangtze River Delta as well as China’s improved legal
and regulatory framework, FDI inflow has significantly picked up, with rapid
increases from 1992 to 1998. FDI growth was slow between 1999 and 2000 due to
the Asian financial crisis, returning to a fast growth track with China’s accession to
the WTO in 2001.
FDI always accounted for an absolute majority in China’s use of foreign capital.
There is no doubt that FDI has contributed greatly to China’s integration with
the world since the 1990s and to the country’s prominence as a world workshop.
According to IMF statistics, the proportion of FDI in China’s foreign capital was
mostly around 60 per cent, and in some years (such as 2009) it was even close to
70 per cent. Moreover, as shown in Table 8.2, almost 90 per cent of the foreign




















































Figure 8.2 FDI inflows, 1984–2016
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
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The distribution of foreign investment has also favoured Chinese coastal
regions. Table 8.3 shows that between 1979 and 2016, nearly three-quarters of
foreign capital (72.36 per cent) was concentrated in the eastern region, reflecting
the fact that FDI tends to be export oriented.
As Figure 8.3 shows, since the 1990s, due to the phenomenal growth in FDI,
China’s trade has recorded growth higher than that of nominal GDP, causing China’s
trade-to-GDP ratio to keep rising until 2007, before the global financial crisis. China
has since become a major trading country, ranking third globally in terms of trade-to-
GDP ratio.
China’s higher trade-to-GDP ratio partly reflects the fact that the proportion of
processing trade is still relatively high, and also unduly reliant on FDI (Huang,
2003). This phenomenon has not been seen in India and other high-growth
economies in East Asia.
In fact, the excessive share of export processing in China should be interpreted
as a benefit of the learning process. First, compared to Japan and the four Asian
Tigers, China is a latecomer and has had the opportunity to make use of early
comers’ capital and technology to develop its processing trade. This is a rational
choice. Second, in the 1980s when the SEZs were established and the 1990s when
Shanghai began to open up, China was to some extent still subject to the planned
economy system dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and administra-
tive control. Under this system, there were still many institutional distortions and
Table 8.2 Distribution of foreign capital in China’s
industry in 2016 (in US$ million)
Secondary industry Paid-in FDI Ratio
Mining 96 0.24%
Manufacturing 35,492 88.26%





Source: Ministry of Commerce.
Table 8.3 Spatial distribution of foreign investment,
end of 2016 (in US$ million)
Region Paid-in FDI Ratio
Eastern region 2,033,125 72.36%
Central region 534,809 19.03%
Western region 187,446 8.61%
Total 2,809,788 100%
Source: Ministry of Commerce.
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financial discrimination against private enterprise, which greatly limited the
ability of Chinese local enterprises to participate in global production. Had it
not been for the excessive use of foreign investment under a rigid planned
management system, China would not have been able to quickly overcome
these obstacles and constraints to participate in the global production chain. So
perhaps China’s excessive use of foreign capital should rather be regarded as a
second-best solution to rapid participation in globalization (Sung, 2001).
Learning curves work in China. From P&A to PIM, Chinese companies learned
to catch up. They accumulated knowledge and human capital from the learning
process, and continuously improved their manufacturing capabilities. As a result,
China’s export mix was continuously optimizing (Fu, 2003; Jiang, 2002; Wen,
Xian, and Ma, 2009), and the quality of exports continued to improve (Li and
Wang, 2013). Moreover, studies have found that the technological sophistication
of Chinese exports continued to increase (Xu, 2007; Xu and Lu, 2009), reflecting
the technological progress and upgrading of China’s manufacturing industry.
China is no longer known as a sweatshop and has instead become a global
manufacturing powerhouse (Sung, 2007). Furthermore, dependence of China’s
manufacturing exports on FDI has significantly reduced over the past ten years.
8.4 Paradigm Shift and Institutional Reform
Shortly after the CPC came to power on the Chinesemainland in 1949, China began
to build a socialist country modelled on the USSR and implemented a closed
command economy system. This was also a typical large-scale experiment in policy
learning and technology learning. After completing 156 heavy industry projects
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Figure 8.3 China’s trade as a percentage of GDP
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
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development model that promoted import substitution and self-sufficiency, and
prioritized heavy and chemical industries. To achieve its goal of catching upwith the
Great Leap Forward, China chose to build a centrally planned regime, under which
the allocation of resources, including employment arrangements, was decided and
controlled by a central planning agency (the Planning Commission). China also
initiated a collectivizationmovement in the agricultural sector to deprive farmers of
land and freedom of choice so as to support urban industrialization. Agricultural
products were procured by the government at a very low price to subsidize urban
residents and industrialization. A system of strict urban–rural distinction was
implemented: farmers were unable to be freely employed or live in cities, and capital
prices were artificially depressed by the nationalization movement.
This approach deviated significantly from the factor endowment structure of
China in the early days which featured a lack of capital. Disconnected from the
world economy, China, with its abundant labour supply and shortage of capital,
could not fully participate in the global industrial chain. As a result, its potential
comparative advantage was not tapped and its productivity did not improve at all.
Despite the unique endowments of China’s coastal areas (Guangdong and
Fujian had a large number of overseas Chinese, and Shanghai before 1949 had
close commercial links with Hong Kong, Europe, and the United States), China
could not be developed into an economic powerhouse under Mao Zedong’s
planned economic model and its balance-oriented development strategy. On the
contrary, the heavy and chemical industries and the national defence-oriented
strategy pursued in the 1960s focused on hinterland provinces and mountainous
areas. Because Mao Zedong and his team believed that the international environ-
ment was not safe enough for China to develop its coastal areas at that time, he
decided to develop inland, abandoning the coastal areas, especially Guangdong
and Fujian. (Geographically, China’s coastlines are in the east and south, so there
is a spatial imbalance between east and west.) This inland-looking development
model undoubtedly denied China’s comparative advantage.
After the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1972,
Premier Zhou Enlai decided to import a large number of machines from the
United States. Unlike most of the machines imported from the USSR, which
were sent to the hinterland, half the US machines went to the eastern region,
which was more poised for industrialization due to its unique location and
endowments. With the establishment of diplomatic relations between China
and the United States, Mao Zedong changed his views on the likelihood of a
third world war. China’s economic policy began to shift from balance oriented to
efficiency oriented.
Deng Xiaoping was not interested in the inland development strategy. He
believed that Mao Zedong overestimated the probability of a third world war. In
1978, two years after the death of Mao, he insisted that some areas should be
allowed to develop first and he turned his attention to Guangdong and Fujian on
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the east and southeast coast. In 1978, after his visit to Japan and Singapore, he
confirmed his determination to develop compensation trade and make use of
foreign capital in coastal areas. He was very supportive of the proposal to set up
SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian. In order to fight criticism and resistance within
the party, he visited Shenzhen SEZ twice showing his endorsement. He was thus
regarded as the spokesman of Shenzhen.
The trial-and-error approach of allowing some regions to move first and then
replicating their success in other ready regions reflects Chinese leaders’ profound
understanding of the constraints and conditions facing the country. In 1984, five
years after the establishment of the Shenzhen SEZ, the central government
decided to carry out systemic reform of the overall planned economy system.
In the years that followed, China’s reform was characterized by gradualism and
incrementalism. Instead of pursuing large-scale privatization from the outset,
SOEs were only allowed to engage in market transactions if they met the planned
quota. A ‘grandfather policy’ was applied in a number of fields, such as employ-
ment and housing. Those whose interests were undermined by the reform were
compensated by one-off subsidies, keeping resistance to reform to a minimum.⁹
Throughout the 1980s, factor prices, including the price of capital, were not
liberalized all at once; a gradualist approach was adopted, with a combination of
price adjustments and small-step liberalization according to the relative import-
ance of the factor in question and market equilibrium conditions. One of the
upsides of this approach was that private companies began to expand rapidly by
leveraging the liberalized market in certain regions or sectors, while SOEs con-
tinued to receive support from the planned system. However, with the passage of
time and the expansion of the private sector, SOEs inevitably began to face
competition from the private sector. Competitive pressures continued to challenge
SOEs and change their market environment and profitability, to the extent that in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, most SOEs suffered huge losses. This result led to
massive sector-by-sector restructuring and governance reform of SOEs in the
mid-to-late 1990s.
This dual-track approach provided incentives for state producers to produce
more even under the quota system of the planned economy, resulting in signifi-
cant marginal efficiency improvement in resource allocation and labour product-
ivity. Over time, the proportion of planned production continued to shrink and
market-driven production expanded and dominated. Clearly the dual-track
reform approach aimed to avoid the economic chaos and social instability of
large-scale privatization and radical market-oriented reform—basically a win–win
strategy (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000; Zhang, 1997).
⁹ The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform by Lin, J. Y. et al. described and
analysed how China promoted the reform of the planned economic system; see Lin et al. (1994).
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At the end of the 1990s, China shifted its economic reform focus onto
macro-economic management and the regulatory framework. This phase can be
conceptualized as ending the dual-track system, reshuffling the central–local
fiscal relationship, building sound banking and rules-based regulation, and intro-
ducing corporate governance of SOEs. This package of reforms paved the way
for prolonged macro-economic stability and created institutional conditions
favourable to attracting FDI and accelerating China’s integration with the world.
These institutional reforms were also important steps on the way to member-
ship of the WTO. After fifteen years of ongoing arduous negotiations, and having
gained the support of major developed economies such as the United States,
China finally joined the WTO in 2001. In accordance with its commitments to
the WTO and the free-trade principle, China over a very short time reformed
around two thousand ministerial-level rules and 190,000 local government regu-
lations inconsistent withWTO rules. It also made great changes in IPR protection,
national treatment, environmental protection, and market access. In 2013, China
decided to introduce a pilot free-trade zone in Shanghai; subsequently a further
eleven pilot free-trade zones have been allowed to set up, continuing to deepen the
process of opening up and structural reform.
8.5 What can be Learned from China’s Catch-up
Learning Experience?
According to the World Bank, China’s per capita GDP in 1978 was only US$156,
less than one-third of that of the sub-Saharan African countries, which
was US$490. As in other poor countries, forty years ago, 81 per cent of Chinese
residents lived in rural areas, and 84 per cent of Chinese lived below the inter-
national poverty line of US$1.25 a day. Today, more than 700 million people have
been lifted above the international poverty line, contributing to more than 70 per
cent of poverty reduction across the world in the past forty years.
From the 1950s to the 1970s, China was very much a closed economy. In 1978,
exports and imports accounted for only 4.1 per cent and 5.6 per cent of GDP
respectively (altogether only 9.7 per cent). Moreover, more than 75 per cent of the
exports were agri-products or agricultural processed products. Over the past forty
years, China’s trade with the rest of the world has maintained an average annual
growth rate of 14.5 per cent. In 2010, China’s exports exceeded Germany’s, and
China became the world’s largest exporter, with manufactured products making
up more than 97 per cent of its exports.
From 1978 to 2017, the Chinese economy achieved an average growth rate of
9.5 per cent for forty consecutive years. No country or region in history has
sustained such a long period of growth at such a high rate. In 2017, China’s per
capita GDP reached US$8,640, making it an upper middle-income country.
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Meanwhile, although the notion of ‘China collapse’ has cropped up from time to
time, China is the only country in the world that has not experienced a serious
economic crisis over the past forty years.
China’s economic performance over the past forty years raises many questions
for economists. First, why did China achieve such rapid growth over forty years?
Second, why was China so poor before the reform and opening up? Third, as
China was not the only country that has transitioned from a planned economy to
a market economy, why have other economies collapsed, stagnated, and become
stuck in crises while China has maintained stable and rapid development? Fourth,
what can economists learn from China’s transformation process?
To answer the first question, we first need to understand what economic growth
is. At first glance, growth appears to be a continuous increase in per capita income,
but to achieve increased per capita income, labour productivity needs to be
continuously improved. Generally there are two approaches to realizing product-
ivity increase: one is to make technological innovation happen in existing indus-
tries so that more and better products can be produced per worker; the other is to
upgrade the industrial structure so that resources can be allocated to sectors with
higher added value away from those with lower added value. For developed and
developing countries alike, both approaches work.
However, as a latecomer, the developing country can easily realize technological
progress and industrial upgrading by introducing, digesting, and re-engineering
technology from early comers. By leveraging this latecomer advantage, developing
countries can achieve technological progress and industrial upgrading at a lower
cost and with less risk, achieving faster economic growth than developed coun-
tries. This is because the technologies and industries of developed countries are
already at the forefront, and only by inventing new technologies and new indus-
tries can they sustain technological progress. For developing countries, however,
as long as the technology used in the next phase of production is better than the
current phase, it constitutes technological progress; the same applies to industrial
upgrading.
If China’s rapid and prolonged economic growth is reasonably attributed to its
advantage as a latecomer, then why did the latecomer advantage not help China
before 1978? This leads to our second question.
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Chinese leaders aspired to build a strong
and prosperous country. In the 1950s, the development goal proposed was to
catch up with the United Kingdom in ten years and the United States in fifteen.
Despite its poverty, China sought to expand its production capacity in heavy
industries similar to those of developed countries, in the hope of narrowing the
productivity gap as quickly as possible. However, the most advanced industries
and the most advanced technologies not only had patent protection, but also were
related to national defence and security, so it was impossible to achieve the goal by
welcoming transfer of those industries and technologies from the developed
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world. In these circumstances, China had to be self-reliant in developing these
technologies, and therefore had to give up the latecomer advantage.
Advanced industries are extremely capital intensive, and China was then an
agricultural country with a severe shortage of capital. To ensure the development
of heavy industries during the centrally planned regime, China could only rely on
the administrative command and subsidies and distort the prices of resources and
factors to reduce the cost of developing heavy industries at the expense of
agriculture and light industries. Although the command economy had allowed
China to quickly establish an independent and relatively complete industrial
system, technical efficiency was rather low. Obviously such a development model
was not sustainable for long.
It was not until Deng Xiaoping regained his leadership position in 1978 that
China finally and boldly gave up its unrealistic development strategy and dogma-
tism, changed its development paradigm, and established a development strategy
and goal appropriate to its endowment conditions. China decided to implement
market-oriented reform and a programme of opening up, consciously encour-
aging the expansion of industrial sectors with comparative advantage, leading to
tremendous growth of manufactured exports. By creating jobs, the export-
oriented industrialization shifted huge numbers of surplus labourers from rural
and agricultural sectors to labour-intensive industries in the urban areas, achiev-
ing rapid growth in labour productivity. The ‘grandfather policy’ was introduced
so that capital-intensive, large-scale state-owned enterprises as well as national
security-related industries continued to receive protection and subsidies from
governments during the process of structural transformation in order to maintain
economic and social stability. The investment in previously suppressed labour-
intensive industries was liberalized; SEZs, industrial parks, and export-processing
zones have all been set up in a pragmatic manner to vigorously attract FDI and
technology transfer, connecting Chinese producers to global production chains
and turning the latecomer advantage into a global competitive advantage.
Over time, as physical and human capital has rapidly accumulated, China’s
comparative advantage has evolved. The former CAD industries have become
CAF industries. Previously non-viable companies have become viable. The ‘offer-
ing fuel in snowy weather’ type of protection and subsidies in the transition period
have become the ‘icing on the cake’, creating conditions for the elimination of
various market interventions and distortions.
In the 1980s, when China initiated economic reform and opening up, most
socialist countries and other developing countries were also transitioning to a
market economy. The mainstream view in international academia was that ‘shock
therapy’ was essential for the success of economic transformation, and various
government interventions needed to be eliminated all at once, according to the
Washington Consensus. Many countries, whether socialist or capitalist, did adopt
the ‘shock therapy’. However, the Washington Consensus ignored the fact that
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government intervention was necessary to protect and subsidize heavy industries
that defy comparative advantage. Once protection and subsidies were all elimin-
ated, heavy industries would quickly collapse, resulting in mass unemployment,
and social and political instability, at least in the short term. Moreover, quite a few
heavy industries were related to national defence and security. Even if they were
privatized, the state still had to provide protection and subsidies. Private entre-
preneurs in these industries would actually have more motivation to ask for
government protection and subsidies. Many empirical studies have shown that
this is exactly what happened to the former Soviet Union and Eastern European
countries.
Fortunately China’s economic transformation did not follow any existing
doctrines; rather it took note of its own actual conditions. Given the initial
political conditions, it would have to take small steps forward and continuously
look for opportunities to create new sectors to spark growth. The ‘grandfather
policy’ remained for reasons of economic and social stability, but the focus was on
the creation of new sources of growth by shifting surplus labour from agriculture
to labour-intensive export manufacturing sectors. In the 1980s and the 1990s,
Western mainstream economists believed that the dual-track gradualist trans-
formation adopted in China was perhaps the worst approach, even worse than the
original idea of creating a centrally planned economy. However, the result has
proved otherwise. China’s economic transformation has so far been a great success
story. Not only has it successfully undergone structural transformation, but its
achievements have amazed the world, even though China still has problems of
corruption, income disparity, and environmental pollution.
We believe, considering the similarity of initial conditions, that China’s experi-
ence as a latecomer and learner might have implications for other developing
countries looking to start on the path to industrialization and modernization.
After the Second World War, a large number of developing countries aspired
to catch up with developed countries. Most socialist countries also wanted to
build capital-intensive and modern industries out of their backward agricultural
economy. Their problems brought about by the planned economy were similar
to those of China. Developing countries such as India, and many in Latin
America and Africa, newly independent from colonial powers after the war, also
pursued capital-intensive modern industries despite the fact that they were still
constrained by lack of capital due to the much lower labour productivity of a
backward agricultural economy. A series of market distortions and unwarranted
interventions that were essentially the same as China’s also cropped up in their
economic operations.
By comparing the performance of a handful of successful and a large number of
unsuccessful developing economies after the Second World War, we find not a
single developing economy that has succeeded by formulating policies in accord-
ance with Western mainstream economics. In fact, the policies implemented by a
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couple of economies that turned out to be successful were all deemed wrong by
mainstream economists. For example, in the 1950s and the 1960s, all developing
countries were advised to pursue the goal of modernization and industrialization.
At that time, the mainstream economic model for development was structuralism,
which proposed an import-substitution strategy, that is, government-led resource
allocation to develop modern capital-intensive industries. However, all the
economies that pursued this strategy have failed. By contrast, a few successful
East Asian economies all started with traditional small-scale labour-intensive
industries and pursued an export-oriented strategy rather than import substi-
tution. At that time, such a strategy was considered wrong.
In the 1980s and 1990s, all the socialist and non-socialist countries shifted from
a government-led to a market economy. At that time, mainstream neoliberal
economics advocated the Washington Consensus and shock therapy to eliminate
all kinds of government intervention and distortions in the hope of building a
sound market economy system. Countries that took this approach have experi-
enced economic collapse, stagnation, and crises. By contrast, a handful of coun-
tries like China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Mauritius (which began to transform in
the early 1970s) that adopted a dual-track gradualist approach, have achieved
rapid development.
Mainstream economic theories are based on the experience of developed
countries. As developing countries have different endowments and initial condi-
tions, mainstream theories are inevitably problematic for them. Mainstream
economists either use developed economies as a yardstick against which to
measure developing countries, e.g. structuralism, or propose a growth model
based on the experience of developed countries where the model is doing well.
However, advocating well-developed institutional arrangements to developing
countries is risky, because it ignores the very important fact that developing
countries are quite different from developed countries in terms of their initial
conditions.
Professor Justin Yifu Lin has been committed to advocating New Structural
Economics (NSE) for the past decade (Lin, 2009, 2012). NSE is based on China’s
own experiences and lessons drawn from the learning process of China and East
Asian high-performing economies. It also summarizes the successes and failures
of other developing countries and economies after the Second World War. It
consciously takes the conditions of developing countries as a starting point for
study, and can better explain why China is successful, in what aspects China falls
short, and where China should be heading in the future. NSE also has an
important reference value for other developing countries.
NSE, the third edition of development economics after structuralism and
neoliberalism, is a rethinking tool for revisiting the modern economics derived
from developed countries, and aims to build up a new theoretical framework
for economic development for developing countries. NSE proposes to use the
  -     169
neoclassical economic approach to study the nature of economic growth and its
determinants. NSE underscores the endowment structure in an economy at a
given time as a major determinant of industrial and technological structure in the
economy at that time; the change in industrial/technological structure is driven by
the change in endowment structure. It pays more attention to the role of govern-
ment in improving both soft and hard infrastructure in the process of structural
transformation in an economy.
8.6 Conclusion
China is one of the few economies that successfully achieved rapid growth after
the Second World War over a long period of time. Given its population as well
as the pace and duration of growth, China’s growth is indeed a miracle. Measured
by the technological complexity of exports and the speed of technological advance-
ment, China is also one of the fastest technological learners among latecomers.
Considering its humble starting point and the widespread poverty in China forty
years ago, its success is of particular reference value for late latecomers.
Overall, China’s rapid technological progress and economic success would be
better attributed to the transformation of its development strategy since 1978. It
renounced dogmatism and the unrealistic catching-up strategy, and instead
adopted a pragmatic approach to managing the economic transition. For instance,
China continued to offer transitory subsidies for CAD industries in the transition
process in order to maintain economic and social stability; at the same time,
through institutional reform and by encouraging the inflow of FDI, China created
market conditions to help CAF industries integrate with global production
chains and learn from early comers. With massive accumulation of both physical
and human capital through the expansion of CAF sectors with learning and
rapid growth, China successfully paved the way to gradually eliminating various
distortions and marketizing previous CAD sectors, turning China from a closed
economy into a global manufacturing powerhouse.
Another factor in China’s successful industrialization and technological
advancement may be that China has avoided a top-down, one-size-fits-all indus-
trial policy. China’s industrialization process had a strong sense of experimenta-
tion. The authorities improved urban planning and physical infrastructure,
offered one-stop services, and reduced bureaucracy within the industrial parks
and economic zones. Central government created incentives to govern for local
officials to focus on and facilitate investment growth and entrepreneurship.
China’s experience of economic success, as well as that of East Asian high-
performing economies, reveals the points that development economics has so far
missed. The catching-up strategy proposed by development economics for late-
comers fails to take note of the evolutionary nature of industrial structure, and
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ignores the importance of initial factor endowments for the success of the
industrialization strategy.
The third edition of development economics advocated by Justin Yifu Lin, New
Structural Economics (NSE), attempts to draw lessons from the successful
catching-up process of high-performing economies, including China. It under-
scores the importance of technological learning and following comparative advan-
tage in the making of industrial policy. Latecomers should avoid being captured by
dogma and should highly respect their initial conditions in triggering economic
development. The Chinese case shows that by gradually overcoming various
constraints, accumulating physical and human capital by learning from early
comers, and expanding CAF sectors, latecomers have a great opportunity of
achieving piecemeal rapid economic development and narrowing the income
gap with early comers.
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Learning and Catch-up in Singapore
Lessons for Developing Countries
George Yeo, Tan Kong Yam, and Tan Khee Giap
9.1 Introduction to Learning and Catch-up
in Singapore
The overall competitiveness of a state’s economy is not just about its ability to
mobilize resources to achieve quality economic growth. Promoting greater ease
of doing business and improving efficiency are also paramount. For instance,
Ethiopia is an example of a developing country that has internationalized its
economy by plugging into the globalization network. Key objectives are not only
to achieve balanced and equitable economic development across the state through
effective use of natural resources to accumulate government surpluses, but also to
deliver meaningful employment over time to its people, ensuring social stability
and a good quality of life for all in a green, sustainable, and liveable environment.
Effective leadership supported by an efficient civil service with budget sustain-
ability are essential for the successful development of any economy, and such is
the hallmark of Singapore’s rapid transformation from a third-world to first-world
country in only a few decades. To become a competitive, efficient, and equitable
economy with a harmonious society requires good governance and efficient public
administration, supported by resilient public and private institutions. A govern-
ment that is to efficiently deliver public services, guided by prudent and sound
budgeting principles, needs to implement both hard and soft infrastructure pro-
grammes, a prerequisite for creating and redistributing wealth. Furthermore, in
macroeconomic dynamics, a fine calibration between external and domestic
demand requires the economy to be constantly refashioned in order to stay relevant.
Such was the wisdom of Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew.
9.2 The Neighbourhood Demonstration Effect
Regions need countries with a developmental success story to serve as role models
for their neighbours. At the turn of the twentieth century in East Asia, Japan was
such a role model.
During the Meiji Restoration period, Japan developed and modernized rapidly,
economically as well as socially, both through local innovation and by utilizing
technologies from more developed countries in Europe. After the Second World
War, neighbouring economies like South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore acquired
ideas and technologies, as well as a psychological boost, from Japan, enabling
them to achieve developed status.
In November 1978, senior vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China Deng
Xiaoping made his first official visit to Singapore, where he met with Lee Kuan
Yew and was shown the country’s Housing Development Board and the Jurong
Town Corporation. Shortly after returning to Beijing, Deng began to spearhead
reforms which ushered in more than thirty years of rapid economic growth for
China. While there are no official records of their meetings, this piece of history
was re-enacted in a state-sanctioned TV drama released in China (see Long et al.,
2014). In the series, Lee remarks that China is in a better position than Singapore
to develop because of its ‘progeny of scholars, mandarins, and literati’, to which
Deng responds, ‘you’re right [;] there is no reason for China’s economy to be
lagging behind’.
The notion of demonstration effect within a region can be put into the African
context. In the 2000s, Africa was described by some as the ‘hopeless continent’; by
2011, it was more widely recognized as ‘rising and aspiring Africa’. According to
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook in 2018,
Ethiopia is among the fastest-growing economies in its region. If Ethiopia develops
economically and socially in accordance with this growth, the country could be
recognized as a pioneer in the development of sub-Saharan Africa. Just as Meiji
Japan played a leading role in the development of East Asia, Ethiopia is in a
unique position to lead region-wide confidence in Africa’s development: it is one
of only two countries in the continent not colonized, with a long and illustrious
history and culture.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section briefly discusses East Asian
development experience, before considering in detail the role of the Singapore
government in formulating pragmatic public policies and planning longer-term
development. Strategic steps towards industrial upgrading and longer-term
economic transformation to plug Singapore into the global trading system are
then highlighted, followed by analysis of successful and less successful case studies
of industry cluster development. The chapter concludes with a look at the Singapore
government’s updates on its strategic economic roadmaps, with relevant lessons for
developing countries.
The East Asian experience shows that an export-oriented strategy of releasing
production capacity through comprehensive planned investment to resolve infra-
structure underdevelopment is not only a prerequisite for economic take-off but
also a useful support in navigating through the middle-income trap (see Tan et al.,
2014). For balanced, sustainable, inclusive regional economic integration and
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social development, provision of both physical and soft infrastructure for greater
connectivity is increasingly viewed as a regional public good. Most developing
countries, including those from the African continent, however, tend to have weak
budgetary conditions. Due to the relatively large capital requirements, the long
gestation period, and the longer-term nature of returns on investment for infra-
structure projects, the cost of financing tends to be high, and competition with
other funding commitments keen, resulting in financing constraints.
In the longer-term roadmap for Africa, it is the stronger economies with
comparative advantages that should seek to overcome the infrastructure bottle-
neck that is causing growth inertia and unbalanced regional development. Emer-
ging economies with an abundant supply of low-cost unskilled labour and
adequate financing for infrastructure development through public–private part-
nerships could bring about a reshuffling of global production networks, achieving
significant poverty reduction and improved standards of living for the majority.
Effective leadership and good governance will be paramount in harnessing and
promoting infrastructure investment.
9.3 Singapore’s Track Record: Strong Budgetary Discipline
and an Enabling Efficient Civil Service
Two prime attributes are critical to the successful development of any economy:
prudent and sustainable budgetary discipline capable of financing strategic eco-
nomic policies and social development initiatives; and effective leadership sup-
ported by an enabling, efficient civil service (see Tan et al., 2015).
The emergence of Singapore as amodern developed city state is partly a historical
accident but also owes much to the effective leadership which enabled the economy
to thrive under challenging circumstances. Five fundamental principles were rec-
ognized by the government as essential to the process of nation building. Hence
Singapore’s achievements to date are by and large due to the facilitating role of the
government—which paradoxically is inconsistent with the highly open and global-
ized city-state economy. The five basic principles are as follows:
1. Singapore will always be more rather than less dependent on external
demand, given her small size and limited scope for domestic demand.
Thus policies to stimulate domestic demand are likely to be ineffective.
The pragmatic approach is to sharpen competitive edge, and build human
resource capability and infrastructure capacity to capture and attract exter-
nal demand.
2. With no natural resource endowment Singapore’s only resources are financial
and human capitals. Hence continuing wealth accumulation and recruitment
of foreign experts are keys to its continued success. Sound and sustainable
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budgetary policies thus become the sine qua non for creation of government
surpluses. Sensitive employment policies providing an appropriate local–
foreign workforce mix are vital for continued growth, innovation, equitable
social distribution, and stability.
3. While efficiencies can be introduced in education, health care, housing, land
use, transportation, water, and electricity supply, these will become increas-
ingly costly without subsidies. Policy subsidies should therefore distinguish
target groups and potential benefactors, and should recognize the longer-
term financial burden and sustainability.
4. With intensified global competition, trade protectionism, and the disruptive
changes caused by digitalization and technological innovation, Singapore has
been going through transformational change in an era of growth discontinu-
ity since the 1997 Asian financial crisis and continues to experience rapid
economic restructuring. Given widening income gaps and an ageing popula-
tion, public policy for social mobility and wider social integration needs to
take into account the potential fiscal burden of the high dependency ratio.
5. The increasingly uncertain global environment makes ‘picking winners’ far
more difficult than it used to be. The government’s new facilitating role in
industrial policy instead promotes ‘hosting winners’. This requires greater
financial resources and a lean and nimble, more transparent and account-
able government responsive to closer domestic and international scrutiny.
9.4 Prudent and Sustainable Budgeting
Singapore has adopted a ‘workfare’ principle under which the government subsid-
izes the difference between current wage and defined living wage for the unskilled
indigenous workforce through the Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) scheme,
instead of a conventional welfare system of entitlement to unemployment benefits.
While ensuring that public services such as housing, health care, education, and
transport remain efficient and affordable, this principle increases the international
competitiveness and productivity of the workforce by directing resources to skills
training, industrial internships, and updating the education curriculum rather
than to welfare spending for the unemployed.
Table 9.1 shows the trends in Singapore’s budgetary structure from 1998 to
2018. The primary budget surplus begun to fall in 1999 and a primary budget
deficit has developed since 2002 during the years of slow and low economic
growth, although the duration and scale of structural deficits are relatively mild.
Faster-than-expected economic restructuring following the 1997 financial crisis
significantly altered costs structure and potential output, and competition from
emerging global economies has been stronger than expected.
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Singapore does not follow the conventional IMF budgetary accounting system
but adopts a conservative system whereby development expenditure is included
as part of total operating expenditure. Revenue from state land sales and returns
from the state’s investment abroad are both excluded from total operating revenue.
From 2000 to 2018, government spending on cash handouts such as New Singapore
Shares, Economic Restructuring Shares, cash top-ups on Central Provident Funds,
skills development fund, utilities rebates, subsidies, and workfare averaged US$2.3
billion per year (excluding top-ups to endowment and trust funds). This was largely
buffered by contributions fromnet investment income (NII), which amounted to an
average of US$6.7 billion per year over the same period, but has since more than
doubled to US$15 billion per year from 2016 and 2018.
Singapore’s budgetary philosophy has always been to have a balanced budget,
on average, over the business cycle, with surplus accumulated during good years
and deficit incurred during not-so-good years. It has become the norm for the
budget to be supplemented by NII, a timely dividend resulting from early decades
Table 9.1 Singapore’s budgetary structure 1998–2018 (US$ million)
Primary surplus
(deficit)*
Special transfers NII contributions Overall budget
FY1998 977 52 – 925
FY1999 5,566 682 – 4,885
FY2000 3,531 1,835 2,287 3,983
FY2001 1,190 5,264 1,375 (2,698)
FY2002 (1,683) 1,802 3,675 191
FY2003 (3,184) 603 1,900 (1,887)
FY2004 (1,487) 1,661 3,043 (105)
FY2005 (463) 829 2,777 1,486
FY2006 (549) 3,580 2,845 (1,284)
FY2007 (639) 2,071 2,019 (691)
FY2008 1,600 4,390 3,650 (2,150)
FY2009 (2,344) 4,071 7,006 (819)
FY2010 722 1,505 7,352 980
FY2011 4,514 2,909 7,916 4,003
FY2012 6,811 1.458 7,870 5,821
FY2013 5,292 2,990 8.289 4,988
FY2014 4,151 4,330 8,553 (125)
FY2015 (4,250) 4,540 9,900 (4,880)
FY2016 (2,720) 2,870 14,370 5,180
FY2017 1.240 2.220 14,610 9.61
FY2018** (7.34) 1.810 15.850 (0.60)
Note: Overall budgetary surplus (deficit) in US$ million = primary position + special transfers + NII
contributions;
*primary budgetary surplus (deficits) in US$ million; **estimated.
Source: Republic of Singapore (1998–2018) Annual Budgetary Statements, Ministry of Finance.
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of prudent surplus accumulation and investment. NII will help Singapore to put in
place further measures to strengthen its competitive tax structure, meet possible
increases in spending on defense, social needs, health care, and employment
support, and cope with its ageing population.
In the longer term, to build an even more inclusive society, there are only two
ways to deal with the potential structural budget deficit. The first option is a ‘red
ocean’ strategy of cutting government expenditure or/and raising taxes for short-
term budgetary improvements with marginal financial impacts but longer-term
consequences necessarily involving trade-offs. Governments of developing econ-
omies often do not have the strong discipline and political will to undertake such
painful austerity measures, which gives rise to development inertia caused by
financing, infrastructure, and production bottlenecks that exacerbate the vicious
cycle of severe structural budget deficit or sometimes insolvency.
With its move into the knowledge-based economy in the new millennium,
Singapore adopted the alternative ‘blue ocean’ strategy: drive for business innov-
ation and transformation; deepen manpower skill sets; and strengthen global trade
and investment partnerships with further internationalization of economic activ-
ities. This is reflected in the annual budget statements since 2016 when Industry
Transformation Maps were first introduced. In the final analysis, having a period
of robust and consistent economic growth is the best way to ensure sufficient
financial resources and hence the government’s commitment to an even more
inclusive society.
The second approach to volatile and declining government revenues and
expectations of a hike in public spending is broadening the tax base. The global
trend of lowering indirect taxes such as corporation tax (CIT) and personal
income tax (PIT), together with a more broad-based hike in taxes on direct
goods and services (GST), is an integral part of government revenue reforms to
ensure a broader and a less cyclical tax base which tends to be outstripped by
rising public and social expenditures.
Raising GST, or value added tax (VAT) as it is sometimes termed, alone is
clearly regressive since the additional amount of GST, however small, would be a
much heavier burden on lower- than on higher-income groups and SMEs.
However, the package of tax reforms adopted by the Singapore government in
April 1994, which raised GST while also lowering PIT or/and CIT, was progressive
because of the extensive and more than one-off GST offsets involving government
subsidies and rebates. The ultimate objective was to render the economy more
vibrant and competitive, with the economic cake growing over time and everyone
benefiting. Developing countries can learn pertinent lessons from the prudent,
sustainable budgetary philosophy as follows:
a. Economic restructuring can have a profound impact on public finance, and
is thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition for structural budgetary
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deficit. Given this condition, external shocks or business cycles may trigger a
prolonged structural deficit.
b. The instability of government revenue streams can be exacerbated by
overheating in one particular sector of the economy, such as bubbles in
the property or equity market or both.
c. ‘Institutionalized’ public spending can hamper economic initiatives and
social development plans unless there are fiscal buffers from other sources
of investment income derived from accumulated government surpluses.
d. The unpredictability of budgetary conditions underlines the importance of
grappling with the budgetary process. It may be useful to lessen the budget
burden by outsourcing some social/public services.
e. From the perspective of inter-generational budgetary consideration, it may
be critical to avoid the ‘spend now and pay later’ syndrome and adopt a
more responsible ‘spend more now and enjoy the pay-off later’ paradigm.
f. There should be serious effort to build up or even institutionalize contin-
gency budgetary resources as a hedge against uncertainty and external
shocks, due to lack of continuity in government.
Politically, this restructuring may undermine the support of voters who are not
prepared to swallow the bitter pill of painful tax reforms. The longstanding
political style of the Singapore government, still relevant today, can be found in
the classic speech by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew at the 2005 Global Branding
Forum:
I do not believe that popular government means you have to be popular when
you govern. I think the best thing to do is to do all the unpopular things when
you are governing so that at the end of your term, you have a choice of a date
when you feel that they will be most grateful that you have done all these
unpopular things and they vote for you.
9.5 The Enabling, Efficient Public Sector and the Art
of Public Policy Management
There is no doubt that the prime movers of the Singapore miracle were the
nation’s visionary and transformational leaders. However, the major institutional
vehicle delivering national outcomes was the powerful civil service which pre-
pared development plans, coordinated their implementation, and delivered public
services efficiently.
Policies are designed for the long-term good, not short-term populism. This
requires strong leadership with a vision and clear direction for the country. The
watchwords for policy are flexibility and pragmatic anticipation of change.
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Government is regarded as a trusteeship rather than an agency of special interest.
Good governance in Singapore is built on three interrelated factors: accountability
and transparency, long-term planning, and social justice. For that, a powerful,
honest, and efficient civil service is critical.
In a comparison of how talent is selected in Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore,
Poochaoren and Lee (2013) find that Singapore’s process of identifying able civil
servants is highly selective. The main selection principles are to get the best people,
give them a challenge, and pay them well. Candidates are selected by academic
results, with ministries often approaching junior colleges and universities for lists
of top students. Candidates are also given psychometric tests to determine their
suitability for the civil service.
There are also different streams of public service recruitment, including
Administrative Service and High Potential (HiPo) programmes singling out
those with potential to become administrative officers (AOs) or assume other
leadership roles. Within these programmes, there are reporting and ranking
systems with a quota-based bell curve designed to incentivize civil servants to
work harder. The result is a clear, defined career path for candidates which ensures
them a competitive salary. The downside to this system is the potential for an ‘us
and them’ mentality between those deemed to be talented and those who are not.
For example, the selection of candidates for HiPo programme is not transparent,
while AOs are given a slight preference in the ranking system. Poochaoren and Lee
(2013) warns that this might breed cynicism and complacency in the talented and
resentment in those who are not.
Singapore’s approach to change in public service is described in ‘Public Service
for the 21st Century: Being in Time for the Future’, known as PS21, which has
three pillars: to anticipate, welcome, and execute change (see Civil Service College,
2015). The objectives of PS21 are first, to nurture an attitude of service excellence,
anticipating and meeting the needs of the public with high standards of quality
and courtesy. The essence of anticipating change is scenario planning with
alternative possible views of the future. Ideally civil servants should identify
driving forces and define critical uncertainties by dealing with known knowns,
known unknowns, and unknown knowns, but not with unknown unknowns.
Second, to foster an environment which induces and welcome continuous
change for greater efficiency, convincing public officials of the need for change
before it becomes critical: evolution in execution yielding a revolution in results. It
is crucial to mould public officials’ attitudes so as to ensure everyone is an activist
for change. These high expectations require leadership, conviction, commitment,
and tenacity in seeing through execution.
Third, to formulate and execute public policies cost-effectively by employing
modern management tools and techniques, while considering the morale and
welfare of public civil servants. Successful management of the civil service requires
organizational excellence which must be both people and system oriented.
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Citizens must therefore be regarded as customers of multiple agencies under the
administration of a single government.
PS21 is a programme about change, not change to a specific final state but change
as a permanent state. The thrust is to see change as a superior and necessary way
of life and as an instrument for improvement and advancement. The idea is that
any organization that effects change only in reaction to circumstances becomes the
slave of circumstances, doomed to running around making urgent change after
urgent change because it allows circumstances to catch up with it.
PS21 contains strategic imperatives encompassing continuous operational
improvement, openness to continuous change, confidence about uncertainty,
and superior leadership. These are summarized in Figure 9.1.
Appropriate incentives must be in place for civil servants if effective and
efficient provision of public services are to be assured. The bottom line of a
company is the profit margin. For the Singapore government, public officials’
key performance indicator is linked to GDP growth, which also takes into account
events beyond the government’s control. This business-oriented mind-set and
‘Singapore Incorporated’ culture help to attract investment resulting in job cre-
ation. Figure 9.2 shows a typical bonus announcement for civil servants in 2017.
9.6 Public Policy Formulations Pioneered by the Old Guard
Singapore has successfully transformed itself from the third to the first world
within a few decades. This achievement can be attributed to the public policy
formulation pioneered by the country’s old guard under the leadership of Lee
Kuan Yew, which can be summarized in the following five tenets.
PS21
IN SUMMARY
• Theme of PS21
• Reason for PS21
• Thrust of PS21
• Means of PS21
• End of PS21
Continuous change
Unending uncertainty
Change as a way of life
Harvesting creativity
In time for the future
Figure 9.1 Singapore’s public service: Rising to the challenges of the twenty-first
century
Source: Civil Service College (2015) ‘Upholding Integrity in Public Service’ Institute of Governance
and Policy, Singapore
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9.6.1 Pragmatism in Public Policy Formulation—No Reliance
on Textbook Cases
Pragmatism is the hallmark of Singapore’s unique and innovative policy initiatives.
Pragmatism is more than simply being practical; it requires strong adherence to
governing with integrity and principles. The affordability of the asset-enhancing
public housing scheme through the Housing Development Board (HDB), and the
unique Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution system are examples of prag-
matism in policymaking leading to innovation in its formulation.
9.6.1.1 Case Study: Public Housing, Asset Ownership,
and Social-political Stability
During one of the frequent riots of the 1960s caused by high unemployment and
social tension, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was inspired by the sight of a
resident rushing down from his apartment to carry his battered motorbike
upstairs to determine that every citizen should have a stake in the stability of
the country, this to be achieved by giving them a job and forcing them to save to
buy a government-built flat.
Thus a series of highly innovative and interrelated public policies were con-
ceived and implemented. Industrialization created jobs, generated income, and
enforced savings. Social stability was restored with a virtuous cycle of economic
prosperity, employment, rising standards of living, and improved quality of life for
Figure 9.2 Civil service bonus press release, 2017
Source: Straits Times (2017) Press Release, Singapore Press Holdings
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the majority. The CPF and HDB were set up as statutory boards linking citizens’
asset ownership to the economy as a stake in the homeland. In 2018, 92 per cent of
the population live in this accommodation, with 85 per cent owning their home.
Public housing consists of housing estates, which are self-contained satellite towns
with schools, supermarkets, clinics, and sports and recreational facilities. There
are many different types of flat catering for various housing budgets. HDB flats
were built primarily to provide affordable housing for the poor and assisted
purchase is available through the CPF.
9.6.2 Industrial Upgrading to Connect Singapore
to the Global Trading System
The top priority during the early days of nation building was to reinforce
Singapore’s strategic location as a regional hub for international trade and ser-
vices, projecting the republic as a cosmopolitan city state. Faced with limited
financial resources after independence, the government prioritized education,
concentrating on raising the quality of teaching rather than large-scale expansion
of schools or heavy investment in airports and seaports promoting global eco-
nomic connectivity. Singapore’s successful industrial transformation has made it
an international hub for world-class financial, aviation, maritime, logistics, and
telecommunication and education services.
9.6.2.1 Case Study: Strategic Industrial Upgrading towards
a Knowledge-based Economy
In the five decades since political independence in 1965, Singapore has achieved
one of the highest rates of economic growth among newly industrialized econ-
omies (NIEs). This rapid growth was initially driven by a strategy that leveraged
foreign direct investment (FDI). As Singapore’s factor costs, especially of land and
labour, rose in tandem with rapid economic growth, the government made a
concerted effort in the 1990s to shift its policy focus, transforming Singapore from
an investment-driven to a knowledge-based economy (see Figure 9.3). This policy
shift emphasizes the building of intellectual capital and a vibrant entrepreneurial
culture to create value and jobs.
When Singapore separated from Malaysia to gain independence in 1965, the
challenge was to develop an economy despite having a small market and no
hinterland to rely on. The Economic Development Board (EDB), established in
1961, focused on protectionist policies geared towards a more labour-intensive
economy, supported by labour unions who believed that equipment-intensive and
innovative industries were worse for workers. However, through legislation such
as the Employment Act, the government gave more power to managers and
restricted the power of the unions.
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In the 1970s, the government removed many tariff restrictions, seeking to
promote a more export-oriented economy and attract more MNCs to invest in
Singapore. Indigenous firms also lacked productivity measures. FDI-friendly
policies placing MNCs at the centre of economic and industrial development
enabled a decade of double-digit growth. The EDB then sought to attract foreign
and local entrepreneurs to encourage cooperation as well as healthy competition.
Singaporeans were sent to the United States, Europe, and Japan to gain techno-
logical and technical expertise. The Ministry for Trade and Industry (MTI) set
up organizations and statutory boards as spin-offs from EDB specializing in
economic and financial activities (see Table 9.2; Republic of Singapore, 1960–2011).
An important industrialization success story relevant for other developing
countries is the role of MNCs in helping to develop local industries, domestic
entrepreneurs, and the professional class (see Wong, 2008). Several EDB–MNC
joint training centres were set up to ensure the availability of skilled workers,
including those with Rollei of Germany (optics and precision mechanics) and
Philips of Holland (precision machining) in 1973 and 1975 respectively. Workers
spent two years at the centre and two years being trained at the plant. Nurturing
local supporting industries (LSIs) included support, improving capabilities, and
Figure 9.3 Singapore’s strategic industrial upgrading
Source: SPRING Singapore, a Singapore Government Statutory Board
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facilitating technology transfer to indigenous SMEs. This was a win–win formula
for attracting and retaining MNCs, as it helped to lower costs of parts and
components, and allowed MNCs to concentrate on final assembly and testing of
finished products. An example of the EDB’s work under the Local Industry
Upgrading Programme (LIUP) is shown in Figure 9.4.
In 1980s, the EDB set out to attract high-tech industries. Mechanization,
automation, and computerization required more specialized skills, technical
know-how, and production technology. Between 1979 and 1982, EDB set up
three Institutes of Technology (ITs) with foreign partners: Japanese-Singapore
Institute of Mechatronics, German-Singapore Institute of Production Technology;
and French-Singapore Institute of Electro-Technology. They ran three-year courses
for diploma-level graduates and four-year skills and craftsman certificate courses.
Short courses were provided for supporting electronics industries to enable MNCs
to outsource parts- and manufacturing-related services such as moulded stamped
parts, surface finishing, printed circuit boards, sub-assembly and testing, tools and
die, cartons and packaging, transportation, warehousing, and logistics.
In addition to its consistent upgrading of skillsets and diversification of the
economy base, Singapore has coordinated and consolidated a number of different
agencies. For example, the EDB attracts investment into Singapore; International
Enterprise (IE) Singapore promotes the growth of Singapore-based corporations
overseas to smooth the path of international trade; and SPRING Singapore over-
sees the healthy expansion of small and medium enterprises. On the other hand,
Jurong Town Council (JTC) encourages the vigorous growth of the industrial
landscape through the development of land and resources, while organizations
such as A*Star are centred around high-end science and technology research.
Table 9.2 Spin-offs from the Economic Development Board
Year Spin-off Type Function





1968 Development Bank of Singapore Publicly listed
company
Banking
1968 Jurong Town Council Statutory board Industrial estates







1972 National Productivity Board Statutory board Productivity matters
1973 Singapore Institute of Standards
and Statutory board
Industrial standards Industrial Research
Source: Wong, 2008.
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The Ministry for Trade and Industry holds monthly ministerial meetings to
coordinate overall policies and economic strategies based on regular input from
all the various agencies including EDB, IE Singapore, JTC, A*Star, and SPRING
Singapore.
Singapore Polytechnic and Ngee Ann Polytechnic were among the early pion-
eers offering three-year diploma courses in sciences and engineering which
became an incubator for indigenous business entrepreneurs such as Wong Ngit
Liong, who founded the billion-dollar Venture Manufacturing, and a professional
training ground for indigenous managers such as Koh Boon Hwee, who later
became chairman of Singapore Airlines. The success of Singapore’s committed
industrial upgrading can be seen in the near twenty-fold growth of GDP and
double-digit sectoral growth summarized in Table 9.3.
9.6.3 Long-term Planning for an Inclusive, Productive,
Environmentally Friendly, and Socially Harmonious
Cosmopolitan Singapore
As one of the world’s most densely populated countries with a multi-racial, multi-
religious, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual population of 5.6 million, Singapore’s
public policies were aimed at an inclusive society from the start of the nation
Local Industries Upgrading Programme
Case Example: Plastic Injection Moulding Company
Matsushita Asia Business

































Figure 9.4 Structural framework of plastic injection moulding company
Source: Wong (2008)
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building process. Given its small geographical area of 720km² and lack of natural
resources, development policies which maximize land-use value and are inclusive,
productive, environmentally sustainable, and socially harmonious are paramount.
Even highly developed economies, however, are today facing worsening income
inequality. Although this is frequently said to be an inevitable outcome of global-
ization, many, including Professor Jagdish Bhagwti and Ben Bernanke, former
chairman of the US Federal Reserve, argue that it is the rapid skill-biased techno-
logical change rather than the globalization process itself which is causing most of
the disparity.
The fundamental social equalizers of education, innovation, and entrepreneur-
ship are critical for an inclusive and productive society. Thus a prolonged period
of social stability is an overwhelming priority, without which upward social
mobility and a meritocracy-based society cannot prevail. The ultimate solution
to worsening income disparity is not state handouts, rebates, or subsidies. Creative
policy measures and human resource management are needed that ensure decent-
paying jobs and retraining for the lowest-earning 20 per cent of society. As
Singapore has moved up the technological ladder to meet the challenge of the
new economy, the urgent need to recalibrate the skillset of the indigenous
workforce has prompted a restructuring of higher education with the addition
of entrepreneurial and industry-relevant dimensions.
Until the end of the 1990s, the National University of Singapore (NUS)
followed the traditional British university model with teaching as the primary
mission and research as a secondary function, and limited linkages between
academia and industry. The major impetus for change came in the late 1990s.
Economic slowdown precipitated by the Asian financial crisis led to growing
recognition by policymakers of the need to increase the entrepreneurial dynamism
Table 9.3 Contributions to Singapore’s GDP by sector
1960 1960–70 1970–80 1980–90 1990–2000 2000-11
GDP at constant 2005 prices
at end of period ($ million)
6,863 16,567 39,229 82,659 165,245 299,625
Average growth pa (%) 9.3 9 7.8 7.2 5.7
Manufacturing (%) 13.8 11.1 7.3 7.5 6
Construction (%) 16.7 6.4 5.3 10.8 1.8
Services (%) 7.6 8.5 7.9 7.5 5.7
Share in GDP (at end of
period)
Manufacturing (%) 15.2 22.8 27.4 26.3 25.7 27.1
Construction (%) 4.3 8.2 6.2 4.3 5.6 3.7
Services (%) 80.5 69 66.3 69.6 68.6 69.1
Source: Singapore Economic Survey, Department of Statistics, Ministry for Trade and Industry,
Singapore.
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of economy. In a speech in August 2002, Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, deputy prime
minister and minister for defence, stated:
The three primary roles which a world-class university should play in a modern
economy and society [are]: i. delivering quality undergraduate education;
ii developing graduate education and research; and iii fostering entrepreneur-
ship and industry involvement.
The Singapore government has since embarked on the path of upgrading tertiary
education to match the modern economy comparable to those world-class aca-
demic institutions prevailing in the west. Tertiary education would now gear
toward post-graduate studies with strong emphasis on scientific research. Most
of all, the academic curriculum of local universities would now place emphasis on
being industry relevant and aiming to produce entrepreneurs who are well versed
in the latest technology developments.
With strong support from top political leadership, NUS appointed a new vice
chancellor with research leadership experience at leading US universities and
corporate experience at a major US corporation. Subsequently highly distin-
guished and experienced academics from the United States and Europe were
appointed vice chancellors at other universities including Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore Management University, and Singapore University of Tech-
nology and Design.
9.6.4 Planning for a Comprehensive Long-term Vision
The Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) undertakes long-term planning but
its Singapore Urban Development Plan (SUDP) is an example of its ability to
actively respond to change. SUDP plots national land allocation for the long term
while meeting national needs in the short term, with land allocated to sectors that
need it the most following detailed revisions of the Master Plan (see Figure 9.5).
Figure 9.6 shows the structure and function of URA with its mission ‘to make
Singapore a great city to live, work and play in’. Competing land requirements of
housing, commerce, industry, airport, seaport, green parks, water treatment and
storage require long-term planning. However addressing short-term needs calls
for inter-agency discussion and coordination between agencies including the
Singapore Land Authority, National Parks Board, Singapore Tourism Promotion
Board, Land Transport Authority, Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, Mari-
time Port Authority, Public Utilities Board, Business Chamber of Commerce, and
Trade Councils.
Singapore takes a sustainable approach to development which relies on a robust
system of good governance, a pragmatic sense of environmentalism, and lastly, a
balanced approach to growth and national interests. Figure 9.7 provides an overview
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Figure 9.5 Singapore Urban Development Plan: A comprehensive long-term vision
Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority, ‘Singapore Urban Development Plan’
URA–Singapore’s National Planning Authority




















Figure 9.6 Structure and functions of the Singapore Urban Redevelopment
Authority
Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority, ‘Singapore Urban Development Plan’
Planning Framework
Concept Plan
• Broad strategies for the next 40–50 years
• Reviewed every 10 years
• Reviewed every 5 years
• Implementation
• A guiding plan, actual pace of development
   will depend on market demand
• Detailed plans for the next 10–15 years
Master Plan
Land Sales & Development Control
Figure 9.7 Planning framework of the Singapore Urban Redevelopment Authority
Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority, ‘Singapore Urban Development Plan’
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of URA’s strategic planning framework. The long-term Concept Plan is reviewed
every decade and adjusted to suit the national interest. The Master Plan has a
detailed medium-term plan for the next ten to fifteen years. A Guiding Plan
monitors the actual pace of development based on market demand.
9.6.5 Zero Tolerance of Corruption
Studies by the World Economic Forum and Transparency International have
shown a negative correlation between corruption perception and economic com-
petitiveness and attractiveness to foreign direct investment. World Governance
Indicators by the World Bank Group have also concluded that political stability is
positively related to absence of corruption. A study by Transparency International
closely linked corruption with state failure. Singapore continually tops the rank-
ings for being among the least corrupt countries in the world. A strict zero
tolerance of corruption, from financial rewards to exchanging power for favours,
has been the bedrock of the country’s effective public policy formulation and its
efficient implementation.
However, as a former colony, Singapore was rife with corruption in its early
days. A British-commissioned report found three main reasons: low salaries for
public officials, ample opportunities for corruption, and low risk of detection and
punishment for corrupt practices (see Quah, 2001, 2017). These factors still
prevail in many developing countries. Instability caused by historical and ongoing
civil strife or even natural disasters provides scope for corruption. The ‘natural
resource curse’ of many resource-rich developing nations which creates incentives
for bribery is another factor. Landlocked countries may have rampant corruption
among customs and border officials.
There are three ways to combat corruption. First, strengthening existing anti-
corruption mechanisms. This is not feasible for many developing nations
because they do not have a strong enough base from which to expand. Second,
multiple government anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) that can tackle different
types of corruption. Again, this is not recommended because it would create
multiple underfunded ACAs competing with each other for resources. Third, as
suggested in the literature, a single independent ACA, such as Singapore’s
Corruption Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). Key features of successful
ACAs include independence of political whims and police jurisdiction, an
effective ACA should be chaired by incorruptible and competent staff. The
most important factor enabling an ACA to properly do its job is a conducive
environment created by strong political and public support as well as compre-
hensive anti-corruption laws.
When Singapore took over from the British colonial government, corruption
was rife. Prevention was weak: public officials were poorly paid. The population
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was less well educated and, ignorant of their rights, often resorted to bribery to get
things done. The CPIB, founded in 1952 even before Singapore gained independ-
ence from the British, is one of the oldest agencies in the world dedicated to
handling corruption matters. It works directly under the Prime Minister’s Office,
and if the prime minister refuses to sign off on an investigation, the CPIB can go to
the president instead.
There are four main pillars to Singapore’s culture of anti-corruption: effective
and all-encompassing anti-corruption legislation; an effective independent ACA;
a system that punishes corrupt practices adequately; and efficient government
administration (see Figure 9.8). Political will is a key ingredient as it forms that all-
important sub-structure upon which all the superstructures of anti-corruption
work rest. It provides the soil and the nutrients which allows the seeds of anti-
corruption work to germinate and grow. The government has matched its words
with deeds as it has mobilized the public and the entire civil service to fight
corruption.
Government departments that are prone to corruption, such as police or
customs, have their procedures periodically audited to ensure fewer opportunities
for corruption. CPIB also can investigate corruption in private enterprises.
Through its policy of keeping public-sector jobs economically competitive, the
government is able to hire and keep professional staff for the CPIB as well as
reduce the chance of other public-sector workers resorting to corruption.































































Figure 9.8 Anti-corruption framework in Singapore
Source: Quah (2001)
192  ,   ,    
9.7 Preserving a Democratic Electoral System Allowing
for Checks and Balances
Singapore’s parliamentary democracy has three pillars: legislation by parliament;
governing by the government; and jurisdiction by the courts.
Legislation. Parliament consists of eighty-seven constituency MPs, with a max-
imum of nine non-constituency (NCMPs) and about nine nominated (NMPs)
(see Figure 9.9). Parliament is dissolved and a general election (GE) held every five
years. In accordance with legislation passed in 1984, after a general election
NCMPs are picked from the highest-polling losing opposition party candidates.
Further legislation in 1990 provided for NMPs to be nominated by the Parlia-
mentary Nomination Committee, approved by parliament, and to serve a two-
year term.
Government. Following a general election, the president of Singapore appoints the
MP who has the majority support of his fellow MPs as prime minister (PM), and
on the PM’s recommendation other cabinet ministers (CMs) and ministers of
state (MOSs) are appointed. The PM, CMs and MOSs are in charge of the various
government ministries and collectively report to parliament. The independent
Public Services Commission appoints civil servants.
Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court consist of the High Court and Court of Appeal
and subordinate courts are district and magistrates courts. The chief justice and
high court judges are appointed by the president on the PM’s recommendation.
Magistrates are appointed by the Legal Service Commission.
The president of Singapore is the supreme head of state and is elected by the
citizens of Singapore. The presidential candidate must be a citizen aged 45 or
above, not an MP and not belonging to any political party, must have held a
significant position in the public or private sector and be of high moral and good
social standing. The president normally takes the advice or recommendations of
the PM. However, he can act independently in accepting a motion to dissolve
parliament, accepting nominations to high positions as required by the constitu-
tion, and in proposals to deploy the government’s reserves or surpluses.
Fifty years of political milestones for the People’s Action Party (PAP) can be
summarized as follows. During 1954–9, the old guard was leading the anti-colonial
movement. From 1959 to 1963, PAP went through internal party struggles and
conflict. Singapore became part of Malaysia and PAP advocated anti-racial politics
from 1963 to 1965. Singapore was expelled from Malaysia and became an inde-
pendent city state in 1965. PAP was elected as the governing party with a two-thirds
majority through nine general elections held every five years from 1968 to 2015.
The PAP has the following prime objectives in government: ensuring political
stability; delivering robust economic development through meritocracy with
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Electorial Divisions
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Figure 9.9 Singapore’s constituencies in the 2011 general election
Source: Straits Times, ‘Report on Singapore General Elections 2011’, Press Holdings
social mobility; promoting the national interest; forging a united, inclusive, and
harmonious community; and cultivating national identity. The guiding principle
of national development is the starting point and ultimate end of policy formu-
lation. The PAP won a landslide victory at the 2001 general election which was
held soon after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the collapse of the US
tech bubble. In times of crisis, Singaporeans turn instinctively to the trusted hands
of the PAP. Ten years later, the 2011 general election was a political watershed for
the PAP, which scored only 60.1 per cent of the popular vote, down 15 per cent
from ten years previously, and losing five parliamentary seats in a Group Repre-
sentative Constituency (GPC) and two parliamentary seats in Single Representa-
tive Constituencies (SRCs) (see Table 9.4). While GDP growth has been quite
respectable over the last ten years, satisfaction levels and confidence in the future
seem rather flat, if not negative. The PAP did badly in 2011 because it was out of
touch with the grass roots, and was perceived to have become arrogant and deaf to
increasing unhappiness over issues such as congestion, rising house prices, and
excessive reliance on foreign workers.
Over the period 2011–15, the PAP government worked hard to address the cost
of living, issues of housing affordability, public transport, and health care, and
significantly reduced the inflow of foreign workers. In the 2015 general election
their share of the vote increased by almost ten percentage points. As of today, the
ruling party is able to claim the following five significant achievements in public
Table 9.4 Popular votes won by People’s Action Party in past ten
general elections
Year of election No of seats won* % of votes won#
1959 43 (51) 54.08%
1963 37 (51) 46.93%
1968 58 (58) 86.72%
1972 65 (65) 70.43%
1977 69 (69) 74.09%
1980 75 (75) 77.66%
1984 77 (79) 64.83%
1988 80 (81) 63.17%
1991 77 (81) 60.97%
1997 81 (83) 64.98%
2001 82 (84) 75.29%







Notes: *Number in brackets denote the total number of parliamentary seats;
# % based on number of valid votes.
Source: ‘Summary Report on General Elections’, Straits Times, Singapore Press
Holdings.
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services, which are by no means common in many developed or developing
countries. First, no Singaporean who wants to work is denied a job unless they
are voluntarily unemployed. Second, no Singaporean who wants to study is denied
an education because of financial constraints. Third, the majority of Singaporeans
will always have a roof over their head and own it as a valuable asset. Fourth, no
Singaporean who is unwell is denied basic health care and affordable medical
treatment. Finally, public transportation remains affordable for the young, work-
ing adults, and senior citizens.
As Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of Singapore, succinctly put it:
The government must be clean and efficient, be able to protect the people and to
ensure every citizen is able to lead a good life and progress within a stable and
disciplined society which must also be capable of ensuring a better life for future
generations.
In summary, the five tenets laid down by the political old guard under the
leadership of Lee Kuan Yew have underpinned Singapore’s public policy formu-
lation for decades and have become a major part of the socio-political contract
between the ruling party and the electorate. However, in the post-Lee Kuan Yew
era, it is not surprising that the articulation, communication, and implementation
of policy will have to take a more consultative approach by engaging in national
conversations, and at times, intense debate in terms that resonate with people.
9.8 Singapore’s Strategic Transformation
to a Knowledge-Based, Innovation-Driven, and High
Value-Added Economy
To develop its industries, Singapore adopted a strategy of leveraging global and
emerging multinational corporations to encourage cluster development. In particu-
lar, Singapore looked to exploit the window of opportunity in the high-tech devel-
opment and globalization cycle. This strategy required strong support and planning
by its ministries and statutory boards, including proactive, targeted FDI promotion
policies, geographic agglomeration, and proactive investment in core infrastructure
and skills. There was also an opportunity to leverage anchor firms to stimulate
development of more specialized resources supporting industries and services.
9.9 Industry Cluster Development Policies: Singapore’s
MNC Leveraging Strategy
Wong (2008) analyses two case studies—the biomedical tech sector and
the offshore marine engineering cluster—of how the Singaporean government
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worked to strengthen the country’s innovation base and knowledge-based
industrial clusters.
The biomedical tech sector had to be built from the ground up. This involved
attracting foreign talent to train and work in Singapore, developing education
institutions to better train locals, international collaboration, and nurturing ven-
ture capital for firms in related sectors. In marine engineering the government
sought to expand the already strong transport sector towards offshore marine
engineering. The difference in strategy between the two sectors illustrates the need
to take a tailored approach to developing a knowledge-based cluster that depends
on the resources initially available.
Until the mid-2000s, the clusters in Singapore included electronics, computer
equipment and peripherals; precision engineering; maritime (ship-building and
repair, offshore engineering, port and shipping services); chemical manufacturing;
semiconductor assembly and testing; and pharmaceutical manufacturing. How-
ever, from the late 2000s, emerging clusters included interactive digital media,
water treatment and clean technology, biomedical devices, and life sciences. There
are a number of notable examples of industry cluster development. Biopolis is a
research and development centre focusing on biomedical, biotechnology, agro-
biology, and engineering research. It houses several A*Star institutes and is
situated close to universities, creating a technology corridor. Fusionopolis is a
research and development complex that focuses on ICT research, media, broad-
casting, and solutions for e-business, e-commerce, and the overall development of
an intelligent city.
9.10 The Nation’s Pillars of Industrialization: Successful
and Not-so-successful Case Studies
9.10.1 Case Study of a Successful Industry Cluster:
Jurong Island Chemical Hub
Singapore has no oil or gas resources and limited land space. But against all the
odds, it has achieved tremendous success in the petrochemical industry. Today,
Singapore is the third-largest oil refining centre in the world, the largest bunkering
port, one of the top three oil trading hubs in the world, and the price discovery
centre of Asia’s oil trading industry.
Jurong Island Chemical Hub is today a growing chemical hub in Asia (see
Figure 9.10). Its stellar success can be attributed to clever land utilization, adapt-
ability to volatile markets, and adequate attention to safety and security. It is home
to almost ninety international petroleum and chemical companies, and has
contributed to investments of over US$47 billion. The hub manufactures refined
and chemical products from integrated petrochemical complexes of oil majors
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Exxon Mobil and Shell, intermediate products from chemical producers such as
Sumitomo & BASF, to automotive chemicals and agro-chemicals from firms such
as Evonik and Solvay.
9.10.2 Case Study of a Not-so-successful Industry Cluster:
Biomedical Sciences in Singapore
Singapore’s vision for this industry cluster is to project Singapore as a biomedical
sciences hub with world-class capability across the whole value chain. The strategy
adopted by Singapore included human capital, intellectual capital, and industrial
capital elements, and an ethical framework (Figure 9.11).
However, the reality may be different from the vision. First, there is a limited
pool of talent in Singapore to develop this sector. Second, there is intense global
competition in life sciences. Other larger countries, including the United States
and China, have access to financial and human capital resources that impose
significant competitive pressures on small countries like Singapore to grow and
develop in the life sciences industry. Finally, Singapore lacks a sufficiently large
domestic market for the life sciences industry to be able to achieve a critical mass
to grow and develop. These three factors have led to the lack of growth in the
biomedical and life sciences sector.
Figure 9.10 Jurong Island Chemical Hub: A growing center in Asia
Source: Economic Development Board, a Singapore Government Statutory Board
198  ,   ,    
In 2018, the guaranteed funding for core research activities and overheads of
A*Star scientists is set to be cut by up to 20 per cent. The ten biomedical institutes
and laboratories, which employ about 1,700 research scientists, engineers, and
technicians, had their fixed funding cut to about 70 per cent in 2011. News of
another round of cuts in fixed funding has unsettled the biomedical research
community. Some scientists are considering leaving for institutes overseas.
Figure 9.12 shows the production process in biomedical sciences. Even after
many years of government investment and initiatives, Singapore was not able to
make a breakthrough at the first stage of basic and clinical research.
In addition, Singapore’s multi-pronged strategy included economic develop-
ment via investment, recruitment of overseas talent, legal and ethical frameworks,
clinical centres of excellence, extramural funding for investigator-based research,
research institutes, improvement of the education system, physical infrastructure
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Figure 9.12 Production process for biomedical sciences
Source: Wong (2008)
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such as Biopolis, and the development of local human resources such as scholar-
ships for graduate and post-doctoral studies.
9.11 Singapore Government Updates to Strategic
Economic Roadmaps
The Singapore Economic Committee was formed in 1985 to examine the longer-
term problems and prospects of the Singapore economy, identify new growth
areas, and define new strategies for promoting growth. As the Committee studied
the problem, it quickly realized that it also had to address the 1985 recession
which was caused largely by a slump in commodities’ prices and loss of competi-
tiveness. The recession could not be brushed aside as a cyclical difficulty which
would eventually disappear by itself. On the contrary, the recession was a mani-
festation of fundamental problems in the economy. These had to be corrected,
with policies changed, not only to overcome the recession, but also to set the
correct direction for the country’s longer-term growth. Four of the Committee’s
major recommendations are of particular importance:
1. Undertake competitive and structural wage reforms.
2. Undertake competitive and structural tax reforms.
3. Upgrade business efficiency and productivity.
4. Promote service industries to diversify the economy further.
The Economic Strategies Committee was set up in 2010 to identify key recom-
mendations on seven broad strategies to help sustain Singapore’s longer-term
growth target of 3 per cent to 5 per cent over the next decade. The seven key
strategies are:
1. Growing through skills and innovation.
2. Anchoring Singapore as a global Asia hub.
3. Building a vibrant and diverse corporate ecosystem.
4. Making innovation pervasive, and strengthening commercialization of
research and development.
5. Becoming a smart energy economy.
6. Enhancing land productivity to secure future growth.
7. Building a distinctive global city and an enduring home.
The Committee for the Future Economy, formed in 2017, suggests that the
national workforce should have deep skills and be inspired to learn throughout
their lives. Businesses should be innovative and nimble. The cosmopolitan city
200  ,   ,    
should be vibrant and connected to the world by continually renewing itself. The
government needs to be well coordinated, inclusive, and responsive. The commit-
tee recommended the following moves:
1. Deepen and diversify our international connections.
2. Acquire and utilize deep skills.
3. Strengthen enterprise capabilities to innovate and scale up.
4. Build strong digital capabilities.
5. Develop a vibrant and connected city of opportunity.
6. Develop and implement Industry Transformation Maps.
7. Partner each other to enable innovation and growth.
These collective efforts will allow Singapore’s economy to grow by 2–3 per cent
per year on average for the next decade, exceeding the performance of most
advanced economies, and becoming a value-creating economy that is open and
connected to the world, offering a multitude of opportunities, with sustainable
wage growth and meaningful careers for all Singaporeans. There is a rising
expectation among younger voters of leadership renewal in the next general
election, due by 2020 at the latest. A more uncertain global environment and
protectionism in trade are to be expected. An ageing population, flagging
economic dynamism, and rising health care costs are some of the more challen-
ging circumstances that need to be better prepared for (Republic of Singapore,
1986, 2010, and 2017).
Surrounding the public policy discourse, there are three serious socio-economic
challenges that both Singapore’s leadership and public will have to deal with:
alleviating worsening income disparity; improving upward social mobility; and
enhancing social integration by class, ethnicity, religion, and cultural group.
Given the increasing discontent caused by the spread of globalization, more
should be done to ensure balanced and inclusive economic growth in order to
reduce income inequality. While improving upward social mobility and promot-
ing greater social integration between people from diverse backgrounds may be a
daunting task, these goals are paramount, especially in a densely populated city
state. The wisdom of the new leadership will be measured by how it approaches
issues such as integrated housing programmes, ensuring a level playing field in
education, promoting religious harmony, and forging a common national identity
that evolves with time.
Singapore took its place on the world stage as the host of the historic Trump–
Kim summit in June 2018. In the past Singapore has successfully organized annual
meetings of the World Trade Organization, The World Bank Group, and the
International Monetary Fund, and will undoubtedly continue to host similar high-
level meetings in the years to come. The country’s current internationally credible
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reputation for efficiency has been nurtured over the decades by the Singaporean
government under the PAP. However, there will be a host of new social, economic,
and political challenges to face as the country moves ahead.
9.12 Lessons for Developing Countries
As the old Chinese saying goes, one should think of potential crisis even if one is at
peace or in safety. The Singapore government tends to have a strong sense of crisis
to the extent that there is an element of paranoia, which may well be healthy!
A perpetual sense of crisis and alertness for the government would mean public
policymakers and senior civil servants would always be ahead of the curve. For not
only the government but also the population at large to be constantly on guard
against complacency, ready for change in anticipation of potential scenarios
ahead, would strengthen the public sector’s crisis-management capability.
Constant monitoring of an economy’s relative global ranking on ease of doing
business, reviewing infrastructural competitiveness, investing in research and
development, spotting industry and market trends, establishing a committee to
crystal-ball gaze into future disruptive changes caused by rapid technological
innovation and the imminent replacement of conventional jobs by new skillsets,
are paramount for longer-term strategic economic planning.
Developing countries, especially those emerging economies undergoing rapid
economic expansion, need to take a balanced approach to national development
and be conscious that income disparity, slowing down of upward social mobility,
and uneven distribution of opportunities for different social groups could lead to
social disharmony and friction within the community.
Promoting robust economic growth, ensuring a balanced government budget
over the business cycle, and even generating moderate government surpluses
would help to cover the rainy days.
Expanding the middle class through creation of decent-paying jobs is still the
optimal way to guarantee adequate and sustainable public services including
housing, education, health care, and transportation.
As for existing latecomers to industrialization, the window of opportunity may
now be narrower as mechanization, robotization, and digitalization have over-
taken much labour-intensive production, so catching up on relevant skillsets
becomes a daunting task calling for public-sector initiatives, especially for SMEs.
Developing countries are running out of industrialization opportunities sooner
and at much lower levels of income than early industrializers, with evidence that
both globalization and labour-saving technological progress in manufacturing
have been behind these developments. Premature de-industrialization has signifi-
cant economic and political ramifications, including lower economic growth and
democratic failure. The recent round of trade protectionism initiated by the
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United States to retaliation by China, Japan, and the European Union is an added
cause of concern for global trade and investment. However, there could be another
new round of opportunities for developing economies as reshuffling of production
value chains begins across the globe from affected economies, notably China, to
emerging economies including those in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Govern-
ments of emerging economies need to send out trade and investment missions to
actively attract and quicken the pace of production relocations.
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Industrial Policy and Learning
Lessons from Latin America
Wilson Peres and Annalisa Primi
10.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, the world global economic outlook has profoundly
changed. The rise of China, the shifts in the global geopolitical equilibria and
the digital revolution are configuring a fast-changing economic landscape in
which windows of opportunities open and close at high speed. The South East
Asia and the Pacific region dominates the headlines due to its growing global
relevance. Africa gathers world attention as the continent where most of global
population growth is expected to happen and where local leaderships are standing
up with a new, shared vision for the future embedded in the Africa Union
Commission (AUC) Agenda 2063: the “Africa We Want”, and as a continent
for business and investment from traditional and emerging partners. In this
context, Latin America appears as a region in slow motion.
Despite progress made in poverty reduction, somewhat better income distri-
bution, increasing access to education and health, advances in digital connectivity,
and an emerging regional start-up scene, still the countries in the region remain
among the most unequal in the world, and the region seems trapped in some of
the challenges of the past (Prebisch, 1949). How to go beyond being a provider of
raw materials and commodities to the global economy? How to benefit more from
trade and FDI and ensure that the outcomes of increased participation in the
world economy accrue to the domestic stakeholders?
This chapter contributes to the understanding of how nations learn by looking
at the experience of Latin America. The region is far from being homogeneous. It
groups countries at different levels of development, with diverse market sizes and
diverse specialization patterns. However, there are similarities in terms of histor-
ical and cultural heritages, evolution of policy approaches, and economic per-
formance that make the region a relevant and interesting unit of analysis. The
region, as the chapter shows, could have achieved more in terms of development
and economic transformation since the 1960s had it exploited at full all the levers
through which economies learn and accumulate capabilities (Oqubay and Ohno,
this volume). The experience of Latin American countries, despite the limited
aggregate outcomes, is rich and offers interesting insights on how and why nations
learn, why some learn faster and better than others, and why some don’t manage
to trigger the profound learning and accumulation mechanisms that are needed
for countries to develop.
The chapter, which reviews the experiences of several countries in Latin
America, focusing on the most advanced and industrially developed, contains
three sections. The first presents some stylized facts about growth and structural
change in Latin America. It highlights the limitations of the growth patterns of the
countries in the region, the shortcomings in terms of learning opportunities that
derive from the prevailing production and trade specialization, and their limited
knowledge base. The second section analyses the limited impact of industrial
policies in Latin America, discussing their evolution over time and their capacity
(or lack of capacity) to foster virtuous learning dynamics. The third section
focuses on three areas in which the countries of the region have achieved change
and have managed to foster learning in the economy and in policymaking. The
chapter concludes deriving lessons for development. The chapter closes by recall-
ing that there is no one-size-fits-all for how nations learn, but that, at the same
time, there are some general principles that, when addressed, can trigger virtuous
development patterns across all countries and regions.
10.2 A Region in Slow Motion in a Fast-Changing
World Economy
While the global economic outlook is changing at a fast speed, Latin America
seems to stand out for its slow motion. Latin America’s contribution to world
GDP is stable at around 7.5 per cent since the 1960s (Figure 10.1). The rise of
South East Asia and the Pacific, and in particular China’s accelerated growth
since the Open Door Policy of the late 1970s, represent a major landmark in
the evolution of the global economy outlook. The South East Asia and the
Pacific region accounts today for 28 per cent of world GDP, up from 12 per
cent in the 1960, surpassing the United States as the world leading economy
since 2007.
Latin America stands out for its reduced dynamism. Differently from Africa,
China, and South East Asia, over the long run the region is growing less than the
world average (Figure 10.2). Despite the increasing demand for its raw materials
and the growing middle classes that could have sustained GDP growth through
domestic demand, the region is far from recovering the growth rates of its Golden
Age. The regional average GDP growth in the last decade is half of what it was
during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, which coincided with the phase of the
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developmental state and with import substitution policies oriented to build
domestic industrial capabilities to compete in the global market.
Learning enables countries to progress; learning is in fact the origin of increases
in GDP and productivity (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2013). Learning takes place at
different levels. On the one hand, it happens at the level of policymaking and
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Figure 10.1 Share of domestic GDP in world GDP (US$ constant, 2010), 1960–2017
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innovation systems at different levels: sectors and value chains, firms, territorial
clusters, and individuals. The limited growth performance of Latin America
compared with Asia is associated with the marginal, unidimensional integration
into the global economy, the persistent structural inertia of the region, and with
the associated limited learning opportunities. On the one hand, Latin America
remains anchored to raw materials and commodities and with a limited partici-
pation to global value chains (GVCs). While in the success stories from Asia the
Hidalgo-Hausmann economic complexity index has risen in the last two decades,
it has remained very low in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean
(ECLAC-Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016:
114). Not only have the countries in the region specialized in natural-resource-
intensive activities or in assembly functions in GVCs, but many countries in the
region have seen their dependency on natural resources increase over time at the
expense of their industrial capabilities. In Chile, for example, the share of mining
exports over total exports increased from 40 per cent to 50 per cent from 1990 to
2017, and, during the same period, in Colombia the share of oil exports over total
exports doubled from 25 per cent to 50 per cent (OECD/UN- Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development/United Nations, 2018 and OECD/UN/
UNIDO 2019).
In Latin America achieving structural change and diversifying economies is
still a challenge. Manufacturing, which despite its changing nature due to
digitalization is still crucial in terms of its capacity to generate linkages and
foster learning and accumulation of capabilities, is losing ground in the region
due to growing competition from China and limited investment in research and
innovation. Most of the economies of the region share the challenges of low
productivity and little diversification of their economic structures. These char-
acteristics are associated with a concentration of opportunities in a few firms,
sectors, and territories. For example, in Chile large firms play a dominant role in
the economy but they innovate less than their peers in advanced countries.
Large firms in Chile are responsible for 73 per cent of business turnover and
57 per cent of total business R&D, while in Germany such firms account for
53 per cent of turnover and for 85 per cent of R&D (OECD/UN, 2018). In
addition, economic opportunities tend to be concentrated in a few hubs within
each country. In Chile, for example, the Santiago Metropolitan Region generates
almost half of national GDP, and accounts for 40 per cent of domestic popu-
lation. Foreign direct investment concentrates in Santiago and the mining
regions of Antofagasta and Atacama, and the creation of new firm clusters in
Santiago (OECD/UN, 2018). Something similar occurs in Mexico, where most
of modern production and export platforms are located in the northern and
central parts of the country.
Despite decades of attempts to increase the technological, innovation, and
knowledge base in Latin America, the gap with advanced countries persists and
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the gap with dynamic developing economies is increasing. A limited knowledge
base hampers the capacity to innovate, connect, and learn from others. Most
countries in the region suffer a bias towards tertiary education and insufficient
vocational and technical training. In addition, quality of education represents a
major hurdle. Notwithstanding an average annual investment in education
amounting to 3.9 per cent of GDP, countries in the region show poor results in
international tests, such as PISA (Programme for International Student Assess-
ment) and TERCE (a large-scale regional study on learning assessment carried
out in Latin America by UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organisation), particularly in science-related areas. In addition, Latin
America invests little in innovation and its private sector tends to be more risk
adverse than in other areas of the world. On average, Latin American countries
devote around 0.8 per cent of their GDP to R&D investments (i.e. R&D intensity),
and around 80 per cent of that investment comes from the public sector. Only in
Brazil is R&D intensity higher than 1 per cent. These figures are in stark contrast with
what happens in advanced economies and in Asia, where countries devote higher
shares of their GDP to R&D. On average, OECD countries invest 2.4 per cent of their
GDP in R&D, of which almost 62 per cent is financed by the private sector. China has
an R&D intensity as high as the OECD average and its private sector finances account
for more than 80 per cent of it (Figure 10.3).
Trade and FDI have struggled to deliver on their growth promises in the region.
They have contributed to increased export earnings and sustained growth,
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Note: GERD: Gross domestic expenditure on research and development.
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https://stats.oecd.org/, UNESCO (2017)
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especially in the phases of growing prices of raw materials, but they have fallen
short with respect to opening up widespread possibilities for learning. In Asia,
active export-oriented industrialization strategies have sustained the accumula-
tion of capabilities and the development of a domestic entrepreneurial class
(Amsden, 1990; Wade, 1990; see also Chapters 7, 8, and 9 in this volume).
In Latin America, trade and FDI have not opened learning opportunities on
a par with what has happened in Asia. This can be partially explained by the
prevailing production and trade specialization (in Asia trade and FDI have
focused relatively more on manufacturing than on natural-resource-based activ-
ities) and by the conditionalities included in trade and FDI agreements, which in
Asia have tended to contain more effective clauses for local content and domestic
linkages. In Asia trade and FDI have been crucial in the setting up of domestic
entrepreneurial capabilities, in Latin America this has not been the case. In fact,
Latin America stands out, in comparison with Asia, for the lack of home-grown
brands, even in industries where the region has attracted FDI and set up trade
rules that foster domestic industrial development such as the automotive industry.
Latin America also falls short when compared to Asia and Africa with respect to
capitalizing on the benefits of regional integration as a way to foster industrial-
ization and learning in the domestic economy. Latin America is the region that
trades less within itself than other areas in the world. In Latin America intra-
regional exports account for 15 per cent of total exports, while the same figure
is up to 23 per cent for Africa and 52 per cent for East and South East Asia
(Figure 10.4). The same applies when looking at regional trade in intermediaries,
which is a proxy of regional value chains. Only 14 per cent of total exports of inter-
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Figure 10.4 Share of intra-regional and extra-regional exports, 2016–18
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN Comtrade data (2018)
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East and South East Asia, according to estimates from the UN Comtrade database.
Regional trade can enable learning in developing economies as it tends to be more
diversified than global trade (e.g. countries trade a higher number of products
within the region than globally) and SMEs tend to participate more in regional
trade than in global trade (Dini and Stumpo, 2018). Latin America is also a region
where regional trade agreements have struggled to take off, Mercosur is an example
while the Central America Common Market, with its more effective integration,
represents the exception. In contrast, Asia with the ASEAN (Association of South
East Asian Nations) experience shows that regional integration can be highly
effective and support industrialization and learning especially when it goes beyond
trade and includes cooperation in multiple fields, including scientific and political
fields. In this respect, Africa is also showing a bold commitment to sustain the
continent’s industrialization by boosting intra-regional trade with the signing of
the Continental Free Trade Agreement.
10.3 Industrial Policies Struggle to be Pivotal
in National Development Strategies
Industrial policies (in different forms and under diverse names) have not been
strangers to Latin America since the 1950s (Peres, 2013; Peres and Primi, 2009).
However, apart from the period between the 1950s and 1970s, they have struggled
to be pivotal in national development strategies. Their destiny has followed a
swing that has never recovered the ambitiousness, strength, and investment that
they had in the initial phase of the modernization of Latin America, even now that
they are back as part of national development strategies (Cimoli et al., 2017;
OECD/UN, 2018).
In fact, during the decades of the 1980s up to the 1990s, these policies that had
fostered industrialization, learning, and accumulation of capabilities, fell into
disrepute. Even though in practice certain industrial policy tools remained active
during the liberalization period, they were often disguised under more market-
friendly concepts such as competitiveness policies and cluster development pol-
icies (Porter, 1990). At that time, the prevailing sentiment towards industrial
policies in the region can be effectively summarized by the well-known sentence:
‘The best industrial policy is no industrial policy.’ An ideological conviction in the
superiority of the market as resource allocation mechanism and incentives’ setter,
fuelled a generalized worry about the perils of active government intervention in
the economy, and fostered a soft approach in development strategies to minimize
the risks of corruption and capture. Since then industrial policies have come back
in the region in different forms and shapes, but their impact has been, apart from
some isolated success cases, below expectations (Cimoli et al., 2017; OECD, 2013a;
Primi, 2015).
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There are many reasons behind the little aggregate impact of industrial policies
in Latin America. Among these explanations, the most relevant ones are linked to
the fact that various success factors of industrial policies in other areas of the
world are not present in the experiences of the different countries of this region.
Policies for industrial development in Latin America have always been far from
the ambitiousness of the export-oriented industrialization strategies of South East
Asian economies, and even further from the whole-of-government approach of
preference for the domestic industry and the focus on technology and research
that has always prevailed in the United States. And they have not been imple-
mented with the same continuity and budget intensity pursued by successful
economies.
Learning in policymaking occurs through two main channels: learning by doing
(i.e. by experimenting and implementing new policies) and learning from others
(i.e. learning by emulation and by adaptation to the local context of policies and
practices applied elsewhere (Reinert, 2009)). The experience of Latin America
shows that, while learning from others is crucial, it is not enough. Learning by
doing is a more powerful tool to enhance the quality and impact of policy
processes. Latin American countries have historically been prone and open to
learning from the experiences of other countries. Almost all countries in the
region can count many missions to and from more advanced countries with a
view to learning from their policy approaches. Many innovation programmes
introduced in the region since the 2000s have been designed as a result of looking
at the experiences of European countries, and several financial instruments for
business start-up and expansion, derive from the experiences of the United States.
In their learning from others, in general, governments in Latin America have been
always careful to tailor to their realities the experiences of others. However, in
some cases they have not been immune to the tendency to ‘cut and paste’
programmes and institutions from abroad. While peer learning and dialogue
matter and can increase the quality and impact of the policymaking process,
most of the learning occurs when countries directly experiment with policy design
and implementation (Cimoli et al., 2005).
On the one hand, the reason for the limited impact of industrial policies in
Latin America is linked to the fact that these policies have never been among
the top priorities for governments—at least since the 1980s. Macroeconomic
stability and a certain compliance with what was considered to be a respect-
able and conventional economic policy have been the main shapers of national
development strategies. In contrast with the experiences of successful South
East Asian economies, in Latin America, even when well designed, industrial
policies never had the role of orchestrators of national development strategies
(Cimoli et al., 2017; Ocampo, 2017; OECD/UN, 2018, OECD/UN/UNIDO
2019). In South East Asia, activating learning dynamics in the domestic
economy and accumulating technological and production capabilities were
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among the top national priorities; and therefore these policies were able to
mobilize investments in bundles and to create the necessary incentives for
learning and capabilities accumulation.
On the other hand, industrial polices failed in Latin America because they
lacked certain features that characterized the success cases. Overall, they lacked
the time and budget consistency enjoyed in other economies, such as the Republic
of South Korea and China. But they also differed in specific features that can be
grouped in three categories: a) the vision and the strategy; b) the role of private
sector and of domestic demand; and c) the implementation mechanisms.
Table 10.1 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the policy
approaches over the three main historical phases since the 1940s. The Golden
Age and the developmental state (1940s up to 1970s), the foreign debt crisis
and the liberalization period (1980s and 1990s) and the slow return of industrial
policies since the 2000s. Each country has followed different trends and in
some countries reforms started earlier than in others, but as an overall overview
this periodization is quite accurate for what has happened in the countries of
the region.
Latin America has witnessed at least three major changes in visions and
strategies for economic development since the 1940s. The changes in the overall
policy approach to development from the developmental phase to liberalization
and the return of the competitiveness agenda entailed significant ruptures in
government funding and regulatory priorities, and also in what concerns the
expected role of the private sector and the domestic demand as drivers of growth.
These deep changes in the political economy that inspired strategies and policies
also resulted in changes in the policy mix, and overall in alterations of the
coherence between industrial, technology, and trade policies. Even in countries
with the longest and strongest experience in industrial policy, like Brazil, since
the 1980s continuity of priorities, investments, and tools was achieved only
for a decade (2004–14). Too short to achieve major structural changes and too
short to set the basis for private learning processes (ABDI-Brazilian Industrial
Development Agency, 2015). In this sense, it is possible to assert that industrial
policies have not been part of a strategic development vision in the region, even in
the few cases where such vision existed.
Many countries in Latin America struggle when it comes to deciding how to
prioritize. The changes in visions and approaches to policies for production
transformation that have occurred since the 1940s have generated an ideological
bias against government intervention. There is a generalized perception, actually
often well-grounded in poor policy experiences, that governments are not well
suited to identify priority areas for public and private investment. This fear of
government failures, sustained by the temptation of certain policy approaches,
backed by product-level analysis, to choose priorities so narrow as to arrive at the
granular level of selecting specific products and services, makes it difficult for
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Table 10.1 Industrial policies in Latin America, 1940s up to the present
Policies for industrial development and learning 1940s–1970s 1980s–1990s 2000s onwards
Vision and
strategy
Priorities Few, strategic industries of
national interest
Horizontal, no selectivity Multiple, limited
selectivity
Time-frame and budget Long-term budget and
investments





National champions YES (e.g. Embraer) NO NO but focus on start-ups
Domestic demand Limited, as national consumption gives premium to imported
goods and services




Planning and strategic functions
debilitated. Implementation







territorial level start to be
developed
Quality of civil servants Limited incentives and control/reward mechanisms
Policy mix Trade and
FDI










SMEs No YES YES







Horizontal Incipient return of
alignment, but lack of
technical skills
Evaluation as part of
policy cycle
Limited Limited Limited, when available focused on
specific policy tools/instruments
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on interviews with experts and policymakers in the region and revision of official policy documents and available policy evaluations.
Consulted background material is available in Peres and Primi (2009); Cimoli et al. (2017); Dini and Stumpo (2018).
countries to ‘think big’ and identify opportunities beyond the current potential
comparative advantages. This is an area, where the difference with the South East
Asian approach is remarkable. Successful Asian economies are well known for
having developed capabilities, backed by government support, in areas which
defeated their initial advantages (Amsden, 1989; Chang, 1994; Lin, 2012; Wade,
1990). Latin America’s more gradual approach, (e.g. building technological cap-
abilities in natural resources and agro-food find almost generalized consensus
across all political approaches and visions in the region), seems to have made the
detour towards learning and diversification longer, and more difficult. In fact,
horizontal measures have limited impact in a context characterized by high
structural heterogeneity. They tend to foster established interests, and end up
being selective in practice. This has been made evident by some analysis of the use
of policy instruments in countries of the region. In Mexico, for example, an
analysis of fiscal incentives for innovation (a typically market-friendly, horizontal
policy tool) revealed that main beneficiaries over time have always been the same
large foreign corporations and that these incentives had very limited impact in
terms of fostering systemic learning and innovation in industrial clusters in
Mexico (Sánchez and Poy, 2019; Unger, 2011).
Prioritizing requires not only a well-grounded, future-oriented vision, it also
needs political feasibility. And this is where Latin American governments struggle.
The discussion on how ambitious the policy should be and how far from existing
assets and competences a country can target are non-consensual issues in the
region. Some exceptions in this direction come from small, successful economies
such as Costa Rica, which since the early 2010s, started to switch its approach
towards a selective approach to attracting FDI, prioritizing knowledge-intensive
industries such as ICT and medical devices (OECD, 2012).
This lack of strategic relevance has had a profound impact on policy design and
implementation, as well as on governance and institutions. The institutions in
charge of technological and industrial development in the region have been debili-
tated over time and, even in the case of well-respected ones such as CORFO
(Chilean Production Development Corporation, an implementing agency affiliated
to the Ministry of Economy) in Chile have never recovered their relevance in the
domestic power structure of the early developmental days. The vision put forward
by CORFO in 2016 on strategic programmes to transform the Chilean economy
with a horizon reaching to 2025, leveraging on new technologies, global demand for
sustainability, and the uniquenesses of the country, was very innovative and well
crafted (OECD/UN, 2018). The vision, and the associated programmes and tools,
however, struggled to generate consensus beyond the obvious. Strengthening min-
ing through innovation, local supply chains, and partnerships was well accepted
and obtained private funding to back up public investment, building on previous
successes of effective cooperation with leading multinationals, domestic and for-
eign. However, the most transformative aspects of the programme, and the more
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long-term oriented struggled to find support beyond the administration that
proposed the programmes. Investing in digital technologies and in solar energy,
both enablers of transformative changes across the whole economy, remained
orphan priorities. This is not only happening because the private sector is risk
adverse and because market incentives give a premium to natural-resource activ-
ities that the current structure of public policy tools is not able to alter in favour of
investments in innovation. This is happening also because, from an institutional
point of view, there is no agency in charge of strategic planning and thinking for the
future. In Chile, the Ministry of Planning ceased its functions in 2011, and has been
transformed into the Ministry for Social Development. CORFO, with all its auton-
omy and reputation, is an implementing agency and is not regarded by theMinister
of Finance and the Minister of Economy as the agency in charge of strategic
industrial planning.
Many countries in Latin America are actually looking at how to modernize
and rehabilitate planning (Primi, 2015). The structural market-oriented reforms
packages of the 1980s and 1990s have weakened, when not eliminated, these
capabilities. Since the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis of 2008–9,
the return of structural growth policies in OECD economies, and the emergence
of new technologies and the challenges of digitalization, many countries in Latin
America are looking at how to think long term and how to rebuild their
planning capacities. In the last two decades, countries such as Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica started experimenting with modern ways of
fostering long-term thinking by setting up different forms of councils for
public–private consultations and for inter-ministerial coordination. The cre-
ation of these institutional spaces is not a guarantee of their capacity to operate.
In fact, in many instances these councils and commissions lack enforcement
mechanisms or decision-making power (as, for example, the National Com-
petitiveness Commission in Chile). However, when supported by presidential
commitment, these agencies help in creating spaces for strengthening private–
public dialogue and aligning the actions of different ministries to the objective
of structural transformation and production upgrading. In certain cases they
can help in building trust and alignment with the ministries of finance, which in
Latin America often are the most adverse to endorse investments in production
transformation strategies.
In addition to the institutional and governance challenges, investments for
industrial and technological development in Latin America have often not been
up to the ambitions. Chile, for example, with a population four times that of
Emilia Romagna (one of the most manufacturing-intensive regions of Italy)
invested four times less than that region for industrial development and innov-
ation in the same 2014–17 period (OECD/UN, 2018). While policies for industrial
development and innovation in Latin America are often well designed but poorly
funded, this is not always the case. Brazil is an exception in this respect. The
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country, especially since the Production Development Policy (PDP) launched in
2008, has mobilized a sensible amount of public funds for industrial development
and innovation. Between 2004 and 2014, Brazil has implemented three consecu-
tive policies for industrial development: the Industrial, Technological, and Foreign
Trade Policy (PITCE) of 2004, the Productive Development Policy (PDP) of 2008,
and the Greater Brazil Plan (Brasil Plan Maior) of 2011. During those years the
financing for production development policy has represented 83 per cent of the
total financing disbursed by the National Development Bank of Brazil (BNDES).
The BNDES financing of industrial development for the 2004–14 period is
estimated to be around US$270 billion, that is, an average of approximately
US$ 25.7 billion per year, which rounds up to 1.3 per cent of the country’s GDP
and close to 15 per cent of domestic manufacturing value added (Table 10.2).
During this period, BNDES has also developed new tools to facilitate channelling
resources to SMEs (Small and Medium Sized Enterprises). For example, the
BNDES has introduced Credit-Card-BNDES that enabled direct access to credit
for SMEs, thereby fostering bank usage and reducing the time of access to finance.
In addition, BNDES started to introduce new programmes to foster innovation.
For example the Innova programme (Inova Empresa) invested more than US$12
billion for innovation; more than 80 per cent of these resources targeted seven
priority areas: energy, oil and gas, health-related industries, defence and aero-
space, ICT, agribusiness, and the environment (Ferraz et al., 2015).
In Brazil the challenge has not been the limitation of resources, but the capacity
to channel the resources to effective uses and to areas and agents that would
trigger additional investments from the private sector. In certain cases crowding
out of private investment instead of a multiplication effect has taken place, helping
to explain the limited aggregate impact of these investments. Industrial policy
presented some significant shortcomings in Brazil:
i) Lack of selectiveness. Even for a government structure as large as Brazil’s there
were too many priority sectors, and their number grew as a result of political
pressures and short-term territorial or sectoral development challenges.
ii) Limited coordination with macroeconomic policy. Frequently industrial
policy was considered as a means to compensate competitiveness problems
caused by domestic currency overvaluation, this being particularly the case
during the commodity price boom of the first decade of the century.
iii) Use of industrial policy to address macroeconomic problems. After the
2008–9 financial and economic crisis, industrial policy was used as an
instrument of counter-cyclical policy and resources were focused on redu-
cing capital costs to sustain investment.
iv) Scarce evaluation of policy impacts prevented learning and policy adjust-
ments; this problem was compounded with frequent lack of transparency.
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Table 10.2 Financing for production development policy in Brazil by BNDES, 2004–14 (yearly disbursements in billions of US$), by industry
Industries 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 2011 2012 2013 2014** Total
Metal mechanics, electro electronics
and health-related industries
4.24 7.81 8.69 8.73 12.65 11.01 15.69 15.84 15.00 15.72 7.22 122,60
Scale intensive 1.40 2.59 4.83 6.68 9.76 11.86 12.96 15.06 13.98 14.98 5.57 99,66
Labor intensive 0.72 1.11 1.29 2.36 4.09 4.65 6.94 8.13 7.99 7.70 2.55 47,52
Total 6,36 11,50 14,80 17,77 26,50 27,51 35,59 39,03 36,97 38,40 15,34 269,79
Notes: * Does not include an operation with Petrobras valued in 24.75 billion reais (about US$8 billion).
** 1st Semestre (Jan–Jun). Data include a slightly different set of sectors. In the source, the yearly total does not coincide with the sum of sector data.
Source: Authors elaboration based on Ferraz et al. (2015).
The peculiar relevance and strategic role of large industrial enterprises in Latin
America since the 1940s also contributes towards explaining the lack of perva-
siveness of learning processes within the regional productive system. While in
early industrializing countries, from the United Kingdom, to the United States,
Japan, and Europe, large industrial firms have played an important role in
facilitating technological developments and adoption, improvements, and diver-
sification in products and services and in the accumulation and diffusion of new
managerial and organizational techniques, in Latin America things have evolved
differently.
Large industrial firms have not played a leading role in technological innov-
ation in the region apart from the decades between 1940 and 1970, a period in
which the governments of the countries of the region implemented policies
targeted to build technological and industrial capabilities in key strategic indus-
tries (Ocampo, 2017; Peres and Primi, 2009). On the one hand, the phenom-
enon of large industrial firms has been limited in number. In addition, only a
few of them reached competitiveness in key dynamic, complex, and technology-
intensive industries: the Brazilian aeroplane producer Embraer or the Argen-
tinian producer of seamless steel tubes Techint are cases in point. The majority
of these large firms is active in natural-resource-intensive industries (such as
Ecopetrol in Colombia, Pemex in Mexico, and Codelco in Chile), banking and
retail, an area where many multilatinas (large enterprises from the region for
which a significant portion of their business takes place outside the country of
origin, usually within Latin America) do business. On the other hand, especially
since the liberalization efforts of the 1990s, political and managerial control of
many of these large, state-owned or -controlled firms has been aimed more at
reducing their capacity to lobby and capture power, than at fostering their role
as catalyzers of learning processes within the overall production structure.
Moreover, these firms were badly hit by the debt crises of the 1980s and with
more than two decades of the fiscal consolidation programmes that reduced
government investments in R&D and in technological progress, many saw their
competitive edge declining. Some privatization processes have been successful,
such as in the case of Embraer. The company was privatized in 1994; it has
managed to resurface and stay innovative and competitive on the global market
until now.
In the few successful cases the experience of Latin American countries does
not differ from Asian and North American success cases. These large firms, such
as Embraer, were set up thanks to government strategic vision and support;
they grew by focusing on innovation and on getting ready to compete in the
global market and to operate they relied on domestic skilled workforce and
capabilities. In practice they acted as engines of growth and development for the
local production system and looked at technology and innovation as key
competitiveness drivers.
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The case of Embraer is emblematic. The company, which nowadays operates at
the forefront of global aviation technology and is among the world-leading
manufacturers of commercial and executive aircrafts, was set up as a state-
controlled enterprise in 1969, and started its first commercial operations in the
1970s. But what was at the origin of its creation? A national ambition that dates
back to the early 1940s to develop competences and compete in aeronautics and
engineering. An interesting paper by Cassiolato et al. (2002) provides a well-
developed and detailed summary of the history of Embraer. The main points
are summarized in our own words in the following paragraphs. In 1945, the
federal government of Brazil set up an Aeronautics Research Centre, through a
partnership with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The Research
Centre focused on advancing research in the field through original research and
through partnerships with foreign partners. In 1947, the Federal Government
inaugurated the Aeronautics Technology Institute to train local engineers and
technicians. The building of a solid learning base proceeded in the following years
until the mid-1950s, when the federal government set up the Institute for Research
and Development. The institute focused on developing aeronautics, aviation, and
engineering technologies through basic and applied research and by technology
adoption through licenses from more advanced partners, especially from the
United States. The main philosophy behind this whole operation and the creation
of the research institute was the need for Brazil to achieve technology and
knowledge ‘independency’ by knowing the whole production cycle, even if for
productivity reasons they specialized in specific phases and components. The
overall objective was to develop a competitive aeronautics company that could
design, conceive, and assemble aircraft relying on local engineering and tech-
nologies. Embraer, was set up as a state-controlled company in 1969, almost
fifteen years after the setting up of the Aeronautics Technology Research Centre.
Embraer, as mentioned before, was privatized in 1994 and continues to be a key
player in the Brazilian economy. The company has continued to benefit from
government support through more market-friendly policy tools such as innov-
ation funds and fiscal incentives for technological development. It is the leading
company in the country for technology-intensive exports, a major source of
foreign exchange, and a demander of high-skilled employees. Its fortune rests
on its innovation-oriented approach that originates from the technology and
research focus of its inception back in the 1940s.
If Latin America had more Embraer or Techint type of firms and if its policies
for production development had been capable of greater leverage on large indus-
trial firms to engender domestic learning processes, we would probably see a
different Latin America today, more diversified and less elite-dominated. On the
contrary, since the 1980s the prevailing attitude has been not to back national
champions and to control their potential effect in terms of power and rent capture.
The focus has shifted to prevent capture by large firms and incumbents, setting
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aside the tools that could have been used to incentivize these large firms to operate
as innovators and groundbreakers.
In parallel with the distrust for national champions, also supported by an
effective weakness in competition policy in the countries of the region, Latin
American countries have accumulated experience in policies, programmes, and
tools for SMEs development (Dini and Stumpo, 2018). These policies gained
ground even during the liberalization decades of the 1980s and 1990s. These
types of interventions were considered market friendly and in line with traditional
market-failure approaches: SMEs face barriers in access to finance, markets, and
information, and therefore horizontal programmes were needed to remove (or at
least reduce) these barriers and to sustain their competitiveness. In some cases, the
SMEs policies have been more successful, as, for example, in Mexico, Chile, Brazil,
and El Salvador. Yet most of the domestic firms are small and characterized by low
productivity and reduced international competitiveness; moreover, many of them
operate in the informal economy.
The attention to SMEs has also evolved into a new approach in policies for
economic transformation that takes into account territorial development. Latin
American countries are highly heterogeneous when it comes to territorial govern-
ance. The region includes federal countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
and unitary countries, like Chile, where the election of regional authorities is a very
recent achievement. Nevertheless, across the whole region there is a growing
recognition that policies for industrial development cannot be space blind as they
have been in early developmental phases. New tools are being developed to ensure
that production and technological opportunities are exploited across the whole
territory, regardless of the level of centralization of the country. An assessment of
the production development policy of Chile released in early 2018 identified
progress towards a place-based approach to industrial development as a key game
changer for the country. In addition, the willingness to identify mechanisms to
better channel rents from natural resources to foster innovation is also pushing
some countries to identify new forms of working with the regions. This is happen-
ing, for example, in Colombia where 10 per cent of the royalties from mining are
now transferred to regions earmarked for innovation (OECD/UN, forthcoming).
The policy mix for industrial policy in Latin America has also evolved in line
with the different waves of policy approaches. While there is disagreement on
how to choose the direction of technical change, and who should do it, since the
aftermath of the 2008–9 financial and economic crises and taking into account
the new digital revolution, there is consensus on the fact that the new context
opens opportunities for going beyond the current specialization pattern. This
can be done in several ways: by promoting the upgrading and diversification of
existing companies; by fostering the creation of new companies; and by stra-
tegically interacting with foreign firms. Countries can mobilize different levers for
strengthening their domestic capabilities, including financing of S&T development,
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public procurement, FDI and entrepreneurship promotion. Those instruments are
not novel, but they need to be designed in new ways to be in line with the new
landscape and to be more effective. Among some of the policy tools that Latin
American countries are using nowadays to foster learning and the accumulation of
domestic capabilities, it is worth highlighting:
• The incentives enabling a strategic management of FDI and trade. Some
countries are trying to attract FDI in a more strategic way linking them to
national priorities. A successful case in this respect is Costa Rica, Brazil
(especially some states within the country) and Chile are also advancing in
setting up strategic partnerships with foreign investors. Chile, according to
the information provided by the General Directorate of Foreign Trade of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has also recently innovated in its trade policy by
introducing a GVCs chapter in future bilateral trade agreements to ensure
trade policy is aligned with the objective of increasing participation of
domestic firms to GVCs.
• The resurgence in the use of public procurement in areas such as software
development, health, defence, infrastructure, and energy. These are busi-
nesses where there are high social and economic issues at stake and where
in general the state is involved in the research, use, service delivery, and/or
production. Managing public procurement is complex and requires trans-
parency. The region has not been exempt from controversies, especially
from foreign companies, which claim the application of the WTO principle
of equal treatment. More recently, the industrial strategy of the adminis-
tration that took office on 1 December 2018 in Mexico includes procure-
ment by the federal government to foster local content development as a
key policy tool.
• The new set of programmes including financing, service provision, and
mentorship to foster start-up development in the region. These programmes
have relatively low operation costs and are of relatively high impact. They
contribute to placing Latin America under the spotlight of investors in search
of innovative projects (OECD, 2013b; OECD, 2016). Since the introduction
of Start-up Chile in 2010, similar initiatives have been started in the region,
notably in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
• Financing and research infrastructure for innovation remains the Achilles
heel in Latin America’s current policy mix. Innovation policy continues to be
not aligned with main industrial development priorities and the resources
and infrastructure for research are still insufficient with respect to what is
happening in South East Asia and in frontier economies. Renewable energies
could represent a potential for the region to leapfrog, but bolder public
action would be needed in this respect.
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Another aspect in which Latin America differs from successful world experiences,
is that evaluation is not always conceived as part of the policy cycle and as a tool
for policy learning, with the exception of a few cases: the most notable among
the recent ones is linked to the quick reforms introduced in the Start-up Chile
programme because of monitoring and early-stage implementation evaluation.
Since its introduction in 2010, Start-up Chile has been constantly updated to
address unintended consequences, such as the bias towards foreign entrepreneurs
and the excessive concentration of beneficiaries in the capital region (OECD,
2013b; 2016). In the absence of formal evaluations, some public agencies contrib-
ute to increasing awareness of policy objectives and results. For example, in
Argentina the Observatory on Employment monitors job and production trends
in the country and favours policy fine-tuning by operating in close collaboration
with the ministerial level. In Colombia the Observatory for Science and Technol-
ogy (OCyT), created in 1999 as a public–private partnership initiative, is respon-
sible for the elaboration of qualitative and quantitative indicators to monitor
trends and support the process of strategic decision-making (Primi, 2014).
Why are implementation failures so common in the region? On the one hand,
there are few policy operators defined as implementing agencies, such as CORFO
in Chile and BNDES in Brazil. On the other hand, the policy mix tends to lack
powerful instruments. There is a generalized preference for horizontal and soft
instruments such as support for meetings, seminars, and services provision, which
target a myriad of beneficiaries and have little impact. In addition, sometimes it
happens that the political commitments to formulate a policy and release the
policy document do not last until resource allocation. In such cases, policies
remain merely a propaganda tool to show that governments, at least in theory,
care about production development and firms.
10.4 When the Region Takes a Head Start and Learns,
Smart Policies are Behind it
As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, despite Latin America’s
limited achievements of industrial policies, there are some significant experiences,
which show that when effective learning and capabilities accumulation mechan-
isms take place in the region there are effective institutions and policies behind
them. In this sectionwe present lessons learned from three successful recent cases in
three different countries in the region: the capacity of an old institution like CORFO
in Chile to re-invent its internal procedures and routines to adapt to changing
circumstances, the case of the Uruguayan e-government agency (AGESIC), and
the experience of Mexico in the automotive industry. These cases have been
selected based on two criteria. On the one hand, they entail a learning process at
different levels: CORFO and AGESIC provide examples of institutional and policy
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learning, while the Mexican case focuses on learning dynamics at the firm and
cluster level. On the other hand, these cases, even though they all focus on
advanced countries in the region, they encompass very different economic
realities: a small economy (Uruguay), a medium-sized one strongly specialized
in natural resources (Chile), and the second-largest economy in Latin America
and the second exporter of high-tech manufacturing in the region (Mexico).
10.4.1 CORFO: The Importance of Renewing Routines
CORFO was created in 1939; it played an important role in the import substitu-
tion period from the 1940s to early 1973. Afterwards it kept some of its functions
as a holding of state-owned enterprises and since the 1990s it has specialized in
promoting entrepreneurship, innovation, and competitiveness, with particular
attention to SMEs. CORFO manages several programmes, among them three
offer relevant lessons: i) a programme to foster attracting FDI to technology-
intensive industries, introduced by lead-managers who had to convince senior
leadership of the relevance of the proposal; 2) the setting up of a programme to
promote the creation of networks of SMEs to strengthen their competitiveness;
and 3) the introduction, with support of top leadership, of a totally new line of
action: the creation of Start-up Chile in 2010.
The programme to attract knowledge-intensive FDI aimed at increasing FDI
inflows to new industries and making Chile visible to global investors. To reach
these objectives, CORFO had to create its own capabilities to formulate and manage
the full process of investment promotion: this implied that it had to go beyond its
traditional, long-term routines. Its traditional routines were not enough for a new
subject for the agency (attracting FDI), particularly because the new task implied
direct policy operation, well beyond the elaboration of policy guidelines and the
provision of financial resources to firms to which the agency had been used since the
early 1940s. Defining and implementing these new routines and procedures required
vision and persistency from individual managers, especially because the team in
charge had to convince the agency’s CEO and the president of the Republic that the
new programme was feasible and efficient. A new disruptive team, both at the
leadership and operational level, managed the programme. During the first years
of operating the programme more than half of the team had to be changed.
The successful results contributed to highlighting the need to define targeted pro-
grammes to attract FDI and contributed to the upgrading of the domestic institu-
tional governance for attracting FDI. More recently, the Committee for FDI was
upgraded and transformed into the Chilean Agency for FDI (InvestChile).
A different logic was behind the second programme under consideration:
the promotion of networks to foster SMEs’ development. In this instance, the
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programme was the result of the agency’s long-term routines. Its main instruments
were grants to hire managers to help sector-based networks of SMEs to implement
shared strategies, especially in investment and marketing. The introduction of
the new programme was based on the willingness to experiment with new policies
in the field of SMEs’ development, also based on observation of global trends
in the field (especially from Spain). The process of definition and adoption of the
new programme involved an open internal debate to ensure consensus and to get
feedback from various departments. An initial pilot was approved before the policy
was scaled up and introduced into the standard policy tools of CORFO. The piloting
phase included: i) the creation of a three-level organizational structure to scale up
operations (strategic guidance by CORFO, intermediate policy operators, and
beneficiary firms); ii) informal monitoring meetings with policy operators every
two weeks; and iii) systematic, structured formal evaluations by independent bodies
(universities) and a formal commitment by CORFO to actually use evaluation
results to improve policy and instrument design. This programme has been par-
ticularly successful (with beneficiary firms increasing sales and employment more
than the control group).
In 2010, CORFO introduced a new, disruptive programme in its already big
portfolio: Start-up Chile (OECD, 2013b, 2016). Few programmes from CORFO
and from Latin America, have had the global resonance that Start-up Chile
achieved. Many reasons can explain this success. On the one hand, it was the
right programme at the right time. With digitalization exploding and Silicon
Valley in need of a different identity, the world was ready to see new start-up
hubs emerging globally. Months after the introduction of Start-up Chile similar
programmes began to be developed in other countries in the region (Start-up
Brazil, Start-up Peru, InnPulsa Colombia, among others). The programme was far
from perfect when it was first launched. The initial call offered no repayable
contribution only to foreign start-uppers willing to set up a business in Chile.
Discontent from stakeholders induced the lead-team to quickly reform the call
and eliminate the foreign nationality conditionality. A first early evaluation of
results also showed that it was very difficult to scout good proposals and that it was
better to split the programme into two phases to avoid waiting time in low-growth
unsuccessful business ventures. The programme was, and still is, managed by a
disruptive, innovative, and young team (newly recruited CORFO staff) which has
been given autonomy to operate faster and in line with the timing of global start-
up markets. After an initial pilot phase, Start-up Chile was formally included in
CORFO’s governance structure, but it maintains a certain managerial flexibility.
In addition to contributing to the generation of a critical mass of profitable start-
ups in Chile, Start-up Chile has also put pressure on CORFO’s operational system
to show that it is possible to transfer resources faster to beneficiaries and to
improve routines to adapt to the digital economy.
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10.4.2 AGESIC: Creating an Agency That Fosters Change
In 2018, Uruguay jointed the D7 collective of world-leading digital governments,
which includes Estonia, Israel, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and Canada. How was it possible for a small Latin American economy
to join the network of the world’s most advanced digital nations? A significant
part of the answer lies in the operation of a strong government agency AGESIC
(Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y Sociedad de la Información y del Con-
ocimiento) which responds directly to the presidency of the Republic and
which has been operating since 2007. A set of well-defined priorities, strong
governance, and managerial and staff continuity allowed AGESIC to develop
and implement an agenda shared by all stakeholders. Within its broad policy
agenda, AGESIC is implementing a strategic plan crafted to harness the
opportunities provided by blockchain. This involves the development of
blockchain-based shared assets to be incorporated into services by public
institutions and a platform for the deployment of blockchain as a service
(BCaaS) solution. The agency has produced a toolkit through which domestic
institutions can assess the convenience of using this technology and determine
which type of blockchain would be the most appropriate for their objectives.
AGESIC also periodically assesses the political, legal, efficiency, and security
implications of blockchain use. At present, blockchain is used for traceability
in supply chains. The agency foresees widespread use by 2023. A review
of AGESIC’s modus operandi reveals the importance of four organizational
features: i) a clear objective (in this case, transformation with equity) and
efforts sustained for more than a decade; ii) well-defined quantitative goals;
iii) the identification of specific implementation bodies; and iv) the practice of
quarterly evaluations open to all.
Pragmatism, clear goals, and continuity are at the core of AGESIC’s experience.
This also helps explain why ICT policies were much more successful than
industrial policies in Latin America. The region has been able to expand broad-
band internet access, sharply reduce tariffs, and connect more than 60 per cent of
its population (and almost 75 per cent of millennials living in cities) in the last two
decades. Three forces determined these results: i) governments and firms (large,
foreign, domestic, and state-owned corporations) worked in partnership;
ii) government officials thought of themselves as agents of change and cooperated
with their counterparts in other Latin America countries; and iii) all agents
worked to foster adaptation to fast exogenous technological change, avoiding
actions to defer or prevent its dissemination. The ICT agenda also benefited
from a pragmatic approach focused on results and on the willingness to make
change possible in the medium term. ICT policies have been freer of the ideo-
logical burden that industrial policy carries in the region and therefore enjoyed
higher levels of commitment and consensus.
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10.4.3 The Automotive Industry in Mexico: Learning
from FDI Is Possible, But Home-grown Brands Are Needed
to Be Prepared for the Future
Mexico is one of the world’s leading producers and exporters of vehicles, although
it has no automanufacturers of its own. For more than two decades under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which included Mexico, the
United States, and Canada, the country’s production of light vehicles grew from
1.1 million units in 1994 to nearly 3.5 million in 2016 and Mexican light-vehicle
exports increased from 579 thousand to 2.8 million units during the same period
(Klier and Rubenstein, 2017). Although the country has developed some
intermediate-level capabilities, its main competitive advantage was being the
low-wage country in NAFTA (ECLAC, 2017; Promexico, 2016).
Trade and industrial policies have been determinant in positioning Mexico
on the world map of global trade as a cars’ export platform. Vehicle assembly in
Mexico dates back to the 1920s. During the first half of the twentieth century,
Mexicans could only buy cars assembled locally by small-scale plants. After the
1982 debt crisis, the government shifted from import substitution to export
promotion. Vehicle producers responded by importing more parts and compo-
nents from abroad, and by modernizing local factories. NAFTA removed most of
Mexico’s remaining trade restrictions over a period of ten years. After the end of
this transition, a large number of foreign carmakers announced plans to assemble
vehicles in the country, due to its competitiveness in terms of low wages, and to
trade facilitation measures. Thus, new car companies were set to begin production
between 2013 and 2020, raising the number of vehicle producers to eleven, while
the number of assembly plants was set to increase from eleven in 2004 to twenty-
one in 2020. By 2017 several world-leading companies were operating in Mexico:
BMW, Daimler’s Mercedes-Benz, Hyundai Motor Group’s Kia Motors, Mazda,
and Volkswagen Group’s Audi subsidiary (Klier and Rubenstein, 2017). Since
NAFTA, the auto industry in Mexico has not only became more integrated with
the United States and Canada, it has also become more international in nature.
According to estimates from the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database, the
domestic value added of gross exports for the automotive industry in Mexico
reaches almost 50 per cent, showing a high integration of Mexico in this GVC with
quite an important share of local content. These locally generated value added
derive from skilled labour and from a well-developed network of research centres
that support design, technology development, and the testing of materials and
products. As of 2018, Mexico has twenty-eight R&D centres: thirteen private
centres connected to large producers, seven connected to academic institutions,
seven government centres, and one with mixed capital. Despite significant pro-
gress, the Mexican car industry faces limitations. First, there is a limited presence
of Tier II and particularly Tier III suppliers, that is, local suppliers struggle in
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activities where economies of scale matter. Second, and more importantly, the
industry is well adapted to the current technological paradigm based on metal-
mechanics capabilities but is not prepared for the revolution in production tech-
nologies that electric cars and autonomous vehicles will pose. Although many of
themost important developers of new car technologies (Tier I suppliers) are located
in the country, new research in this field is scant (ECLAC, 2017).
The Mexican experience in the automotive sector shows that a shift from the
domestic market to the external market can contribute to fostering learning in
the domestic economy if it leads to a large inflow of investment from world-
leading firms and their suppliers. However, despite the development of domestic
capabilities, it also shows that it is difficult to keep pace with technological
change if a country does not have producers of its own. Moreover, the reliance
on just one or two markets, as huge as they are, increases uncertainty and may
harm investment and innovation, as shown by the unexpected and hard renego-
tiation of NAFTA, which concluded with a renewed United States–Mexico–
Canada agreement in 2018.
The overview of the three experiences presented in this section can be sum-
marized by three main lessons: i) policy design, despite its problems and ideo-
logical biases, is the easiest, particularly in a world of open knowledge, the main
challenges are in implementation; ii) trial-and-error processes are inevitable, and
flexibility to create new routines lies at the heart of successful experimentation;
iii) evaluation, although seldom done, is crucial; but what matters most is to
actually use evaluations to correct mistakes and improve performance.
10.5 Conclusions
The experience of some of the most advanced and successful countries in Latin
America offers relevant insights on how nations learn, or do not learn. Since the
1940s, and despite the changes in policy approaches and the fact that overall the
region hasn’t actually been able to engender a deep transformative change of its
economies and societies, most countries of the region have made progress in the
following areas:
• They have realized that having good internal policy processes with the
participation of all stakeholders is far more efficient that copying best
practices of developed countries and regions.
• Policy design and implementation are learning processes. There are no
blueprints for policies, experimentation and trial and error lie at the core
of effective policy processes.
• Policies and programmes need to have a limited set of explicit measurable
goals. Presenting attractive objectives and somewhat coherent policy lines is
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not enough. The apophthegm “if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it”
may not always be true, but in the case of Latin America it is true.
• Countries in the region have developed a better understanding of the time
needed for learning. Governments in Latin America always knew that it takes
time to learn and to get tangible results. However, the experience of the last
two decades shows that the time needed is much longer than was initially
assumed, and definitively longer than the four- to six-year period of a
government’s administration.
• A plan without a budget is demagogy. Latin American countries, through
their own successes and failures, have learned that a policy is a real one only
if it is backed up by the financial and human resources to implement it. The
private sector tends to interpret small financial commitments as merely acts
of public relations and marketing, not as real policies to foster change, and
therefore are not interested in collaborating in these small efforts.
Despite progress, some old problems persist in the Latin American approach to
industrial development:
• Quite frequently new administrations discontinue previous policies and/or
re-brand old plans under new names.
• Often policies for transforming the economy lack prioritization and contain
a never-ending shopping list. Announcing dozens of priorities without clear
trade-offs among them hampers implementation and is a recipe for failure.
• Many policies, particularly those that consist only of objectives and policy
lines, with no quantitative goals and allocation of resources, never go beyond
the publication of the policy document.
• Evaluations are still not a common practice and countries seldom use evalu-
ation results to improve policy design and management.
• A new approach to apply leverage on large firms is needed, as with no
national champions it is difficult to engender deep learning processes in
the domestic production system.
The experiences presented in this chapter highlight that to improve industrial
policy design and implementation countries need to pay attention to four issues:
i) ensuring the highest political leadership backs the policy; ii) endowing the
public sector with managerial and technical capacities to manage these policies;
iii) defining a coherent policy mix from trade, to industrial development and
innovation that fast-tracks technological change and that does not prevent it; and
iv) taking into account all stakeholders from local to regional governments,
foreign and domestic firms.
In brief, policy works better when it has clear priorities, when it is capable
of getting a constructive dialogue going between the public and the private
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sector, and when it mobilizes investments in bundles in critical areas, including
infrastructure, skills, and finance. Institutions co-evolve with the challenges they
are called upon to face and with the policies that they administer and implement.
Poor institutional capabilities are no excuse for calling for low state intervention.
Investing in institutional strengthening is part of a pro-active policy package.
In a fast-changing global landscape, where digitalization is transforming devel-
opment opportunities and opening up possibilities not otherwise available, Latin
America faces a dichotomy. On one side, such as ICT diffusion and use, the region
has registered major advancements, with strong policies designed and implemented
and with demonstrable results. When pragmatism was stronger than ideology the
region achieved positive results. On the contrary, on the structural side, policies
never regained the ambition, continuity, and focus on leading players that they had
in early developmental phases. In these areas, the region stands out for its inertia.
The Latin American countries discussed in this chapter have made some progress,
but their main structural weaknesses persist: little diversification of production and
exports, high dependency on commodities and raw materials, little integration into
global value chains (apart from the ones linked to natural resources), and poor
exploitation of regional integration that hampers development and innovation. To
activate learning and fast track development, Latin America needs to modernize its
policy approach and learn from its past and more recent successes.
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The Journey of Ethiopian Airlines
Technological Learning and Catch-up in Aviation
Arkebe Oqubay and Taffere Tesfachew
11.1 Gate Open: An Introduction to Ethiopian Airlines
This study examines firm-level technological learning and catch-up in Africa,
using Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) as a case study.¹ EAL was established in April
1946, barely a year after the end of the Second World War. At the time, sceptics
doubted the wisdom of transferring modern technology and management culture
into a country that lacked the capabilities to administer them and apply its
comparative advantage. In the past seven decades, however, EAL, confounding
the sceptics, has evolved from a small domestic airline into a fully integrated,
technologically sophisticated, internationally competitive, and highly profitable
twenty-first-century aviation company. By 2019, EAL’s use of cutting-edge tech-
nology and modern organizational and management techniques, has allowed the
firm to serve more than 120 international destinations, including more cities in
Africa than any other airline.²
A July 2018 cover story in the widely read Airline Weekly remarked, ‘When
Ethiopian Airlines started life in 1946, it did so with the help of America’s TWA
[Trans World Airlines]. Who back then imagined it would be the African airline,
not the American one, still alive and thriving 72 years later?’ The article, ‘Diamond
in the Rough,’ featured EAL’s remarkable success despite being rooted in one of
the world’s poorest countries: ‘[In 2017] Africa’s strongest airline grew at a
lightning pace.’
The prime drivers of this growth were the support of a disciplined state and an
obsessive focus on developing technological capability and the intensity of learn-
ing, a strategic approach that enabled the company to align itself with the future
of the aviation industry. EAL has acquired the technical and operational capability
to repair and overhaul the latest commercial aircraft; to train pilots, aircraft
¹ Since the airline’s establishment in 1946, its official name has changed several times from, for
example, ‘Ethiopian Air Lines’ before 1965 to ‘ETHIOPIAN’ to, more recently with the expansion of
the range of services, to ‘EAG’ (Ethiopian Aviation Group). In this study EAL will be used consistently.
² See Appendix and EAL 2018a.
engineers, and technical personnel; and to offer intercontinental cargo services in
partnership with leading global service providers. In 2011, EAL became a member
of Star Alliance, meaning it had narrowed the gap between itself and leading
industry players and achieved international best-practice standards. In the past
few years, EAL emerged as a major overseas investor and exporter of technical and
management services. By early 2019, EAL will have acquired equity in several
other African airlines and secured contracts to provide technical, operational, and
management services to various other airlines.³
This study analyses how EAL acquired and developed these technological and
organizational capabilities in a low-income agricultural economywith limited skills,
few technological capabilities, and a low knowledge base. Conventional wisdom
says that successful technological learning and catch-up require prior development
of technical, social, and organizational capabilities by learning by doing through
assimilation, adaptation, and mastery of international technologies.⁴
Building these capabilities and ‘absorptive capacity’ requires considerable
investment, intensive learning, specialized skills development, and constant
upgrading, especially as economic and technological development progresses.⁵
These factors are often cited as distinguishing countries that have caught up (such
as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) from those that are stuck in the middle-
income trap—unable to move beyond a certain level of technological capability—
and from those that lag behind, including many low-income African countries
that lack even rudimentary technological capabilities.
The EAL experience raises several important research questions. How did EAL
acquire the technological and organizational capability to transform itself from a
small domestic airline into a global competitor exporting technical, operational,
and management services? Why was EAL more successful than other African
carriers? Can EAL’s learning and catch-up model be emulated by other firms in
Ethiopia and other late-latecomer countries in Africa? And what are the implica-
tions of EAL’s learning and catch-up model for future research in late-latecomer
countries?
11.1.1 Learning and Catch-up for Late-latecomers
The pioneering work of Friedrich List and Alexander Hamilton has shed light on
the challenges and pathways of technological capability building, and on catch-up
³ In 2018, EAL was equity shareholder and managing operator in more than six airways (EAL
2018b; The Economist 2018).
⁴ Cohen and Levinthal (1990). These authors underscore the importance of absorptive capacity for
learning and innovation and highlight that ‘the ability of a firm to recognise the value of new, external
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities’
(p. 128).
⁵ Cohen and Levinthal (1990).
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by the latecomers of the nineteenth century—the United States and continental
European countries such as Germany.⁶ In post–Second-World-War economic
development discourse, Albert Hirschman and Alexander Gerashchenko advanced
the proposition that late starters in industrialization have opportunities to catch
up based on ‘latecomer advantages’—learning from the frontrunners.⁷ Extensive
research has studied the dynamics of technological learning and capability building
by latecomers and the role of industrial policy in fostering learning capability.⁸
A series of firm-level empirical studies focused on the successful learning and
catch-up experiences of the newly industrializing East Asian economies.⁹ In parallel,
other scholars advanced the notion of national innovation systems and viewed
technological learning and capability building as an interactive process that goes
beyond the firm to the sectoral and national levels.¹⁰
However, most research on learning and catch-up has focused either on
latecomers that have succeeded (the familiar cases in East Asia) and those that
gained considerable technological capability but remain far from catch-up, such as
Brazil, India, Mexico, and Turkey. Very little research has examined firms and
countries in the early stages of technological development and industrialization—
which include practically all African countries.¹¹ The potential for and challenges
to their technological learning and catch-up requires further exploration. So does
the question whether their being late-latecomers in the twenty-first century
constitutes an advantage or a disadvantage.
11.1.2 Ethiopian Airlines against the Odds
In 1946, when most of Africa was still under colonial rule, aviation would have
been considered an ‘alien industry’ for Ethiopia, a poor African country totally
reliant on subsistence agriculture with an illiteracy rate of more than 96 per cent.
When EAL was first established, Ethiopia had only two secondary schools and no
tertiary institution. Influential mainstream economists of the day would have
advised that an aviation industry was out of line with Ethiopia’s comparative
advantage.
Over the past seven decades, more than five thousand airlines have secured
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) codes, but only a small number
have survived beyond ten years. EAL is one of them. Its journey is thus a rare
⁶ Cohen and DeLong (2016); List (1856).
⁷ Gerschenkron (1962); Hirschman (1958).
⁸ Bell (1984); Freeman (1987); Kim (1997); Lall (1992).
⁹ Amsden (1989, 2001); Chang (2003); Kim (1997); Lee (2013); Wade (1990); and others.
¹⁰ Huo (2015); Lundvall (1992); Nelson (1993). See also Fagerberg (2005); Fagerberg and Godinko
(2005).
¹¹ Cramer, Oqubay, and Sender (forthcoming).
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African catch-up story, teaching the centrality and complexity of technological
learning and the role of a disciplined state in building a national champion. It
gives hope to African policymakers that, despite the odds and numerous internal
and external constraints, catching up is possible even for late-latecomers in the
early twenty-first century.¹²
EAL’s story defies the notion of comparative advantage and other conventional
nostrums. By 2018, EAL had acquired its 100th airplane—a Dreamliner—and
grown its annual passenger count to more than 12 million (Appendix). In the
same year, it was voted Best African Airline and was ranked 40th in customer
service and 24th in size by the World Airline Awards.¹³ Its medium-term vision
includes doubling the number of aircraft in its fleet to 200 and increasing the
number of annual passengers to 25 million by 2025–30. EAL estimates that its
total revenue will also double from the target of US$5 billion in 2019 (more than
Ethiopia’s projected earnings from merchandise exports) to US$10 billion by
2025–30. EAL expects to transport more than 1 million tons of cargo annually
within the next decade, building on a joint venture with DHL Logistics.¹⁴ EAL is
also forging partnerships with such leading component and commercial aircraft
manufacturers as Boeing, GE, and Airbus and their subcontractors, ultimately
aiming to build a new aerospace manufacturing hub in Ethiopia.¹⁵
EAL developed in three distinct phases. In the first, the airline built absorptive
capacity and capability through learning by doing in partnership with TWA, and
it pursued a proactive Ethiopianization or localization policy. This phase lasted
from EAL’s establishment in 1946 until the end of the TWA partnership 1975. In
the second phase from 1975 to 2000, by managing a series of externally generated
crises, EAL protected and maintained the capability and corporate independence
acquired during the first phase and built further capability. In the third phase,
which began with the new millennium, EAL has upgraded its capability, improved
its processes, diversified its competencies, and caught up.
11.2 Take Off: The Rise of the Ethiopian Aviation
Industry (1946–75)
11.2.1 Partnership with TWA: The Genesis
Right after the Second World War, Ethiopia was the only independent African
sovereign state, and a founding member of the United Nations.¹⁶ The Ethiopian
¹² Cramer, Oqubay, and Sender (forthcoming).
¹³ Skytrax (2018).
¹⁴ Interview with the CEO of EAL, Tewolde Gebremariam (EAL, 2018b).
¹⁵ See Oqubay and Lin (forthcoming).
¹⁶ The only other African country joining the United Nations in 1945 was the Union of South Africa,
which was not an independent state but an autonomous dominion within the British Commonwealth.
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government, as part of a modernization initiative, committed to establishing a
commercial airline to integrate the country politically and economically—the
most rational and cost-effective strategy because of the rugged and mountainous
terrain and inadequate roads and railways. With the assistance of Swedish Count
Eric von Rosen, the Ethiopian government initially approached the Swedish
carrier ABA, and an agreement was due to be signed in December 1945.¹⁷
However, in June 1945, the Ethiopian delegation attending the United Nations
founding conference in New York met with US State Department representatives
and requested technical assistance in establishing a commercial airline, primarily
for domestic air service. The state department organized an initial meeting with
Brigadier-General T. B. Wilson, board chairman of Transcontinental andWestern
Airlines (TWA, renamed Trans World Airlines in 1950).¹⁸ The Ethiopian gov-
ernment signed an agreement with TWA in September 1945, and the new airline
was founded on 21 December 1945, commencing operation on 8 April 1946 with
five war-surplus aircraft.
The agreement creating the TWA partnership was the first critical step in
establishing a small domestic air service and later transforming it into a successful
international airline. It was the first of five critical agreements signed during the
thirty-year partnership to help EAL develop strategic technological capabilities
and business competitiveness (see Table 11.1).
The first agreement laid the foundations, giving TWA full authority to establish
and manage the new airline.¹⁹ In many respects, the agreement was similar to
subcontracting relationships that evolve from joint operations between trans-
national corporations (TNCs) and local manufacturing firms through original
Table 11.1 EAL–TWA agreements
Agreement Year Key content
First 1945 Established EAL, undertook full operation and the procurement
of aircraft
Second 1953 Stated clearly the ultimate objective of Ethiopianization
Third 1959 Reinforced the urgency of the Ethiopianization agenda
Fourth 1966 Transferred management from TWA to EAL and appointed an
Ethiopian deputy CEO
Fifth 1970 Shifted TWA’s role from management to advisory until 1974
Source: EAL–TWA agreements (EAL 2018c).
¹⁷ EAL (1988). Count Eric von Rosen was associated with the initial engagement of the Swedish
support for the Ethiopian air force.
¹⁸ John Spencer, foreign affairs adviser to the Ethiopian government, helped facilitate the agreement
with TWA.
¹⁹ See Spencer (2006).
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equipment manufacturing (OEM) arrangements.²⁰Under OEM, the foreign partner
initially helps select the technology and equipment needed for production; trains
managers, engineers, and technicians; and advises on production, financing,
and management.²¹ Finished products are initially manufactured according to
the specifications of the foreign partner, which markets them under its own brand
name. As the local partner learns by doing and imitating, and acquires the
capability to manufacture to the TNC’s specifications, production is gradually
transferred to the local firm. The agreement between TWA and EAL fore-
shadowed such arrangements. TWA was responsible for selecting and procuring
all aircraft and the equipment needed to start an aviation industry. It provided all
personnel recruited from abroad, including the CEO, management team, pilots
and technicians, finance officers, cabin crew, and staff to perform other functions
such as catering. It advised on financial arrangements, including facilitating credit
for EAL from US banks. It served as the main interlocutor between EAL and
aircraft suppliers. And it provided advisory services for all training and technical
facilities established in Ethiopia. For its services, TWA was paid a management
fee. It was also offered a minority equity share but never took it up.
From the outset, it was understood that TWA would transfer knowledge and
build local capacity so that Ethiopians would gradually take over posts held by
foreign (mostly US) staff. The Ethiopianization policy was formalized in the
second agreement in 1953, which stated, ‘The ultimate aim is that EAL shall
eventually be operated by Ethiopian personnel.’ The third agreement in 1959
reinforced the localization of expertise, while the fourth in 1966 marked a major
milestone, transferring management and appointing as a deputy CEO Semret
Medhane, who would become the first Ethiopian CEO in November 1971 on the
occasion of the EAL’s silver jubilee. The fifth agreement in 1970 articulated the
shift of TWA’s role from managing to advising. The partnership ended in 1975
when TWA found the venture less attractive. TWA continued to provide services
to EAL on request.
11.2.2 Ethiopianization Strategy
The Ethiopianization strategy, which took almost three decades, aimed at the
eventual takeover by Ethiopians as pilots, technicians, cabin crew, accountants,
and marketing personnel. Execution was challenging, particularly preparing
Ethiopians for management roles and, due to safety and operational considerations,
²⁰ It is important to note, however, that the TWA–EAL partnership predates the concept and
practice of OEM. In this respect, it was a precursor in services of an arrangement that subsequently
emerged in manufacturing.
²¹ Hobday (2000). The OEM model was prevalent in East Asia and, as Hobday shows, contributed
significantly to technological learning and catching up in electronics.
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replacing pilots and technicians. Constant differences of opinion arose between
TWA and the Ethiopian authorities on the pace of Ethiopianization.²² At a time
of widespread racism, Ethiopian trainees had to show exceptional skill and
competence before they were allowed to replace US pilots.²³ Developing a pool
of Ethiopian recruits was a major challenge due to the lack of higher education.
At the time, the only institutions that could provide potential recruits were
public colleges, the School of Commerce, and the Technical School, which
offered pre-tertiary education. To alleviate the skill constraints, an aviation
school was established under the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority with assist-
ance from TWA.
The difficulties were eased by recruiting the first Ethiopian pilots and techni-
cians from the Ethiopian Air Force. They had been trained well in Ethiopia and
the United States and had built a tradition of excellence. Even the candidates for
CEO and other positions came from the air force. Key to the success of Ethiopia-
nization was the young Ethiopian staff ’s exceptional commitment and sense of
mission and the board’s strong commitment and close follow-up. TWA was also
committed to building competence and achieving Ethiopianization because of the
implications for its own reputation and credibility. TWA staff ’s reluctance to
compromise on standards contributed to a tradition of excellence, and fostered
the ability to operate in the seemingly impossible situation of practically non-
existent infrastructure. Two CEOs in particular, Walden Gene Colien and Vic
Harell, played a critical role in instilling a spirit of excellence. Although initially
aircraft manufacturers and suppliers played a smaller role, later on Boeing was
instrumental in building EAL’s technological capability, especially after supplying
jets in the early 1960s.²⁴
Corporate governance during the TWA partnership included a board with two
members from TWA and two members representing the Ethiopian government,
while the Ethiopian transport minister served as president and board chair. From
the start, the US State Department followed EAL’s development closely, and this
political support no doubt contributed to the project’s success.
11.2.3 Capabilities and Operational Performance
11.2.3.1 Technology Selection
An important element of technology and know-how transfer from TWA to EAL
was in the selection of technologies appropriate to the unique local operational
requirements and conditions. In 1946, Ethiopia had no runways, and TWA
²² EAL (1988).
²³ EAL (1988).
²⁴ See Christian Science Monitor (1988) and The Economist (1987).
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advised the purchase of DC3 (Douglas C-47) war-surplus aircraft, which had a
proven record of operating in rugged terrain and difficult conditions. The fleet was
then expanded with a dozen new aircraft (DC 6B and CV-240), which were
capable of regional and international flights and could handle more passengers.
In 1962, after completion of the new Bole airport, EAL became the first African
airline to incorporate Boeing 720B jets into its fleet. EAL’s entering the jet age had
considerable implications for its technological advancement. Its ability to select
technologies served it well over the years, as evidenced by its continuing strategic
and pioneering decisions in acquiring new commercial aircraft technologies.
11.2.3.2 Capability-building Facilities
The new aircraft required improved facilities, new skills, and certification and
standards. In the first two decades of EAL’s existence, TWA helped it establish a
range of capability-building assets to boost its absorptive capacity. The Ethiopian
Aviation Academy was founded in 1956, and the Pilot School in 1964. Pilot
training commenced in 1970 for both Ethiopians and trainees from other African
countries.²⁵ An aircraft maintenance and technical facility was opened in 1957,
and the first overhaul of jet engines was conducted in 1964. From the beginning,
the aviation academy and its technical facility provided training and maintenance
for carriers from Africa and the Middle East, thereby developing strategic techno-
logical capabilities and business opportunities. Accreditation and certification met
a high standard.
11.2.3.3 Operational and Marketing Capability
The corporate and management qualities and capabilities EAL acquired proved
beneficial during the early expansion into regional markets and the later multiple
crises following the establishment of a socialist regime in 1975. From the early
days, TWA instilled in EAL a culture of corporate independence, a need for
intensity of learning, and the importance of a strategic approach to marketing.
Consequently, EAL’s marketing of both domestic and international destinations
was aggressive from the start. For instance, EAL surveyed West Africa as early as
1949.²⁶ In the early 1960s, EAL found that it needed an expanding regional and
international flight network to build economies of scale, improve technology, and
remain profitable. Consequently, it extended its routes within Africa and to Europe.
Soon EAL’s annual passenger numbers exceeded 260,000, while its total revenues
reached almost ETB 70 million (about US$125,000) by 1971/72 (Appendix).
Throughout the 1960s, EAL focused on continuous improvement and took the
immense challenges posed by rapid growth as opportunities for accelerated learning,
primarily through learning by doing, to ensure survival and sustain the growth
²⁵ EAL (1971).
²⁶ EAL (1988).
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momentum it had built up. EAL thus vigorously developed its operations andmarket
capability, with TWA as the main driver and as an effective mentor.
11.3 Cruising Altitude: Sustaining Corporate Independence
in Turbulent Times, 1975–2000
11.3.1 Crisis Management and Survival, 1975–91
The last quarter of the twentieth century tested EAL with the crises that engulfed
Ethiopia, creating instability and economic uncertainty. The airline achieved only
modest growth. But its survival in the face of operational challenges and political
crisis is testimony to its remarkable progress during the early stage of learning and
building absorptive capacity.
Between 1972 and 1975, EAL had already begun the transition to Ethiopian
executives and personnel, and after the partnership with TWA was officially
terminated in 1975, EAL was managed and operated by Ethiopians.
The first challenge of the period was the dramatic political instability created by
two regime changes. Following the toppling of the emperor in the February 1974
revolution, the Derg—a totalitarian military regime—came to power in 1975. The
Derg’s socialist economic doctrine was a major obstacle to EAL. Derg officials
intervened in the airline’s internal corporate affairs, dismissing Semret Medhane
and appointing a military general as CEO solely on political grounds.²⁷ The
government also interfered in labour relations, compromising EAL’s performance,
staff discipline, and conformity with industry practice, which later led to major
financial losses that brought EAL close to bankruptcy.²⁸ This crisis continued into
the early 1980s.
In many respects, EAL responded effectively to the crises of the second half of
the 1970s and most of the 1980s, demonstrating the corporate independence, self-
reliance, ability to operate in an unconventional setting, and capacity to manage
and survive setbacks it had acquired during the long partnership with TWA. Four
concrete examples illustrate this.
First, under pressure from EAL management, Derg officials eventually agreed
to appoint someone who understood the industry as CEO. Captain Mohammed,
an aviation veteran, accepted the post in 1980 on condition that state intervention
in internal matters would stop and that the airline would operate under inter-
national business practices rather than socialist doctrines.²⁹ The Derg accepted the
conditions and the new CEO was able to turn around the nearly bankrupt EAL.
²⁷ EAL (1988).
²⁸ EAL (1988).
²⁹ See Oqubay (2019a; 2019b).
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Second, the Derg had instructed EAL to cease purchasing US aircraft and to
purchase them only from Russia.³⁰ This would mean a major policy shift for an
airline that had built its capabilities andmanagement style on the basis of partnership
with a US airline (TWA) and a US aircraft supplier (Boeing). What happened next
was clear testimony to EAL’s maturity and emergence as an economically crucial
industry. EAL management threatened collective resignation, forcing the govern-
ment to reverse its decision. Subsequently, EAL introduced Boeing 767s, opening
new opportunities for non-stop long-distance flights of up to thirteen hours across
the Atlantic, and replaced its Boeing B720s with the newBoeing 737s. EAL expanded
its technical services and training facilities accordingly.
Third, between 1975 and the fall of the Derg government in 1991, Ethiopia was
engulfed in a civil war that drained resources and kept the economy stagnant. The
decline in tourism caused shrinkage of domestic networks, currency overvaluation,
and anti-export bias, constraining EAL’s operations. In response, EAL prioritized
its strategic routes and introduced measures to enhance effectiveness. As a result,
EAL achieved modest growth in its fleet size and operations. It also made its first
attempt to assemble an aircraft—the crop-spraying agro-aircraft, Eshet—under
license in 1986.³¹ Although this venture proved commercially unviable and was
discontinued, it demonstrated EAL’s catch-up aspirations. Throughout the 1980s,
driven by its motto ‘Bringing Africa Together’, EAL vigorously expanded its routes
to all African regions, amove that undoubtedly helped to save the aviation industry
from the fate met by similar industries elsewhere in Africa.
Fourth, the collapse of the Derg regime in 1991 gave rise to a period of tension
and uncertainty. The army of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) approached the capital Addis Ababa, practically placing it under
siege. EAL management decided at this critical juncture to protect and save the
assets of the company from damage and destruction should the conflict spill over
into the city itself.³² The management unilaterally decided to move EAL’s aircraft
to Nairobi, negotiating with the Kenyan Aviation Authority to operate and service
EAL’s customers from Nairobi until the political tension in Ethiopia abated. This
remarkable corporate independence, commitment, and responsibility was only
possible because of the corporate culture developed in EAL and the training and
commitment of its management.
An important lesson from EAL’s experience is its ability to develop a corporate
culture and a high level of commitment among topmanagers and other employees.
Part of the explanationmay lie in themanagement style introduced in EAL from its
early days, whereby constant engagement by top management with all employees
³⁰ EAL (1988).
³¹ EAL (1988).
³² Interviews with former CEO GirmaWake and Group CEO Tewolde Gebremariam in 2018 (EAL,
2018b); minutes of the EAL management team.
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and careful evaluation of staff welfare was a priority. From the early 1950s, several
steps improved the well-being and working conditions of employees, including
increased vacation time, recreational facilities for all staff, group accident
insurance—the first of its kind in Ethiopia—and a collective bargaining system—
also the first of its kind in Ethiopia. These and other measures, such a generous
retirement plan introduced in 1969 and suggestion boxes to solicit the views of
employees, created a sense of belonging and ownership among employees and a
corporate culture that has lasted to this day (EAL 1958; 1959; 1964; 1967).
11.3.2 Transition, Lingering Crisis,
and Modest Growth (1991–2000)
For nearly a decade following the fall of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopia was in
transition from a closed and socialist-oriented economic system to an open and
market-based one. The period was also occupied with recovery from nearly two
decades of civil war, economic mismanagement, and neglect of infrastructure and
institutions. The reconstruction efforts were both financially and organizationally
demanding for the new government, which was simultaneously struggling to
re-establish economic relations with traditional trading partners.
The impact of these developments on EAL was mixed. To EAL’s benefit, the
reconstruction program repaired and upgraded domestic airports, enabling the
expansion of domestic routes and the recovery of tourism. The new government’s
devaluation of the local currency was also favourable for EAL. Reconstruction
began to turn the economy from negative to positive growth, as evidenced by the
modest 5 per cent annual growth rate achieved following the economic reforms.
Economic recovery during the 1990s thus provided a welcome opportunity for
EAL to revitalize itself and reinforce the technical and management capabilities it
had built over the previous decades. The strategic importance of EAL was further
magnified by the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998–2000 and Eritrea’s prior independ-
ence from Ethiopia in 1993, which had left Ethiopia landlocked.
But EAL’s efforts to reignite growth and resume its expansion were impeded by
the political uncertainties and its own changing management during the transition
period. Even after 1991, EAL remained in crisis management mode as a result of
government interference and the ambiguities of the political and economic envir-
onment, according to company insiders. For example, between 1991 and 2000, the
board appointed three successive CEOs from within and outside the airline,
creating uncertainty and disrupting EAL’s longstanding coherent and stable
corporate management structure and culture. It also fired thirty-seven senior
staff—practically all the top management team—in disagreements over strategy
and the future of the airline. A series of ill-advised reforms and policy experiments
by the government damaged EAL’s performance and undermined the morale of
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its management team and staff, leading many executive officers and technical
personnel to resign. The 1990s were thus a period of transition, confusion, and
policy experimentation, and the government’s delay in resolving the situation
caused unwarranted setbacks in EAL’s recovery, growth, and expansion.
This episode shows that a firm’s learning and catch-up can be hampered or
accelerated by the type of governance and leadership provided. Internal and
external crises can waste capabilities created over decades. But crisis in the
political and economic environment can also present opportunities for learning
by problem-solving and policy experimentation. At EAL, this happened in the
2000s when two EAL veterans, Girma Wake and Tewolde Gebremariam,
returned—Wake from Gulf Air to become CEO and Gebremariam from
New York to become deputy CEO.³³ The appointment of highly experienced
insiders began to turn the fortunes of EAL from managing crises to pursuing
growth and upgrading capabilities. The episode also reveals that managing
vulnerability and crisis, given their potential to undermine capabilities and hamper
catch-up, is as important managing growth.
11.4 Upgrading: High Growth and Catching up
in the Twenty-First Century, 2001–18
11.4.1 A New Chapter in Twenty-first-century African Aviation
The 1990s and 2000s brought major changes to the global aviation industry.
International competition intensified, spurred by advances in information and
communications technology, both in general and in the aviation industry.³⁴
Mergers and acquisitions and alliances between airlines heightened competition.
TWA, with about two hundred aircraft and considered one of the big four US
airlines (along with American, United, and Eastern), ceased operating after
seventy years and was acquired by American. Many flagship African carriers
were also grounded. At the same time, globalization and the growing need for
air connectivity increased opportunities for growth and expansion, including in
developing countries exhibiting high levels of sustained growth and prosperity.
These developments allowed EAL to realize its vision of becoming an industry
leader in Africa and to strategize for the twenty-first century.
Economies of scale were essential to EAL’s vision. Rapid growth and diversifica-
tion required not only new aircraft but also technical excellence, new market
capacity, organizational capabilities, continuous improvement, and a high level of
absorptive capacity. With EAL’s survival threatened by the increasingly competitive
market environment, a new board and management team unanimously decided to
³³ Tewolde Gebremariam became CEO in early 2011.
³⁴ Belobaba (2016).
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develop a fundamental new vision and long-term plan for rapid growth. Vision 2010
(a five-year plan for 2006–10) and Vision 2025 (a fifteen-year plan for 2011–25) laid
out a fundamentally new trajectory for the company.
The new vision and the newmanagement team created dynamism and optimism,
and the airline surpassed its Vision 2010 targets with high financial performance and
considerable market expansion. Within five years, EAL’s fleet had increased by 60
per cent to forty-one commercial aircraft, its annual passenger capacity had doubled
to 3.2 million passengers, and its cargo volume had tripled (EAL, 2004; Appendix)).
The rapid growth inspired still greater confidence and commitment and more
ambitious targets in Vision 2025.³⁵ Within five years, by 2015, EAL had become
the largest African airline. In 2018, it transported more than 12 million passengers
(a fourfold increase since 2010) and half a million tons of cargo, and had increased
its fleet tomore than one hundred new-generation aircraft (a threefold increase since
2010). Its network widened to 115 international destinations, including Los Angeles
and Tokyo.³⁶ Its China–Africa routes alone are expected to carry 1 million passen-
gers in 2018, making EAL the major airline linking Africa with China.³⁷ This rapid
overall expansion has made EAL the most profitable aviation company in Africa,
while other African airlines (including Egypt Air, Kenyan Airways, and South
African Airways) have struggled to survive. Progress has been achieved in the
face of intense competitive pressure from Gulf and Middle Eastern carriers, which
enjoyed economies of scale and large direct and indirect subsidies. Competition from
Middle Eastern state-supported airlines remains EAL’s most formidable challenge.
The intensity of international competition, withmergers and alliances, environmen-
tal protection requirements (for both air and ground pollution), and accelerated
technology advances, make airline survival increasingly challenging. The aerospace
manufacturing industry has consolidated, making Airbus and Boeing an oligopoly of
commercial aircraft manufacturers.
In short, EAL’s intensity of learning, and its determination to develop techno-
logical absorptive capabilities, enabled it to survive the crisis period, to reorganize
itself for renewed growth and expansion, and to formulate an ambitious vision
and a strategy for catch-up.
11.4.2 Modernizing the Fleet
and Developing Technological Capability
The size and type of an airline’s fleet shape its value to customers and its
operational scope and scale. With advanced avionics and aerospace technology,
³⁵ EAL (2010).
³⁶ See EAL (2016, 1950–2018a, and 1950–2018b). See also Appendix for trends on growth and
performance.
³⁷ Oqubay and Lin (forthcoming).
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commercial aircraft have seen rapid technological progress. EAL was committed
to expand and modernize its fleet as part of its upgrading and catch-up strategy by
introducing the latest aircraft to secure first-comer advantages. EAL was the first
airline in Africa to order the most modern aircraft—the Boeing Dreamliner
B787—and the longest-range commercial aircraft—the Boeing B777-200 LR.
After lengthy internal debate (and an intense bidding process) EAL decided to
diversify its fleet with the Airbus A350, the latest and most environmentally sound
aircraft. The technical and operational capabilities EAL accumulated over the
years enabled it to acquire the advanced aircraft, which in turn have kept the
airline at the frontier of aviation technology, with implications for forming skills,
upgrading technology and infrastructure, and building organizational capability.
Although the A350 provided value for money, its acquisition affected EAL’s
inventory, maintenance facilities, and absorption capacity (in training pilots and
technical personnel). All EAL’s procurement arrangements include technical
specifications and technological capacity development packages (such as training
facilities and skill upgrading). EAL originally envisaged acquiring an additional
100 aircraft over fifteen years (to 2030), giving it the advantage of a bulk purchase.
The initial aspiration of Vision 2025 was to increase the number of aircraft in the
fleet to 120 by 2025 (a 20 per cent increase), subsequently to be revised to 200
(a 100 per cent increase) by 2025–30. Since EAL’s annual absorption capacity of
new fleet reached twelve aircraft in 2018, doubling the fleet within a decade seems
entirely feasible (Appendix).
However, executing the high growth and expansion strategy was by no means
smooth due to delays in new aircraft delivery (especially the Dreamliner) and
common technical problems in their introduction. The greatest challenges to
rapid technological upgrading are preparing sufficient pilots and technicians
and managing rapid growth to avoid reducing service quality. Managing growth
became a major pressure point, intensifying the need for learning by all staff from
cabin crew, pilots, and technicians to the executive leadership. Another major
challenge was inadequate physical infrastructure that required a new passenger
terminal and cargo terminals. Such tensions are inevitable in a growing and
upgrading firm that must improve continuously or risk being paralysed by crises.
EAL’s prior learning and capability building were key to resolving each problem
and engaging in intense learning.
11.4.3 Improving Organizational Capability and Process
Building technological capability is often narrowly associated with acquiring hard-
ware (machinery and equipment), and fostering innovation with dramatic new
inventions. But an alternative view sees building technological capability as acquiring
a range of abilities, including organizational capabilities and continuous process
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improvement. Schumpeter, for example, distinguishes categories of innovation,
including new products, new production methods, new inputs, new markets, and
new methods of business organization.³⁸He distinguishes innovation as continuous
improvement and incremental change from radical innovation and technological
revolution.³⁹ Organizational capability and continuous process improvement have
arguably been central to EAL’s Vision 2025 because of the challenges arising from
increasing size to seek economies of scale.
11.4.3.1 New Structure and Capability
A new organizational structure became necessary as EAL underwent a strategic shift
from airline to a fully diversified aviation group (Ethiopian Aviation Group).
Initially, the various services and operations were structured in seven autonomous
strategic business units, each operating as an independent profit centre: international
passenger service, domestic express service, cargo service, technical services (MRO—
maintenance, repair, and overhaul), the aviation academy, ground services, and
catering and hotel services.⁴⁰With growing, upgrading capabilities, and diversifying
into strategic services, EAL needed amore integrated structure that allowed strategic
planning, coherence, performance monitoring, and accountability.
The new structure required a fundamental shift affecting all functions, includ-
ing EAL’s strategy for equity shareholding and in providing operational and
management services to other African carriers. EAL acquired a 40 per cent equity
share in ASKY (AfricaSKY Airline),⁴¹ including management services, which
allowed it to build a West African hub. Similarly, acquisition of a 49 per cent
equity share in Air Malawi has enabled EAL to strengthen its southern African
hub. Furthermore, in 2018, EAL’s overseas operations expanded with the acqui-
sition of equity shareholding in Guinea Airlines (49 per cent), Chad Airlines
(49 per cent), Zambia Airways (45 per cent), and management contracts with
CEIBA Intercontinental in Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopian–Mozambique
Airlines, a new domestic carrier in Mozambique.
EAL has also partnered with DHL Logistics (owning 51 per cent of the joint
company), aiming to move beyond conventional passenger air services to become
³⁸ Schumpeter (1942).
³⁹ Fagerberg (2005); Fagerberg and Godinko (2005).
⁴⁰ EAL’s MRO services were established in 1957 to provide MRO for aircraft, engines, and
components of Ethiopian and third-party customers. At present, the MRO division employs over
1,800 qualified technical staff, and its facility is certified by international regulatory bodies. In addition
to the maintenance base in Addis Ababa, the MRO division has some sixty senior and highly qualified
maintenance personnel located at forty destinations in Africa, Europe, North America, South America,
the Middle East, and the Far East. These technical staff provide line maintenance services to both
Ethiopian and other carriers.
⁴¹ ASKY is a private passenger airline, founded by West African governments to operate across
several West and Central African countries, and based in Lomé, Togo. EAL is a major shareholder in
ASKY and provides training, operational, marketing, and maintenance services under management
contracts.
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a leading logistics provider in Africa. EAL has initiated a new programme to
develop and manage African airports, including air traffic control. The develop-
ment of a more sophisticated organizational capability, building on knowledge
acquired through learning by doing, has thus enabled EAL to spearhead a new
strategic initiative, expand revenue streams, and reinforce its presence and com-
petitive position in Africa.⁴²
11.4.3.2 Continuous Process Improvement and Performance
Since mid-2000, EAL has developed several internal process improvement
schemes, to which it has adhered consistently. Three are worth highlighting.
First, to achieve competitive excellence and enhance and maintain the airline’s
credibility and safety records, increase proficiency in engine maintenance, aircraft
engineering, and planning capability; increase component maintenance, quality
assurance, and environmental management system capability; implement the
International Air Transport Association Operational Safety Audit programme;
and adopt the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Safety Management
System. EAL also digitized its operations and became a paperless organization.
Second, to ensure continuous improvement, adopt a benchmarking approach
that robustly links capability with performance. Although EAL had previously
compared its performance with leading African airlines, its board and manage-
ment decided to upgrade its benchmarking standards to compare its performance
with leading global airlines—Singapore Airlines, United, Lufthansa, and Emirates.
This has pushed performance closer to the industry’s productivity frontier and has
had a major impact on EAL’s continuous performance improvement.
Third, to develop new market capabilities, build on EAL’s core Vision 2025
motto, ‘The New Spirit of Africa’, as its prime marketing strategy.⁴³ In 2011,
following almost two years of mentoring by Lufthansa that triggered improve-
ments in service, processes, and safety standards, EAL became a member of Star
Alliance, one of the largest and oldest global alliances. This consolidated EAL’s
access to wider global markets. New initiatives to upgrade its services such as
Cloud 9 business class and Sheba Miles were introduced in the late 2000s.
11.4.4 Building Technical Capability and Skill Formation
With EAL’s Vision 2025 goals, its focus on skill development, and its traditional
technical excellence and self-sufficiency, EAL has developed new capabilities and
⁴² See Arrow (1962); Cohen and Levinthal (1989).
⁴³ Over the years, EAL has adjusted its motto to align with its prevailing strategy. It started with ‘To
go to great length to please,’ then ‘Bringing Africa together and closer to the world’ to reflect its
dominance in the African market.
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reinforced its absorptive capacity. For example, the aviation academy has invested
in state-of-the-art facilities, including simulators that accommodate the latest
aircraft, thus expanding its capacity and upgrading to the level of other leading
global aviation academies. Similarly, the pilot school has opened centres in five
cities and improved its intake and quality of pilot training. Both the EAL technical
school and the cabin crew school have also expanded and upgraded. The technical
school can now train more people than EAL can absorb, producing a surplus for
the market.
But executive leadership development at different levels is a major limitation.
With continued growth of the EAL Group, upgraded human resource manage-
ment will be essential to motivate and retain the company’s 15,000-strong work-
force. Priorities include an employee housing project, performance-based
payments, staff appraisal, and building a productive relationship between man-
agement and unions. Retention of core technical staff is critical to technological
capability and organizational memory. To date, the turnover of pilots and tech-
nicians has been limited to 1 per cent a year, much lower than the industry norm.
Preparations for an aerospace manufacturing facility—part of the government’s
vision of Ethiopia as Africa’s leading manufacturing hub—are complete. With
system integrators such as Boeing and Airbus dominating aerospace manufacturing,
the success of Ethiopia’s initiative depends on EAL’s ability to work closely with
commercial aircraft manufacturers, component suppliers, and subcontractors. EAL
signed a tripartite agreement with sub-manufacturers alongwith Boeing, Airbus, and
othermanufacturers in 2018 and has studied existing aerospacemanufacturing hubs,
such as those inMorocco and Singapore, to extract lessons and ensure the success of
its new venture. This new frontier has great potential for technological spillovers and
linkages to domestic manufacturing capability. A unique characteristic of EAL and a
potential lesson for other late-latecomer firms has been its investment in institutions
that enabled it to develop its absorptive capacity. It has invested US$500 million in
upgrading its aviation academy and technical services infrastructure and another US
$500 million in hubs infrastructure.⁴⁴
11.5 Air Miles: Implications for Policy and Technological
Capability and Lessons for Late-Latecomers
11.5.1 The Government and EAL’s Catch-up
Technological learning and catch-up in Ethiopia’s aviation industry would have
been impossible without the government’s strong commitment and support. EAL
⁴⁴ Terminal 2, which cost close to $400 million, was inaugurated on 27 January 2019. The new
terminal increases passenger capacity from 12 million to 22 million. The first phase of its five-star hotel
complex was also completed.
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was established by the state at a time when no domestic private company had the
required capacity, and it was nurtured by the state as a major industrial policy
instrument for several decades. From the beginning, EAL was built into a national
champion by the government, which maintained self-discipline in its relationship
with the airline while playing a developmental role. Even during the 1975–2000
phase, when government interference posed major operational challenges, it was
clear that ultimately the government of the day had no interest in jeopardizing the
survival of EAL, which has always been regarded as a flagship state enterprise with
unofficial corporate independence.
During the 2001–18 phase of EAL’s development, the government used the
airline as an instrument of industrial policy and offered it new growth opportun-
ities by pushing it to serve the export sector.⁴⁵ The Ethiopian floriculture industry,
whose development began in the early 2000s, would not have expanded without
EAL investment and services. EAL also promotes tourism in all its destinations.
EAL itself has become the largest single generator of export earnings for
Ethiopia, accounts for 4 per cent of GDP, and has directly or indirectly created
employment for fifty thousand people. It has achieved a high level of domestic
technological capability in a technology-intensive industry, and it serves as a role
model for both state-owned and private African firms.
Government ownership has provided stability, growth opportunities, and the
ability to pursue a long-term strategy rather than short-term profitability. The
corporate culture and management capability developed during EAL’s early
evolution were clearly instrumental in generating a sense of independence and
self-reliance. Equally important is the operational autonomy provided by EAL’s
corporate governance structure, notwithstanding isolated but damaging instances
of interference. For example, it has been customary under successive regimes for
the ministry of finance to pay for EAL services for the head of state or prime
minister, and even in times of conflict, the government must compensate the
airline for cargo transport services. The government’s inability to subsidize EAL
has clearly provided the discipline to EAL to ensure fiscal responsibility.
The case of EAL contradicts the myth that industrial policy should be limited to
latent comparative advantage and new comparative advantage cannot be created
in highly competitive industries. It also defies the notions that ownership deter-
mines performance and that public ownership is inferior to private, EAL having
performed considerably better than many privately owned airlines. EAL has
demonstrated the advantages of long-term strategic orientation rather than the
short-term profit orientation dominant in the Anglo-Saxon corporate world. And
it has shown that industrial policies are not limited to the manufacturing sector,
but can encompass high-productivity service sectors.
⁴⁵ Oqubay (2019b). See also Cheru, Cramer, and Oqubay (2019).
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11.5.2 The Dynamics of Technological Learning
EAL’s story also demonstrates that technological learning does not occur in a
vacuum, but is organically intertwined with a firm’s struggle to survive and grow.
Despite the inherent tensions, EAL had to develop its own absorptive capacity,
which thrived with the company’s growth and was shaped by its strategic vision
and choices. This experience challenges the idea that prior knowledge and
absorptive capacity are prerequisites for learning and technological capability
building, especially for technological learning and catch-up by late-latecomers
with underdeveloped domestic absorptive capacity. Rapid expansion and the gap
in coping with growth pressured EAL’s management and staff to focus on rapid
development of technological capability. Reciprocally, however, EAL’s accumu-
lation of technological capabilities and growing confidence about its future,
especially after 2000, shaped its vision and strategy. EAL’s ability to exceed the
goals of Vision 2010 encouraged it to adopt a new and more ambitious trajectory
in Vision 2025, which in turn added impetus to revise the company’s targets.
While long-term strategy and vision were essential, building technological cap-
ability also required continuous assessment of the external and internal envir-
onment and the capacity to gauge and align the strategic drive. Vision and
strategies are not static, and their interactions with technological capability go
in both directions.
EAL’s experience shows that technological capability is built at the firm level
and that sectoral capability is expanded by the presence of competitive firms. So,
firm dynamics are the most decisive factor. Technological capability development
and intensity of learning become yet more critical due to the growth of the firm
and, in the case of EAL, due to intensified international competition in the
aviation industry in the early twenty-first century. Not only has learning become
more intense, but its complexity has increased as new organizational capabilities
are required to develop new markets, achieve continuous process improvements,
develop sophisticated skills and facilities, establish a new structure and business
model, and achieve new performance milestones. The EAL experience also shows
that learning by doing is not limited to imitation, but also involves building
capability through continuous process improvements. For EAL, learning by
doing involved incremental innovations—suggesting the possibility of creating
paths to developing entirely new industries.
Vital to EAL’s catch-up was the passionate and concerted development of
technological capability and dynamic learning by doing that blended incremental
innovations in response to the challenges and opportunities the firm faced.
Learning and catch-up are facilitated by the very newness of an industry such as
aviation and thus critically benefit from an eye to the future and a long-term
approach. The intensity of learning is promoted by aviation’s very narrow
latitude for poor performance, since high safety standards leave no room for
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failure.⁴⁶ The capital intensity of the industry makes operating at full capacity
critical and sustaining creditworthiness a precondition for survival and growth.
Intense international competition, which leaves no room for inefficiency, further
increases pressure for learning.
11.6 A Safe Flight: Conclusions from the Journey
of Ethiopian Airlines
The EAL experience presents a unique example of firm-level learning and catch-
ing up in an industry considered alien to a late-latecomer country struggling to
reach middle-income level. The relevance of the Ethiopian experience to other
twenty-first-century late-latecomers is less clear, depending on country specificity,
government commitment, institutional development, and the internal and exter-
nal policy environments.
Broadly, however, a review of the ups and downs in the transformation of EAL
from a simple domestic airline into an internationally competitive aviation industry
reveals five critical factors:
First, the more backward and late-starting a country is, the more intensive and
assertive the state response needed for technological learning to influence cap-
ability building and catch-up. This is confirmed both by EAL’s experience and by
empirical research on the catch-up of East Asian economies.
Second, twentieth-century economic history clearly links learning to the rare
instances of catching up. As Amsden highlighted, ‘Diversity notwithstanding, all
late industrializers have in common industrialization on the basis of learning,
which has conditioned how they behaved.’⁴⁷ Learning by doing and emulation
aimed at equalling or surpassing others is critical for late industrialization, especially
in the early stages.⁴⁸ In EAL’s experience, intensity, pace, and direction of learning
are key determinants of technological learning, especially learning by doing.
Third, path following and, ultimately, path creation are required for catching up
to leading firms or countries.⁴⁹ In this complex process, learning by doing and
emulation must eventually combine with innovating.
Fourth, firms are the key drivers and the foundation of technological learning,
although sectoral-level learning creates catch-up of the overall economy through the
cumulative development of sectoral and national systems.⁵⁰ As EAL’s experience
shows, firm-level technological catch-up can be achieved while economic catch-up
lags behind.
⁴⁶ Hirschman (1967).
⁴⁷ Amsden (1989: viii).
⁴⁸ While ‘true innovation and learning by doing’ are critical for overall productivity catch-up,
learning by doing ‘is arguably the most important source’ in mature industries (Solow, 1997: 33).
⁴⁹ Lee (2013); Lee and Malerba (2018).
⁵⁰ Lee and Malerba (2018); Oqubay (2015).
254     
Fifth, for late-latecomers, imported technologies and know-how are important
sources of technological learning and capability building.⁵¹ They may come
through trade, turnkey projects, management contracts, technical cooperation,
partnerships with leading global firms, and other ways. Just as technology transfer
was an important source of learning and catch-up for nineteenth-century late-
comers industrializing in continental Europe, so it is now for twenty-first-century
late-latecomers. The main difference is that twenty-first-century latecomers have a
wide choice of sources of new technologies—many emerging economies are in a
position to supply them. However, the jury is still out on whether the diversity
of sources has a qualitatively different impact on the pace and direction of late-
latecomers learning and catching up.
In general, technological development paths are unique and country specific.
Latecomers cannot simply copy or emulate them. Although the experiences of
other firms or countries can provide valuable lessons, the most successful learning
is based on adapting to local peculiarities and context: ‘Catch up does not mean
just cloning. What is actually achieved by successful catching up invariably
diverges in certain ways from practices in the countries serving as benchmark
models. In fact, this divergence reflects the fact that exact copying is almost
impossible,’ according to Lee and Malerba.⁵²
This study has reviewed the path followed by EAL in transforming itself from a
simple domestic airline into an internationally competitive and dynamic aviation
industry. Three key points may serve as lessons for other late-latecomers:
First, TWA served as a role model and a source of inspiration and experience.
The selection by the government of a reliable technological partner and teacher
was a critical strategic choice that affected the intensity of learning and transfer
of knowledge and know-how, as well as the pace and direction of catch-up.⁵³
Learning by doing played a dominant role in EAL’s technological learning and
catch-up. The investment in capability-enhancing facilities and infrastructure
accentuated EAL’s learning intensity and broadened its capacity to ‘identify,
assimilate, and exploit’ knowledge from the environment.⁵⁴
Second, the government’s strong commitment to Ethiopianization—to building a
national carrier entirely run by Ethiopians—shaped the learning process. From day
one, the Ethiopian government was keen to make this strategy work. The supportive
US political environment and the commitment to excellence of the foreign partner
were also helpful. Ultimately, the commitment and readiness to learn and the process
fostering this outcome primarily determined the intensity of learning.
⁵¹ See Oqubay and Ohno (2019).
⁵² Lee and Malerba (2018: 3).
⁵³ TWA’s motivation was not simply money but also pride in helping establish a new and high-
quality airline service in Africa that reflected the global standing of TWA itself.
⁵⁴ See Cohen and Levinthal (1989: 569).
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Finally, crisis management was critical to increasing the intensity of learning. EAL
had to survive and expand in difficult situations, and the intensity of airline industry
competition with a narrow latitude for poor performance offered critical pull.
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12
Learning to Catch up in South East Asia
Khuong Vu and Kris Hartley
12.1 Introduction
A developing country encounters both opportunities and challenges when
embarking on economic development. Gerschenkron (1962) argues that develop-
ing countries have the distinct advantage of backwardness, including the oppor-
tunity to acquire technologies and best practices already developed by more
advanced countries. However, Abramovitz (1994) finds that this potential has
not been fully realized across all developing countries, due in part to variations in
technological congruence and social capabilities. Furthermore, Quah (1993, 1996)
finds that cross-country distribution of per capita income is moving towards a
twin-peaked profile, suggesting the presence of enduring structural hindrances to
economic catch-up. In seeking to understand these structural determinants, many
studies argue that total factor productivity (TFP) growth plays an essential role
(Aghion and Howitt, 2007; Baumol, 1986; Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989; Easterly
and Levine, 2001; Fagerberg, 1987; Klenow and Rodriguez, 1997; Lee, 2013; Solow,
1957). While this finding is significant, TFP driven by technological progress alone
is not a sufficient basis for steering catch-up efforts, especially in developing
countries. Indeed, Lin (2009, 2011) emphasizes the importance, in driving indus-
trial upgrading and economic catch-up, of economic strategy that is focused on
embracing comparative advantage and facilitating the change in endowment
structure in favour of capital intensity.¹
Understanding the policy frameworks and mechanisms that enable a develop-
ing country to achieve catch-up through a multi-pronged effort is not only
theoretically meaningful but also practically useful. This chapter examines the
catch-up performance of Asian countries between 1995 and 2015, with insights
into underlying determinants and the contribution of learning efforts. The success
of Asian countries relative to those in other parts of the world confirms that
capital accumulation and TFP growth have been important drivers of catch-up,
¹ Ohno (2013) and Oqubay (2015), among others, provide valuable insights into the role of
industrial policy in development success of a developing nation.
and that the absence of strategic efforts to exploit these drivers was a significant
hindrance in some countries.
In problematizing this issue, this chapter introduces the concept of nation
learning for catch-up, defined as consistent and strategic cross-sector efforts to
identify pathways towards economic catch-up. Efforts to learn how high rates
of capital accumulation and TFP growth can be sustained are, for the purpose
of this study, paramount objectives in nation learning. As developing coun-
tries tend to have comparatively low levels of capital stock per capita, fostering
catch-up by emphasizing capital accumulation is a defensible approach. One
example is Vietnam, which is among the most successful Asian countries in
parlaying capital accumulation into catch-up. Playing a crucial role in helping
a government make sound strategic choices, nation learning can include a
variety of approaches to rethinking the fundamental concepts of economic
development, such as adopting a market economy, reorienting the private
sector to embrace trends like globalization and the information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) revolution, and enhancing investment attractive-
ness through facilitative infrastructure, regulatory efficiency, and workforce
up-skilling.
At the same time, lagging efforts to promote TFP growth are a hindrance for
countries that have otherwise successfully boosted capital accumulation; examples
are Vietnam, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. These countries shared two revealing
features over the study period: contribution of TFP growth to catch-up perform-
ance was negative, and efforts to improve three conditions conducive to TFP
growth (technology acquisition, innovation, and control of corruption) were
insufficient. Nation learning with a focus on sustaining TFP growth alongside
rapid capital accumulation requires vigorous efforts to build high-performing
institutions and coordination capabilities.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The first section exam-
ines the global dynamics of economic catch-up over the period 1995–2015,
covering 167 countries. A catch-up performance index (CUPI) is introduced,
and an analysis of sources of catch-up performance for Asian countries reveals
insights into the importance of nation learning. Next is a deeper examination of
the case of Vietnam and comparator countries in Asia, highlighting strategic
approaches to boosting capital accumulation and factors underlying low TFP
growth. The concept of nation learning for economic catch-up is introduced
and a model for nation learning that emphasizes the role of government is
presented. The final section summarizes the results and concludes with broader
implications for research and practice.
        263
12.2 Asian Countries and the Global Dynamics
of Economic Catch-up
12.2.1 Catch-up Performance Index
To assess the catch-up performance of country i over T-year period ½0;T, we




















Note that yit and y
US
t , which are, respectively, the per capita income of country i
and the United States in year t, are measured in purchasing power parity (PPP)
dollars at constant prices.
By definition, CUPIi0;T>0 if country i is catching up ðrel–yiT>rel–yi0Þ, < 0 if it is
falling behind ðrel–yiT<rel–yi0Þ, and = 0 if it is neither catching up nor falling
behind ðrel–yiT ¼ rel–yi0Þ:
12.2.2 Data and Results
We use the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) dataset to compute the
CUPI over a twenty-year period (1995–2015) for all countries with available data
on per capita income (measured in PPP US$ at constant prices). The result shows
that of the 167 countries in the dataset, 114 (68 per cent) were catching up
and fifty-three (32 per cent) were falling behind (details on the CUPI for all
167 countries are provided in Appendix 12.1). Table 12.1 reports the result for
nineteen Asian countries.
Three observations emerge from Table 12.1. First, nearly 90 per cent of Asian
countries were in catch-up mode, compared to only 68 per cent across all 167 coun-
tries studied. In particular, China and India—the world’s two most populous
countries and together accounting for more than one-third of the world’s
population—were among the top five catch-up leaders. This is evidence of Asia’s
general rise in the global economy. Second, the coefficient of variation (CV) on per
capita income for the nineteen Asian countries declined from 1.542 in 1995 to 1.156
in 2015. This is evidence of a convergence trend among Asian countries, although
² Woo (2011) calls this relative income level the ‘Catch-up Index’ (CUI).
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variations in absolute measures of per capita income remained large. Third, most
Asian countries remained far below the United States on per capita income, ranging
froma 2015 relative level of 4.4 (United States = 100) forNepal to 152.2 for Singapore
and including only modest levels for India (10.9) and China (25.8).
12.2.3 Sources of Economic Catch-up
Among the nineteen Asian countries examined in Table 12.1, seventeen have
accessible data on growth-accounting decomposition as compiled by the Asian
Productivity Organization (APO).³ As presented in Appendix 12.2, the CUPI for
each country can be decomposed into three sources: capital deepening, labour
participation, and TFP growth. Each of these sources captures how well a given
country performs compared to the United States over the period of examination.
Table 12.1 Catch-up performance of Asian countries, 1995–2015 (sorted by CUPI
score in decreasing order)
Country CUPI
(1995–2015)
Relative income level (United States=100)
1995 2015
1. Myanmar 7.08 2.3 9.4
2. China 6.89 6.5 25.8
3. Cambodia 4.02 2.8 6.2
4. Laos 3.70 4.8 10.1
5. India 3.68 5.2 10.9
6. Vietnam 3.66 5.2 10.8
7. Sri Lanka 3.04 11.4 21.0
8. Bangladesh 2.44 3.7 6.0
9. South Korea 2.14 42.6 65.2
10. Singapore 1.46 113.6 152.2
11. Malaysia 1.36 36.6 48.0
12. Philippines 1.36 10.0 13.2
13. Indonesia 1.29 15.2 19.7
14. Nepal 1.24 3.4 4.4
15. Hong Kong 1.07 82.0 101.4
16. Thailand 1.00 23.9 29.1
17. Pakistan 0.23 8.5 8.9
18. Japan –0.67 82.1 71.9
19. Brunei –2.27 219.8 139.7
Mean (M) 2.25 35.76 39.67
Standard deviation (SD) 2.30 55.17 45.88
CV=SD/M 1.02 1.54 1.16
Source: Authors’ calculation from WDI and APO datasets.
³ The APO dataset is available on line at http://www.apo-tokyo.org/wedo/measurement.
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Table 12.2 Drivers of Asian countries’ catch-up performance, 1995–2015 (sorted by CUPI score in decreasing order)














China 6.89 3.45 0.43 3.01 50.1% 6.2% 43.7%
Cambodia 4.02 1.60 1.38 1.04 39.8% 34.3% 25.9%
Laos 3.70 3.40 0.28 0.03 91.7% 7.5% 0.8%
India 3.68 1.37 0.07 2.24 37.3% 1.8% 60.8%
Vietnam 3.66 4.20 0.13 0.66 114.6% 3.5% 18.1%
Sri Lanka 3.04 1.20 0.69 1.15 39.5% 22.7% 37.8%
Bangladesh 2.44 2.80 0.47 0.82 114.5% 19.2% 33.7%
South Korea 2.14 1.55 0.05 0.53 72.6% 2.5% 24.9%
Singapore 1.46 0.92 0.54 0.00 63.0% 36.7% 0.3%
Philippines 1.36 0.32 0.27 0.77 23.7% 19.8% 56.5%
Malaysia 1.36 0.08 0.26 1.02 6.1% 19.0% 74.9%
Indonesia 1.29 1.62 0.49 0.83 125.9% 38.2% 64.1%
Nepal 1.24 0.54 0.62 0.08 43.8% 49.7% 6.5%
Hong Kong 1.07 0.68 0.35 0.04 63.9% 32.6% 3.5%
Thailand 1.00 0.56 0.15 0.59 56.3% 15.5% 59.2%
Pakistan 0.23 0.53 0.31 0.45 225.4% 133.0% 192.4%
Japan 0.67 0.68 0.19 0.21 102.4% 28.3% 30.7%
Median 1.46 1.20 0.31 0.45 56.3% 19.8% 24.9%
Source: Authors’ calculation from WDI and APO datasets.
Table 12.2 reports the sources of CUPI for the seventeen Asian countries over the
period 1995–2015.
Several observations emerge from Table 12.2. First, for most countries, all three
components—capital deepening, labour participation, and TFP growth—played a
role in driving catch-up performance. This signals the importance of a compre-
hensive approach that fosters catch-up through multiple avenues. Second, capital
deepening is the leading driver of catch-up performance for ten of the seventeen
countries under consideration: Vietnam, China, Laos, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Cambodia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Hong Kong. This implies
that promoting capital deepening should be a top priority in developing a catch-
up strategy. Third, the contribution of TFP growth was positive for fourteen of
the seventeen countries but negative for only three: Vietnam, Bangladesh, and
Indonesia, all of which showed high catch-up performance driven largely by
capital deepening. The cases of Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia deserve
more in-depth examination to understand obstacles to TFP growth and the risk
of policy bias towards capital deepening.
The relationship between capital deepening and TFP growth (Figure 12.1) is nega-
tive but statistically insignificant, as captured by equation y = –0.0495x + 0.6131 (R20Þ.
The three countries previously specified—Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia—lie
notably below the trend line, indicating that their TFP growth or efficiency of using
production inputs was much lower than expected levels. This suggests that the
countries may have faced significant obstacles to TFP promotion efforts or that
they overlooked this strategy due to a bias in favour of promoting capital deepening.
Among these three countries, Vietnam stands out as themost notable case because it





































y = –0.0495x + 0.6131
Median line
Figure 12.1 Contribution to catch-up performance: TFP growth vs. capital deepening
Source: Authors’ calculation from APO data (http://www.apo-tokyo.org/wedo/measurement)
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magnitude of capital deepening contribution among the seventeen countries
considered. Below we consider the case of Vietnam in more detail in order to
understand why the country successfully mobilized capital investment but failed
to achieve meaningful TFP growth throughout its catch-up phase.
12.3 Vietnam’s Nation Learning for Economic Catch-up
Over the past three decades, the economic reforms launched by Vietnam in
December 1986 have produced considerable achievements in shifting the country
from a Soviet-styled planned economy to a market-oriented and highly open
system. The economic development process in Vietnam throughout this reform
period was a hybrid approach drawing loosely from three development models:
the China model, in which proactive reforms to modernize the economy were
combined with adoption of market principles; the Africa model, in which aid
donors had substantial influence on the country’s reform agenda and sources of
capital investment; and the Singapore model, in which the country attracted
investment from multinational companies (MNCs) as a driver of economic
development. Behind this profound economic transformation was a robust learn-
ing effort, especially in rethinking the fundamental concepts of economic develop-
ment and making strategic choices. Specific initiatives included the following:
• Adopting market economy principles, enhancing the effectiveness of market
forces, and legalizing and promoting the private sector;
• Opening up the economy and fostering global integration;
• Creating a favourable environment for business by stabilizing political and
macroeconomic conditions;
• Giving priority to investments in key infrastructure projects;
• Embracing the ICT revolution and leveraging ICT to promote growth;
• Investing in human capital development.
In addition to these initiatives, Vietnam specifically emphasized benchmarking
as a tool to foster nation learning. At the national level, the government has used
yearly global rankings such as the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) index by the
World Bank and the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic
Forum to identify areas for improving the country’s business environment. For
example, the government promulgated a decree that outlines objectives and
strategies to be a leader among ASEAN countries on the EDB ranking.⁴ For
⁴ The EDB ranking is based on a composite index constructed from ten sub-indices: Starting a
Business; Dealing with Construction Permits; Getting Electricity; Registering Property; Getting Credit;
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benchmarking that fosters learning at the provincial level, the government has also
relied on the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI),⁵ compiled annually since
2005 by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce (VCCI) and USAID experts. The
PCI report ranks Vietnam’s provinces and province-level cities on economic
competitiveness. This ranking has proved highly effective in encouraging prov-
inces and cities, especially those with lower performance, to review their policy
strategies and improve their business environments.
Vietnam’s efforts to develop and implement sound strategic choices have
produced measurable results. As shown in Table 12.3, Vietnam performs
favourably among its Asian peers on factors influencing capital investment,
including business environment (proxied by rankings on ease of doing busi-
ness and political stability), infrastructure development (electricity consump-
tion per capita and growth in electricity generation), embrace of the ICT
revolution (Facebook penetration and speed of internet connectivity), and
global integration (trade/GDP ratio, total export value, export value per capita,
and FDI flow as a percentage of GDP). Notably, Vietnam outperformed most
Asian peers on electricity consumption per capita and internet connectivity
speed, although it lagged behind most countries on per capita income level. On
human capital development, Vietnam was comparable to its peers on the
education index in 2015 and strongest in improving this measure over the
period 1990–2015.
Table 12.3 also provides information that helps explain Vietnam’s poor per-
formance on TFP growth. All three countries with negative TFP growth—
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Bangladesh—shared three features: low or missing
values on payment for technology acquisition, low performance on innovation,
and low performance on control of corruption (in global rankings). Vietnam is the
only country for which data on payment for technology acquisition are missing
for every year, even though this information is available for countries with even
lower per capita incomes such as Bangladesh and Cambodia. This suggests that
Vietnam has not given strategic priority to monitoring technology acquisition
efforts—an essential means of promoting catch-up by narrowing the knowledge
gap with countries that are technology leaders.
Protecting Minority Investors; Paying Taxes; Trading across Borders; Enforcing Contracts; and
Resolving Insolvency.
⁵ The PCI is a composite index constructed from ten sub-indices: Entry Costs (Business Establish-
ment Costs); Land Access and Security of Tenure; Transparency and Access to Information; Time
Costs of Regulatory Compliance; Informal Charges; State-Sector Bias (Competition Environment);
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership; Private-sector Development Services; Labour Training; and Legal
Institutions.
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Table 12.3 Selected factors influencing economic catch-up: Vietnam vs. Asian peers
Vietnam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand China India Bangladesh
A-Facilitators or favourable to capital deepening
1. Business environment
Ease of doing business (global rank), 2018 68 72 24 113 26 78 100 177
Political stability (% countries below), 2017 59.5 29.1 52.4 10.9 19.1 36.6 17.2 10.5
2. Infrastructure development
Electricity consumption per capita (kwh), 2015 1,465 774 4,384 707 2,477 3,844 804 304
Electricity generation, 1995–2015 CAGR (%) 12.3 7.0 6.1 4.6 4.1 9.2 6.1 8.7
3. Embrace of the ICT revolution
Internet users (% of population), 2016 46.5 25.4 78.8 55.5 47.5 53.2 29.5 18.2
Facebook penetration (% of population), 2016 41.9 33.4 61.0 52.0 60.0 0.1 11.7 12.7
Internet connectivity speed, 2017:
Average (Mbps) 9.5 7.2 8.9 5.5 16.0 7.6 6.5 n/a
% exceeding 10 Mbps 37% 18% 32% 11% 72% 20% 19% n/a
4. Global integration, 2017
Trade/GDP (%) 200.3 39.5 135.9 70.6 121.6 37.8 40.6 35.3
Exports in 2017 (US$ bn) 227.2 193.5 224.9 83.8 310.7 2,422.9 488.1 39.1
Export intensity (US$/Capita) 2,381 734 7,217 807 4,549 1,745 364 237
FDI flows/GDP (%) 6.3 2.7 3.1 3.0 1.7 1.13 1.5 0.8
5. Human capital development
Education index, 2015 0.62 0.62 0.70 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.54 0.46
Health index improvement, 1990–2015 change 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.12 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21
B-Inhibitors to TFP growth
Payment for intellectual property (% of GDP), 2016 n/a 0.18 0.58 0.26 0.94 0.23 0.25 0.01
Innovation, global ranking (2018) 72 68 30 67 51 24 31 102
Control of corruption (% countries below), 2017 31.7 48.1 58.1 39.9 42.8 46.7 48.6 19.2
Sources: World Bank (World Development Indicators dataset; Ease of Doing Business 2018 report; World Governance Indicators); United Nations (UNDP 2015); Akamai
Internet Connectivity Report 2017 (for internet connectivity speed); International Energy Agency (for electricity data); Global Competitiveness Report 2018 (for
innovation).
12.4 Nation Learning to Catch up:
A framework for Action
12.4.1 Strategic Focus
We have seen that catch-up performance is driven by the three factors: capital
deepening, labour participation, and TFP growth. This sub-section focuses on
capital deepening and TFP growth. Facilitating capital deepening should be the
paramount objective in catch-up efforts for two reasons. First, capital deepening
establishes a fundamental direction for the course of development through
straightforward policy design and implementation efforts that can produce imme-
diate and tangible results.⁶ Second, most developing countries have a low level of
capital stock per capita compared to the United States and their growth prospects
are substantially hindered as a result; capital deepening focuses specifically on
this problem.
Research shows that capital deepening has been a major source of economic
growth and catch-up performance in developing countries (Jorgenson, 1995;
Kumar and Russell, 2002; Vu, 2013a, 2013b). Sustaining high growth rates for
capital deepening, however, requires robust TFP growth, especially when a
country has reached a certain level of capital stock labour (Box 12.1). TFP growth
has been found to play a dominant role in successfully driving long-term catch-
up, especially in countries that are now developed. Nation learning to catch up
should thus focus on both capital deepening and TFP growth. The following sub-
sections highlight key features of a nation learning to catch up, with a focus on
the strategic directions that enable a country to successfully promote capital
deepening and TFP growth.
12.4.2 Three Main Actors
In nation learning for catch-up, particularly with respect to capital deepening and
TFP growth, central and local governments, private firms, and workers are the
three main actors. While they have differing underlying motivations for their
respective learning efforts, their efforts are strategically inter-related. At the centre
of the overall learning endeavour is the business sector. As a profit-seeking entity,
each firm makes its own decisions about how much to invest, which technology to
⁶ Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), analysing the growth acceleration patterns of 110
countries over thirty-six years (1957–92), found that sustained acceleration in economic growth is
stimulated by major reforms in economic policy. In addition, the authors also found that reforms
focusing on macroeconomic stability and trade liberalization can stimulate growth and yield quick
results.
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acquire, and how to innovate in order to enhance competitiveness. The main
motivation driving workers to learn is to improve their individual quality of life.
In an environment supportive of such learning, workers are keen to improve
their skills in order to competitively position themselves in the labour market.
These learning efforts not only augment their productivity and employability
but also contribute to national absorptive capacity and nationwide efficiency
improvements that ultimately boost TFP growth. Note that human capital
development, as presented in Box 12.1, improves the marginal productivity of
capital (MPK) and hence boosts capital deepening. Government is responsible not
only for making public investments and executing certain R&D projects but also for
playing a crucial role in fostering a facilitative environment and enabling efficient
platforms for all actors and broader society to realize their full potential in contrib-
uting to catch-up. Next we consider the role of government in driving nation-
learning efforts.
Box 12.1: The importance of productivity growth in long-term
economic performance
GDP generated by a country can be expressed in a Cobb–Douglas aggregate
production function
Y ¼ A:Kα:ðhLÞ1α (12.1)
where Y, as GDP, is a function of total factor productivity A, capital input K,
number of workers L, and labour quality h. Parameter α, ð0<α<1Þ, is the
income share of capital.
The marginal product of capital (MPK), therefore, can be expressed as:
MPK ¼ ∂Y∂K ¼ A:α:Kα1:ðhLÞ1α ¼ A:α: hK=L
 1α
(12.2)
MPL ¼ ∂Y∂L ¼ A:α:Kα:ðhÞ1αð1 αÞ:Lα ¼ A:α: h KL
 1α
(12.3)
Under perfect competitive conditions,MPK is equal to the gross return rate of
capital, while MPL represents the market rate for labour wages. Increasing
MPK boosts investment while increasing MPL raises wages, ultimately boost-
ing labour participation.
Equation (12.2) indicates that raising productivity A (through TFP growth)
and human capital h are effective ways to increase MPK, thereby leading to
further capital deepening. These strategies become more urgent as increasing
K=L causes MPK to decline.
Equation (12.3) implies that raising productivity A (through TFP growth),
human capital h, and capital deepening (K=L) are the main levers to increase
MPL, ultimately boosting labour participation.
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12.4.3 The Role of Government in Driving Nation Learning
Making investments, moving up the value chain, adopting a new technology, and
taking risks in R&D projects are crucial decisions made by firms. Governments
can nudge firms towards such activities by improving the cost–benefit structure
and building expectations about the economy and economic system through
robust analysis and data. In doing so, government should exhibit foresight and
decisiveness in two areas: (i) strategic choices and (ii) building high-performing
institutions and coordination capabilities.
12.4.3.1 Making Strategic Choices
The government’s strategic choices are essential to nation learning because they
establish the foundation on which all actors make decisions. Making strategic
choices goes beyond a simple reasoning process; it includes robust rethinking of
underlying assumptions about economic development, thoughtfully learning
from experience, and vigorously embracing global trends. Examples of strategic
choices are adopting market-oriented reforms, embracing global integration,
investing in human capital development, creating a favourable business envir-
onment, prioritizing industrial and infrastructure upgrading, and seizing oppor-
tunities brought about by the digital revolution. The experience of Vietnam
shows that making sound strategic choices can positively impact a country’s
development path and can substantially impact the process of capital deepening.
At the same time, if a country makes poor strategic choices, unwanted effects are
likely to follow. For example, Venezuela has adopted a particularly aggressive
socialist model for the past two decades and is now suffering from a severe
economic crisis.⁷
12.4.3.2 Building High-performing Institutions and Coordination
Capabilities
Making sound strategic choices is fundamental for entering a growth trajectory
complemented by robust capital investment and job creation—especially for
countries with relatively low per capita income. However, achieving high-quality
and sustainable economic growth requires learning efforts for building high-
performing institutions and coordination capabilities. The negative TFP growth
observed for Vietnam, Indonesia, and Bangladesh is suggestive of the challenges
resulting from insufficient learning efforts.
Building high-performing institutions and coordination capabilities is not only
supportive of a friendly business environment but also reduces market distortions
and leads firms towards more productive choices such as value creation over rent
⁷ Vu (2018) shows that Venezuela’s global ranking on per capita income fell by thirty-three places
over the period 1990–2017, from 42nd in 1990 to 75th in 2017.
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seeking, collaboration over undercutting, and honesty over cheating. Building
high-performing institutions and coordination capabilities is also essential for
enhancing the quality of decision making and efficiency of resource allocation
across sectors.
Singapore is an instructive example of how vigorous learning efforts can be
applied to build high-performing institutions and coordination capabilities. In his
memoir From Third World to First: The Singapore story 1965–2000, Lee Kuan Yew
recalled:
When we started in 1959 we knew little knowledge about how to govern, or how
to solve economic and social problems . . .We learnt on the job and learnt
quickly. If there was one formula for our success, it was that we were constantly
studying how to make things work, or how to make them work better.
. . . I almost never made the same mistake twice, and I tried to learn from the
mistakes others had made. I discovered early in office that there were few
problems confronting me in government which other governments had not
met and solved. So I made a practice of finding out who else had met the problem
we faced, how they had tackled it and how successful they had been. Whenever it
was to build a new airport or to change our teaching methods, I would send a
team of officers to visit and study those countries that had done it well.
I preferred to climb on the shoulders of others who had gone before us.⁸
Goh Keng Swee, credited with being the main architect of Singapore’s economy,
insisted that the ability to learn from others was a key factor in the country’s
success:
There is nothing new under the sun—whether it is setting up an MRT system, a
gifted education programme, an air force, a container port or whatever . . .We do
not try to reinvent the wheel; we study how other people do it. We learn and
adapt, not imitate without thinking.⁹
There are four channels for learning efforts in building high-performing institu-
tions and coordination capabilities:¹⁰ acquisition of competencies; benchmarking;
experimentation; and continuous improvement. Examples of these efforts from
Singapore include learning from the Shell Oil Company about criteria for recruit-
ing government officials (acquisition of competencies); examining factors influ-
encing the country’s performance on global rankings (benchmarking), ranging
from ease of doing business and global competitiveness to effectiveness and
innovation in court; so-called sandbox programmes at the Monetary Authority
of Singapore (MAS) focused on promoting the Fintech sector (experimentation);
⁸ Lee (2000: 758–9).
⁹ ‘Dr. Goh’s Recipe for our Success’, Strait Times, 7 August 1984.
¹⁰ Yeung et al. (1999) provide a rich discussion on learning capability.
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and the application of performance-based management across government
agencies and organizations (continuous improvement).
12.4.4 Nation-learning Capability
Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 128) introduce the concept of firm-level absorptive
capacity, defining it as ‘the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends’. This concept can be
broadened to capture the learning capability of a nation in its efforts towards
economic catch-up. Nation-learning capability (NLC) can be expressed in the
following simple mathematical formula:
NLC ¼ P  V∗A∗E
Sþ C ð12:3Þ
where the components in the numerator are drivers and those in the denominator
are obstacles. These are elaborated as follows:
• P is the pressure that forces a country to learn in pursuing economic catch-
up. Underlying factors include security threats, lack of natural resources, and
catch-up success in neighbouring or peer countries, among many others.
These factors have been found to drive vigorous learning efforts in Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore (Doner et al., 2005).
• V is leadership vision, which depends heavily on the quality of the country’s
top leaders. Lessons from historical failures can be a powerful force shaping
the leadership’s vision of the future. China and Vietnam have a vision that is
arguably more receptive to market principles and global integration than
that in similarly situated (previously closed authoritarian) countries; this
may be due in part to the countries’ costly experiences with a command
economy and economic isolation.
• A is the aggregate absorptive capacity of government organizations and firms
for adopting new strategies and reforms. Progress on the measurement of
this component depends on not only the learning efforts of firms and
individuals but also the government’s effort to build high-performing insti-
tutions and coordination capabilities.¹¹
¹¹ As an example, Singapore’s Productivity Practices Sharing Platform created a platform to
promote productivity by fostering the sharing of best business practices with SMEs. Business leaders
were invited to partner with the National Productivity Board to develop curricular and training
materials based on experiences and best practices in the three focus areas: customer service (Singapore
Airlines); industrial engineering (Singapore Philips); and on-the-job training (OJT) programmes (Seiko
Instruments).
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• E represents the enabling conditions that facilitate nation learning. Underlying
factors include globalization, the ICT revolution, strategic alliances, devel-
opment assistance, and regional growth dynamics, among others. FDI is
also a potentially powerful enabler, especially in efforts to reap benefits from
spillover effects.
• S represents factors that maintain status quo bias in policymaking, including
outdated regulations, ageing bureaucratic habits, and vested interests. Nation
learning should seek to mitigate these factors as part of broader moderniza-
tion reforms. For example, India’s Make in India initiative has endeavoured
to change bureaucratic culture, away from the ABCD approach (avoid,
by-pass, confuse, and delay) and towards the ROAD approach (responsibility,
ownership, accountability, and decisiveness).¹²
• C represents challenges related to the cost of nation learning, including
pervasiveness of corruption, lack of transparency, and the absence of efficient
mechanisms for knowledge diffusion.
Expression (12.3) suggests that a country can augment NLC through a com-
prehensive framework that focuses on specific factors. For example, a new lead-
ership team that proposes a fresh vision of development with a commitment to
pursuing catch-up should not only accelerate reforms (V) and establish a sense of
urgency (P) but also reduce status-quo bias (S) and corruption practices (C).
12.5 Conclusion
The high performance of many Asian countries in pursuing economic catch-up
presents an opportunity to examine strategic policy efforts and their impacts on
traditional drivers of growth. Capital accumulation and TFP growth are shown in
the literature to be contributing factors, but they fail to exhibit their full trans-
formative potential in the absence of strategic policy visions. This chapter has
argued that nation learning, i.e. the consistent and strategic effort among all
sectors to identify pathways to economic catch-up, is a crucial undertaking for
developing countries that lack the levels of capital stock per capita enjoyed
by developing countries. In this chapter’s examination of cases of lagging capital
accumulation and TFP growth, nation learning was argued to be the missing link
among otherwise aggressive policy efforts. Nation learning is a crucial step in
helping governments to rethink their fundamental approach to economic devel-
opment, including the adoption of market systems and facilitation of a vibrant
private sector.
¹² Case study, Make in India: The Operating and Marketing Challenge, by Gaganpreet Sing and
Simarpreet Singh, Ivey Publishing, 2014.
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This chapter has argued that nation learning should draw from global case
lessons and focus on generating sustainable performance in capital accumula-
tion and TFP growth. Bias in favour of capital deepening while overlooking
promotion of TFP growth is a common pitfall in economic catch-up efforts.
Such efforts, including those systematized by an NLC-informed framework,
should focus not only on capital investment but also on technology and other
factors underlying TFP. The case of Vietnam provides a notable example. The
country excelled among its Asian peers on the contribution of capital deepening
to economic growth while being one of the three weakest on TFP growth.
Regarding concrete policy implications, the mathematical formula presented
above for NLC offers specific guidance for pursuing catch-up, including which
factors to emphasize (leadership vision, reform capacity, and conditions that
facilitate nation learning) and which to minimize (status quo bias and costs
associated with nation learning). More broadly, catch-up efforts must not be
unduly concerned with performance targets on specific measures but must instead
address reform and economic growth as a systemic process in which elements of
the whole—institutions, private-sector behaviour, aid programmes, cross-sector
collaborations, and others—are fundamentally interdependent and mutually
reinforcing. This calls for a leadership approach that emphasizes rethinking and
prioritizes unexploited pathways for economic growth.
A country’s factor endowments and other endogenous economic fundamen-
tals will determine whether it will be competitive in the global economy, but the
degree to which the country is competitive depends on a variety of other factors
including strategic policy vision, institutional performance, coordination cap-
acity, and nation learning. There is considerable nuance in how these factors are
measured and leveraged, and this chapter has sought to articulate that nuance in
a way that generates actionable implications. As an illustration, the chapter
presented Vietnam as a successful case of leveraging sound strategic choice into
catch-up performance, including the adoption of market principles to promote a
thriving private sector and investments in infrastructure and workforce develop-
ment capacities. Countries such as Vietnam and others throughout Asia are
instructive examples of the challenges and opportunities of development, and
exhibit how nation learning is crucial for advancing broader development goals.
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Appendix 12.1: Catch-up performance of 167 countries
(sorted by CUPI score in decreasing order)
Country CUPI
(1995–2015)
Relative income level (United
States=100)
1995 2015
1. Equatorial Guinea 13.48 4.9 72.6
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina 7.16 4.6 19.2
3. Myanmar 7.08 2.3 9.4
4. China 6.89 6.5 25.8
5. Azerbaijan 6.63 8.4 31.7
6. Georgia 5.39 5.8 17.1
7. Armenia 5.02 5.5 15.0
8. Turkmenistan 4.61 11.7 29.5
9. Liberia 4.34 0.6 1.5
10. Belarus 4.31 13.4 31.6
11. Mozambique 4.09 0.9 2.1
12. Cambodia 4.02 2.8 6.2
13. Lithuania 3.85 23.7 51.2
14. Kazakhstan 3.77 21.0 44.6
15. Laos 3.70 4.8 10.1
16. Latvia 3.69 21.0 43.8
17. India 3.68 5.2 10.9
18. Vietnam 3.66 5.2 10.8
19. Mongolia 3.53 10.8 21.8
20. Bhutan 3.49 7.4 14.9
21. Albania 3.46 10.5 20.9
22. Ethiopia 3.44 1.5 2.9
23. Uzbekistan 3.23 5.7 10.8
24. Cabo Verde 3.22 6.1 11.7
25. Rwanda 3.11 1.7 3.1
26. Sri Lanka 3.04 11.4 21.0
27. Trinidad and Tobago 3.03 32.4 59.4
28. Estonia 2.95 28.8 51.9
29. Cuba 2.68 23.3 39.9
30. Ireland 2.66 68.4 116.5
31. Panama 2.65 23.3 39.6
32. Poland 2.59 28.6 48.0
33. Iraq 2.51 16.6 27.4
34. Bangladesh 2.44 3.7 6.0
35. Dominican Republic 2.41 15.7 25.4
36. Sudan 2.37 4.9 7.8
37. Slovakia 2.37 33.4 53.6
38. Angola 2.35 8.2 13.2
39. Mauritius 2.34 22.4 35.8
40. Tajikistan 2.27 3.2 5.0
41. Nigeria 2.16 6.9 10.7
42. South Korea 2.14 42.6 65.2
43. Bulgaria 2.05 21.4 32.3
44. Chad 1.93 2.6 3.9
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45. Romania 1.87 26.7 38.9
46. Ghana 1.80 5.2 7.5
47. Kyrgyzstan 1.77 4.3 6.1
48. Peru 1.74 15.8 22.3
49. Morocco 1.73 9.9 14.0
50. Russian Federation 1.72 32.5 45.8
51. Uganda 1.65 2.4 3.3
52. Tanzania 1.58 3.5 4.8
53. Moldova 1.55 6.6 9.0
54. Zambia 1.49 5.1 6.8
55. Serbia 1.48 18.7 25.2
56. Singapore 1.46 113.6 152.2
57. Burkina Faso 1.45 2.3 3.0
58. Tunisia 1.37 15.5 20.4
59. Malaysia 1.36 36.6 48.0
60. Philippines 1.36 10.0 13.2
61. Uruguay 1.31 29.2 37.9
62. Guyana 1.29 10.4 13.4
63. Indonesia 1.29 15.2 19.7
64. Nepal 1.24 3.4 4.4
65. Chile 1.24 32.9 42.1
66. Lesotho 1.22 4.1 5.3
67. Grenada 1.19 19.1 24.2
68. Seychelles 1.18 38.2 48.4
69. Botswana 1.14 22.5 28.2
70. Namibia 1.08 14.9 18.6
71. Hong Kong 1.07 82.0 101.4
72. Malta 1.06 50.2 62.1
73. Nicaragua 1.05 7.5 9.3
74. Turkey 1.04 30.0 36.9
75. Macedonia 1.03 19.7 24.2
76. Croatia 1.02 32.0 39.2
77. Costa Rica 1.01 22.7 27.8
78. Suriname 1.00 24.4 29.8
79. Thailand 1.00 23.9 29.1
80. Hungary 0.99 38.6 47.1
81. Egypt 0.89 16.3 19.4
82. Bolivia 0.88 10.4 12.4
83. Czech Republic 0.85 48.7 57.6
84. St. Vincent & Grenadines 0.85 16.8 19.9
85. Slovenia 0.84 46.7 55.2
86. Colombia 0.71 21.4 24.6
87. Iceland 0.65 71.2 81.0
88. Samoa 0.62 9.3 10.6
89. Luxembourg 0.62 157.4 178.2
90. Algeria 0.53 23.5 26.2
91. Ukraine 0.49 12.8 14.1
92. Sweden 0.46 78.7 86.3
93. Mali 0.45 3.3 3.6
94. Australia 0.37 76.9 82.8
95. Honduras 0.35 8.5 9.1
96. Saudi Arabia 0.32 89.5 95.4
(continued )




Relative income level (United
States=100)
1995 2015
97. Swaziland 0.29 14.6 15.4
98. Finland 0.28 69.9 74.0
99. Dominica 0.28 18.3 19.4
100. El Salvador 0.27 14.6 15.4
101. Israel 0.26 57.6 60.7
102. Jordan 0.25 18.5 19.4
103. Pakistan 0.23 8.5 8.9
104. Ecuador 0.22 19.6 20.4
105. Fiji 0.21 15.9 16.6
106. Djibouti 0.19 6.0 6.2
107. Sierra Leone 0.18 2.7 2.8
108. Argentina 0.15 35.2 36.2
109. Tuvalu 0.14 6.8 7.0
110. New Zealand 0.11 65.3 66.7
111. South Africa 0.06 23.2 23.5
112. United Kingdom 0.04 72.5 73.1
113. Malawi 0.03 2.1 2.1
114. Cameroon 0.01 5.5 5.6
115. Canada 0.00 81.6 81.6
116. Netherlands –0.01 88.1 88.0
117. Kenya –0.07 5.6 5.5
118. Brazil –0.07 28.0 27.6
119. Mexico –0.11 32.0 31.3
120. Austria –0.11 85.4 83.6
121. Paraguay –0.13 16.8 16.4
122. Germany –0.13 85.2 83.1
123. Benin –0.16 3.8 3.7
124. Guatemala –0.17 14.3 13.8
125. Spain –0.19 63.5 61.1
126. Senegal –0.19 4.5 4.3
127. Belize –0.20 15.7 15.1
128. Belgium –0.21 82.8 79.4
129. Congo –0.24 11.9 11.4
130. Norway –0.25 126.8 120.8
131. Antigua and Barbuda –0.28 43.5 41.1
132. Barbados –0.37 31.5 29.2
133. Switzerland –0.40 116.2 107.2
134. Denmark –0.44 94.3 86.3
135. France –0.45 78.4 71.7
136. Tonga –0.46 10.8 9.9
137. Portugal –0.47 55.4 50.4
138. Japan –0.67 82.1 71.9
139. St. Lucia –0.67 22.3 19.5
140. Cyprus –0.75 67.0 57.6
141. Togo –0.77 3.0 2.6
142. Greece –0.82 53.8 45.7
143. Niger –0.83 2.0 1.7
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Appendix 12.2: Sources of catch-up performance index (CUPI)
144. Côte d’Ivoire –0.84 7.4 6.3
145. Guinea –1.03 2.6 2.2
146. Vanuatu –1.08 6.6 5.3
147. Marshall Islands –1.18 8.8 7.0
148. Lebanon –1.20 31.5 24.8
149. Italy –1.29 84.0 64.9
150. Palau –1.34 35.7 27.3
151. Bahrain –1.35 108.7 83.0
152. Kiribati –1.49 4.8 3.6
153. Madagascar –1.54 3.6 2.6
154. Comoros –1.56 3.6 2.6
155. Bahamas –1.56 56.0 41.0
156. Oman –1.58 97.6 71.2
157. Jamaica –1.61 21.8 15.8
158. Gabon –1.71 50.4 35.8
159. Solomon Islands –1.94 5.8 3.9
160. Kuwait –2.09 201.9 133.0
161. Guinea-Bissau –2.15 4.0 2.6
162. Brunei Darussalam –2.27 219.8 139.7
163. Burundi –2.43 2.1 1.3
164. Yemen –2.90 9.0 5.0
165. Zimbabwe –3.25 6.1 3.2
166. Central African Republic –3.42 2.2 1.1
167. United Arab Emirates –3.85 269.2 124.7
Mean (M) 1.03 31.24 33.71
Standard deviation (SD) 2.19 40.63 33.82
CV=SD/M 2.12 1.30 1.00
Source: Authors’ calculation from WDI and APO datasets.
The CUPI, by definition, can be expressed as follows (see Vu (2018) for elaboration):



















5=T ¼ Δlnyi0;T  ΔlnyUS0;T (A12.1)
Where Δlnyi0;T is the average annual per capita growth rate over period [0, T] of country i’s
income.
Note that
Δlnyi0;T ¼ ΔlnYi0;T  ΔlnPi0;T (A12.2)
Where ΔlnYi0;T and ΔlnP
i
0;Tare the average annual growth rate of country i’s GDP and
population over the period [0, T].
At the same time, GDP growth can be decomposed into a contribution of capital, labour,
and TFP as follows (see Jorgenson et al. (2002) for elaboration):
ΔlnYi0;T ¼ wi0;T :ΔlnKi0;T þ ð1 wi0;TÞ:ΔlnLi0;T þ ΔlnAi0;T (A12.3)
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        281
References
Abramovitz, M. (1994) ‘Catch-up and Convergence in the Postwar Growth Boom and
after’, in W. Baumol, R. Nelsonand , E. Wolff (eds) Convergence of Productivity:
Cross-national Studies and Historical Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 86–125.
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (2007) ‘Capital, Innovation, and Growth Accounting’,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23(1): 79–93.
Baumol, W. J. (1986) ‘Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What the
Long-run Data Show’, The American Economic Review 76(5): 1072–85.
Cohen, W. M. and D. A. Levinthal (1990) ‘Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on
Learning and Innovation’, Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 128–52.
Doner, R. F., B. K. Ritchie, and D. Slater (2005) ‘Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins
of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective’,
International Organization 59(2): 327–61.
where wi0;T is the average income share of the country i’s capital service in period [0, T ]
while ΔlnKi0;T , ΔlnL
i
0;T , and ΔlnA
i
0;T are, respectively, its growth rates of capital services,
employment, and total factor productivity over the period.
Combining (A12.2) and (A12.3) yields
Δlnyi0;T ¼ wi0;T :ΔlnðKi0;T=Pi0;TÞ þ ð1 wi0;TÞ:ΔlnðLi0;T=Pi0;TÞ þ ΔlnAi0;T (A12.4)
Equation (A12.4) means that growth rate of a country’s per capita income can be
decomposed into three sources:
(i) the contribution of capital deepening in the population: wi0;T :ΔlnðKi0;T=Pi0;TÞ;which is
denoted as kpopci0;T ;
(ii) the contribution of labour participation expansion: ð1 wi0;TÞ:ΔlnðLi0;T=Pi0;TÞ, denoted
as lpopci0;T ; and
(iii) TFP growth:ΔlnAi0;T , denoted as TFP
i
0;T .
The CUPI in Equation (A12.1), therefore, can be expressed as
CUPIi0;T ¼ ðkpopci0;T  kpopcUS0;TÞ þ ðlpopci0;T  lpopcUS0;TÞ þ ðTFPGi0;T  TFPGUS0;TÞ
That is, the catch-up performance index (CUPI) for a country can be broken down into
three constituent components capturing its performance relative to the United States on the
three sources of per capita growth:
ðkpopci0;T  kpopcUS0;TÞ, which is the differential in capital deepening rate, which is referred
to in the chapter as ‘capital deepening’;
ðlpopci0;T  lpopcUS0;TÞ, which is the differential in labour participation rate, which is referred
to in the chapter as ‘labour participation’; and
ðTFPGi0;T  TFPGUS0;TÞ, which is the differential in TFP growth, which is referred to in the
chapter as ‘TFP growth’.
Continued
282     
Dowrick, S. and D. T. Nguyen (1989) ‘OECDComparative Economic Growth 1950–85:
Catch-up and Convergence’, The American Economic Review 79(5): 1010–30.
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (2001) ‘What HaveWe Learned from a Decade of Empirical
Research on Growth? It’s Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth
Models’, The World Bank Economic Review 15(2): 177–219.
Fagerberg, J. (1987) ‘A Technology Gap Approach to Why Growth Rates Differ’,
Research Policy 16(2–4): 87–99.
Gerschenkron, A. (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of
Essays. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Hausmann, R., L. Pritchett, and D. Rodrik (2005) ‘Growth Accelerations’, Journal of
Economic Growth 10(4): 303–29.
Jorgenson, D. W. (1995) Productivity: International Comparisons of Economic Growth,
Vol. 2. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jorgenson, D. W., M. S. Ho, and K. J. Stiroh (2002) ‘Projecting Productivity Growth:
Lessons from the US Growth Resurgence.’ Resources for the Future Discussion
Paper 02–42, Washington, DC.
Klenow, P. J. and A. Rodriguez-Clare (1997) ‘The Neoclassical Revival in Growth
Economics: Has It Gone too far?’ NBER Macroeconomics Annual 12: 73–103.
Kumar, S. and R. R. Russell (2002) ‘Technological Change, Technological Catch-up,
and Capital Deepening: Relative Contributions to Growth and Convergence’, The
American Economic Review 92(3): 527–48.
Lee, K. Y. (2000) From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000: Memoirs
of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings.
Lee, Keun (2013) Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up: Knowledge, Path-
creation, and Middle-Income Trap. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lin, J. Y. (2009) Economic Development and Transition: Thought, Strategy, and
Viability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lin, J. Y. (2011) ‘New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Develop-
ment.’ Policy Research Working Paper No. 5197, Washington DC, World Bank.
Ohno, Kenichi (2013) Learning to Industrialize: FromGiven Growth to Policy-aided Value
Creation. New York: Routledge-GRIPS Publications Development Forum Studies.
Oqubay, Arkebe (2015) Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Ethiopia. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Quah, D. (1993) ‘Galton’s Fallacy and Tests of the Convergence Hypothesis’, The
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95(4): 427–43.
Quah, D. T. (1996) ‘Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence’, European
Economic Review 40(6): 1353–75.
Solow, R. M. (1957) ‘Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function’, The
Review of Economics and Statistics 39(3): 312–20.
UNDP (2015) ‘Human Development Data.’ United Nations, Geneva.
        283
Vu, K. M. (2013a) ‘Information and Communication Technology and Singapore’s
Economic Growth’, Information Economics and Policy 25(4): 284–300.
Vu, K. M. (2013b) The Dynamics of Economic Growth: Policy Insights from Compara-
tive Analyses in Asia. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Vu, K. M. (2018) ‘The Global Dynamics of Economic Catchup: Patterns, Drivers, and
Determinants.’ LKYSPP Working Papers, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,
Singapore.
Woo, W. T. (2011) ‘Understanding the Middle-income Trap in Economic Develop-
ment: The Case of Malaysia.’World Economy Lecture delivered at the University of
Nottingham, Globalization and Economic Policy, pp. 17–34.
Yeung, A. K., D. O. Ulrich, S. Nason et al. (1999) Organizational Learning Capability.
New York: Oxford University Press.
284     
13
Learning to Catch up in Africa
Arkebe Oqubay and Taffere Tesfachew
13.1 Introduction to Learning and Catch-up
This chapter examines the dynamics of learning and catch-up in twenty-first-
century Africa—a continent generally regarded as a laggard in technological
learning and catch-up.¹ It argues that despite low levels of absorptive capacity
and the increasingly restrictive and unbalanced world order created by the neo-
liberalization wave, the dynamics of learning and catch-up in late-latecomer
countries can be accelerated by proactive industrial policies, supported by strategic
vision and the commitment to catch-up through intensive learning, including
policy learning. To support this argument, the chapter presents industry-level case
studies of learning and catch-up in Ethiopia, one of the fastest-growing economies
in Africa.
In this chapter, catch-up is understood as a process of ‘narrowing of a firm’s or
country’s gap vis-à-vis a leading country or firm’ (Lee and Malerba, 2018: 2; Lee
2013).² Economic catch-up is a rare phenomenon and only a handful of countries
have succeeded in catching up and in sustaining the investment and technological
capability required to maintain leadership at the frontiers of technology. This makes
measuring progress in catching up difficult, especially when leading firms and
countries are also moving forward by improving their capabilities, thereby widening
the gap. This chapter proposes that for late-latecomers, a useful indicator of catching
up is the ability of firms and industries to compete with those that have established a
clear position of international excellence and leadership in the same products.
What are the main sources and drivers of successful technological learning and
catch-up? Are the conditions required to spur technological learning and catch-up
in the twenty-first century different from those applicable to latecomers in the past?
Economic history and empirical evidence suggest that government support
through proactive industrial policies, involving various forms of direct and indirect
instruments to encourage intensive learning, has been an important characteristic
of countries that have succeeded in catching up. This was the case both when
¹ See Cramer, Oqubay, and Sender (forthcoming) on historical and contemporary African economic
development.
² See also Gerschenkron (1962) on the advantage of late development and innovative responses.
latecomers in continental Europe were industrializing in the nineteenth century
and in the catch-up of the newly industrialized economies in East Asia in the
twentieth century (Chang, 2003; Cohen and DeLong, 2016; Lee 2013). The role of
industrial policy as a powerful tool to spur technological learning and catch-up is
linked to two factors.³
First, industries or sectors vary significantly in their structures, their disposition
to technological learning, and the conditions required for initiating the catch-up
process. Setting aside the debate on whether industrial policies are the best
instruments for picking winners (Wade, 2015), it is evident that they enable
governments to target industries or sectors that are predisposed to technological
learning and could, therefore, serve as role models in setting the process of
learning and catching up in motion.
The second factor is the policy direction, particularly its export or inward
orientation and its approach to foreign direct investment (FDI). This can have a
profound influence on the pace and depth of technological learning and catch-up
by local industries. The window of opportunity for learning tends to be greater in
export-oriented industries, where interactions with buyers and competitors facili-
tate access to foreign knowledge spillovers, and there is greater pressure to
improve efficiency and to meet international technical and quality standards.
Targeted industrial policies can also influence the pace and direction of dynamic
learning (both technological and policy), creating a sense of urgency and a
collective mission and passion to promote learning. The ‘learning intensity’
these measures induce can be a powerful tool to fast-track dynamic learning.
The chapter is organized as follows.Wefirst review the experiences of learning and
catch-up in the export-oriented floriculture industry in Ethiopia and the impact of
policy learning on the industry’s accelerated development.⁴ Next, we examine the
rapid development of the cement industry in Ethiopia and its implications for
learning and catch-up. Ethiopia’s intensive efforts to build domestic absorptive
capacity are considered, focusing on reforms in university-level, technical, and
vocational education, and on the development of industrial hubs. The final section
draws conclusions and highlights potential lessons for other late-latecomer countries.
13.2 Learning and Catch-Up In A New Export Industry
13.2.1 The Rise of a New Export Industry
Floriculture production and export in Ethiopia date back to the mid-2000s. As
a relative newcomer to floriculture within East Africa, the country’s rapid
³ See Amsden (1989, 2001); and Amsden and Chu (2003). See also Oqubay, Cramer, Chang, and
Kozul-Wright (forthcoming) on industrial policies. On learning by doing, so also Arrow (1962).
⁴ See Ohno (2013).
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development of export capacity is a remarkable achievement and a demonstration
of successful learning and catch-up.⁵ Since the mid-2000s, Ethiopia has emerged as
one of the world’s four largest cut flower exporters, generating more than US$2.5
billion between 2005 and 2018. Its exports are destined predominately for the highly
competitive European market, where high standards and stringent regulations are
strictly enforced. Ethiopia’s floriculture exports originate from seventy firms, which
have createdmore than 50,000 direct jobs in floriculture and 130,000 indirect jobs in
the non-flower horticulture sector.
The floriculture industry emerged as the result of an active industrial policy
implemented by a government willing to experiment with new policy
approaches and to learn from policy mistakes. The first bold policy action
was to invite Dutch flower growers who were already international market
leaders to invest in Ethiopia. Measures taken to attract and support foreign
investors included incentives such as duty-free machinery imports, tax breaks
for exporters, and zero income tax for five years. New investors, both local and
foreign, were also offered access to finance (from the Development Bank of
Ethiopia) at subsidized interest rates, and land within a 160 km radius of Addis
Ababa at affordable rents. Investment in the industry was further encouraged
by general export incentives such as retention schemes and devaluation of the
local currency. The Netherlands government also provided special financial
support to Dutch firms.
At the time, Kenya was the leading flower producer and exporter in East Africa,
with experience spanning more than five decades. The productivity gap between
Ethiopian and Kenyan floriculture sectors soon narrowed, however, even though
30 per cent of the Ethiopian firms were newly established.
The key factors in the development of the industry were effective implementa-
tion of industrial policies and the intense and multi-dimensional learning
process—which also applied to the government. FDI firms, with their long
experience in floriculture (in some cases second generation), were also important
partners in the intensive learning.
The government continued its engagement with foreign firms, providing facili-
tation services, and where appropriate financing, that encouraged foreign firms to
support learning within the sector. Since the global hub of floriculture is located in
the Dutch auction centres, the fact that most foreign firms were Dutch helped
local firms to learn the flower business in a relatively short time. The export
market was an important source of learning: exporting to Europe generated
formidable pressure to improve performance on quality, timeliness of delivery,
sustainability of production methods, and reliability.
⁵ Floriculture is a high-productivity industry and exhibits many features of manufacturing.
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13.2.2 Drivers of Learning and Catch-up
The similarity of floriculture, in some respects, to the manufacturing sector, also
contributed to accelerated learning and catch-up.⁶ The emergence of the industry
prompted the introduction of high phyto-sanitary standards, skill-intensive pro-
duction practices, and cool-chain logistics capacity from farms all the way to
airports. Local and foreign firms established a dynamic industry association which
conducted a regular dialogue with government and enabled all producers to be
actively engaged in capacity building, market promotion, and advocacy. The skill-
intensive nature of floriculture and its scientific production management require-
ments helped to develop a domestic workforce that was able to rapidly familiarize
itself with modern manufacturing-type production. Indeed, the sector became a
stepping-stone for workers to move to factories (especially in the apparel sector)
and for workers seeking overseas employment opportunities in the Middle East.
The narrow latitude for failure and poor performance created significant
pressure for managers, the workforce, and service providers, including air freight
operators, to improve their learning intensity. While production and farm man-
agers were initially mainly expatriates, most were soon replaced by Ethiopian
professionals from colleges and university graduates specializing in horticulture,
management, and engineering.
National learning systems and local absorptive capacity in general, therefore,
played a critical role in the industry’s development and catch-up. A government
agency was established to support the horticulture industry and capacity-building
programmes were implemented in cooperation with the industry association and
with the support of Dutch partners. For instance, an MSc in horticulture intro-
duced at Jimma University for eighty professionals working in the agency and in
local firms helped upgrade and incentivize professional staff. The widespread use
of English by Ethiopians, investors, and expatriates has been conducive to facili-
tating learning.
Government initiatives to promote linkages made a major contribution to
learning new activities and the development of technological capabilities. Three
typical examples of linkage dynamics generated as a result of learning and growth
in the floriculture industry are those with Ethiopian Airlines (EAL), the corru-
gated packaging industry, and the cool-chain logistics industry. For many years,
EAL’s core business was passenger services, and air cargo emerged as a strategic
business only in response to growing demand from the floriculture sector, which
required a regular, reliable service and a modern terminal for perishable goods.
The cargo business eventually became EAL’s core business, with cargo capacity
gradually expanding to one million tons. To date, EAL has airfreighted about
⁶ See Kaldor (1967) on special properties of manufacturing and as a key driver of growth and
structural change.
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500,000 tons of cargo and full cool-chain storage facilities have been built at new
airports. The corrugated packaging industry also developed from demand by the
floriculture industry. More than a dozen corrugated packaging manufacturing
firms were established after the introduction of additional support schemes, with a
total capacity of 100,000 tons.
While the learning and catch-up in Ethiopia’s floriculture industry has been
exemplary, with potential lessons for other late-latecomers, the process is only at
the initial stage and additional intensive learning efforts are required to advance
further. There has been a lack of consistency in learning in key areas. For example,
after the initial successes, the government failed to adopt appropriate policies and
incentives to increase the capacity of domestic firms and their share in the
industry. Despite locational advantage and the tremendous potential for export
earnings and employment, it has been difficult to secure sufficient land and
finance for expansion of production. The government has not supported the
upgrading of growers to move into higher-value cut flowers and reduce their
dependence on seeds subject to foreign royalties. Progress in diversification into
and expansion of the non-flower horticulture sub-sectors has also been limited.
Market diversification and the development of new capabilities, such as product
consolidation to facilitate economies of scale, similarly suggest that learning was
partial and lacked vigour, contributing to slow growth of the sector after 2013.
More importantly, policy lessons from floriculture were not systematically
extracted and applied to other industrial sectors. The experience of the floriculture
industry shows not only that learning is central to industrial policymaking, but
also that continuous policy learning is essential to upgrading and ensuring
continuous progress for targeted industries along the catch-up trajectory.
13.3 Learning in an Import-Substitution Industry
13.3.1 Slow Start but Rapid Growth and Learning
The cement industry, directly linked to construction and infrastructure develop-
ment, has strategic significance for early industrialization. Despite its seventy-five-
year history, Ethiopia’s cement industry was slow to expand, especially during the
Derg period when overall economic growth was sluggish. In 1990 cement was
produced by a single state-owned enterprise, Mugher Cement Enterprise (MCE).
Output was only 350,000 tons in 1991, doubling to 750,000 tons in the mid-1990s
as a result of economic recovery, and the reconstruction programmes and private-
sector investment associated with the shift towards a market-driven economy.
Despite encouragement of both foreign and domestic private investment in the
sector and the abundant availability of raw materials (including within a radius of
100 km of Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and Mekelle), there was no new investment
for almost ten years. This was partly due to the industry’s capital-intensive nature,
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requiring large investment outlays, and relatively complex technology, demanding
effective project execution and operational management. However, demand for
cement continued to grow in the 1990s, and a second factory was built in 2000,
doubling production capacity to 1.6 million tons.
By 2003, both cement factories were operating at full capacity, although by 2005,
cement shortage had become a binding constraint for a booming construction
industry driven by rapid economic growth, increased per capita consumption, and
massive public infrastructure projects (energy, roads, airports, public housing,
schools, urban expansion, etc.) initiated by the government.⁷ The construction
industry had become a key driver of economic growth, with an annual growth rate
of 11.1 per cent and 27.7 per cent during PASDEP (2005/6–2009/10) and GTP
I (2010/11–2014/15) respectively, and doubling its share in GDP and employment
(Oqubay 2019b: 632 and 641). The government became concerned with the lack of
private investment and the possibility of cement supply shortages paralyzing public
infrastructure programmes, resulting in cost overruns and delays. The import ban
initially enjoyed by the industry was lifted, and the government started importing
through private and government agencies.
The period prior to 2000 was highly lucrative for the existing cement factories,
which enjoyed protection while demand was beginning to grow. After 2000,
however, major changes in the industry were triggered by three factors: rapid
growth of the construction sector and increased public investment in major
infrastructure projects; the government’s targeting of the cement industry as a
strategic priority requiring intensive policy efforts; and the lifting of the import
ban, signalling that the domestic demand for cement could not be met by the
existing firms. The clear market signals produced heightened investment interest
in the industry, disproving the previous assumption that only large companies
with the appropriate capacity could manage investment projects in what was
regarded as a highly capital- and technology-intensive sector.
Once investment started flowing into the cement industry, projects of all sizes
were undertaken. Some investors, for example, chose to build small-scale cement
plants using the vertical kiln system (primitive and small-scale technology) that
required less finance and shorter gestation period. Others focused on building
bigger-capacity equipment and technologies to benefit from economy of scale,
moving from 1,000 to 5,000 tons per day clinker capacity. A total of sixteen
firms invested in the cement sector, raising Ethiopia’s total production capacity
to 16 million tons (with four factories accounting for two-thirds of the output) and
making Ethiopia among the top three cement-producing countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. While in other African countries European MNCs dominate the industry,
in Ethiopia domestic firms continue to dominate it. The growth of the cement
⁷ For instance, the government’s public housing programme required more than 1.5 million tons per
annum in 2006–10.
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industry has also encouraged new investment in the manufacture of other
building materials, including reinforcing (rebar) steel.
As in floriculture, technological and policy learning was intense in the cement
industry, especially after 2000. For the government, learning focused primarily on
learning by doing, and trial and error. The cement industry is without doubt a
successful story of learning driven by an activist industrial policy, encompassing
learning from both positive experiences and mistakes.
13.3.2 Learning Framework in the Cement Industry
We have seen that the main sources or drivers of learning in the floriculture
industry were FDI and exports, together with intensive policy efforts. What were
the sources of learning in the cement industry?
First, new investment in the sector was induced by demand formation, stimu-
lated by the public infrastructure and construction industry boom, and the
government’s significant commitment to importing cement. The resulting mas-
sive demand influenced the selection of technology towards larger economies of
scale, with larger kiln capacity, and encouraged risk-taking. Cement was imported
from Asian countries, and Pakistani cement suppliers reliably produced good
quality cement at half the local price. This engagement with foreign suppliers
was a valuable learning experience for both government and local firms, including
in the use of coal for burning clinkers.
Second, learning was facilitated by the sole public enterprise in the sector.
Former managers and technical heads organized themselves, conducted studies,
and initiated the investment establishing Habesha Cement, mobilizing capital
through local shareholding and forming a joint venture with a South African
cement manufacturing group. The presence of the SOE encouraged participation
in the industry by domestic firms such as Messebo and National Cement. A small
privatized factory in Dire Dawa also became a vehicle for new investment by
National Cement. Almost all new factories relied on the services and capacity of
the SOE during the design and construction phase (laboratory facilities, informa-
tion on mining areas, and staff training), and employed managers, professionals,
and technicians previously trained by the SOE.
Third, most of the new cement projects were executed on a turnkey basis to
reduce the risk of delays, cost escalation, and technical difficulties. Globally, the
cement industry has been dominated by Chinese technology and equipment, and
all new cement firms in Ethiopia used Chinese suppliers and contractors, who
were cheaper and executed on time. Some also used non-Chinese consulting
firms. Almost all new projects included training of engineers and technicians in
Ethiopia and abroad. Learning took place during the design, execution, testing,
commissioning, and trial stages, as well as during operations, with technical
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support from suppliers. The continuous production process required specialists
and professionals, although in some cases, the smooth transfer of skills was
hampered by language barriers.
Fourth, the government decided, having looked at other countries’ experi-
ences, to burn coal for energy, putting significant pressure on the manufactur-
ers to shift from heavy fuel oil to the much cheaper coal. The introduction of
coal was a major cost saving in the cement production process, saved consid-
erable foreign exchange for the country, and enabled exploitation of local coal
resources. The government arranged bulk purchase on a credit basis, which had
advantages in terms of cost, cash flow, and logistics. The government also
encouraged and favoured factories using large rotary kilns over the outdated
vertical kiln system. These adaptations through learning contributed to cost
competitiveness and enabled producers to maintain product quality. A short-
term shortage of cement prompted initiatives to explore alternative building
materials, though with only partial success. The supply of cement continued to
grow as new factories began to compete and produce at full capacity, signifi-
cantly reducing the price of cement.
Finally, further learning occurred as a result of changes in government
policies towards consulting firms in the construction industry. University
reform was already producing an important supply of highly skilled engineers
for the industry. Relaxation of the requirements for engineers establishing
consulting firms and construction companies now resulted in an explosion of
the number of construction companies in the country. More than 150 consult-
ing firms and 2,500 small contractors were established. They were given
contracts to develop their capacity and participated in the construction of
public housing, universities, health centres, and the telecoms network. New
equipment was imported and loans were facilitated to strengthen capacity of
these new construction companies.
The intense competition was also conducive to fast and intensive learning. As
in the floriculture sector, the latitude for poor performance was limited by the
political dimension of public infrastructure and housing supply, and by techno-
logical features of the industry.
13.3.3 The Role of Industrial Policy and Policy Learning
The cement industry is an example of successful transformation of a less significant
inward-oriented industry into a strategic domestic industry. Proactive industrial
policy and a number of measures taken by government induced intensive learning,
including at policy level.
First, the government boosted investment in the industry through the SOE, and
later became a source of technology and learning for the industry as a whole.
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Second, the government subsidized interest rates and arranged various forms of
financing, including through the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE), the
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), an industrial development fund, foreign
financing, and concessional lending. The industry was also identified as a priority
sector for foreign exchange allocation.
Third, the government provided mining concessions, made land available at
nominal prices, and offered a five-year zero income-tax incentive and duty-free
importation of machinery.
Fourth, the government permitted imports of cement during times of shortage,
allowed the two manufacturers to enjoy super profits enabling them to invest
in new expansion of their production capacity, and applied an import ban when
there was oversupply. Investment restrictions on foreign companies in the
cement industry were provisionally introduced to manage overcapacity. The
development of freight capacity was also encouraged during the importing
phase; spillover effects included fleet modernization and corporate reorganiza-
tion for transporters.
However, policy learning was not automatic, and many mistakes were made.
For example, the government lacked understanding of the industry’s structure
and a strategic approach to its development. Cement shortages led to unex-
pected political pressure. Inaccurate supply and demand forecasts, reflecting
limited market research capability, led to errors in the first five-year Growth and
Transformation Plan (GTP). There was no institute focused on the development
of the cement industry and this institutional gap weakened the support scheme.
Learning was limited by lack of sustained capacity building in the construction
industry, and productivity was relatively low as rent-seeking behaviours dom-
inated the sector.
13.4 Building Ethiopia’s Absorptive Capacity
13.4.1 National Learning System
In the 1990s, Ethiopia focused on expanding education, particularly improving
coverage and access.⁸ In the 2000s, policymakers recognized the need for funda-
mental changes in education, as universities had very limited intake and were
weak in technology and engineering, while high schools focused on mathematics
and science, neglecting alternative skills. To achieve the goal of export-led manu-
facturing growth, in line with the government’s industrialization strategy,
would require a lasting solution to the chronic shortage of technically skilled
⁸ For almost two decades about 7 per cent of GDP was spent on education; and public universities
account for 32 per cent of the total education expenditure.
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labour, including the trained engineers and applied scientists needed to accelerate
technological learning and move the country up the development ladder.
In 2005, the Engineering Capacity Building Programme (ECBP) was estab-
lished, to be spearheaded and implemented by the Ministry of Capacity Building
in collaboration with the Ministry of Education. The key reforms included
expansion and reform of universities, introduction of a technical and vocational
education and training (TVET) system, and development of a national quality
infrastructure. Alternative education systems compatible with Ethiopia’s develop-
ment objectives were explored, and the German education system, especially its
apprenticeship scheme, was identified as a robust basis for the country’s needs.
Lessons were also drawn from South Korea, particularly its development of
institutes to support sectors and its establishment of science and technology
universities. The ECBP was financed by the Ethiopian government with technical
support from the federal government of Germany.⁹
After almost fifteen years, this fundamental reform of Ethiopia’s education
system is recognized as the largest education transformation initiative in Africa
(see Appendix for data on universities reform). The reform was fully backed
politically, championed by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who also
convinced the then Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schröder, to become a
strategic partner in the endeavour. The three key components of the university
reforms were a rapid expansion of universities, a shift from social science-oriented
to engineering-driven learning, and the development of linkages between univer-
sities and industries.
13.4.1.1 The Expansion of Universities
The expansion of universities was challenging for reasons of capital resource and
robust execution capability requirements. The construction of new universities
was executed by a project team from the German development agency GTZ and
the Ministry of Education, while in-house university project teams were
responsible for expanding intake and developing new courses. GTZ provided
technical support to develop economic designs and use low-cost technology.
Construction of buildings (including dormitories for half a million students and
residences for teachers) was relatively easy. However, equipping workshops and
laboratories, and providing teaching staff and university leadership, was slower
and more problematic. Although regional governments allocated the land
needed for new universities and supported programme execution, the process
was poorly coordinated, and courses had to commence before all facilities and
equipment were available.
⁹ See also MoE, ECB, MoCS, and MoCB (2016).
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13.4.1.2 Reform of Engineering Education
Reforming the engineering education system was a complex process. More than
forty-two undergraduate and thirty-five masters degree courses were introduced,
and a number of students were sent to pursue PhDs through the German academic
exchange service to meet the growing demand for teachers. A major new ‘Ethio-
German Homegrown PhD Programme’ saw science and technology students
spending a considerable amount of time in practice workshops and laboratories,
and included a six-month mandatory internship during the fourth year. A total of
50,000 interns participated in this programme between 2010 and 2015.
13.4.1.3 New Structures and Institutions
A new three-model structure to support the new technology and engineering
orientation was adopted, based on the most favourable international experiences.
The first model was the establishment in 2009 of two independent science and
technology universities (Adama Science and Technology University and Addis
Ababa Science and Technology University), based on the South Korean model.
The second model involved the establishment of autonomous institutes of tech-
nology; ten such institutes, each with its own specialization, were set up in ten
different universities.¹⁰ The third model involved the establishment of a school of
engineering in all universities. Hundreds of expatriates from Germany, Austria,
South Korea, and the United States were hired as university presidents, scientific
directors, managing directors, school deans, and teaching professors. A Higher
Education Relevance and Quality Agency (HERQA) was established in the mid-
2000s. In 2018, an Ethiopian Institute of Higher Education (EIHE) was estab-
lished, inspired by models from Germany and the Netherlands, with a mandate to
develop management and leadership capacity in universities.
13.4.1.4 University–Industry Linkage and Research Capability
One of the central objectives of the reform programme has been to facilitate
technology diffusion from universities to industry by strengthening university–
industry linkages, which were previously almost non-existent. Universities
appointed vice presidents to lead the development of linkages, and linkage offices
were established in all ten technology institutes. Some universities also established
technology and business incubation centres, although to date their impact remains
limited. Guidelines on linkages were prepared jointly by relevant ministries, and
¹⁰ The ten independent institutes are located where new industrial parks have been built. They
include the Ethiopian Institute of Architecture, Building Construction and City Development (Addis
Ababa University); Addis Ababa Institute of Technology (Addis Ababa University); the Ethiopian
Institute of Technology (Mekelle University); the Ethiopian Textile and Fashion Technology Institute
(Bahirdar University); the Jimma Institute of Technology (Jimma University); the Hawassa Institute of
Technology (Hawassa University); Dire Dawa Institute of Technology (Dire Dawa University); and
Kombolcha Institute of Technology (Dessie University).
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annual conferences on university–industry linkages have been held since 2014.
While these initiatives have increased awareness, their outcomes have been
constrained by limited capacity in universities, as well as the low level of industrial
development. Although the government has increased its budget for research, the
resources allocated to academic research have been generally insignificant. On
average, only 11.3 per cent of the academic staff in universities have a PhD-level
qualification and most universities lack adequate research facilities (Nega and
Kassaye, 2018).
The government has made concerted efforts to reform the national quality and
standards infrastructure, and TVET systems. A new national quality infrastruc-
ture was implemented, product standards were introduced in most industries, and
the former Ethiopian Quality and Standards Authority (EQSA) restructured into
separate independent agencies (the Ethiopian Standards Agency, the Ethiopian
Conformity Assessment Enterprises, the Ethiopian Metrology Institute, and the
Ethiopian Accreditation Office under the newly established Ministry of Science
and Technology) (ECBP, 2009). The new TVET structure includes a demand-
driven skills production system, reflecting the requirements of the labour market
and local industries; increased focus on practical training in firms; expansion of
TVET centres and upgrading of existing facilities; new specialized teacher-
training courses; and new competence assessment and accreditation systems
(Ministry of Education, 2008, 2017). By 2018, TVET capacity had increased to
nearly one million trainees (80 per cent of high school graduates) in about a
thousand public technical schools and three hundred non-government technical
schools. While the impact of the TVET system on catch-up cannot be assessed
reliably, it has clearly contributed to skill formation and has helped to widen the
entrepreneurial mindset, as reflected in the increasing numbers of micro and
small firms in recent years.
13.4.1.5 The Remaining Challenges
The university reform programme goes to the heart of the challenges facing the
Ethiopian national learning system, and addresses the key absorptive capacity
constraints on accelerating technological learning and catch-up. In this respect,
the government is moving in the right direction, and there are some signs that its
efforts are bearing fruit. There are now many university graduates in engineering
and technological fields easing the high-level technical skill shortages of the past.
There are more than 500,000 students in higher education helping to boost
economic dynamism.
On the negative side, however, the quality of university education has yet to
reach the desired level, and there is a major gap between the supply of graduates,
skills, and course content, and the demand from industry. Almost all engineering
teachers lack practical industrial experience, and exposure of students to the
reality of industry is limited. More importantly, the capacity of teachers has not
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kept pace with the expansion of universities. The inability of policymakers to
resolve the inherent conflict between quality and quantity is exacerbated by poor
leadership capacity in all universities (on boards and in executive management at
university and department level), limiting their pursuit of excellence. Low-quality
education in high schools and primary schools has contributed to worsening
quality at university level. Universities are under-equipped in terms of facilities,
including workshops, laboratories, and libraries.
Linkages with industry remain weak, with little guidance for higher education
from industry (as evidenced in board composition, course design, and initiation of
technology transfer linkages). This is a fundamental failure that may require
significant changes to the current system. However, the evidence highlights the
complexity of building a national innovation or national learning system and the
difficulty of measuring its impact.¹¹
In summary, university-level technical qualifications and skills are undoubtedly
crucial to fostering technological learning and catch-up, which can be impeded
by an underdeveloped ‘national learning system’ (including TVET). For late-
latecomer countries with limited resources and budgets for education, one diffi-
culty is striking the right balance between training highly skilled specialists
(essential for technological catch-up), and training at primary and secondary
levels (lack of which limits the economy’s absorptive capacity and the develop-
ment of dynamic SMEs).
13.4.2 Industrial Hubs as Instruments of Learning
The development of Ethiopia’s industrial hubs illustrates the importance and
dynamics of emulation, and the complex process of learning by doing and
learning by experimenting. Ethiopia’s strategic approach to industrial hubs has
been based on three principal conceptual approaches.¹²
First is the relationship between policy learning and industrial policy. Ethiopia’s
approach to industrial park development is integral to its industrial policy of
creating and developing new industries with new productive activities and techno-
logical capability at sector and firm level (Oqubay 2015, 2019a, 2019b).
Second, the industrial hub approach is associated with a learning framework,
particularly the concept of absorptive capacity, which is directly relevant to
learning at the firm and sectoral levels.
Third, the approach is also associated with agglomeration economies, focusing on
the geographical concentration of economic activities and the interaction among
related industries, which accelerate and shape learning and productivity catch-up.
¹¹ See Mowery and Sampat (2005) on universities as part of the national innovation system.
¹² See Oqubay and Lin (forthcoming) on industrial hubs and economic development.
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Clustering of economic activities is an important feature of industrialization and
urbanization (Jacobs, 1969; Marshall, 1920; Ohlin, 1933).¹³
13.4.2.1 Ethiopia’s Learning Approach to Industrial Hubs
13.4.2.1.1 Emulation and New Learnings
Industrial hubs have played a broadly successful strategic role in East Asian newly
industrializing economies. However, until 2010, industrial parks were not incorp-
orated into Ethiopia’s industrialization strategy, and references to economic
agglomeration and industrial clustering were too general to serve as a policy
guide. By 2013, there was only one industrial park in Ethiopia—the Eastern
Industrial Zone, promoted by a Chinese developer from Jiangsu province. The
developer faced many obstacles arising from the government’s failure to put in
place the required legislative, institutional, and policy framework. The first
government-sponsored park was also subject to long delays, due to lack of
strategic guidance and full understanding of industrial hubs as instruments of
industrial policy. In 2013, acknowledging the need for in-depth research, the
government launched an evidence-based study of a variety of successful and
unsuccessful programmes to identify the most appropriate model for Ethiopia.
The countries considered were South Korea, Singapore, China, and Vietnam in
East Asia, and Mauritius and Nigeria in Africa. East Asian economies pioneered
industrial hubs within their industrial policies’ framework and catch-up strategies
(South Korea largely focusing on domestic firms for technological catch-up, while
Singapore used FDI as the driver). These twentieth-century late-latecomers effect-
ively integrated the development of industrial hubs within an industrial policy
framework for late industrialization and technological upgrading.¹⁴
Other important sources of learning have been literature reviews and learning
from industrial park specialists, facilitated through international partners such as
the World Bank and UNIDO (on agro-industrial parks). Specialists and consult-
ants hired through the World Bank included a Malaysian expert who supported
the organizational structure of Industrial Park Development Corporation (IPDC)
and the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC), and more than ten specialists
brought in for a three-day consultation workshop. The legislative framework was
prepared by a UK consultant; a Chinese consultancy, CADZ, conducted a study
on the Dire Dawa special economic zone and strategic framework; and an add-
itional adviser was hired to support the IPDC. Multiple studies were also
¹³ See also Lazonick (2005: 35–6) who highlights that in the last half of the nineteenth century, when
Britain became known as the ‘workshop of the world’, ‘the localized, on-the-job character of skill
formation was the major factory underlying the growth of industrial districts that made use of
particular specialized craft skills’. He also notes that ‘regional concentration encouraged vertical
specialisation, which in turn eased firm entry into a particular specialty, thus resulting in high levels
of horizontal competition’.
¹⁴ See also Kuchiki and Tsugi (2008) on flowchart approach as a supplementary approach within
industrial policy framework.
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conducted on the Ethiopian Investment Commission. However, while these pro-
vided an important and diversified source of learning, they were not fit for purpose
without an in-depth understanding of, and adaptation to, local conditions.
In September 2014 a White Paper was prepared and discussed at a meeting of
almost a hundred policymakers at regional state and federal levels, chaired by the
then prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn. Among other outcomes, the import-
ance of a strategic approach to high standards of environmental protection and
sustainability was identified.
A second important lesson was that the government should focus on building
specialized, sector-specific parks rather than generic or mixed parks to enhance
learning, foster skills development, foster verticality, and accelerate education–
industry linkages. Sector-specific infrastructure, international compliance stand-
ards, targeting of buyers and manufacturers, and exploitation of opportunities in
global value chains would be applied. Industrial parks could also be located
according to the requirements of each industry, for example, locating apparel
parks in areas close both to ports and to the supply of trainable labour. The sector-
based, specialized park approach to industrial policy and catch-up integrates
incentive structures with policy learning according to the specific nature of
each sector.
Third, the need for excellence in the study, design, construction, and operation
phases was highlighted, and adopted as a working principle. The development of
each park was to be supported by economic feasibility, environmental safeguards,
social safeguards, and hydrology studies, and a master plan conducted by inter-
national consultants. It was also decided to shorten the development period to
nine months, and procedures were established to select the best and most experi-
enced designers and contractors.
Fourth, it was decided to focus on targeted investment promotion, identifying
anchors and leading export-oriented manufacturers, as a means of accelerating
learning by domestic firms and ensuring greater success in exporting to inter-
national markets.
Fifth, ‘islands of excellence’ with an enhanced business environment were
created, and one-stop services were established in all industrial parks.
Finally, alternative methods were adopted for the development of industrial
parks, including joint ventures by the government and private developers,
together with a new approach to developing the existing infrastructure (especially
railways and airports). These strategic approaches have been integrated into
Vision 2025, which aims to establish Ethiopia as a leading manufacturing hub,
and within the overall industrial policy framework.
13.4.2.1.2 Learning by Doing and Experiment
These new strategic directions were easier to establish than to put into effect, and
it was important to maximize learning during the execution phase. First, it was
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necessary to design and introduce the strategic framework that included legisla-
tive, regulatory, institutional, and policy reforms. This included the preparation of
a new proclamation on industrial parks, which facilitated execution and predict-
ability for endorsement by Parliament (see FDRE, 2015). Related regulations and
executive directives were approved by the Council of Ministers and the Ethiopian
Investment Board respectively. The necessary policy decisions were taken and new
incentive structures established.
The new strategic direction and policy required changes in organizational
settings to establish the legislative, regulatory, policy, and institutional framework.
The Ethiopian Investment Board (EIB), composed of high-level policy and regu-
latory bodies and chaired by the prime minister, focused primarily on industrial
policy decisions. The Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) was restructured
to serve as a regulatory body for industrial parks and to provide policy support for
productive investment targets. The Industrial Parks Development Corporation
(IPDC) was mandated to build and operate government-sponsored industrial
parks, to serve as a land bank, to study the national master plan for industrial
parks, and to facilitate off-site infrastructure facilities for investors.
A further challenge was to develop new industrial parks on the basis of this new
concept. The government demonstrated its commitment to this strategic initiative
by allocating sufficient resources, mostly from sales of government bonds (the Euro
Bond). Other critical issues were selecting sites based on productive criteria but
without neglecting political considerations, and maximizing agglomeration econ-
omies consistent with the concept of federalism. The government decided to develop
a greenfield site in Hawassa, as a pilot specialized apparel and textile industrial park.
Though complex and challenging, construction of the largest industrial park was
completed within nine months, and to the highest international compliance stand-
ards. The ‘plug-and-play’ setting created favourable conditions, allowing production
to commence in a few months. Within a year of becoming operational in July 2017,
the park employed 20,000 workers.
Excellence in execution was critical, to win over sceptics among policymakers
and to demonstrate to the public the opportunities presented by the strategy. This
project was a learning ground for other parks, which were built on the basis of
lessons from the Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP). It was also a showcase for
Ethiopia’s unique approach to industrialization, ultimately becoming a flagship
and a model for other projects. PVH, the leading retailer and brand, served as an
anchor investor, and about twenty leading manufacturers invested in this park.
The investors’ association established at HIP became an effective vehicle for a
government–industry dialogue supported by a shared vision and strategy. The
coordination of government agencies improved, led by the Office of the Prime
Minister, although it fell short of the ideal level.
During the Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTPII, 2015–19), Ethiopia has
developed a national network of industrial parks. The country’s approach to
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learning, combining learning by doing with learning by experiment and emulation,
has demonstrated policy learning and helped to create policy capability. This was a
typical model of learning by experiment, aided by mutual learning in
the partnership that has evolved between the government and investors. Many
African policymakers and scholars have visited Ethiopia to learn from its experience.
13.4.2.2 Challenges of Absorptive Capacity and Emerging Issues
The new approach to industrial parks is a work in progress, based on industrial
policies that foster technological learning, increase FDI inflows, facilitate domestic
linkages and capabilities, and accelerate industrialization. Nevertheless, strategic-
ally significant constraints have emerged during this process.
The first strategic issue was the development of an industrial workforce and
working culture for an industrial mode of production. While most firms have
invested in skills formation, and despite abundant human resource and high levels
of unemployment, absenteeism and high turnover have become apparent.
Second, the development of domestic productive capability has become a major
challenge, as most firms have shown greater interest in the service sector than in
manufacturing, particularly export-oriented manufacturing. New policy instru-
ments and new learning are needed. An important related issue is the weakness of
industry–higher education linkages.
Third, shortage of foreign exchange and balance of payment constraints have
intensified in recent years, slowing economic growth. New learning and policy
interventions are now required to build export logistics and trade facilitation
capacity.
In summary, valuable as the lessons derived from other countries’ experiences
have been in developing Ethiopia’s industrial hub programme, its implementation
has itself been a learning experience, demonstrating the importance of learning in
key policy areas for identifying and focusing on new policy constraints. This
demands a policy learning approach based on comprehension of learning frame-
works and of the catch-up process, in which targeted learning efforts help to
identify new opportunities for learning, as well as contributing to successful
catching up.
13.5 A Synthesis and Conclusions
This chapter presents evidence on an important issue that the literature on
learning and catch-up has not yet addressed adequately, namely the dynamics of
technological learning and catch-up in late-latecomers to industrialization in the
twenty-first century. It is widely believed that globalization, internationalization
of production systems, and rapid technological advances have made access to
technologies easier. At the same time, however, the widening economic and
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technological gaps between countries resulting from globalization have made it
increasingly difficult for late-latecomers with limited absorptive and learning
capabilities—including most African countries—to catch up through dynamic
technological and policy learning.
However, this chapter demonstrates that successful learning and catch-up can
and does occur in late-latecomer countries. It presents sectoral case studies from
Ethiopia, one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, to show how techno-
logical learning can be accelerated and sectors enabled to catch up with global
leaders through effective application of industrial policy, active engagement by the
government, and willingness to learn from policy errors and to promote intensive
learning. Successful sectoral-level learning and catch-up in Ethiopia is largely a
result of the relative success of its industrial policy, which predominantly reflects
the country’s indigenous approach to policymaking, based on policy learning,
learning by doing, and policy independence. Ethiopia’s industrial policymaking
process has been marked by the selective adoption of policies that worked in
latecomer countries and assimilation of other policies to local conditions through
policy experimentation and active state involvement. The important lessons for
other late-latecomers are that catch-up occurs largely within sectors, and that
industrial policy is a key driver of learning, through its sectoral focus and creation
of new industries. It also plays a role in setting strategic perspectives and estab-
lishing incentive structures to support institutions.
The Ethiopian experience also shows the unevenness of learning and policy
outcomes across industries, reflecting variations in politics, industrial structures,
policy direction, and specific features of each industry. This is clear from a compari-
son of the sources and drivers of learning and catch-up in the floriculture and cement
industries. At the beginning of 2000, for example, floriculture was ‘alien’ to Ethiopia,
which had neither produced nor exported floriculture products.¹⁵ In less than a
decade, however, Ethiopia ranked among the four largest flower exporters globally,
supplying the competitive European market and narrowing the productivity gap
with regional competitors that had started flower production and exports five
decades earlier. A large part of the explanation for this rapid growth and learning
lies in the industry’s narrow latitude for failure and poor performance, because of its
dependence on highly competitive and quality-sensitive export markets. This had a
significant influence on the response of enterprises in the industry (both foreign and
local) to technological learning and upgrading. In these conditions, survival depends
on intensive learning and acquiring the technical and organizational capabilities
required to meet the standards and logistical competency demanded by the inter-
national market.
¹⁵ For an in-depth discussion on the genesis of the floriculture industry in Ethiopia and the policies
and government actions that influence its development, see Oqubay (2015).
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The pattern of development and export success of Ethiopia’s floriculture sector
were not only significant for the rapid learning that took place within the industry
(Oqubay, 2015). Valuable lessons were learned by policymakers in a number of
areas, including the targeted policies for export-oriented industries; investment
promotion and development of facilitation skills through interactions with Dutch
flower producers; export trade logistics and facilitation needs; the critical role of
intermediary institutions in the development and technological learning of tar-
geted sectors; and the importance of state–business interactions and dialogue
(Oqubay, 2015; Ghebreyesus and Sonobe, 2012).
The experience of the floriculture industry in Ethiopia also suggests that with
appropriate industrial policies, targeted investment promotion and facilitation
schemes, and active government engagement, FDI can play an important role as a
source of learning and transfer of know-how and as a channel for accessing
international markets. This reconfirms the widely held view that, while the
development impact of FDI is not automatic, its contributions to technology
transfer and capability building though spillover effects can be enhanced through
strategically targeted policies. As Akyüz (2017: 198) highlights, successful
examples of FDI contributing to development in host countries are found ‘not
necessarily among countries that attracted more FDI, but among those which used
it in the context of national industrial policy designed to shape the evolution of
specific industries through interventions’.
The experienced and highly skilled foreigners who invested in the Ethiopian
floriculture industry were attracted through a high-profile investment promotion
campaign by the government, and clearly understood that they were investing in
an industry identified by the government as a priority for exports. In addition to
the usual investment incentives, the government was willing to advance finance to
foreign investors and consult with them on logistical and other arrangements
to ensure the development of the industry. This interactive approach induced the
foreign investors to play their part in the successful development of the industry,
actively participate in the floriculture industry association, share information on
European markets with local firms, and exchange information with them about
enhancing productivity.
As an import-substituting industry, cement production in Ethiopia did not face
the same external market pressures as floriculture, and the role of FDI as source of
learning was minimal. However, this chapter shows that a similar level of response
and intensity of learning was generated by rapid increases in domestic demand
accompanied by industrial policies aimed at prompting intensive learning through
direct support, internal competition, and the use of imports as a policy option.
In less than a decade, Ethiopia’s cement production capacity increased from
insignificance to one of the largest in Africa. Although the industry still needs to
upgrade its technological capability and level of productivity to catch up with
leading global producers such as China, the growth and learning achieved within a
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short period demonstrates the potential for achieving learning even in import-
substituting industries. The important lesson and the overall message for late-
latecomer countries is that even in inward-oriented industries, the opportunities
for learning and capability upgrading can be considerable if governments take
advantage of growing domestic demand to encourage competition, create an
intensive learning environment, and engage actively in instigating learning
through strategic policy intervention. As Lee and Malerba (2018: 13–14) highlight:
‘The specificity of local demand with respect to global demand in terms of income
per capita, consumer preferences, local industrial requirements, and public pro-
curement, may provide a test bed for local firms and shelter them from inter-
national competition long enough to allow them to survive and then grow. When
such demand is large, as was the case in China, India and Brazil, it also provides
the economies of scale needed to set off virtuous cycles of learning, capability
building and growth.’
In identifying the different sources and drivers of technological learning and
catch-up, it is important to note that the pace and depth of their impact can vary
between countries depending on the level of development of absorptive capacity,
the intensity of policy efforts, and the capacity of governments to implement
industrial policies effectively. Accumulating learning capability and developing
the local knowledge base involves investment, policy effort, and building a wide
range of technical skills and competencies necessary for intensive learning and
catch-up. The key to building absorptive capacity that accelerates the pace of
learning and catch-up is the development of high-level human capital. Countries
that have successfully caught up in manufacturing and technological capability
over the past half century show the importance of the education system or
‘national learning system’ in providing a supply of technicians, trained engineers,
and scientists to help move their countries through the various stages of techno-
logical learning and catch-up (Ozturk, 2001).
In this respect, Ethiopia is heading in the right direction. Extensive university-
level reforms andmajor expansion of technical and vocational training will develop
domestic absorptive capacity, especially in the provision of technical and highly
skilled professionals. While it is premature to evaluate the overall impact of these
reforms, there are already clear signs that they are easing skill constraints in some
industries and sectors.
The relationship between learning and catch-up is complex. Experiences
observed elsewhere (Kim, 1998) suggest it is not learning per se that matters for
dynamic learning and successful catch-up: more critical are the intensity of
learning and the intensity of policy efforts. This highlights the importance of
pace and direction of learning, and the cumulative and multifaceted nature of the
learning process, which encompasses learning by doing, learning by experiment,
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emulation to match or excel, and the incremental changes required to sustain
learning into more advanced stages of the catch-up process. In constructing
industrial hubs that promote learning and capability building, Ethiopia has
created an environment conducive to the diffusion of technology through linkages
between local enterprises and foreign firms—a process which itself involved
intense policy learning to ensure that, as policy instruments, industrial hubs
were compatible with the country’s development objectives.
Two factors in Ethiopia’s successful learning and catch-up at sectoral level are
particularly noteworthy as lessons for other late-latecomers. The first is the
effective application of industrial policies targeting industries with a predispos-
ition to instigate intensive learning and accumulation of technological capabilities
through linkages and inter-firm interaction, including with foreign investors. The
second is the government’s development commitment and vision, and its willing-
ness to apply intensive policy efforts and policy learning, including through
emulation and learning by doing. Indeed, for the government, the selection of
sectors and identification of the right and/or appropriate policies was itself a
learning process, which was made possible by the government’s choice to main-
tain ‘policy independence’ and the ability to experiment with policy options, free
from pressures either from external forces or from domestic interest groups.


















2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
0
Figure 13.1 Number of fourth-year science and technology students on internship
programme (Addis Ababa, 2009–16)
Note: Since 2009 more than 50,000 fourth-year science and technology students have gone through
the qualified mandatory internship programme.
Source: MoE (2016a)
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Table A13.2 Trends in postgraduate enrolment in government and non-government
institutions, 2015–16
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Government Masters Male 15,996 18,169 20,060 20,871 23,129 34,398
Female 2,490 4,635 5,043 5,246 7,337 9,706
Total 18,486 22,804 25,103 26,117 30,466 44,104
PhD Male 690 1,530 2,809 2,922 2,755 2,444
Female 99 319 356 370 380 281
Total 789 1,849 3,165 3,292 3,135 2,725
Non-
government
Masters Male 682 779 2,339 2,433 4,820 2,779
Female 193 228 697 725 1,866 1,913
Total 875 1,007 3,036 3,158 6,686 4,692
Grand total Male 17,368 20,478 25,208 26,226 30,704 39,621
Female 2,782 5,182 6,096 6,341 9,583 11,900
Total 20,150 25,660 31,304 32,567 40,287 51,521
Source: ESSA (2017)
Table A13.1 Trends in undergraduate enrolment in all courses (regular, evening,
summer, and distance) in government and non-government institutions, 2010–16
Courses Gender 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Total Male 326,769 355,006 387,707 413,556 475,971 512,915
Female 120,978 139,104 166,141 180,018 253,057 265,851
Total 447,693 494,110 553,848 593,574 729,028 778,766
Source: ESSA (2017)
Table A13.3 Trends in PhD enrolment, 2006–15
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total enrolment 64 122 258 325 791 789 1,849 3,165 3,292 3,135
Female
enrolments %
4.7 2.5 2.71 8 5.9 12.5 17.3 11.2 11.2 21.1
Total graduates 7 10 19 15 149 21 76 115 152 335
Female
graduates %
0 0 5.71 0 12.1 4.8 9.2 6.1 8.6 6.3
Source: MoE (2016b)
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How Nations Learn
Implications for Latecomers and Pathways
to the Future
Arkebe Oqubay and Kenichi Ohno
The editors hope that, with its combination of diverse cases and country experiences,
and the specialization and expertise of the authors, this volume will make a unique
contribution to the ongoing debate on the dynamics of learning and catch-up. This
final chapter focuses on two important areas: (a) our understanding of the notions
and processes of learning and catch-up as discussed in existing literature; and
(b) implications (and potential lessons) for countries still to go through technological
learning and catch-up (i.e. late latecomers). The objective is not to present an
exhaustive summary of the conclusions of various chapters but to highlight selected
elements that have a direct bearing on late-latecomer countries’ efforts to advance
learning and catch-up.¹ The discussion is presented under four themes: the dynamics
of technological learning; nature of catch-up, industrial policy and manufacturing as
drivers of learning and catch-up; and finally, catch-up and the policy space in the
twenty-first century.
14.1 The Dynamics of Technological Learning
As observed in the discussions in various chapters, technological learning has
multiple features, as summarized below.
14.1.1 Dimensions of Dynamic Learning
14.1.1.1 Technological and Policy Learning: The Two Dimensions
Successful or ‘dynamic’ learning actually involves two dimensions: technological
learning (private/firm level) and policy learning (by governments). How governments
learn is as important as firm-level technological learning.² Firms and governments
¹ See also Gerschenkron (1962) on advantages of latecomers and responses.
² See Fagerberg, Mowery, and Nelson (2005), Kim (1998), Kim and Nelson (2000), and Lee (2013).
learn by doing, through policy experimentation, and from other countries’
experience.³ Most importantly, governments learn from their own mistakes
and policy errors, and policy learning by governments should be regarded as
an integral part of an industrialization and catch-up strategy.⁴ This volume
presents many examples of policy learning, including from early-stage catch-
up countries such as Ethiopia and Vietnam, where learning by governments
has been an important driver of successful industry- and sectoral-level learn-
ing and catch-up.
14.1.1.2 The Three Levels of Learning
Learning and catch-up generally take place at three levels: firm (micro), sector
(mezzo), and national (macro). However, to be mutually productive, the different
levels must interact and support each other. Not all firms or sectors develop at the
same time and the same rate because the conditions required to kick-start
successful learning and catch-up differ considerably between sectors or areas of
economic activity. Catch-up may be attained in a specific industry/sector or by
developing a specific ‘niche’ economic activity while the rest of the economy takes
time to catch up or continues to lag behind. Furthermore, who leads and who
follows among the three levels depends on the relative strength of each player in
each society. In advanced societies, all players are likely to be equally strong and
mutually supportive. In many of the less developed countries, the private sector is
weak and the likelihood of private firms taking the lead is minimal. In this scenario,
the state will guide and firms follow. In middle-income economies, private firms
(including FDI) or business groups tend to be relatively stronger and often instruct
policymakers what to do (for example, Thailand’s automotive policy was devel-
oped by the association of private auto firms and submitted to the government for
review and comment). However, not all interactions produce positive outcomes.
Negative interactions and outcomes are also possible, for example, where the state
dictates or leads without proper knowledge; businesses distrust government and
politicians; and rent-seeking sector associations serve only a small segment of their
members. Mapping the exact pattern of interactions in each economy and their
effectiveness is a critical element in the catch-up strategy.
14.1.2 Capacities to Learn and Intensity of Learning
14.1.2.1 Capacity to Learn and Unlearn: Absorptive Capacity
In the literature, there is a tendency to assume technological learning as an
automatic process that occurs when individuals and firms are exposed to
³ See also Arrow (1962), Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Nayyar (2013).
⁴ See Ohno (2013), Oqubay (2015).
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technology and know-how. However, the case studies in this volume demonstrate
that: first, an important precondition for successful technological learning is the
development of domestic absorptive capacity—for example, the development of a
local skills and knowledge base, and the building of the science and technology
infrastructure and ‘knowledge communities’ in agriculture, manufacturing, and
services that a nation needs to create a conducive learning environment.⁵ This
does not mean, however, that learning should wait or be postponed until all the
necessary absorptive capacity preconditions are developed. Second, as Lee points
out in Chapter 7, the acquisition of technology is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for promoting successful technological learning. It is also necessary to
acquire the tacit knowledge (or know-how) needed to understand how technolo-
gies operate. Equally important is the ability of firms and governments to ‘unlearn’
old habits or old ways of conducting business which could pose obstacles to
learning new technologies.
14.1.2.2 Intensity of Learning and its Multiple Sources
A common thread among countries that have succeeded in promoting techno-
logical learning and catch-up is the intensity with which learning has occurred,
including the intensity of policy learning and determination by government to
push the catch-up agenda. This is similar to what Kim (1998) has termed
‘intensity of efforts’, referring to the amount of energy expended and the sense
of urgency attached by firms and governments to speeding up technological
learning or solving problems. The successful learning and catch-up experiences
discussed in this volume are the results of intensive learning by both firms and
governments.
Intensity of learning varies according to starting positions, availability of skills,
and the level of absorptive capacity development. However, its main impact is to
activate momentum for rapid technological learning and catch-up. In some cases,
intensity of learning is built into the nature of products and technology that
require continuous upgrading of capabilities and production techniques to keep
up with quality standards or to retain parity with competitors. In other cases,
particularly export-oriented activities, intensity of learning originates from
narrow latitude for poor or sub-standard performance when competing in inter-
national markets. Intensity of learning could also derive from the need to manage
crisis—at firm or national level—and find viable solutions. Another important
driver of intensive learning has been the determination of leadership and govern-
ments to reduce the time it takes to develop technological capability.
⁵ See also Cohen and Levinthal (1989: 569). They highlight the importance of how R&D ‘enhances
the firm’s ability to assimilate and exploit existing information’.
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14.2 Dimensions and Trajectories of Catch-up
14.2.1 The Balance between Common Factors
and Local Uniqueness
The country experiences covered in this volume are highly diverse because
countries differ in their starting positions, resource endowment, history, institu-
tional capacities, culture, and so on. However, there are some features that are
common to countries, sectors, and periods. These include the importance of:
creating a competent and competitive industrial labour force; strengthening
domestic firms; investing in the development of basic industrial infrastructure,
especially power and transportation; supporting technological learning and policy
learning for dynamic upgrading of capabilities and to cope with change; effective
and constant engagement between the state and the private sector; creating a
favourable business climate and a business-friendly government; and ensuring
macroeconomic and social stability (as a background condition).⁶
Naturally, how these common features are achieved concretely and effectively
differ between countries, and the period and context in which they are imple-
mented. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish specific experiences from
those that are common to most countries and firms. Indeed, this pragmatic vision
of balancing commonality and uniqueness should replace the futile debate
between the ‘one-size-fits-all’ and ‘everyone must follow this formula’ crusade,
and the ‘anything goes and each country is different’ view which resists systematic
learning.
14.2.2 Strategic Divergences and Diversity of Projects Diversity
14.2.2.1 Diversity of Strategies
Strategies for achieving these goals differ between countries and depend on
internal, external, and historical circumstances.⁷ Policy goals are usually similar
across countries but success patterns are many and varied. The key lesson is that
there is usually more than one strategic option that any latecomer can adopt,
although not all options may be open to it due to its unique initial conditions. For
example, there are choices between state-led or private sector-led development,
depending on the capacity of the state and the private sector, and the domestic and
international political economy; and between gradual industrialization and leap-
frogging, which depends partly on whether the industry is mature or emerging/
frontline and partly on initial domestic capability. There are alsomany entry points
to industrialization. For example, Taiwan’s industrialization was initially driven by
⁶ On the strategic role of the state in shaping strategic sectors, see Mazzucato (2011), Wade (1990).
⁷ See Hirschman (1958), Chang (2003), Andersson and Axelsson (2016).
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SMEs; South Korea’s was propelled by chaebŏls; Singapore opted for attracting
high-quality FDI in manufacturing, finance, and services; and Thailand created an
automotive hub by attracting foreign car giants. Interestingly, despite the diversity
of these strategies, they all succeeded in advancing technological learning and
catch-up. This indicates quite clearly that there are many paths to catching up.
14.2.2.2 The Diversity of Project Design and Execution
Industry- and sectoral-level catch-up experiences show that countries carried out
key industrial projects differently depending on initial conditions, resource
endowment, and capabilities, and they all succeeded because efforts were made
to fit the project design and implementation methods to the local context. There is
no universal way to design and implement SME finance, export promotion,
TVET–industry linkage, or industrial park development. For example, in imple-
menting kaizen (factory process productivity improvements), the United States
started with statistical analysis and top-down management in auto manufacturing
(Fordist production system), while Japan (Toyota and others) converted the
American system to a more incremental, bottom-up approach based on teamwork
and expanded it to all manufacturing (and some service) activities.⁸ India learned
kaizen from Maruti-Suzuki (car maker) but Indian kaizen experts are more
interactive and organized across firms with very little government assistance.
Singapore learned how to engage in continuous improvement of productivity in
manufacturing from Japan but applied it to all sectors including industry, service,
and government.
14.2.3 The Time Element and Changing Context
One of the contributions of this volume is to underscore that although in principle
the fundamental developmental requirements of countries are the same across
time periods, the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries have offered
radically different environments for catch-up. For example, as highlighted in
Chapter 5, the Meiji restoration of late nineteenth-century Japan had to fight
Western colonialism and the opportunity for foreign assistance was non-existent.
Indeed, Japan also resisted foreign borrowing or FDI for fear of foreign domin-
ance. Similarly, in the second half of the twentieth century, South Korea did not
accept FDI but learned technology from foreign (mostly Japanese) automobile,
steel, shipbuilding, and electronics firms.
Unlike Japan, South Korea also borrowed heavily from abroad. The develop-
mental state pursued an active industrial policy and protected nascent domestic
⁸ See Oqubay and Lin (forthcoming) on hubs as key facilitators of learning.
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industries with a strong state–chaebŏl–bank developmental partnership. Replicating
a similar policy approach and strategy would be increasingly difficult in the
twenty-first century as developing countries and emerging economies face restric-
tions on copying technologies freely and introducing high protective tariffs under
the rule-based and highly regulated global economic system.⁹ They also face global
and ICT pressure and must adopt environmental codes and labour rights from the
beginning.
14.2.4 The Passion for Catch-up
Another important contribution of this volume is to demonstrate that while
technological learning and accumulation of technical knowledge are absolutely
necessary for successful catch-up, they are not, by themselves, sufficient. Virtually
all great nations, sectors, and firms that have risen from technological backward-
ness to world prominence are driven by leaders and followers who are passionate
about their work, determined to learn and catch up with the best, improve on their
present lack of competitiveness, and take pride in others excelling. Financial
rewards (salaries and bonuses), top-down orders, and assigned duties motivate
average managers and workers, but the few who really transform the world are
motivated, not by money or external instruction, but by the collective desire to see
their society catch up, obsessed with their dreams, and willing to take huge risks
for great achievement. They are not deterred by failures or setbacks.
As the experiences of Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and China discussed in
this volume show, such Schumpeterian path-breaking innovators were the main
drivers of the rapid technological learning and catch-up witnessed in East Asia in
the second half of the twentieth century. Passion and a ‘can-do’ mindset are
required not only in state leaders but at all levels, including CEOs, engineers,
and workers.
14.3 Industrial Policy and Manufacturing as Prime
Drivers of Learning and Catch-up
This volume underlines the critical role of industrial policy and ‘policy learning’ in
creating a conducive environment for learning and catch-up. The experiences of
countries that have successfully caught up with advanced economies and those that
have made steady progress in advancing their technological learning show that
industrial policies were the main instruments used to accelerate technological
⁹ This is being challenged by the protectionist policies of the Trump administration in 2018
(UNCTAD, 2018).
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learning, target industries and sectors as priority areas, and create the incentives,
support institutions, and skills necessary to induce learning and set the catch-up
process in motion. Many actions taken by governments to encourage learning at
individual, firm, and sector level were actually industrial policies. Equally import-
ant, as demonstrated by the successful learning and catch-up experiences of
Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and others, was governments’ willingness
to learn by doing, experimenting, and emulating, and from other countries’
mistakes as well as their own. The ability and willingness to learn from role models
along with the capacity to design industrial policies and implement them effect-
ively, were singled out as key determinants of successful learning and catch-up.
It is evident from the experiences of these countries, particularly the East Asian
economies, that the manufacturing sector, supported by a developmental state and
proactive industrial policy, has been the main driving force of technological
learning, structural transformation, and economic growth, and the engine that
helped to accelerate productivity improvements and catch-up. Indeed, trends in
structural transformation and rapid technological learning and catch-up across
the East and South East Asian region since 1970 have been closely related to
productive capacity building, industrial policies aimed at shifting resources from
traditional to modern and higher-value activities, the application of increasingly
sophisticated technologies and, above all, the development of a broad and robust
manufacturing base.¹⁰
The latter was particularly critical, as manufacturing, by its nature, involves
multifaceted activities that create inter-sectoral linkages, drive technological pro-
gress, and improve productivity—all essential for promoting technological learning
and catch-up. Manufacturing exports are also crucial for upgrading technological
capability, because they offer economies of scale as well as generating competitive
pressure to learn and catch up.¹¹ While the relative importance of manufacturing
diminishes as countries reach an advanced stage of industrialization, it is evident that
the role of the manufacturing sector as a source of learning and industrial catch-up
has been and will continue to be critical for late-latecomer industrializers in the
twenty-first century.¹²
14.4 Catch-up and Policy Space in the Twenty-First Century
An interesting observation emerging from country experiences reviewed in this
volume is that catch-up and learning occur and are facilitated or constrained by
¹⁰ See Kaldor (1967) and Cramer, Oqubay, and Sender (forthcoming).
¹¹ See Amsden and Chu (2003).
¹² See Kaldor (1967), Passineti (1993), and Thirlwall (2013) on the spillover effect and the special
properties of manufacturing and the strategic role of exports as sources of international learning.
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power relations and the structure of power in global economic governance, which
can have decisive influences on the pace and direction of learning, and the ability
of newcomers to exercise policy independence in pursuing industrialization.
This has implications for countries that are still learning to build their techno-
logical capabilities and catch up.¹³ The world economy has changed significantly
since newcomers in continental Europe, North America, and Japan first industri-
alized in the nineteenth century, and since the East Asian economies accom-
plished their learning and catch-up miracles in the twentieth. At that time, the
global economy was less open and countries had more policy space to protect their
infant industries during the learning and catching-up phase of development.
Intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes were less restrictive, and copying and
imitation was the accepted form of learning and catching up.
The external environment faced by late latecomers in the twenty-first century is
qualitatively different, with mixed impacts on learning and prospects for catch-up.¹⁴
The global economy today is much more open, due largely to the numerous multi-
and bilateral trade and investment agreements, including through WTO. It is also
more crowded, with a multitude of countries simultaneously trying to realize
the promise of export-led industrialization by exporting their manufactures. The
world economy, highly globalized and dominated by global value chains, is much
more competitive and the options for ‘policy independence’ (e.g. to impose local
content requirements, violate patent rights, protect local industry by imposing
higher tariff rates) are much more limited now than they were some seventy or a
hundred years ago.¹⁵
However, advances in information and communication technologies and the
rapidly developing transport network that links most countries and markets
around the world have made it relatively easier and cheaper to manage far-flung
production networks, giving late latecomers opportunities to become active players
in the global economy. Foreign investments and international economic cooper-
ation are now available on a larger scale, with arguably fewer direct imperialistic
overtones than during the colonial era. Late latecomers do not have to devote a large
amount of R&D resource to developing technology needed for production and
communications and can instead leapfrog by acquiring the latest technologies.¹⁶
From this perspective then, learning has become relatively easier.
¹³ See Amsden (1989, 2001).
¹⁴ See also Cramer, Oqubay, and Sender (forthcoming).
¹⁵ In this connection, it is interesting to note the policy independence exercised by Ethiopia in
pursuing its industrial strategy in the twenty-first century (see Chapter 13). The explanation may lie in
Ethiopia’s decision to rebalance the domestic power structure by opting for a ‘developmental state’
approach to economic management and resisting pressure from international institutions even at the
cost of losing support.
¹⁶ See UNCTAD (2018).
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